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FOREWORD
In June 1973 the first scientist arrived at the International Institute for
Applied Systems Analysis. He came, just nine months after the signing of
nASA's charter, to work on the Institute's first major study-the Energy
Project. In the years since, more than 140 other scientists have come from
over nineteen countries to participate in what has become nASA's Energy
Systems Program. Under the leadership of Professor Wolf Hafele, they have
carried out a truly comprehensive analysis of the world's energy future.
This book reports their findings. It is also a "first"-the first complete
report of a major nASA program. As such, it carries a dual responsibility.
On the one hand, it provides a clear, thorough, and objective presentation
of the results of a large, multifaceted study. On the other hand, it demon-
strates to a wide and interested audience the nature of the contribution that
nASA can make to a better understanding of major international issues.
Although analysis strives to be objective, it cannot avoid completely the
imprint of personality or the influence of individual and group experience.
Consequently this study, like all others, reflects the character and back-
ground of its authors. Good analysis, however, tries to make these influ-
ences and assumptions explicit, so that the user of the analysis can be aware
of and compensate for them. Professor Hafele and his team have taken
special care in this report to state carefully the assumptions they have made
and to distinguish their "visions" from their calculations.
The Institute, for its part, has provided the environment in which this
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major international and interdisciplinary study could be carried out. And it
has established the procedures for scientific review of the report by an
international group of experts on energy. Hut the findings of the study are
those of the Energy Systems Program under the leadership of Professor Wolf
Hafele and should not necessarily be ascribed to the Institute, its Council, or
its National Member Organizations.
The global energy problem is so complex that no single study can hope for
complete acceptance. This analysis instead aspires to contribute to the con-
tinuing debate and discussion by providing a globally comprehensive frame-
work and a long-term perspective. Inevitably, there will be those who
disagree with some of its assumptions, methods, or conclusions. They are
challenged to trace the consequences of their alternative views within the
same constraints that everything add up across and over time. The discipline
of quantification and the necessity of coherence are prerequisites for serious
energy analysis.
The global energy problem is so difficult that no nation acting alone can
solve it. Yet for the necessary international cooperation to succeed, there
must be a base of shared understanding of the nature of the problem and its
possible solutions. The IIASA Energy Systems Program has aspired to con-
tribute to the development of that understanding. It has done so both
through its own research and through the creation of an international net-
work of collaborating energy institutions and specialists who share its
perspective and approach. Thus, this book is just one-very important-
dimension of the results of the Energy Program. As it is disseminated and
read, we hope that it will help to enlarge the network of those who have a
common understanding of the global energy problem and, thereby, will help
to establish the basis for wise, successful, and equitable international col-
laboration in its solution.
When the first nASA scientist began working on energy seven years ago,
the Institute's aspirations were high, but its prospects for success were
uncertain. This book demonstrates, we believe, that the Institute's interna-
tional and interdisciplinary analysis can contribute to a better understanding
and resolution of major problems of international importance.
Jermen Gvishiani
Chairman of the nASA Council
Roger E. Levien
Director of nASA
PREFACE
This book presents the findings of the study of the global energy system
by the Energy Systems Program, Phase I, of the International Institute for
Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA). The study, which began in the summer
of 1973, focused for the first two years on understanding and conceptu-
alizing the energy problem. This led to the design of a set of energy models
that were subsequently used for developing two scenarios-the principal tool
of our quantitative analysis. A preliminary draft of our findings was com-
pleted in 1978 and sent out for review. The widespread substantive com-
ments received on this draft were carefully considered in finalizing our
report. This book, which was completed in December 1979, reflects our
work up to this date.
The purpose of this book is not to advance the state of the art of a par-
ticular discipline, although we would be pleased if this were to happen. What
we have tried to do is to look at each of the different aspects of the energy
problem in a new way-to view them as an integral part of an overall pattern.
We therefore suggest that the reader consider this book as a picture or a
pattern and not concentrate solely on individual chapters or subjects.
This book is divided into parts that cover broad areas of research. In Part I
we give some general observations that provide a frame of reference for the
whole study. In our discussion of the various global supply options in Part II,
and in our treatment of possible constraints on energy strategies in Part III,
we have adopted a somewhat visionary approach. We purposely stretched
X III
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our thinking to the limits so as to provide the reader with the broadest pos-
sible choices of input data and parameters for understanding our quantitative
analysis in Part IV. Thus, this book has an inherent duality-realism and
vision. For our quantitative analysis, we had to be realistic and pragmatic;
otherwise we would not have been able to achieve the factual basis on which
to consider possible longer term solutions. Yet, morally, we regard this
realistic approach as unsatisfactory, since we could assume only modest
growth in the developing countries. In Part V, we give some perspectives that
we arrived at after having gone through such an exercise.
Our aim throughout this book has been to be objective. However, in
adding it all up we recognized the need to take a position and to express the
views we actually hold. Thus, the assessments and implications of our study
for energy policy, presented in Part VI, cannot be defended merely on an
objective scientific basis. They are either evident or not.
IIASA is a small research institution, and the group studying the energy
problem was accordingly small. We did not judge it useful to compete with
the energy research of larger national and regional study groups. Our intent
was to complement their work by providing a long-range, global view of the
problems facing civilization. In particular, we aimed for complementarity
with the Workshop on Alternative Energy Strategies (WAES). Similarly, our
thinking was stimulated by the World Energy Conferences of Detroit (1974)
and of Instanbul (1977) and by our contacts with major groups in the energy
field such as those of the USSR Academy of Sciences and of the European
Community.
IIASA, as a nongovernmental institution, is fortunate to receive the
cooperation and support of its seventeen National Member Organizations,
which span both East and West. The Energy Systems Program has benefited
greatly from the diverse political, social, and economic points of view on the
energy problems in these countries. For a truly global perspective, one must
also consider the dynamics of the developing countries, and we are grateful
for the cooperation received from numerous institutions, groups, and indi-
viduals from these countries. We especially wish to acknowledge the support
of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in Nairobi, which
helped us to strengthen our rapport with the developing world.
This book was not written by a single author. Given the diversity of con-
tributions and subjects, we felt it would add richness to the exposition if
there were some disparity of style as well as individual formats of exposi-
tion. Thus, in both the technical and literary editing, the individual authors'
viewpoints have been preserved, and the reader may want to take note of our
explanations about authorship below.
We would not have been able to complete the research reported on here
without the help and support of many institutions, groups, and individuals.
In the list below we gratefully acknowledge the help received from these
bodies by means of contracts and cooperative agreements. It would give a
false impression, however, if this list were considered exhaustive. It is simply
impossible to include all here.
PREFACE XV
UNEP awarded us a major contract on "The Comparison of Energy
Options: A Methodological Study," which covered a major portion of our
work. Thus, to some extent, UNEP could be considered a co-sponsor of this
phase of the Energy Systems Program. UNEP also awarded us a contract on
"A Systems Study of Energy and Climate," which permitted us to examine
the possible climatic impacts of energy technologies.
The Meteorological Office, BracknelI, United Kingdom, cooperated very
closely with us in our study of man's impact on the climate system. Spe-
cifically, they provided us with their Global Circulation Model, which served
as the basis of our numerical experiments carried out with the above-
mentioned UNEP support. We are also grateful to the office for providing us
with experimental output.
The Nuclear Research Center (Kernforschungszentrum), Karlsruhe, FRG,
provided us with large amounts of inexpensive computer time for executing
the numerical experiments supported by UNEP and the Meteorological
Office.
For our research on the impacts of solar energy production on the meso-
scale climate, we received the cooperation of the Stanford Research Institute,
Palo Alto, California, United States.
The National Center for Atmospheric Research, Boulder, Colorado,
United States, lent their cooperative assistance to the above-mentioned
climate studies supported by UNEP.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Vienna, Austria,
formed a joint team with IIASA to study risks. This team made important
contributions to IIASA's work in this field.
The Volkswagen Foundation (Stiftung Volkswagenwerk), Hannover,
FRG, awarded us a contract for studying "Procedures for the Setting of
Standards," which complemented the work of the joint IIASA/IAEA risk
team. The Volkswagen Foundation also gave us a contract for studying
"The Mechanisms of Market Penetration," which very much expedited our
work in this area.
The Federal Ministry of Research and Technology (Bundesministerium
fur Forschung und Technologie), Bonn, FRG, awarded us a major contract
for a "Systems Study on the Possibilities of Intensified Use of Solar Energy
in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)." Through this assistance we
were able to broaden our knowledge of developments in the field of solar
power.
The Austrian National Bank (Osterreichische Nationalbank), Vienna,
Austria, awarded us a contract for studying "Capital and Currency Demand
As a Constraint For Future Technological Strategies For Meeting Demand."
Their support helped us in the development of the IIASA set of mathemati-
cal energy models.
The Siberian Power Institute of the Siberian Department of the USSR
i\cademy of Sciences, Irkutsk, cooperated closely with us, in particular by
~iving us the early version of a computer program that, after adaptation at
IASA, became the economic IMPACT model.
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The USSR Academy of Sciences, through the Kurchatov and the High
Temperature Institutes in Moscow, participated in our study of "The Fusion
and the Fission Breeder Reactor."
The Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, California, United
States, contributed to our study of "The Fusion and the Fast Breeder
Reactors. "
The Institute of Energy Economics and Law (Institut Economique et
Juridique de l'Energie), Grenoble, France, cooperated with us, in particular
by providing us with a computer program that, after adaptation at IIASA,
became the MEDEE-2 model.
Shell Austria, through the Technical University of Vienna, contributed a
grant in support of our WELMM studies.
We also wish to acknowledge here the close cooperation of the National
Coal Board, United Kingdom; of the United Association of German Hard
Coal Mines (Gesamtverband des Deutschen Steinkohlenbergbaus) and the
Hard Coal Mining Association (Steinkohlenbergbauverein), FRG; and of the
institutions in Poland, the USSR, and the United States that helped us with
our assessment of the coal option.
Additionally, we were greatly assisted in our work by the following insti-
tutions and industrial firms: The Institute of National Planning, Cairo,
Egypt; Siemens, Erlangen, FRG; Kraftwerk Union, Erlangen, FRG; Shell,
Vienna, Austria, and London, United Kingdom; General Electric, New
York, United States; The Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries, Kuwait; The Technical University of Vienna, Austria; Gulf Corpora-
tion, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, United States; Electricite de France, Paris,
France; Institut Fran<;ais du Petrole, Paris, France; Bureau de Recherches
Geologiques et Minh~res, Orleans, France; Charbonnages de France, Paris,
France; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris, France; and
Institut fur Kernenergetik und Energiesysteme der Universitat Stuttgart,
FRG.
Here, a note on authorship is in order. This book is the product of a
closely cooperating, multinational team. In addition to scientists from both
East and West, we were assisted by scientists from the developing countries
who shared with us their first-hand knowledge of energy problems in their
countries. A list of the members of the Energy Systems Program over the
study period is given at the beginning of this book. Each member who was
with us at Laxenburg for more than a month is included, with the average
period of service being between one and two years.
Our team was also multidisciplinary: economists, physicists, engineers,
geologists, mathematicians, psychologists, a psychiatrist, and an ethnologist
gave us their different views of the energy problem. Thus it was impossible
for us to hold an extreme, one-sided view.
Part I, "Introduction," and Chapter 1, "The Problem," was written by
W. Hafele, with contributions from B. Spinrad.
Part II, "Energy Supply," was coordinated by B. Spinrad. Chapter 2,
"Fossil Energy Resources," was written by M. Grenon. Chapter 3, "The Coal
Option," was written by W. Sassin, with contributions from B. Spinrad and
PREFACE XVll
W. Hafele. Chapter 4, "The Nuclear Option," was written by W. Hafele, with
contributions from B. Spinrad, K. Cohen, A. Perry, and N. Nakicenovic.
Chapter 5, "The Solar Option," was written by J. Weingart and W. Hafele,
with contributions from R. Caputo and A. McDonald. Chapter 6, "Renew-
able Energy Sources," was written by W. Sassin and B. Spinrad. Chapter 7,
"A Review of Energy System Considerations," was written by B. Spinrad.
Part III, "Constraints," was coordinated by A. Khan. Chapter 8, "Market
Penetration," was written by N. Nakicenovic, with contributions from
W. Hafele, V. Chant, and A. Khan. Chapter 9, "The WELMM Approach to
Energy and Natural Resources," was written by M. Grenon and D. Gour-
melon, with contributions from T. M. Merzeau and A. Grilbler. Chapter 10,
"Energy and Climate," was written by J. Williams, with contributions from
F. Niehaus, W. Hafele, W. Sassin, and G. Kromer. Chapter 11, "Risks and
Standards in Energy Systems," was written by R. Avenhaus and F. Niehaus,
with contributions from D. v. Winterfeldt, H. Otway, R. Schafer, S. Black,
and S. Simpson. Chapter 12, "Constraints on Energy Supply: The Sum-
mary," was written by A. Khan and B. Spinrad.
Part IV, "Balancing Supply and Demand: The Quantitative Analysis,"
was coordinated by P. Basile. Ch apter 13, "The Analytical Approach," was
written by P. Basile, with contributions from M. Agnew, A. Holzl, A. Khan,
Yu. Kononov, A. Papin, and L. Schrattenholzer. Chapter 14, "Two Scenarios
Defined," was written by V. Chant and P. Basile. Chapter 15, "Interpreta-
tion of Scenario Projections," was written by V. Chant. Chapter 16, "Energy
Consumption and Conservation," was written by P. Basile, A. Holzl, and
A. Khan. Chapter 17, "Energy Supply and Conversion," was written by P.
Basile, with contributions from M. Agnew, J. Eddington, A. Papin, and
L. Schrattenholzer. Chapter 18, "Alternatives and Sensitivities," was
written by P. Basile, with contributions from M. Agnew, J. Eddington,
A. Holzl, and L. Schrattenholzer. Chapter 19, "Economic Impacts: Com-
parison of Energy Scenarios and Alternative Cases," was written by Yu.
Kononov, with contributions from T. Balabanov and P. Basile. Chapter 20,
"Balancing Supply and Demand: The Summary," was written by P. Basile.
Part V, "Perspectives," was coordinated by W. Hafele. Chapter 21,
"Energy, Negentropy, and Endowments," was written by W. Hafele. Chapter
22, "New Old Technologies," was written by C. Marchetti, with contribu-
tions from W. Weisz and A. McDonald. Chapter 23, "Energy Densities, Land
Use, and Settlement Patterns," was written by W. Sassin. Chapter 24,
"Hard/Soft Controversy," was written by W. Sassin and B. Spinrad.
Part VI, "Assessments and Implications," Chapter 25, "The Problem
Revisited," was written by W. Hafele.
Without the contribution of J. Anderer as science writer and editor, this
book would not have been completed.
The authorship of the various chapters is indeed diffuse, and the individ-
ual authors cannot be held responsible for their contributions. The final
responsibility rests with the Program Leader.
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I INTRODUCTION

1 THE PROBLEM
Roughly 70 percent of today's global primary energy supply comes from oil
and natural gas, and roughly 20 percent of the oil is crude from the Persian
Gulf. Oil and gas are clean, versatile, and relatively easy to use fuels. The
high specific energy content of oil, close to 10,000 kcal/kg, together with
the physical properties of a liquid permit easy storage and transportation at
relatively low cost. Distances of a global scale, 10,000 km and more, can be
traversed relatively easily. Cheap extraction and production of oil from the
Persian Gulf states has resulted in growing imports from that source for
Western Europe, Japan, and the United States. The low price of oil also
stimulated its use in a number of technologies, as a fuel and as a feedstock.
During the 1950s and 1960s, most of the world's economies had relatively
high GNP growth rates and, related to that, relatively high energy consump-
tion growth rates. A figure of orientation for both is 5 percent per year. This
led to high absolute energy consumptions. Table 1-1 gives global primary
energy supply figures for 1975. Roughly 8.1 TWyr/yra of commercial energy
and roughly 0.6 TWyr/yr of noncommercial energy (e.g., fuelwood and
agricultural waste) were consumed in that year. Such high consumption at
relatively constant energy prices has led, in general, to decreasing reserve-to-
production ratios for crude oil and natural gas.
aHere and throughout the book we have distinguished between installed power capacity (TW) and
annual energy production (TWyr/yr).
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Table 1-1. Estimated global primary energy supply, 1975.
Type
Commercial energy
Oil
Of which oil from Middle East and North Africa
Natural Gas
Other
Total commercial energy
Noncommercial energy (e.g., fuelwood, agricultural waste)
Total energy
Level
(TWyrlyr)
3.8
(1.6)
1.5
2.9
8.2
0.6
8.8
Sources: Commercial primary energy supply estimates are based on data from United Nations
(1978). Estimates of noncommercial energy supply are taken from Parikh (1978).
Until the early 1970s there was no broad awareness of an energy problem.
However, by the early 1970s, a new set of political, economic, and social
conditions had evolved in the world. The oil-exporting countries have been
willing and able to make the price of oil a political determinant, as the price
escalation of late 1973 first illustrated. Also, many of the developing coun-
tries that export raw materials see the case of oil as an example to be emu-
lated for other products. This has led to a greater political unification of the
countries of the South, as has been evident at recent U.N. conferences. The
increasing price of oil has made it more difficult for the industrializing
countries to accelerate their development and for the industrialized countries
to maintain their growing economies.
Since the late 1960s, the impacts of human activities on the environment
are no longer considered small and negligible. Increasingly, the globe is seen
as finite and sensitive to what humanity does with it. This has inhibited the
classical substitution of other resources and technologies for those that have
become too expensive. Specifically, neither coal nor nuclear power has been
deployed at the rates they might have been had the "energy crisis" occurred
in, say, 1960.
THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
Today's energy problem is defined by the political and economic stresses
brought about by the availability and price of oil and by the limited substitu-
tion of other fuels because of environmental constraints. If the problem had
arisen in a fairly static world, it might have been solved in time by a com-
bination of efficiency adjustments (e.g., conservation) and substitutions of
new supply technologies.
But the world is dynamic. The population is growing. The workforce is
growing. Aspirations for amenity are growing. National economies are grow-
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ing, and for the populations of the Southern hemisphere, this growth must
be rapid if they are to achieve reasonable living standards in a reasonable
time.
Development takes energy. With existing patterns of national economies
and their growth rates, of development in the Southern hemisphere, and of
related management of resources prevailing, one could indeed expect a
serious energy problem. In fact, the problem already exists. Even if there
were no oil problem now, sooner or later the world would have come to
grips with the finite nature of the principal fuels in use today. Oil and natu-
ral gas are finite. Natural uranium of a quality usable for nuclear power
today is finite. While there is plenty of coal, it too is finite. The more we use
these fuels, the closer we get to running out of supply or, more exactly, to
finding that the remaining supplies are too expensive to use. The world must
cope not only with an oil problem, not only with problems of increasing
demand, but also with the problems of substituting effectively infinite
energy sources for the ones now in use. And here the question is not
whether, but when.
The energy problem cannot be broken down into individual elements
requiring solution; rather, it is the whole pattern of the energy system that
constitutes the problem. It is from this basis that the following elements
must be considered:
• Absolute size of energy demand;
• Rate of annual increase of energy demand;
• Allocation of global resources to countries-features of world energy
trade;
• Buildup rates of technical supply facilities;
• Innovation rates;
• Absolute size of resources;
• Absolute size of environmental and ecological impacts;
• Management of environmental and ecological impacts;
• Societal and political acceptance of technical and economical changes;
• Relationship between energy problems and policies and more general
social problems.
Energy Forms and Levels
In order to clarify the nature of the energy problem, we differentiate here
between energy at various stages of conversion and use. Figure 1-1 is helpful
for understanding this point. Primary energy is the energy recovered from
nature-water flowing over a dam, coal freshly mined, oil, natural gas,
natural uranium. Only rarely can primary energy be used to supply final
energy-energy used to supply energy services. One of the few forms of
primary energy that can be used as final energy is natural gas, which is why
it is a fuel of preference whenever it is available.
For the most part, primary energy is converted into secondary energy-de-
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Figure 1-1. Energy conversion and use.
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4 Energy Services
fined as an energy form that can be used over a broad spectrum of applica-
tions. Examples are electricity, gasoline, and natural gas; at lesser convenience
(which is why they are declining in their market shares), one could also con-
sider charcoal, sorted and graded coal, and cut and split fuelwood as sec-
ondary energy forms. In order to apply energy without making undue
demands on the consumer, it must be converted into a form that is readily
transported and distributed and that can be used in a variety of devices. The
trend has been toward grids, for obvious reasons-specifically electricity, gas,
and district heating grids. For convenience of storage, portability, and trans-
portability, the trend has also been to liquid fuels, of which gasoline and
diesel oil are the best examples.
Primary energy is converted into secondary energy in several different
ways. Central power plants produce electricity and sometimes district heat.
Refineries convert petroleum, which is not an easy fuel to use at the end
point, to more convenient liquid fuels-gasoline, jet fuel, diesel oil, and
naphtha. When gasoline is not available, coal conversion plants can make
liquid fuels. Sometimes the conversion plant is the end point of a system, as
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with nuclear fission energy (for which chemical conversion, isotopic enrich-
ment, and fuel fabrication all precede the power plant); sometimes, as with
a hydroelectric or a wind generator, it is a simple machine. But, regardless,
there are conversion losses in going with primary to secondary energy and
transmission losses in getting that energy to the consumer. It is wrong to
think of these losses as waste. They represent a trade-off of efficiencies: the
use of energy to transform and transmit energy permits the end user to apply
it efficiently for his purposes. These final steps are the conversion of sec-
ondary energy into final energy-the energy in a motor, a stove, a computer,
or a lightbulb-and of final energy into useful energy-the energy actually
stored in a product or used for a service. It is important to realize that in
providing the service (say, a well-lit room), energy is not merely a stored
entity, but even more an input for the efficient use of other resources-of
labor, of capital, and especially of skill.
THE IIASA ENERGY STUDY AND
ITS OBJECTIVE
We aimed for a new way of looking at the energy problem that would put
the above ten elements of the energy problem into a new pattern. How can
such a problem be approached? What substantive questions should be put to
the forefront? What methods can be employed? During the early years of
the nASA Energy Systems Program, we conceptualized the problem by
exploring ranges of the parameters involved, by identifying terms and their
mutual relations, and by defining explicitly the objective of the study.
What we were looking for were ways of characterizing demands, supply
opportunities, and supply constraints and ways of matching them all up.
When we tried to define the nature of the problem, we came to grips with at
least six of these ten elements. For three of these-innovation rates, manage-
ment of environmental and ecological impacts, and social and political
acceptance of technoeconomic changes-we cannot claim to have done com-
plete research. And we purposely refrained from dealing with the last ele-
ment of the relationship between energy problems and policies and more
general social problems. IIASA is a small research institute that grew out of
the belief that the problems of civilization would gradually become of a
global nature and would thereby require more and more East-West coopera-
tion. As the relationship between energy problems and policies and social
problems varies greatly from country to country, this topic was therefore
deleted, at least for the present phase of nASA research. The nASA
approach was to concentrate on the factual basis of the energy problem.
Political judgment and action, which is indeed an overwhelming problem,
could then be viewed on such a basis.
The approach adopted was ultimately multidimensional. By writing our
results in this book in a linear manner, we cannot hope to transmit the true
flavor of the approach. In a sense, we did everything at once. By doing this,
it was possible to cross-fertilize everything with everything else. In what
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follows, we present our approach in a more orthodox, orderly fashion. It
follows the order in which subjects appear in this book.
Assumptions
A completely comprehensive study of energy problems of the future is
impossible. One would have to list all conceivable eventualities and trace
out their structures and consequences. This is manifestly an infinite task.
Observing then somewhat more closely the objective of our study, we
made a number of assumptions, which helped to reduce the job to a finite
one.
First, we limited the constraints on solutions to the energy problem to
those that are physical or structural. Political and social constraints are
recognized, but were not applied explicitly. This allowed us to explore the
entire range of the possible.
Second, our study assumed a surprise-free future. No major catastrophes
such as wars or large local upheavals were assumed to take place. We also
assumed no positive technological breakthroughs of a nature that cannot
be expected today. This was not meant to exclude such positive unforeseen
breakthroughs, but we did not want to rely on them.
Third, we assumed in general only a modest population and economic
growth. To keep the energy problem manageable, we assumed major energy
conservation and aggressive exploration for additional energy resources. We
also assumed a functioning world trade in oil, gas, and coal such that the
needs of the various parts of the world can be taken care of.
Fourth, we assumed in all evaluations of the study that the u.s. dollar,
and any other monetary unit, has a constant value. This is a more sweeping
assumption; it amounts to decoupling the terms of trade from the side
effects of inflation. In effect, we note that these problems are of a social and
political nature, so that ignoring them is consistent with the first assumption.
We emphasized as much as possible the economic and energy growth of
less industrialized as compared with more industrialized countries. This was
done on a per capita basis as well as on a national or regional basis.
The Temporal Frame
We used a standard time frame of fifty years. That is, we visualized the
scenarios of energy demands, supplies, and potential opportunities up to the
year 2030. There were many reasons for this selection.
Our first intuition was that we would have to imagine the world as it
might be when natural petroleum could no longer be the reference energy
source. This is not a matter of simply guessing when the oil will run out. It
means examining how long it might take to change the current infrastructure
as other things are substituted for oil. Such changes have occurred in the
past; for example, about 120 years ago in much of Europe a real or impend-
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ing fuelwood crisis was mastered by the substitution of coal for wood. From
the time when the crisis was recognized, it took about fifty years before coal
could contribute 50 percent to the then global primary energy demand.
We arrived at our fifty-year estimate in other, less sophisticated ways. For
instance, fifty years is roughly twice the lifetime of a power plant, a char-
acteristic system within the existing energy supply infrastructure. Two such
lifetimes might encompass a major technological change. In order to begin
to penetrate a competitive market, a new large-scale technology must pass
the thresholds of scientific feasibility, of technical feasibility on an industrial
scale, and of commercial feasibility. When all three thresholds are considered
and it is realized that they precede actual market penetration, then fifty
years may be on the short side. Indeed, it is very probable that all of the
technologies in widespread use fifty years from now (at least for providing
energy) have already been applied at some level today. Finally, fifty years
is two human generations, and this is needed to accommodate changes in the
social infrastructure that must parallel changes in the technical infrastruc-
ture. We also considered that fifty years might be required to reach a stable
world population, a point that will be discussed later in this chapter.
For certain aspects of our study, fifty years is definitely not long enough.
This is particularly the case when one looks ahead to the inevitable time
when there really are no fossil resources available. For some of our supply
considerations, we had to look beyond 2030. By extrapolating to the year
2030, we hoped to conceptualize the energy situation of the world after
2030. We expect this post-2030 world to be very different from the present
one, and therefore our temporal frame defines a period of transition. When
might we see the beginnings of that transition?
Several studies, including those of the Workshop on Alternative Energy
Strategies (1977) and the Pestel-Mesarovic group (1974), attempted to
extrapolate from now to around the year 2000. The indications are that the
energy problem will become more difficult, but that the world could "mud-
dle through" by rationalizing and correcting the existing infrastructure. Just
this way of expressing the results suggests that the year 2000 should mark
the beginning of a transition.
It is then appropriate to consider three time phases:
• The present phase: from now to 1995-2000;
• A first transition phase: from 1995-2000 to 2030;
• The ultimate transition phase: from 2030 onward.
The present phase is one of dealing with the oil supply problem as we know
it today, while the first transition phase is that of moving from relatively
cheap and clean oil to one or more different reference energy carriers. The
third phase, from 2030 onward, would involve what we think of as a second
transition toward a sustainable, asymptotic energy supply system.
How our study relates to the present phase can be visualized with the help
of Figure 1-2. The question mark indicates the question, Are the short-range
projections for, say, up to about the year 2000, consistent with the con-
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Figure 1-2. Time phases of energy.
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dition that the period after 2000 must be one of transition? How can we
reach the starting point of that first transition?
The Spatial Frame
We also made some specific assumptions that gave structure to our study.
Clearly, we inhabit a single world; yet various parts of the world have differ-
ent resources, economic systems, and industrial structures. To account for
this, we divided the world into seven, homogeneous groupings. These regions
were selected principally for their economic and energy similarities and not
so much for geographic proximity. Of course, such a definition is to some
extent arbitrary. Nevertheless, we characterized region I, North America, as
a region with a developed market economy and rich in resources. Region II,
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, has a developed, centrally planned
economy and is rich in resources. Region III, which is essentially the member
countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OEeD) minus North America, has a developed market economy and not
many resources. Region IV, Latin America, is a developing region with mar-
ket economies and many resources. Region V, Africa and South and South-
east Asia, is also a developing region, with mostly market economies but not
many resources. The countries of the Middle East and Northern Africa, re-
gion VI, are a special case with their rich oil and gas resources. And finally,
region VII, China and the centrally planned Asian economies, is a developing
region with centrally planned economies, but it is not so rich in resources.
Figure 1-3 gives an overview of these regions; a list of the countries in each
of the seven world regions is given in Appendix A to this chapter.
In considering the seven IIASA world regions, we did not merely add up
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national energy projections and resource production figures. There are a
number of national studies that have done this, and their principal signifi-
cance is to provide short-term (fifteen or twenty year) estimates of how
much oil would be needed. Instead, we examined regional economic growth
patterns and energy intensity trends that, when coupled with population
figures and prices, could provide long-term estimates of energy demand.
Similarly, we used our own definition of resources and estimated them in
units that we judge appropriate to the field, thereby avoiding the idio-
syncrasies that appear in many national evaluations. In any case, it was not
the purpose of our study to describe the energy future of each country to
some approximation. This leads too much into the political domain and
away from the idea of exploring what is physically possible.
Figure 1-3. The IIASA world regions.
'i
____---0..- ------'
~ Region I
~ Region II
m. Region III
lI§ill Region IV
.-.-.-.-, Region VI=CCCI
l1li Region VI
CJ Region VII
(NA) North America
(SU/EE) Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
(WE/JANZ) Western Europe, Japan, Australia, New Zealand,
S. Africa, and Israel
(LA) Latin America
(At/SEA) Africa (except Northern Africa and S. Africa!,
South and Southeast Asia
(ME/NAf) Middle East and Northern Africa
(C/CPA) China and Centrally Planned Asian Economies
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FACTORS AFFECTING ENERGY DEMAND
There are three reasons for energy demand to change-population growth,
economic growth, and technological progress. There is also the associated
change in lifestyles of the people affected by these factors and, related to
that, the problem of urbanization. It is necessary to estimate these factors on
a finer scale than the global one, and even the breakdown into world
regions that we used is not quite adequate. With this caveat, we discuss some
general features of population and economic growth; more specific aspects
of such growth are a major part of the discussion of the two IIASA scenarios
that appears in Part IV of this book.
Population
For our study we relied on population estimates prepared by Keyfitz (977).
In the course of this book we refer repeatedly to his estimates for the various
parts of the world.
There are four billion (09 ) people on earth today; by 2030, the ex-
pected number is eight billion people, as illustrated in Figure 1-4. A condi-
tion is that, by 2015, the average population replacement rate would have
come down to one. Besides leading to eight billion people by 2030, the
population projection means that the flattening of the population growth
curve would have largely taken place by then. Optimistically, one may then
envisage conditions that become sustainable.
Economics and Lifestyles
The population projection leads to different population growth rates in dif-
ferent parts of the world. In particular, it shows more growth in poorer
countries than in richer ones. Since it is always a target to improve the
material standards of the poorest people, this also means that a very con-
siderable economic growth is called for globally.
Changes in lifestyle and in the type of economy being considered can
greatly influence the relationship between economic growth and energy
growth. The major features can be illustrated by examining some overall
statistics on energy consumption per capita. Currently, the global primary
energy consumption average is close to 2 kWyr/yr per capita. But consump-
tion is unevenly distributed. Roughly 70 percent of the world's population
lives with less than the average, and most of this 70 percent with only
0.2 kWyr/yr per capita of commercial energy consumption; we add to this
number in the developing countries another 0.3 kWyr/yr per capita of non-
commercial energy. Even so, distribution remains extremely uneven, and any
smoothing of this distribution that leaves the high per capita energy con-
sumption untouched would lead to an increase in the average per capita
consumption.
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Figure 1-4. World population. Projections to 2030 based on data from Keyfitz (1977).
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Let us now consider increases in the average primary energy consumption
value from 2 kWyr/yr per capita to 3 and to 5 kWyr/yr per capita. Of course,
such assumptions must be substantiated by looking at the details of energy
demand in each of the seven world regions, as is done in Chapter 17. Taking
the numbers 2, 3, and 5 kWyr/yr per capita and combining them with the
anticipated population growth leads to estimates of 16, 24, and 40 TWyr/yr,
respectively, of total global primary energy demand in 2030. This is shown
in Figure 1-5. From this consideration we selected a range of 16 to 40
TWyr/yr as our study range. This range should not be confused with the
projections of the two IIASA scenarios that resulted from our middle of the
road quantitative analysis of energy supply and demand (see Part IV). The
range of 16 to 40 TWyr/yr only defines the order of magnitude that we con-
sidered interesting.
Efficiency and Conservation
One other important factor that must be considered is the "real" price of
energy-that is, the price of energy relative to other goods and services. The
use or the nonuse of energy cannot be considered a principal goal; energy
is an input to our lives and work, along with other resources. Depending on
the relative prices paid for all the inputs, one varies their amounts in order
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Figure 1-5. Total energy consumption, 1975-2030: three possibilities. The solid lines
indicate energy consumption; the dashed line indicates world population.
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to produce the results one wants. If the price of energy goes up. we use less
energy and more of other things. For example. in cold climate countries,
more material and labor is invested in insulation and in other measures to
conserve building heat-that is, to save energy. This price-induced conserva-
tion is simply rational economics.
Technological progress tends to decrease energy demand. This arises be-
cause such progress leads to improved efficiencies of conversion from
primary to secondary energy forms and also to improved efficiencies in end
use-in the conversion of secondary energy to final energy and/or energy
services. Of these two roads to energy conservation, the second-the improve-
ment of end use efficiencies-probably has the greater technical potential.
Three examples of improved efficiencies of end use are plotted in Figure
1-6, indicating that such improvements have taken place in the past. In fact,
historical data indicate that the market penetration process appears with
stunning regularity. The very ponderousness of the system suggests that
'these evolutions are more than likely to occur.
Evolution of lifestyles can increase or decrease energy demand. There
are some trends that appear to be part of the process of industrial develop-
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ment. For example, as industrialization begins, energy demand increases,
both from the capital goods sectors that are being built up and equipped and
from the individual consumers to whom more goods and services can be pro-
vided. As societies move into a postindustrial era of affluence, increasing
buying power tends to increase energy demand, while the market basket
tends to shift toward less energy-intensive services. The result up to now has
been a decrease in energy demand per unit of productive output as measured
in gross domestic product (GDP) and a continuing increase in per capita
energy demand. Even this latter increase could be slowed or reversed by
societies whose lifestyles become less materialistic. (But the virtues of the
"simple life" seem to have the greatest appeal only after considerable mate-
rial wealth has already been accumulated.)
We exclude from consideration of evolving lifestyles those changes and
simplifications that are politically imposed on people but are not voluntary
or economically rational. For example, "carless weekends" could be an
appropriate response to an emergency shortage of motor fuel, but would not
be tolerated after the emergency has passed.
Figure 1-6. Historical trends in efficiencies. € is second law efficiency; Llt1 - S0 % is time
necessary to evolve from an efficiency of 1 percent to one of 50 percent.
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Urbanization and Energy Consumption Densities
In considering the spatial frame of our study, urbanization is an important
driving force. It matters where and how people live. When conducting our
study we discovered, somewhat to our surprise, an apparent trend toward a
constant energy consumption density (as measured in energy per unit area)
in cities. The consumption density of urban areas in advanced industrial
countries is of the order of 5 W/m 2 • The immediate question is whether this
is also true for urban areas in developing countries.
We should not be too surprised if it turns out that way. All cities today
have a similar infrastructure. There are streets, houses, streetcars, and auto-
mobiles that are all similar in size, and this leads to similar energy consump-
tion densities. What is vastly different is the amount of people that use this
infrastructure. There are indeed large differences between developed and
developing urban areas, with the developing urban areas featuring much
higher population densities. In that sense, development means an increase
of the urban area per inhabitant. With a constant area consumption density,
this implies an increasing per capita consumption of energy.
In Figure 1-7 we plot the expected degree of urbanization evaluated by
the United Nations Population Conference in Bucharest (1974). Accordingly,
one could expect 70 percent of the world's eight billion people of 2030 to
live in urban areas. For the purpose of a quick orientation only, let us
assume for 2030 a population density in the urban areas of 1000 people/km2•
With an energy consumption density of 5 W1m2 , one arrives at a figure of
Figure 1-7. Estimated distribution of rural-urban population, 2030. Based on papers
submitted to the U.N. Population Conference, Bucharest, 1974.
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28 TWyr/yr of total energy consumption in the urban areas of the world.
With 30 percent of the eight billion people living in rural areas and with a
population density of 120 people/km2 and a consumption density of 0.1
W/m 2 , one gets an additional 2 TWyr/yr, thus arriving at a global total of 30
TWyr/yr. This is not an unreasonable figure. The salient point is that a
consideration of a spatial quality can lead us to expected energy demand
figures by the year 2030 once the population and the degree of urbanization
for that time have been given. Such a spatial consideration is of a quite dif-
ferent nature than time considerations or the evolution of economic
activities. When they coincide, as they do here in our study, it is reassuring.
The implication is that we have assumed explicitly or implicitly an increasing
degree of urbanization of the kind that was given in Figure 1-7. In view of
the importance that we attribute to such spatial considerations, we have
studied this in greater detail and reported on the results.
This quick orientation is, of course, no substitute for careful evaluation.
These considerations of the quality and texture of the spatial framework
could also specify a range of interest for energy consumption from different
socioeconomic considerations. More detailed studies of energy consumption
densities, urban densities, and degrees or urbanization can be useful for
understanding the nature of the energy problem.
EXPLORATIONS OF SUPPLY SYSTEMS
Let us consider two correct but conflicting statements. On the one hand, in
a physical sense, there is no energy supply problem. There are energy sources
whose production rate and durability could be virtually unlimited. This is
true for nuclear breeders and fusion reactors and for solar power. Similarly,
environmental and ecological impacts of energy supply can be sharply re-
duced, if not totally eliminated, with large investments of capital and skill.
Therefore, again, in a physical sense, there need not be an environmental or
ecological problem of energy supply. Also, the problem of energy demand
can be met in part by the enforcement of strong energy conservation mea-
sures. On the other hand, there is an energy problem, and it is getting worse.
Either there is no visible path for providing the unlimited supplies that are in
principle possible, or no visible way to persuade humanity to trim its de-
mands, or both.
The problem of energy supply is that of realizing the supply potential that
exists globally. This realizable potential is less than what can be imagined on
purely physical grounds because of constraints. In our study we formally
examined some of the major constraints (e.g., market penetration, risk,
WELMM).
Here, let us consider our explorations of supply capabilities. These capa-
bilities are constrained by whatever forces limit each particular technology,
such as public approval for nuclear power, carbon dioxide for fossil fuel
combustion, market penetration, and the economics of central station solar
power. However, virtually every technology will undoubtedly be used at a
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lower level than what we judge to be technically possible. Nevertheless, in
order to give decisionmakers the maximum range of options, we had to
bump up against these limits.
Fossil Resources
Today's fuel supply is based on estimates of reserves of fossil fuels, but these
reserves are only a fraction of the resources. Reserves are those deposits
that are known and measured and that can be produced at economic costs.
Beyond that point are resources-deposits that are known fairly well, shading
out into those that are known only generally, and continuing into those that
exist only as estimates of what we might find if we looked. In the cost
dimension, resources that are marginally economic, shading out into those
that can only be produced at higher and higher prices. The well-known
McKelvey diagram (Figure 1-8) illustrates the distinction. Resources
become transferred into reserves through discovery and measurement,
through improvements in production technology that decrease production
costs, and through economic changes that increase the price of the product
and therefore the cost that is acceptable in extracting the product.
Figure 1-8. McKelvey diagram for the classification of fossil reserves and resources.
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In order to determine supply capabilities over the next fifty years, we had
to estimate a "usable" resource base. This involved using our geological
knowledge to extrapolate improvements in extraction techniques and assign-
ing cost categories. We evaluated costs in constant value currency; otherwise,
there would be shifts in and out of cost categories that depend only on infla-
tion or deflation and not on anything tangible.
The salient question we asked was, How much more oil, natural gas, and
coal is likely to be available when we examine cost categories that are more
expensive than the reserves that are currently exploited? The costs that we
considered run up to about three times what we pay today. So we had to go
further and consider unconventional fossil resources-tertiary oil recovery,
heavy oils, tar sands, shale oil, and "exotic" (i.e., permafrost) coal fields.
These resources are large. Thus, as contrasted with estimates of conventional
fossil resources that tend to be, globally, of the order of 1000 TWyr, the
possibility exists of exploiting additional unconventional resources to bring
the estimate of the global fossil fuel resources to the range of 3000 TWyr.
This makes a difference. Figure 1-9 extrapolates cumulative resource
consumption up to the year 2030, under assumptions of energy consump-
tion rates of 2, 3, and 5 kWyr/yr per capita. The cumulative primary energy
consumption by 2030 runs from 900 to 1400 TWyr. What this suggests is
that the expensive and, because of the problems of their extraction, "dirtier"
Figure 1-9. Cumulative energy consumption for three assumed consumption rates,
1975-2030.
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fossil fuels (coal, tar sands, heary oils) could be a bridge between today and
the future era of durable and abundant nonfossil energy sources.
Coal
The reserves of coal correspond to 600 TWyr/yr of primary energy, and the
total amount of recoverable coal that might fall within reach of economi-
cally viable technical capabilities considering high cost categories is probably
2000 or 3000 TWyr and perhaps more. On today's scale of use this seems to
make coal a very large resource indeed. Note from Figure 1-9 that even
with energy consumption at 5 kWyr/yr per capita, only 1400 TWyr of
primary energy would be consumed by 2030.
This makes coal a very comfortable looking crutch for the world's energy
supply. But is it really? Two things stand out when one takes a longer view.
First, at the highest rates of use contemplated, one would still have to look
for something else before the year 2100; and second, even coal consumption
at 2 kWyr/yr per capita by the year 2030 would call for 16 TWyr/yr of coal
consumption by that year, which is more than seven times as much coal as
is used now. Besides the problems of building up all the mining and trans-
portation capability to handle all this coal, and besides its very large
WELMM requirements, burning so much coal would certainly violate the
qualitative limits that we would like to set on carbon dioxide emissions, at
least until we know better what the carbon dioxide problem really means.
So we must look at coal in a different way. It cannot be the dominant
energy source of a high energy-consuming world. But, it is a large resource
of chemically reduced carbon, and as such it can be used to synthesize
liquid fuels when and if unconventional oils become too expensive. We
therefore devoted most of our coal study to an examination of ways to con-
vert the coal enterprise, stepwise, into a liquid fuel synthesis industry.
Nuclear Power
Central station nuclear power is technically in an excellent position to sup-
plement fossil fuel over the next fifty years. Light-water- and heary-water-
cooled burner reactors, which are commercial now, are the cheapest source
of electricity in many parts of the world. More advanced systems, producing
heat at higher temperatures both for chemical processing and for more effi-
cient conversion of heat to electricity, are ready for commercialization.
These are high temperature gas-cooled reactors and liquid-metal-cooled fast
breeder reactors, for which the required demonstration units are already
operating.
Breeders are particularly important because they have an extremely
high efficiency rate of use of uranium and thorium, while with the use of
burner reactors only, the resources of high grade natural uranium would be
used up rapidly. One would then be forced into mining rock containing small
THE PROBLEM 21
amounts of uranium-a scheme we refer to as mining "yellow coal." But
by the use of breeders, the "good" uranium would last a very long time, and
even if some "yellow coal" has to be used several centuries from now, the
amount needed would be very small.
All this defines a related set of technical problems. First, one must esti-
mate the magnitude of the uranium resource. And second, one must find a
schedule of reactor construction that satisfies several constraints: it must
not use more natural uranium than the resource base provides, and at a
definite time-for our study, the year 2030-it must be capable of operating
virtually independently at the power level achieved by that time, without
requiring still more natural uranium.
Solar Power
Central station solar power can provide electricity and hydrogen, just as
nuclear power can. It uses much more land and materials, but once installed
an in operation, it is practically risk free, very well accepted, and truly
inexhaustible. Again, comparing it with nuclear power, central station solar
has larger WELMM. impacts and larger capital costs. This will doubtlessly
affect the pace at which solar power can be installed, and the realization of
its potential could occur only one or two decades later than that of nuclear
power.
Continuing the comparison with nuclear power, in a competitive situation,
relative economics will be decisive. (Money is a surrogate for the ability to
make investments of human and physical capital and must not, therefore,
be ignored.) For the fission breeder, cost targets exist, starting from con-
siderable experience with pilot systems. Targets also exist for central solar
stations: they are based not as much on experience, but are more readily
derivable from general industrial experience. We can only speculate whether
solar or nuclear will ultimately capture the larger market.
Because of the tremendous thermodynamic quality of sunlight (theoreti-
cally a 90 percent efficiency conversion into mechanical, electrical, or
chemical energy), we have considered the direct use of sunlight separately
from other renewable sources.
Small-scale Solar and Other Renewable Resources
For small-scale solar power installations, considerable investment burdens
are placed on the final consumer, who can neither profit from technical
economies of scale nor invest in as sophisticated a manner. The question is,
If the world improves its efficiency of energy consumption in end use, will
there be a market for small-scale solar devices? For example, conservation-
oriented building designs reduce domestic energy demand for hot water and
comfort heat in temperate climates, and the demand is in any case small
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in tropical and equatorial climates. Most of the solar energy used would be
in "passive" construction techniques.
A possible exception exists for household photovoltaic systems, which
could provide power for air conditioning at minimum and revolutionize
electric utility service if widely used. How realistic are the hopes for cost
breakthroughs?
Other renewable energy sources must likewise be evaluated-wet geother-
mal energy, hydroelectricity, wind power, and less developed systems such
as OTEC and wave and tidal power. For these, the problems are not only
to evaluate the resources-which are generally far smaller than the energy
coming directly from sunlight-but also to determine how much could be
tapped without interfering with the dynamics of weather, air and ocean
water flow, and the other properties of earth's machine.
And finally, we must look at biomass. How much is available, how much
can reasonably be harvested, what to do with it? Biomass has a unique
property that sharply differentiates it from all other renewable energy
sources: its energy is stored in chemical form, as chemically reduced carbon.
This means that in the long run it can be thought of as "renewable coal."
Thus, just as with coal, it is important not merely to evaluate the resource
base, but also to consider how these resources can be processed efficiently
into secondary energy carriers.
SYSTEM PROPERTIES AND CONSTRAINTS
The energy problem exists in the context of the continuity of human institu-
tions and the existence of a "healthy" world. The term healthy refers both
to the human population and to the natural environment throughout the
planet. Because this context limits what can reasonably be done to attack
the energy problem, these considerations function as constraints-be they of
a social, political, or environmental nature.
Market Substitution
We considered as future possibilities some forms of energy supply that are
not in common use today. For example, electricity from solar heat or from
photovoltaic conversion of sunlight is currently a negligible factor in global
energy supply, although there are high hopes. The same might be said for
wind power, ocean thermal power, and tidal power. Even technologies closer
at hand, such as conversion of coal to liquids and gases, or nuclear fission
electricity, or the use of heavy oils, are not yet major components of energy
supply on a global scale. They must penetrate the energy market before they
can become more important.
Market penetration is a phenomenon that has economic and even psycho-
logical components. It can function as a constraint on the growth of a new
energy supply system. We therefore devote considerable attention to the
market penetration factor, building on the logistic model developed by
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Fisher and Pry (1970). While there have been attempts to explain mar-
ket substitution from first principles, at this stage it must be treated
phenomenologically.
Qualitatively, we know that wood was the world's primary fuel until the
late nineteenth century, only to be replaced by coal, which at a later date
gave way to oil and natural gas. The dynamics of the substitution process,
whatever its causes may be, set limits on our expectations. When we plotted
market shares against time, using as our scale the logistic function-which
amounts to taking as our ordinate the logarithm of fl( 1-1) where f is the
fraction of the market held by a particular energy form-a remarkably con-
sistent pattern emerged (Figure 1-10). There are straight lines over sur-
prisingly large time intervals, which implies that the substitution process
follows the S-shaped logistic function. Figure 1-10 also demonstrates that,
globally, it has taken roughly fifty years for a particular type of primary
energy to increase its market share from 10 to 50 percent of the total supply.
This substantiates our choice of a fifty-year extrapolation period as being
necessary to determine the results of new energy sources.
Figure 1-10. Global primary energy substitution. Logarithmic plot of the transforma-
tion f/(l-f) where f is the fractional market share. Smooth lines are model estimates of
historical data; scattered lines are historical data; straight lines show the logistic model
substitution paths.
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Environmental Considerations: WELMM
A considerable amount of work on environmental problems has been done at
IIASA by Foell and his colleagues (see Foell et al. 1979a, 1979b). This work
was performed on a district scale-the state of Wisconsin in the United
States, the Rhone-Alpes area in France, district "X" in the German Demo-
cratic Republic, and Austria. The Energy Systems Program used insights
gained from these local studies to build up a global understanding of the
environmental implications of energy systems.
Some of the environmental problems that arise must be examined as
problems of specific energy sources-for example, energy from biomass and
hydroelectricity have definite ecological consequences. Some are mediated
by the earth's climate, as will be discussed later in this section. However,
there are some encompassing descriptions that can be very useful. In this
spirit, we examined the total commitments of land, water, and materials to a
specific energy technology. Thus, for a given energy system-fossil, nuclear,
or solar-all the land needed for mining, transportation, processing, and any
other required operations is totaled as a land commitment. Similarly, water
and materials commitments are accounted for. The process can also incorpo-
rate commitments of energy and manpower inputs, and this has been done.
The result is a system called WELMMj the acronym stands for Water, Energy,
Land, Materials, and Manpower. WELMM results are not, of course, a sub-
stitute for a detailed study of environmental impacts, but they give a qualita-
tive understanding of the total impacts of types of energy systems. They pro-
vide a similar view of related impacts as well, the most obvious one being
requirements for capital.
WELMM results were used at several points in our study-for example, to
measure the impacts of recovering uranium from low grade deposits, a
process that, because of its comparability to obtaining the same energy from
coal, we labeled mining "yellow coal"; to compare what it means to recover
fossil fuels from difficult or exotic deposits, as against today's "clean" oil
and gas; and to understand the impacts of large-scale central station solar
electricity.
Environmental Considerations: Climate
All energy that is used, except for a small share that is stored as chemical
binding energy, is degraded ultimately to waste heat. This heat is dissipated
to water and air, is transported to the upper atmosphere, and leaves the earth
as infrared radiation. Even considering that the quantity of heat produced
by human activities is small compared with what the earth receives from the
sun and reradiates to space, we must examine the implications of these
activities. The disturbances created by gathering, converting, and using energy
(as well as by other activities of humankind) might have catalytic effects on
the ecosphere, the hydrosphere, and the atmosphere, producing much
greater consequences than the rather puny scale of these activities would
imply. Such effects would appear as climatic changes.
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As with other environmental constraints, some of the climatic impacts are
specific to individual technologies and were examined in our study with
references to these technologies. For example, ocean thermal energy con-
version (OTEC) and harnessing power from ocean currents are probably
limited by the effects they would have on the flow of heat in the ocean. Of
more general concern are the possible climatic effects of dissipating too
much waste heat at the wrong locations and of disturbing the carbon dioxide
balance of the atmosphere by burning fossil fuels.
As to waste heat, the question is whether these effects are global. Most
of the impacts appear to be of a local and regional nature. The coupling of
such impacts into the global weather system is nonlinear and inherently
noisy, making the job of modeling the process both untidy and difficult. Are
there places that we can nevertheless pinpoint as poor locations for concen-
trated dissipation of waste heat?
The situation is quite different with the carbon dioxide problem, which is
of a truly global nature. It takes only a few years for a given amount of
carbon dioxide to dissipate uniformly across all the globe's atmosphere, but
a thousand years or so to dissolve it in the deep ocean. In between, it can
concentrate in the atmosphere. An increase in the carbon dioxide content of
the atmosphere has already been noted over the past one hundred years.
The significance of this is that high carbon dioxide content could lead to
noticeable increases in atmospheric temperatures, through the well-known
greenhouse effect (i.e., the absorption of infrared radiation from the earth).
How this might affect climate, particularly what the net effects might be
when such carbon-dioxide-related effects as those of atmospheric aerosols
are also included, cannot be precisely modeled. However, the information
now available does not rule out the possibility of large-scale climatic changes,
particularly if fossil fuel supplies are burned up quickly.
The effect of large-scale deforestation on the carbon dioxide problem in
particular and on continental weather patterns in general is also still moot.
Even the substitution of silviculture for natural forest growth could have a
climatic effect.
Risk
The management and containment of the stream of energy through the eco-
sphere, the hydrosphere, and the atmosphere requires the establishment of
standards and regulations on a global or at least a regional level. This is be-
cause the uncontrolled use and release of energy presents risks, ecological
and environmental. When we think of risks, we are usually referring to direct
impacts on human health, and it is in that sense that risks were investigated
in our study. The risks that have received the most attention worldwide are
those arising from nuclear power, but one should consider risks of all energy
sources.
There are two levels at which risk should be considered. One is the level
of scientific estimation-of trying to determine how much risk, of what sort,
is presented by specific energy systems. This work has been performed by
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many groups, and it is necessary to evaluate the data. The question that we
must seek to answer is whether any of the energy technologies being con-
sidered can add a significant amount to everyday risks.
There is yet another level at which risks should be considered-the level of
perception and preference. Human beings do not perceive scientific facts;
rather, they extrapolate from experience and information. This adds a
needed critical viewpoint to what is claimed to be "fact": it also makes it
possible for perceptions to be erroneous. These perceptions are then filtered
through a mixture of value judgments and prejudices that are combined as
"preferences"; again, something is added (by considering values) and some-
thing is lost (by considering unreasonable biases) in the process.
We are all aware of the mutable nature of perceptions and preferences.
They change with new information, new propaganda, and new paradigms for
viewing the human experience. This makes the study of perception a very
soft science indeed; it is nevertheless an important topic, since perception of
risk, more than risk itself, can limit the deployment of any technology. Spe-
cifically for nuclear power, perceived risks have clearly slowed down the
very high rate of market penetration that was evidenced some years ago.
How to extrapolate from present understanding of the nature of risk percep-
tion is still unknown. Our study could contribute to the reconciliation of
scientific and political realities over the long run and is presented in that
spirit.
SYNTHESIS THROUGH ENERGY SCENARIOS
The topics of energy demands, resources, technologies, and constraints must
be synthesized or integrated into a coherent whole in order to achieve our
goal-a comprehensive understanding of the nature of global energy systems
over the next 50 years. The synthesis is an important piece of analysis in its
own right, but it also interacts, iteratively and reiteratively, with the topics
already discussed.
The synthesis approach that we chose is neither unique nor "best." But
it does allow us to explore the changing scale of global energy needs-the
central role of large-scale primary energies and the structural changes under-
lying the long-term transition from cheap oil and gas to unconventional
fossil fuels and, eventually, to sustainable energy systems.
The long-range asymptotic target postulated in our study is to reach a
sustainable supply of liquid fuels through the use of the "endowments" of
nuclear breeders, the sun, and other renewable sources. The question
addressed in the synthesis is, To what extent might the world approach this
sustainable condition by the year 2030?
The analytical approach followed for the synthesis is not necessarily easily
identified. A first criterion for us was quantification. The energy problem is
extraordinarily complex, as we have already noted. One can hope to at least
be clear, if not exhaustive, by relying on quantitative analyses. Our synthesis
of energy demands, supplies, and constraints is a dynamic, quantitative one.
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The aim was to start with the general considerations and then proceed to
the specific. This is true both of quantitative aspects and of the setting of the
procedure: the analysis is global and is meant to provide a setting wherein
national policies can be tested and evaluated.
The particular approach chosen for the synthesis uses a set of mathemati-
cal models. These models are a special kind of tool. As introduction to them,
it may be helpful to distinguish three kinds of models.
The first comprises all laws of nature as incorporated in the natural
sciences, mostly physics. These laws are meant to represent nature precisely
and exactly within a given scope. More, they are seen as the ultimate expres-
sion of the behavior of nature for the type of phenomena in question. The
second kind of quantitative model is based largely on statistical or other
experimental data, without (necessarily, at least) implying the existence of
rigorous laws of nature. Such models are meant to approximate reality.
Examples are economic models that may forecast the development of an
economy for, say two or three years. It is conceded that there can be errors
in these forecasts, but the aim is to project real developments. A third kind
of model is meant to conceptualize a complex and conceivable development.
While such models are also quantitative, here such quantification is meant to
deal with an otherwise unmanageable complexity by providing inherent
consistency and an explicit identification of assumptions and results. In
other words, the third kind of model provides synthesis. The results of such
models are therefore not forecasts or predictions, in spite of being quantita-
tive. This clarification can hardly be overstated.
The models of the kind that we use here provide only a way of examining
the consequences of the assumptions that are made. The use of numbers in
these models is meant only to express qualitative features. In other words,
the numbers are intended solely as a means for expressing patterns. They
are indicative, not accurate and exhaustive.
Data-intensive methods are not very helpful for our purposes. It is, for
instance, not helpful to treat the long-range global energy problem on an
input-output basis. A fifty times fifty input-output matrix requires 2500
coefficients. With seven world regions, this would mean 17,500 coefficients.
Then one must study their self-consistent evolution in time, whereas transi-
tions of the underlying infrastructure are the real focus of our attention.
While giving the appearance of exactness, quite often this only means that
persisting ignorance is expressed in that format. Quite to the contrary, for
more short-term or immediate purposes such as input-output analysis, our
approach is highly valuable. Indeed, we employed an input-output analysis
for the more limited purpose of understanding investment implications of
the scenarios for particular world regions.
The desire for data robustness dictated our decision to avoid an approach
relying completely on prices, although we do not exclude the possibility of
this being ultimately feasible. Instead, we tried to grasp the energy problem
primarily in physical terms. For example, supplies were called for to match
the accounting of specific, technological energy end uses when studying
energy demand.
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Energy prices do matter, of course. They will have much to say about
future evolutions of energy systems. We took up the question of prices and
evaluated our results in that dimension. But future costs and prices are not
unambiguously known quantities. Our cost estimates are best described,
perhaps, as informed estimates. We therefore started from substantive, if not
engineering, analyses and then considered economy and world trade.
We tried to make explicit as many assumptions as possible. And for practi-
cal reasons as well as for reasons of principle, we wrote only two scenarios.
The first, the IIASA High scenario, arrived at average per capita consumption
values that are close to 5 kWyr/yr; the other, the IIASA Low scenario, came
close to 3 kWyr/yr. By writing more than one scenario, we emphasize that
we are not making predictions. There is inevitable uncertainty. And by
having two scenarios, two benchmarks were established that permit inter-
and extrapolation. Therefore, these two benchmark scenarios should not be
considered necessarily upper and lower limits. It is not difficult to conceive
of cases with more than 5 kWyr/yr per capita energy consumption or with
less than 5 kWyr/yr per capita energy consumption or with less than 3
kWyr/yr per capita.
We also considered three alternative cases, although not with the same
degree of completeness as the two scenarios. One of these alternatives deals
with a rigorous case of energy conservation in developed countries: it keeps
the global per capita energy consumption at 2 kWyr/yr. Another alternative
explored the effects of a worldwide nuclear moratorium; a final case postu-
lated a furore with as much nuclear power as possible.
The writing of the High and the Low scenarios and the consideration of the
alternatives was done by the use of mathematical models. Originally we were
tempted to have one overall model. Obviously this would become a large and
complex model. Realizing the persisting uncertainty and lack of data, as well
as the need for constant cross-checking and judgment of intermediate results,
we decided to have a set of (sub)models where each model evaluates only a
particular aspect of the problem.
This decision necessitated interfaces among the models where the output
of a precursor became the input of the follower model. This allowed for
human cross-checking and adjustment. Indeed, a judgmental element in the
modeling process was established, and this is intentional. It requires the user
of this model set to have a clear understanding of the problem that he or she
wants to evaluate. In a sense he or she must have understood the problem
beforehand. Donella Meadows, in a seminar at IIASA, called this having a
"mental model." This is essential; otherwise one is not able to ask intelli-
gent questions.
More than half of the effort of the IIASA Energy Systems Program was
devoted to developing a set of such mental models. Once the situation is
understood, semiquantitatively, by a mental model, the purpose of operating
the model set is to make analysis fully quantitative. This requires a choice of
input and relations for this analysis. Providing a background for such choices
was one of the purposes of the chapters of Parts II and III of this book,
where the exploratory research on the various topics in question is reported.
It is therefore not necessarily so that the full range of findings in these chap-
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ters of exploratory research is represented in the scenarios. It is possible to
arrive at a different set of input data than that used here in our scenarios-
that is, in the quantitative analysis of Part IV. But by having both-the
exploratory chapters and the quantitative analysis-the full picture should be
visible, and the reader is left with judgments of his or her own.
Along the lines of identifying more precisely the meaning of our quanti-
tative scenarios, it may be useful to list a number of questions that we had
in mind when building our model set:
• How much investment is needed to master the transition for the various
alternatives considered?
• To what extent does the use of unconventional fossil resources ease the
investment situation?
• What are the indirect impacts of these investments?
• Are there circumstances where the economy has to work for energy in-
stead of having energy work for the economy?
• What is the timing of such investments and what is their sequence?
• What are reasonable allocations of resources to the various world regions?
• What is the impact of an energy strategy chosen by one world region on
the other world regions?
• Can the developing countries make it?
• What is the strategic potential of energy conservation?
• How do alternative technologies compare in light of the above questions?
This list is meant to be illustrative but by no means exhaustive. Basically, it
all centers around the question, Do we have enough time? This is a question
of extreme importance, and its nature is broader than the scope expressed
in our scenarios. The exercise of going through our scenarios is therefore
meant to give insights and perspectives. Once that is accomplished, once a
pattern becomes visible, one may well forget the numbers of the scenarios
(eventually).
THINGS TO THINK ABOUT
The supply explorations and the scenario constructions are, in a sense, the
tangible products of our study; from them, insights and new views have
emerged. Yet, any study as comprehensive as our keeps turning up hints
of new things to think about. Many of these seem to us to be insights, but
until they are broadly accepted as such, they are opinions and hunches.
Still, there is no point in keeping them a secret. Perhaps our thoughts
have value. We selected a few of our opinions, ideas, and hunches and have
presented them separately in the book. They follow the supply and the
scenario parts, because the ideas emerged from considering these questions.
They are not conclusions.
We sought to improve understanding of the term "energy services" and
"capital stock services" used throughout the book. If the terms refer to
something immaterial, then what is the precise meaning? This led us to the
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notion of negentropy (i.e., negative entropy increment) and information:
indeed, for a small group of the scientific community this is a well-known
subject. We have tried to explain this relationship and, perhaps even more, to
view it within the context of our energy study as reported here. Some, per-
haps important, generalizations emerged, mostly of a heuristic nature. Never-
theless, they have given greater insight into the notion of consumptive and
investive uses of resources and the related idea of endowments of negentropy
that allow one to receive energy services indefinitely.
A second example is old new technologies. Priorities for research and
development will undoubtedly change when compared with today's situa-
tion, particularly with respect to development work on unconventional
fossil fuels, long-range transportation of natural gas, energy storage, water
splitting for the generation of hydrogen, and schemes for coal liquefaction.
We examined the numerous preferences and historically based trends in an
indicative manner only. But, given the nature of the IIASA Energy Systems
Program, it was not possible to explore in depth vast technological areas.
There are excellent groups worldwide that are well qualified to do this.
Rather, our goal was to focus on the pattern of which these technologies are
a part and thereby to view them anew.
We also examined the notion of energy densities for both consumption
and production. This has been useful in our consideration of urbanization,
underscoring the importance of spatial considerations as opposed to
temporal ones. Research on energy densities is only at the beginning stage
and will contribute greatly to the understanding of the relationships among
energy, urban planning, and regional development. While this subject is
beyond the scope of the Energy Systems Program, we hope that we have
been able to make a contribution.
Finally, we addressed ourselves to the hotly debated hard-soft controversy.
In fact, this sometimes seems to be the energy controversy. We therefore
did more than our expressed aim of merely providing a factual basis for
political decisionmaking. Again, we recognize the seriousness and dimensions
of such political and societal issues. However, through the exploratory and
quantitative stages of our analysis, we have gained a certain perspective on
the hard-soft controversy that needs to be explained.
ADDING IT ALL UP
Ultimately, it is necessary to synthesize our findings and to define a pattern
for the global energy problem, since it is this pattern-along with other
elements-that will affect the future of individuals and of mankind as a
whole. We have done this in Part VI, in which we have made assessments and
considered the implications of the study findings.
A positive view has emerged: the energy problem can be solved, but at an
expense. It may well turn out that the institutional, societal, and political
problems that have not been dealt with explicitly in this study are over-
whelmingly large and that their solution might be expensive. But by clarify-
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ing the factual basis of the energy problem we hope to have contributed to
their solution.
Throughout the study we have been guided by the belief in the earth as a
"finite" world. Indeed, the fossil resources of the earth are finite; the global
comprehensiveness of our study has shown us this. But the reality of the
situation has led us to view conditions and facts anew and to develop a vision
of how the global energy problem could be solved.
APPENDIX lA: THE SEVEN WORLD REGIONS
OF THE IIASA ENERGY SYSTEMS PROGRAM
Region I: North America (NA)
Highly developed market economies with energy resources.
Canada
United States of America
Region II: The Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe (SUjEE)
Highly developed centrally planned economies with energy resources.
Albania
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
German Democratic Republic
Hungary
Poland
Romania
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Region III: W. Europe, Japan, Australia, New
Zealand, South Africa, and Israel (WE/J ANZ)
Highly developed market economies with relatively low energy resources.
Member Countries of the European Community
Belgium
Denmark
France
Germany, Federal Republic of
Ireland
Italy
Luxemburg
Netherlands
United Kingdom
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Other Western European Countries
Austria
Cyprus
Finland
Greece
Iceland
Norway
Others
Australia
Israel
Japan
Region IV: Latin America (LA)
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
Yugoslavia
New Zealand
South Africa
Developing economies with some energy resources and significant population
growth.
Argentina
Bahamas
Belize
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cuba
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
EI Salvador
Guadeloupe
Guatemala
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Jamaica
Martinique
Mexico
Netherlands Antilles
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Puerto Rico
Surinam
Trinidad and Tobago
Uruguay
Venezuela
Other Caribbean
Region V: Africa (Except Northern Africa and
South Africa), South and Southeast Asia (Af/SEA)
Slowly developing economies with some energy resources and significant
population growth.
Africa
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burundi
Cameroon
Cape Verde
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Africa
Central African Republic
Chad
Congo
Ethiopia
Gabon
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea Bissau
Ivory Coast
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Malta
Mauritania
Mauritius
Morocco
Asia
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Brunei
Burma
Comoros
Hong Kong
India
Indonesia
Korea, Republic of (South)
Macau
Malaysia
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Reunion
Rhodesia
Rwanda
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Somalia
Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania, United Republic of
Togo
Tunisia
Uganda
Upper Volta
Western Sahara
Zaire
Zambia
Nepal
Pakistan
Papua New Guinea
Philippines
Singapore
Sri Lanka
Taiwan
Thailand
East Timor
West South Asia n.e.s.
Region VI: Middle East and Northern
Africa (ME/NAf)
Developing economies with large energy resources.
Member Countries of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries (OAPEC)
Algeria
Bahrain
Egypt
Iraq
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Member Countries of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries (OAPEC)
Kuwait
Libyan Arab Republic
Qatar
Others
Saudi Arabia
Syrian Arab Republic
United Arab Emirates
Iran
Jordan
Lebanon
Oman
Yemen
Yemen, People's Democratic Republic of
Region VII: China and Centrally Planned Asian
Economies (CjCPA)
Developing centrally planned economies with energy resources.
China, People's Republic of
Kampuchea, Democratic (formerly Cambodia)
Korea, Democratic Republic of
Laos, People's Democratic Republic of
Mongolia
Viet-Nam, Socialist Republic of
APPENDIX '18: UNITS AND DEFINITIONS
Conversion Factors
The following gives the definitions of units of measure used throughout this
book as numerical multiples of coherent Standard International (SI) units.
The exact definition is indicated by V; other numbers are approximate to
the number of digits shown.
1 acre = 4,046.8564224 m2
1 bar = 100,000 N/m 2
1 barrel (petroleum, 42 gallons) =0.1589873 m 3
1 Btu (British thermal unit) = 1055 J
1 calorie (thermochemical) = 4.184 J
1elecrronvolt = 1.60210 X 10-19 J
1 erg = 10-7 J
1 foot = 0.3048 m
1 gallon (U.K., liquid) = 4.546087 X 10-3 m 3
1 gallon (U.S., liquid) = 3.785411784 X 10-3 m 3
V
V
V
V
V
V
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1 hectare = 10,000 m2 V
1 horsepower (metric) = 736 W V
1 inch = 0.0254 m V
1 kilopond = 9.80665 N V
1 langley =41,840 J/m 2 V
1 pound force = 4.4482216152605 N V
1 pound mass = 0.45359237 kg V
1 mile (U.S. statute) = 1609.344 m V
1 millibar = 100 N/m 2 V
1 nautical mile = 1852 m V
1 ton (long) = 1016.0469088 kg V
1 ton (metric) = 1000 kg V
1 ton (short, 2000 pounds) = 907.18474 kg V
1 Wyr = 31,536 X 103 J V
1 yard = 0.9144 m V
Useful Approximations
1 million barrels of oil per
day (1 mbd) ~ 71 GWyr/yr
1 Mbd ~ 50 million tons of oil per year
1 Btu ~ 1 kJ
1TWyr ~ 30 Quad
1 TWyr ~ 109 tce
Prefixes
Factor Prefix Symbol
1018 exa E
1015 peta D
1012 a tera T
109 glga G
106 mega M
103 kilo k
102 hecto h
101 deka da
10-1 deci d
10-2 centi c
10-3 milli m
10-6 mIcro J1
10-9 nano n
10-12 pIca p
10-15 femto f
10-18 atto a
al TW (terawatt); 1012 W.
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II ENERGY SUPPLY

2 FOSSIL ENERGY RESOURCES
INTRODUCTION
Fossil resources playa major role in present energy balances and will con-
tinue to do so during the ultimate transition to the use of nonfossil fuels.
And over the long term, fossil resources will still be needed as feedstocks for
the chemical industry and/or as raw materials for producing substitute fuels,
such as gasoline and methanol.
The cumulative demand for fossil energy resources up to the year 2030
will depend on the absolute level of energy consumption-the larger the total
energy consumption, the larger will be the probable demand for fossil fuels.
Such demand is likely because of the inherent market penetration difficulties
of new energy technologies-as experienced today with nuclear fission. (See
Chapter 8 for a discussion of the market penetration process.)
Shifting too soon or too quickly to more expensive (both economically
and socially) energy sources and structures could harm society needlessly.
Shifting too late or too slowly might also impose inescapable pressures on
some fossil resources. Both actions could result, for example, in soaring
energy prices and consequent damage to economies, as has already been
experienced during the 1973-1974 oil crisis.
The transition from the use of fossil fuels is inevitable. However, the
massive supply infrastructure now in place to use fossil resources-particu-
larly refined petroleum, methane, and coal-will have to be employed during
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this transition from fossil fuel use j in fact, this infrastructure may determine
the kinds of synthetic fuels that will have to be produced over the next
twenty to thirty years. Thereafter, a new infrastructure can be adapted to
different synthetic fuels.
How long this transitional period will last and at what rate it will take
place will be governed by the availability of fossil fuels. Availability, in turn,
will depend upon the real amount of fossil resources and on the physical,
political, and institutional capabilities to supply them.
Knowledge of the amount of fossil energy resources, especially of hydro-
carbons, and of the fraction that could be recovered is unfortunately inade-
quate at present for planning a smooth and optimized transition. Because
access to the geological data depends greatly on governments, such knowl-
edge can be gained only through joint, international effort.
RESERVES AND RESOURCES
A summary of the differences between reserves and resources is given below,
based on the McKelvey classification of resources and reserves presented
earlier in Figure 1-8.
• Reserves are geologically and geographically identified resources that are
economically and technically recoverable and producible under present
conditions or under conditions that are expected to prevail in the near
future.
• Resources can be of two types-identified resources that are presently
considered nonproducible for economic reasons (e.g., oil shale deposits
or uranium from sea water) or those portions of a given resource that are
not identified but are surmised to exist. This latter group can be further
divided into so-called hypothetical resources that occur in areas that are
only partially explored or geologically known (e.g., potential oil fields in
the North Sea) or into so-called speculative resources that occur in prac-
tically unknown or unexplored geological areas (e.g., deep ocean basins).
There are three major ways of increasing reserves.
• By raising the price. Previously uneconomical deposits may then become
profitable. (Of course, we are assuming that production costs will not
increase as much. This happened after the 1973-1974 oil price increases,
with apparently no, or very little, increase in oil reserves.)
• By improving the technology or developing new technologies. The success
of underground coal gasification, for instance, could increase global coal
reserves dramatically; enhanced oil recovery is another example. Very
often, raising the price and improving a developing technology act jointly
to increase reserves.
• By discovery, as a result of exploration. (This includes revisions and/or
extensions to known deposits.) Thus, hypothetical or speculative re-
sources are transferred to the identified category.
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When we say that energy resources are poorly known we mean that there
is generally no reliable assessment of unidentified, undiscovered resources
and/or that our understanding of the possible role of new technologies is too
poor to permit reasonable estimates over the next 50 years. Nevertheless,
a long-term perspective must rely on energy resources and not on energy
reserves. In order to better grasp the resource problem, we present in Table
2-1 a comparison of reserves and resources supplementary to the McKelvey
classification of resources and reserves. Because of the large amount of coal
reserves and the much debated situation of oil and gas resources, we shall
concentrate here more on oil resource problems. However, many of the argu-
ments could be valid-possibly with minor changes-for other mineral
resources.
Interest in reserves has always been very large, since they serve as a basis
for planning industrial production. On the other hand, interest in resources
has been mostly episodic, often on a "hobby" basis and generally lacking
strong official support. The time horizon for reserves is short to medium
term-say, about twenty years-which is sufficient for sustaining industrial
activity. Resources have a longer term horizon, generally fifty years or more.
In fact, in Canada the time horizon for resources is about 25 years, whereas
some Soviet publications mention one hundred years. The World Energy
Conference (WEC) of 1974 refers to a "foreseeable future" and the World
Energy Conference of 1978 to "some time in the future." While such time
horizons appear highly uncertain, decisions for the energy sector are binding
for a growing length of time.
Up to now, reserves had to be economically recoverable-that is, profit-
able. Criteria for determining profitability were established by industry,
which, as a result, concentrated mostly on these so-defined profitable
deposits (e.g., giant or supergiant oil fields). Clearly, these criteria should be-
and are being-revised from a more national viewpoint. Resources by defini-
tion are known to be either presently noneconomical or hypothetical (or
Table 2-1. Comparison of reserves versus resources.
Interest in
Time horizon
Economic aspect
Estimated by
Data
Methods
Reserves
Large
10 to 30 years
Must be profitable
Industry
More or less reliable, conservative,
"proprietary," and exploita-
tion oriented
Industrial work (expensive):
exploration, drilling, and
measurements
Resources
None in the past, now
emerging
Long or very long term
Nonprofitable today, "science
fiction" technology
Industrial or governmental
institutions
Uncertain or speculative, but
scientifically oriented
Paper or computer work:
"geological," "historical,"
and so forth
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even speculative) by nature. It is sometimes assumed that they will become
economical in the medium- or long-term future because of a breakthrough
of new technologies, which has the flavor of science fiction when looked at
by today's industrial criteria.
The crucial problem of resource assessment is posed by the data. Many
countries and/or specialized organizations publish national and international
data on reserves of coal, oil, and gas. But comparing and aggregating these
data are often difficult because of varying definitions. The problem is even
more difficult at the global level. For coal, WEe is making a major effort to
collect national data. However, there is no similar effort for oil and gas, and
many countries generally do not publish data on resources or any related
data that would permit their calculation. Additionally, most of these data
are proprietary.a
Some individuals and institutions-for example, the U.S. Geological
Surveyor the American Gas Association-publish periodic estimates of
global oil or gas resources, disaggregated at best into a handful of regional
groupings (and rarely given in detail). Few if any of these estimates can claim
"official value." Apart from a few recent exceptions, none of them has given
the data used and with which a cross-checking of the results would be
possible. Only a few groups have stated the assumptions or explained the
methodology used, usually in very general terms.
Basically there are two methods for assessing oil resources-historical
statistics and geological analogy-and in many instances both can be used
jointly. A summary of these methods is given in Table 2-2.
Historical statistics became famous with M. King Hubbert (of the U.S.
Geological Survey). The method involves the use of production, reserves,
and mostly, discovery statistics (e.g., the historical evolution of oil dis-
covered according to the drilling footage) to calculate the ultimate amount
of oil to be produced. The method is interesting but relies too much on the
assumed continuation of past trends far into the future. Moreover, on a
global basis, its main weakness is the scarcity of good historical data for
most countries: the only reliable data are generally those for production.
Statistics on reserves generally do not distinguish between revisions (with
possible backdating to the year of the discovery) and new discoveries. Data
on drilling are poor and generally do not separate exploratory from develop-
ment drilling, for instance. The mathematical treatment emphasizes too
much the logistic type of curve (for cumulative production and discoveries)
and assumes somewhat arbitrarily a negative exponential for the discovery
rate per foot of drilling, placing too much importance on the last recorded
point on which the curve is fitted.
Geological analogy has been used on a broad scale. In its more detailed
and refined version, it has been the favorite tool of oil companies for about a
decade. Major petroleum companies are practically the only ones to own a
aFor petroleum resource assessment, one must also consider the purpose of the assessment and
be aware of any possible bias introduced by those making the assessment. This is also probably true
for coal and other mineral resources.
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Table 2-2. Comparison of methods for assessing 0;1 resources.
Historical Statistics
Choice of representative statistics,
e.g., discovery rate t!.R/t!.X
Extrapolation to the future
Geological Analogy
Principles
Definition of sedimentary regions
or basins
Comparisons with some reference
regions or basins:
Subjective (current method)
Scientific (being developed)
Disadvantages
Requires long statistical history that
only very few countries have
Biased by political, economic, and
technological factors
Poor (and insufficient) knowledge of
unexplored or little explored basins
No precise experience of ultimate
recovery in a reference basin (even
in the United States)
large amount of data, resulting from exploration and exploitation. A few of
these companies have such data on a global basis (although the data do not
include comparative figures from most countries with centrally planned
economies). These limitations must be kept in mind when considering the
few published global fossil energy resource assessments.
COAL RESOURCES
In the United States, coal was displaced by oil and gas as a prime energy fuel
shortly before the Second World War; this substitution occurred in the rest
of the Western world somewhat later. Oil and gas are much cheaper to pro-
duce (especially in the prolific fields of the Middle East) and much easier to
handle and to use. However, the international oil crisis of 1973-1974, the
fear of potential oil embargoes, and the feeling that oil and gas reserves and
resources are dwindling have led to renewed interest in global resources of
coal, which are enormous.
Global Coal Resources and Reserves
According to WEC (l978a), global coal resources are estimated at 10,126
billion (109 ) tons of coal equivalent (tce)-or more than 1200 years of
today's total global commercial energy consumption (or almost 4000 years
of present global coal production). This figure does not include coal occur-
rences that are known and exist worldwide; nevertheless, this estimate is
considered realistic by the WEC experts. Although the data given are accom-
panied by particulars of seam thickness and depth, a breakdown of the tables
according to seam thickness and depths is not possible.
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Less staggering are the WEC (l978a) figures for global coal reserves. The
coal reserves currently estimated as technically and economically recoverable
amount to 637 billion tce. (This figure is almost five times higher than the
WEC (l978b) figure for oil reserves and almost one and a half times higher
than the present estimates of ultimately recoverable conventional oil re-
sources.) Moreover, according to WEC experts it is very likely that this coal
reserve figure could double over the next decades, reaching a value of about
1200 billion tce by 2020. In other words, assuming no additions to the
10,000 billion tce of coal resources, only 6 percent of the localized resources
would have to be transferred to the reserves to reach the figure of 1200 bil-
lion tce. Or equivalently, some 0.14 percent of the presently known coal
resources would have to be transferred every year to the reserves in order to
reach the reserve figure of 1200 billion tce in 2020 (plus the amount neces-
sary to compensate for cumulative consumption, of course).
These figures should be looked at in the light of the rate of increase from
1974 WEC estimates: resources increased from 8603 billion tce in 1974 to
9045 billion tce in 1975 and to 10,126 billion tce in 1977-that is, a 1523
billion tce increase over the three-year period or an average increase of 5.9
percent per year. Similarly, reserves increased from 473 billion tce in 1974
to 560 billion tce in 1975 and to 637 billion tce in 1977-that is, a 164
billion tce increase in three years or an average increase of 11.6 percent per
year (mostly because of improved economic conditions due to energy price
increases). Or equivalently, about 0.5 percent per year of the resources were
transferred to reserves (as compared to 0.14 percent mentioned in the
above paragraph).
Evidently this process of additions to resources and reserves is far from
being at an end (Hafele et al. 1976). In fact, the experts of the WEC study
judge that in addition to currently estimated resources and reserves, there
is a considerable "potential behind the potential."
Resources and reserves have to be looked at dynamically. Nothing illus-
trates better the potential for additions even in a known coal district than
the Selby story: a new coal field of 600 million tons of clean, dirt-free
reserves was discovered in 1972 in the Yorkshire coal region in the United
Kingdom that had previously been explored unsuccessfully.
In contrast to oil, there has not yet been a very intensive search for coal,
mainly because of the convenience of known reserves and the declining use
of coal as an energy source in many countries. Conditions are changing and
new tools and techniques (e.g., seismic exploration adapted from the oil
industry) are opening up interesting possibilities for coal exploration (e.g.,
Grenon 1977; Meyer 1977). These could be of particular importance for
developing countries, for obvious reasons. First, in many of these countries
coal occurrences are already known to exist. There too, manpower can be
made available relatively cheaply. Of course, there as elsewhere pollution
problems cannot be ignored, but they are not considered so imminent as in
developed countries, and solutions therefore need not be immediate. Most
important, even small-sized discoveries could be worthy of special atten-
tion. For a developing country, with energy consumption equivalent at best
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to a few million tee per year (say, at a 50 to 500 kg of coal equivalent per
capita level), a coal deposit of a few tens of millions of tons could be
valuable.
Some additional comments on global coal resources and reserves are in
order here. WEC (1978a) does not give details on the share of strippable
coal resources, which is unfortunate in light of the growing importance of
surface mining (Grenon 1979). Recall that in the 1974 WEC survey of
energy resources, about 23 percent of U.S. coal reserves were estimated
to be economically recoverable by stripping. For geological and geographical
reasons, this percentage is probably too high at the global level.
As mentioned above, the transfer of resources to reserves can occur in
one of three ways-by increasing prices, by technical change, and by dis-
covery (i.e., improving geological knowledge). For coal, technological change
can and will undoubtedly playa major role. The booming importance of
surface mining is a striking example. Surface coal mines in the western part
of the United States now operate at a 10 to 20 million ton per year level.
Garsdorf, in the FRG, has established a record with 50 million tons per
year; a few kilometers away, in Hambach, plans are being made for a possible
100 million ton per year operation by the end of this century. Mines pro-
ducing 50 or even 100 million tons per year are also planned or projected
in Siberia.
But the coal industry, if it wants to survive globally for a long time, will
have to go underground. Not much has been done yet, and surface mining
can only buy time. Of the many possibilities-from robotization to chemical
or bacterial leaching-only underground gasification has been used (mainly
in the USSR) and is presently being explored thoroughly in, for example,
Belgium, France, the FRG, Poland, and the United States.b The possible
success of this technology could influence strongly the transfer of resources
to reserves, as well as the addition of new resources. For instance, the
success of the INIEX (Belgium) under pressure coal gasification process
would open up quite new resources-namely, coal deposits located deeper
than 1000 or 1200 meters that are generally not included in the reserves
estimates. (For example, in northern extensions of the FRG Ruhr coal fields
or in offshore coal fields such as those under the North Sea, the limit for
resources is generally at 1800 or 2000 meters.) Considering all these factors,
some experts have suggested that ultimately, total global coal resources
could possibly be two or even three times higher than the presently accepted
figure of some 10,000 billion tee.
However, there are factors that may also lower coal resources and re-
serves. Prices and costs are two such factors. Oil prices could demonstrate
some tendency toward stabilization (in constant money), while coal costs,
on the other hand, may continue their upward trend, thereby reducing pro-
gressively their temporary economic advantage. As a result, reserves could
bit is interesting to note that sloping coal beds toO steep for practical mining actually present an
advantage from the viewpoint of underground gasification-a good example of the influence of tech-
nology on the dynamic evolution of reserves and resources.
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again be shifted back to identified but uneconomical resources. (This hap-
pened in the United Kingdom during the 1950s and 1960s.)
The ability of coal deposits to be mined is also a major open question,
especially for underground coal fields. Some experts (e.g., Fettweis 1979)
have expressed doubt that all "recoverable" reserves are actually mineable
or that they would be mined, because of decreased accessibility, among
other reasons.
Finally, the difficulties and the associated high costs of transporting coal
over long distances (2000 to 5000 km) should be carefully considered in
estimating coal resources and reserves. Major coal fields, such as those in
the western part of the United States or in Soviet Siberia, lie very far from
consuming centers. This problem is aggravated by the low quality of the coal
in these areas (mostly subbituminous coal or lignite). However, coal "refin-
ing" technologies are now emerging and pointing to the possibilities of trans-
forming coal into almost anything-synthetic natural gas, liquid fuels,
methanol, and so forth-although the economic picture is still somewhat less
promising. In Chapter 3, we discuss the use of coal for liquid fuel produc-
tion, presenting a strategy for using coal prudently during the transition
period from conventional fossil fuels.
Regional Distribution of Coal Resources and Reserves
Coal resources and reserves are very unevenly distributed worldwide, as can
be seen from Table 2-3. The three major coal countries-China, the USSR,
and the United States-together have some 8868 billion tce or about 87.6
percent of the world's total coal resources. These three countries also have
the largest reserves (178 billion tce for the United States, 110 billion tce for
the USSR, and 99 billion tce for China), although their total share of 386
billion tce is proportionately smaller than that for coal resources (60 percent
as against 87.6 percent). This is normal because the smaller the resources, the
greater the efforts to know more about reserves.
Note also in Table 2-3 that the countries of the second category (100 to
1000 billion tce) each have coal resources equivalent to or greater than total
global oil reserves; however, some of them consider themselves generally
"energy poor." (Such comparisons must, of course, be handled with care,
since resources in the ground are very different from recoverable reserves.)
New exploration is expected to increase the number of countries in the
third and fourth categories shown in Table 2-3, especially with respect to
the developing countries. This would not necessarily change the total global
coal resources appreciably, but it could influence the energy balance of these
developing countries and possibly the potential global energy trade.
Table 2-4 gives the distribution of global coal resources and reserves
among the seven IIASA world regionsc calculated from WEC (l978a) data.
cSee Figure 1-3 for a definition of these regions and Appendix 1 A for a list of the countries in
each of these regions.
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Table 2-4. Coal resources and reserves for the seven IIASA regions (in
109 tce).
Coal Resources Coal Reserves
Region Hard Coal Brown Coal Total Hard Coal Brown Coal Total
I (NA) 1286 1400 2686 122 65 187
II (SU/EE) 4127 892 5019 107 41 148
III (WE/jANZ) 683 80 763 117 29 146
IV (LA) 25 9.3 34.3 4.9 5.9 10.8
V (Af/SEA) 179 4.9 184 43 1.9 44.9
VI (ME/NAf) 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.2
VII (C/CPA) 1427 13.4 1440 99 NA 99
Total a 7727.4 2399.6 ~10.127 493.10 142.8 635.9
a Regional figures do not sum to totals because of rounding.
bNA-not available.
Source: Based on data from World Energy Conference (1978a).
In general, we have considered two cost categories for coal-less than $25/tce
and between $25 and $50/tce. It seems that in many regions large amounts
of coal can be produced at these costs. This includes IIASA region III (WEI
JANZ); it is known that some production costs in Europe are already higher
than the upper limit of $50/tce (France and the FRG, minimum $75/tce;
Belgium, $100/tce), but this region also includes South Africa, Australia,
and the United Kingdom, with reasonable to very low production costs.
The "economically recoverable" reserves have been put in the first cate-
gory (except for region III, because of the above comments) and part of the
resources remaining to be identified in the second category. For the USSR,
the United States, and China, only 10 percent of resources have been con-
sidered. However, the figures are already sufficiently high so that including
more would not change very much-at least with our time horizon of 2030.
Moreover, for these countries, and probably also for others, the possibility
that some of the reserves may finally appear in the higher cost category is
not excluded, but some of the resources remaining to be identified can re-
place them in the lowest category. These assumptions are not contradictory
to the WEC experts' assumption of increasing total global coal reserves to
1200 billion tce by about 2020. Because these figures-1200 or 1500 billion
tce-are already very large, we did not make supplementary assumptions
about the ultimate recoverability factor (estimated at 50 percent by some
experts) of total global resources.
Because of the threatening "shortage" of oil and because of the very big
differences in coal resources among various regions and even more so among
various countries, the subject of a global coal market is heard more and more
frequently.d Although it is somewhat outside the scope of this chapter, we
dAccording to WEC (I978al the existing international coal market was given as 7.7 percent of total
global coal production in 1975. Because at the time of the WEC study no clear trend was apparent
toward a larger world coal market, only small prospects for such a potential world coal market were
given-8.9 percent of total output (i.e., about 788 X 106 tce) in 2020.
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comment briefly on this subject here. One major question relates to the
possible supply role of the three coal giants (the USSR, the United States,
and China), which have tremendous resources but also very large domestic
energy requirements. It is not clear whether these countries would be willing
and/or able to manage additional capacity for an export market, although
this may serve political or economic purposes. Potential customers could also
be reluctant to increase their "energy dependence" on these political giants.
Finally, there are only a few countries that have both large energy require-
ments and few coal resources and as such could be major coal buyers-Japan
and some countries of southern Europe are examples.
Illustrative Coal Production Levels
Figure 2-1 shows the possible coal production curve for the world proposed
by the WEC (l978a) study. For our purposes, the production curve has been
extrapolated according to the following two assumptions:
• From 2020 onwards, production would stabilize at the maximum level
of 8.7 billion tce per year. This level could be maintained until 2065
if proven reserves were to remain at the 640 billion tce level, but it could
be maintained until 2130 if the reserves were to be increased, as sug-
gested by the WEC experts, to 1200 billion tce.
• Production could possibly continue to increase up to a maximum of 12
billion tce per year, which would be reached around 2040, assuming the
Figure 2-1. Coal: possible production and Iifetime of global reserves. Sol id Iine based
on data from WEC (1978a); dashed line is II A5A ex trapolation.
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continuation of the previous rate of growth. Thereafter, production of
12 billion tce per year could continue until 2055 with reserves limited
at 640 billion tce or until 2100 if the reserves were to be raised to the
1200 billion tce level.
The various extensions of the production curve shown in Figure 2-1 are
useful for illustrating roughly the possible continuation of global coal pro-
duction, based on present known reserves or on reasonable assumptions
about their potential increases. These extensions are based on estimates of
reserves and resources j the WEC experts were aware of the political, socio-
logical, and environmental problems associated with such production levels.
We do not repeat their arguments here. Also, such production levels raise the
question of a possible carbon dioxide problem, which will be discussed in
Chapter 10.
OIL RESOURCES
Because of the present and future major role of oil, knowledge of "appar-
ently" limited oil resources is of crucial importance. Unfortunately, efforts
to improve such knowledge have not been commensurate with the impor-
tance of the problem. One reason for this may be that although the final
exhaustion of oil resources has been forecasted periodically, new discoveries
have periodically postponed this. As a result, there is popular faith in in-
finitely new oil discoveries.
From Historical to Delphi Estimates
Over the past thirty-five years, there have been about twenty-five estimates
(less then one per year) of ultimate recoverable global oil resources (defined
as past cumulative production and proven reserves plus recoverable oil re-
maining to be discovered). These twenty-five estimates are, in fact, not
independent. M. King Hubbert has contributed two estimates; Moody (from
Mobil Oil Company, United States), three; and Weeks (from Weeks Natural
Resources, United States), eight; and Klemme (of Weeks Natural Resources,
United States), one. Because of the mutual influence of some estimates (such
as the very good one from Moody presented at the Eighth World Petroleum
Congress in 1975 [Moody and Esser 1975]), there are some half-dozen
independent estimates.
In the course of time, these estimates have shown a general trend toward
increasing values; this trend was somewhat reversed in the first half of the
1970s and was followed by some convergence in 1975 and 1976 around
Moody's estimate (232 billion tons of oil remaining to be produced, plus
about 45 billion tons already produced). It is also interesting to observe that
the dispersion of estimates was about the same between 1945 and 1950 as
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Table 2-5. Historical world oil resource estimates.
Estimate Estimate
Year Name Company (x 109 bbl) (x ]09 tonsf
1946 Duce Aramco 500 68
1946 Pogue 615 84
1948 Weeks jersey 617 84
1949 Levorsen Stanford 1635 224
1949 Weeks jersey 1015 139
1958 Weeks jersey 1500-3000 205-411
1959 Weeks 2000-3500 274-479
1965 Hend ric ks b USGS 1984-2480 272-340
1968 Weeks Weeks 2200-3350 301-459
1969 Hubbert USGS (1350-2000) (185-274)
1970 Moody Mobil 1800 247
1971 Warman BP (1200-2000) (164-274)
1971 Weeks Weeks 2290-3490 314-478
1972 jodry Sun 1952 267
1973 Odell UNIV. 4000 548
1974 Ki rkby. Adams BP (1600-2000) (220-274)
1975 Moody Moody (1705-2030-2505) {234-278-343}
95% 5% 95% 5%
1976 Grossling USGS (1960-2200- (268-301-
3000-5600) 411-767
1976 Klemme Weeks 1600 219
1977 Parent, Linden IGT 2000 274
1977 Delphi IFP 2200-2500 305-350
1978 Moody Moody 2030 278
1978 Nehring Rand (CIA) (1700-2000-2300) (233-274-315)
aRounded figure.
bEstimated oil in place. The two values correspond to the two different recovery rates.
that occurring twenty-five years later (between 1970 and 1975), as can be
seen in Table 2-5 and Figure 2-2.
Table 2-5 lists the global oil estimates that we considered, excluding those
not formally presented or referred to as private discussion. Most of the
original values were given in barrels of oil (column 4) and have been con-
verted into metric tons (using 7.3 barrels per ton, column 5). When two
values are given with a slash, they refer to two values actually given by the
estimator, such as Weeks' two different assumptions on type and value of
recovery. When two or more values are given in brackets, they refer to a
range of values, with or without a proposed average. In the case of Delphi, the
values given are the two averages selected by the estimator.e All these values
have been put on the graph in Figure 2-2.
A major oil resources assessment was made in 1977 by a group led by
elf we take a higher value, 300 X 109 tons remaining to be produced, and add past cumulative
production, we get 345 X 109 tons, or about 2500 X 109 barrels, which is one-eighth higher than the
often quoted value of 2000 X 109 barrels.
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Figure 2-2. Evolution of ultimate world oil resource estimates.
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Desprairies (1977), under the sponsorship of WEe. Some thirty experts
worldwide contributed to the study, which to our knowledge was the first
time that the Delphi method was used for assessing oil resources. The aim
was to reach a consensus among these expertsJ
This Delphi study is undoubtedly one of the best sources of information-
data plus accompanying comments. By making these comments available,
Desprairies has invited those interested to form their own opinion. We have
done just that.
Figure 2-3 interprets graphically the data of the main table of this Delphi
study. An assumption imposed on the participating experts was that produc-
tion costs (excluding taxes and profit) must not exceed $20 per barrel (1976
U.S. dollars) by 2000. (Recall that in 1976 more than 50 percent of the
world's oil probably was produced at less than $2 per barrel.) With this
limitation-which some experts considered a constraint for deep offshore
and polar areas-it may be seen that the answers covered a broad range,
from a low 173 billion tons to a high 550 to 950 billion tons of oil (averaged
in Figure 2-3 as a single 750 billion tons of oil value). More then 90 percent
of the experts considered that the ultimate resources remaining to be pro-
fThis objective was not really achieved, as three opinion groups emerged-pessimistic, moderate,
and optimistic. Anyhow, consensus is not proof. And history is full of examples where all (or a large
number) of experts were wrong at the same time.
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duced would be higher than 225 billion tons (compared to 1977 reserves
of 88 billion tons); 25 percent of this group predicted that ultimate
resources remaining to be produced would be higher than 300 billion tons;
while the "majority" (about two-thirds) estimated resources to be between
225 and 300 billion tons.
Based on the assumption that the recovery rate of the oil originally in
place would increase worldwide from the present 25 to 40 percent toward
the end of the century, Desprairies estimated the ultimate recoverable oil
resources remaining to be produced (as of 1977) at 300 billion tons, includ-
ing deep offshore and polar areas. We note that the author of this Delphi
study has a slight tendency to exclude deep offshore and polar areas
(reducing ultimate resources to 260 billion tons if all of the estimates are
included and to 240 billion tons for the central, majority opinion, which is
very close to the 232 billion tons of Moody's value). Nevertheless, we gen-
erally prefer to retain these areas and to keep the 300 billion ton value. Our
time horizon, up to 2030 or longer, is also greater than that of Desprairies
(2020).
The authors of the Delphi study noted that between now and the end of
the century exploration costs may double; development costs would prob-
ably also increase, but at a slower rate than exploration costs. The opinions
(or the "educated guesses") of the experts were that 36 percent of these 300
billion tons of oil could be produced at less than $5 per barrel, 26 percent
between $5 and $12 per barrel, and 38 percent at more than $12 per barrel
(all prices in 1976 U.S. dollars).
Figure 2-3. Oil resources remaining to be produced. Source: Based on data from
Desprairies (1977).
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Regional Distribution of Ultimate Oil Resources
Whether we consider all of the estimates of the Delphi study or only the
central ones-say, the eighteen answers between 200 and 300 billion tons of
oil remaining to be produced-we can observe very broad variations in the
regional attributions of oil resources, which makes the selection of a single
regional distribution very difficult. For deep offshore and polar areas, for
instance, the experts' estimates vary from 0 to 180 billion tons (all of the
experts)-that is, from 0 to about twice today's proven reserves-or from
o to 50 billion tons of oil (the "majority" of experts). Even for North
America, which is the most extensively explored region (with more than
2.5 million oil and gas wells), assessments still vary broadly-6.2 to 50
billion tons if all estimates are considered and 15.6 to 45 billion tons (which
is still a factor of three) for the eighteen values in the 200 to 300 billion ton
range. These values for North America (which includes the United States and
Canada) can be compared with the values estimated in 1975 by Miller et al.
(1975) for the United States-(minimum) 37.4 billion tons (95 percent
probability); (maximum) 59.6 billion tons (5 percent probability).
Table 2-6 gives the distribution of the ultimate oil resources remaining
to be produced (derived from the Delphi study) among the seven IIASA
world regions and, for comparison, the proven reserves as of 1 January 1978
(International Petroleum Encyclopedia 1978). It can be seen that the share
of the Middle East and North Africa resources (mostly those of the Middle
East) remains very important, although this share is somewhat less than that
for proven reserves.
We judge that the resources of three geographical areas-South America,
Africa, and East and Southeast Asia-have been underestimated in the Delphi
study, considering their prospective areas. Aggregated data according to the
IIASA world regions are also given in Table 2-6, together with total, cumula-
tive drilling activities (Grossling 1976). Prospective areas have been calcu-
lated onshore and offshore up to a depth of 200 meters-that is, they do not
include the deep offshore areas referred to in the Delphi study. We note,
however, that the outline of the prospective area changes with time and de-
pends on the author and the criteria being used.g The last column of the
table gives the drilling densities or the number of wells per thousand square
kilometers of prospective areas.
There is no doubt that these figures, as pointed out rightly by Grossling,
show a "drilling gap" (i.e., very large differences in the drilling densities for
various regions). Curiously, the two lowest figures are for region VI
(ME/NAf) and for region V (AflSEA). The two cases differ completely and
illustrate the need for care in addressing world oil perspectives. Region VI
has been drilled very little, but with exceptional success. The area of region
V is very large (12,169,000 km2 onshore and 5,560,000 km2 offshore, the
gUnfortunately, it is not always easy to distinguish in the statistics between exploratory and devel-
opment drilling. Moreoever, these prospective areas have recently been "challenged" as being too large.
Although interesting, the statistics should be used with caution.
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Table 2-6. Oil resources, reserves, and drilling densities for seven lIASA
regions.
Prospec tive Total Number Drilling Density
Resourcesa Reservesb Areas c of Wells c (total wells/
Region (10· t) (lO· t) (X IOOOkm 2 ) (end of 1975) IOOOkm 2 /
I (NA) 28,000 4857 12,928 > 2,575,000 202.75
II (SU/EE) 46,730 10,670 9797 542,325 55.36
III (WE!JANZ) 16,020 4021 11,030 34,737 3.15
IV (LA) 23,000 5521 12,444 103,359 8.31
V (Af/SEA) 21,150 6176 17,729 28,281 1.60
VI (ME/NAf) 109,100 54,363 8212 12,501 1.52
VII (C/CPA) 12,730 2736 2831 8500 3.00
Total 257,230 88,344 -75,000 > 3,300,000 44.00
aBased on data from Desprairies (1977).
bBased on data from International Petroleum Encyclopedia (1978).
cBased on data from Grossling (1976).
majority of this in the Western Pacific countries). Some of the countries of
region V are among the oldest oil countries (e.g., Pakistan, Borneo), but for
many reasons (very often political ones), they have known only scarce and
irregular drilling activities over the last few decades. The argument that these
countries are not promising in terms of oil does not seem to hold, except
that they have up to now provided a low share of giant fields (almost none
in East Asia and Southeast Asia and very few in Africa, outside Algeria and
Libya).
It is well known that giant fields are the preferred objective of oil com-
panies. But views and attitudes may change, and it is hoped that, along the
lines now explored by the World Bank, more exploration and oil activities
will take place in regions IV and V, which together represent more than 30
million km2 of prospective area (almost 50 percent of the 62.5 million
km2 total excluding the Middle East). The Delphi study value for these
areas-only 44 billion tons of ultimate oil remaining to be produced (about
30 percent of the expected 148 billion tons total excluding the Middle East)
-probably is too low. In fact, at the end of 1975, less than 0.86 percent of
total world drilling had been performed in region V.
Perspective on 300 Billion Tons of Oil
To put such a figure of 300 billion tons of ultimately recoverable conven-
tional oil in perspective, we shall examine briefly the various possibilities of
downward or of upward revisions. The following observations are made
for possible downward revisions:
• Discovery rates (expressed, for instance, in barrels of recoverable oil dis-
covered per foot of drilling) could decline because most of the giant and
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supergiant fields have already been discovered and are increasingly diffi-
cult to find. (Recall that this seems to be especially true for oil, but not
yet true for gas.) Although current trends of discovery rates are being
debated, there is no evidence that they are decreasing worldwide, if the
Middle East is excluded.
• The hopes of increasing recovery rates by 50 percent worldwide-that is,
from 25 to 40 percent-may not be realized.
• Exploration and production costs could continue to increase, making oil
too costly and possibly less and less competitive with cheap coal.
• The potential of the Middle East and of western Siberia may have been
overestimated.
• The international climate may continue to deteriorate, and international
oil companies, which have the know-how, may be progressively pushed
outside the oil business. Thus the tools for oil exploration would be
missing or would be dramatically reduced.
• Deep offshore and polar areas may turn out to be very disappointing
with respect to their estimated potential; they may be reduced from 13
percent of the total Delphi estimate to, say, a few percent.h
Possible upward revisions may be the result of the following:
• Discovery of a new "Middle East." The possibility cannot be completely
excluded (deep offshore, Antarctica, offshore China?). The chances are
generally thought to be very small. Recent discoveries in Mexico (Re-
forma, Campeche, Chicontepec) provide arguments for the optimists.
• Deep offshore is a very poorly known area (continental slope and rise).
There could be an agreeable surprise.
• New types of deposits. Up to now, 95 percent of oil fields, whether
giants or not, have been found in anticlines (a theory that was laid down
some one hundred years ago). Stratigraphic traps have yielded only small
deposits (except in East Texas).
• Progress in exploration, in drilling, and/or in production technology. For
instance, "bright spot" techniques have helped to discover previously
hidden (gas) fields; the possibility of changing the drilling head without
removing all the strings may decrease drilling costs; new offshore produc-
tion technology (as explored by Shell at the Castellon's field off the
shore of Spain) may eliminate the need for expensive platforms, for
example. All of these possibilities point also to a potential growing role
of medium or even small deposits.
• Enhanced recovery (which is at its initial phase) may be more promising
than expected. This may be especially true for large amounts of heavy
oil for which thermal methods can dramatically increase the rate of
recovery (from a low 5 percent to a high of 40 percent or more in some
hSome recent studies in 1978 and 1979 point in this direction. Even normal offshore exploration
has given some discouraging results (such as Baltimore Canyon, as of mid-1979). We consider it too
soon for a definite statement.
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cases); many of these resources are not included currently in the reserves
or only to a small degree. Recall that a 1 percent increase in the recovery
rate, say, from 40 to 41 percent for 300 billion tons of recoverable oil is
worth 7.5 billion tons of oil.
• As mentioned above, some of the regional estimates may have been
somewhat underestimated. (In fact, some experts say that the Middle
East is underestimated.)
Unconventional Oil Resources
Critics are fond of saying that unconventional oil resources have been ex-
pected for more than fifty years and always seem to cost $3 or $5 more than
conventional oil, regardless of the cost of the latter. Certainly, unconven-
tional oil is a "difficult" resource and, thus, expensive. But these resources
are very large, and only a very small part of them is presently known.
These unconventional oil resources (which include heavy crude oils, tar
sands, and oil shales) were extensively reviewed during the Second llASA
Conference on Energy Resources, jointly organized by UNITAR and IIASA
(Meyer 1977). Most of the results of this conference were accepted and
adopted, with minor modifications, by WEC (l978b), which refers only
occasionally to unconventional oil resources and did not include them in
its study.;
According to recent theories of oil formation and migration, there is an
interesting continuity among the various hydrocarbon categories (see
Figure 2-4). In brief, the burial of organic matter has led to the formation of
kerogen-that is, to oil shale formation. If this were to remain near the
surface, it would form the oil shale deposits that are currently known. But
usually, the organic layers have been buried under additional layers of sedi-
ment and have crossed the "petroleum window" (about 65°C to 150°C)
where the kerogen has been transformed into oil and into gas if the burial
has continued deeper and deeper. Often, the fluid oil has migrated into an
entrapping reservoir. Finally, if this oil were to come back near the surface
through upward tectonics and/or if it were chemically (oxidized) or micro-
biologically altered, it would result in tar sands or heavy oil deposits. The
recent understanding of these dynamic phenomena serves as a guide for
new kinds of oil exploration that could pave the way to new discoveries.
Heavy crude oils and tar sands are very closely related. In fact, there has
not been, to date, any general agreement on their definition. In broad terms,
heavy crude oils have 10° to 25° API densities and can flow (although
possibly very slowly); tar sands have between 7° and 10° API densities and
iAs a followup to this IIASA-UNITAR conference in 1976, UNITAR organized the First Interna-
tional Conference on Heavy Crudes and Tar Sands in Edmonton (Canada) in 1979. Although the dis-
cussions were much of a technical nature, there were no important revisions or updating of the data
on world resources. I1ASA, for its part, has launched an independent assessment of world unconven-
tional oil resources.
60 ENERGY IN A FINITE WORLD
Figure 2-4. Continuity of oil resources.
Oil shales Conventional oil
Heavy crude oils
or tar sands
cannot flow under normal conditions. About 90 percent of the currently
known worldwide tar sand/heavy oil resources can be found in three coun-
tries-Canada, Venezuela, and the USSR. Nehring (1978) has pointed out
that the supergiant deposits of tar sands (Alberta), oil shales (Colorado), and
heavy crudes (Orinoco) belong to an "oil ring" (on the Pangea, 180 million
years ago, before the continental drift) that also contains the giant and
supergiant oil deposits of Alaska, Texas, Mexico, North Africa, the Middle
East, and Western Siberia.
In some respects, the worldwide distribution of tar sands and heavy oils
(and oil shales as well) would seem to resemble that for coal, with a broad
geographical distribution dominated by a few giants: j
• Approximately 300 billion tons of heavy oil and tar sands (oil in place)-
as much as the Delphi study estimate for recoverable conventional
oil-are divided among four giant fields-Orinoco (Venezuela, 100 bil-
lion tons)k; Athabasca (Canada, 86 billion tons); Olenek (USSR, 86
billion tons); Cold Lake (Canada, 23 billion tons).
• Approximately 27 billion tons are contained in eight large fields (two in
Canada, five in the United States, and one in Madagascar).
The technology for recovering bitumen and heavy oil falls into two gen-
eral categories-surface mining and in situ recovery. Only 5 to 10 percent of
jNote that these unconventional oil resources are found in unconventional types of deposits-
namely, stratigraphic as opposed to structural traps for oil.
kAccording to some experts, this estimate is rather low and could possibly be doubled, or more.
And Columbia probably also has very rich deposits.
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the currently known resources are potentially recoverable by the surface
mining method (with a reasonably high recovery ratio)-that is, 15 to 30
billion tons. The remainder would be recovered by in situ techniques (with
an estimated recovery rate of between 30 and 50 percent).
In recent years, progress has been made in the recovery of heavy oil and
tar sands, mainly in Canada, Venezuela, and the United States. The Syncrude
plant (Syncrude Canada Ltd. 1978), with 6.25 million tons of oil per year,
went into operation in 1978, and government incentives are progressively
leading to other plants of this type. A growing number of pilot processes for
in situ recovery are under development in Canada (more than twenty by
mid-1979, most of them to be completed between 1980 and 1982), with the
incentive that each future facility could possibly produce more than 6.25
million tons, which constitutes the present optimum figure for surface
mining and surface processing. (Because surface operations are capital and
labor intensive, it is understandable that the penetration of this new tech-
nology will not start soon.)
More than 420 billion tons of oil shale resources have been identified,
two-thirds of them in North America. Here, also,S to 10 percent are consid-
ered recoverable under present conditions. Pilot plants are being developed,
with a growing interest in the Garrett-Dccidental modified in situ process. In
mid-1979, oil shales became a major objective of the Synfuel Program pro-
posed by President Carter to decrease U.S. oil imports.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to make realistic forecasts of how and
when these unconventional oils would enter the market. The Delphi study
mentions that they can be progressively phased in after 1990. We share this
opinion. The events of 1979 in Canada and the United States point in this
direction. Production costs for upgraded syncrudes are given (1978 U.S.
dollars) from $12 to $15 per barrel (Orinoco) to $12 to $20 per barrel
(Athabasca) and up to $20 to $25 per barrel (Colorado oil shales), although
these costs could be lowered through price guarantees and government-
sponsored research and development programs.
The Three Paths to Costly Oil
Summarizing and synthesizing these findings, we see that we are heading for
"costly oil." (By costly oil we mean the cost of producing oil and not the
price of oil.) There are three paths to costly oil, as shown in Figure 2-5.
First, the oil industry, especially onshore, would shift progressively from
supergiant oil fields (larger than 5 billion barrels or 700 million tons) and
giant oil fields (larger than 500 million barrels or 70 million tons) to
medium-sized fields and, finally, to small fields. Note that these supergiant
and giant oil fields are now the most profitable and still account for more
than 70 percent of global oil production. In the United States, small fields
already account for 15 percent of production. As mentioned above, accord-
ing to the Delphi study, most of the oil remaining to be produced (say, more
than 60 percent) could be produced probably at less than $12 per barrel or
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Figure 2-5. Three paths to costly oil.
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(Kerogen, Oil shales)
with investments of less than $6000 to $10,000 per barrel per day capacity.
We judge that this oil will increasingly be the choice objective of the many
national oil companies to feed their national requirements. This is what we
call exploring the prospective areas "with a fine tooth comb." Natural gas
would probably also be found and would contribute greatly to regional
industrial development.
The second path to costly oil is from onshore to offshore, and, pro-
gressively, to deep offshore. Technology has progressed considerably (the
North Sea has contributed much to this development), but costs have also
soared. Because of these higher costs, development projects presently con-
centrate on giant fields. Investment costs for offshore can reach as high as
$10,000 per barrel per day capacity and soar to $20,000 per barrel per day
or more for deep offshore. Because of these costs, the associated high risks,
and the advanced technology required, the largest projects are presently
reserved for the biggest international oil companies (and/or consortia of
many companies), who would thus continue to play their role as pioneers.
The third path goes from "good" oil to oil shales, through "difficult"
oil. The trends are the same as for offshore to deep offshore, and invest-
ment levels are comparable, from $15,000 to $30,000 per barrel per day
for tar sands and oil shales (and production costs between $15 and $20 per
barrel). And also, for the same reasons (investments, risks, and technology),
we judge that this frontier would be reserved initially for the large oil com-
panies, or pioneers, or for governmental organizations. Incidentally, this
points to the important contribution major oil companies continue to make
to future oil supply, assuming that they are allowed, and even encouraged, to
to do so. If this is the case, the physical continuity of oil resources illus-
trated in Figure 2-4 would be matched by the industrial continuity of the
three paths to costly oil, to ensure a lasting oil supply.
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Illustrative Production Levels
As a means of synthesizing these various considerations, we propose a
production curve derived from the Delphi study, but with a major differ-
ence. We judge that the classical bell shape-popularized by Hubbert but
since challenged-is not necessarily the only solution. Discovery rates could
possibly be maintained-at a cost-at a more or less continuous level for a
few more decades. Moreover, the Delphi curve assumes a constant reserve-to-
production ratio over time for the various regions. It could be accepted that
this ratio would decline slowly for other regions, as it did for the United
States, allowing production to be kept constant over a longer period. Both
factors would maintain a longer production plateau and provide more time
for the progressive phasing in of unconventional oil (Figure 2-6).
The curve proposed by the Delphi study would decline from a maximum
of between 4 and 6 billion tons per year around 1990 to a level of about
2.5 billion tons per year in 2020 and would continue to decline to lower
levels over a long period. In fact, according to such a curve, and starting
from 300 billion tons of oil, some 120 to 130 billion tons of oil would still
remain in 2020 or about 250 billion tons in the early 1990s. Such an amount
could (and must) be large enough to sustain a production plateau for a few
Figure 2-6. Oil: possible production and lifetime of ultimately recoverable global
resou rces (conven tional oil only; 300 X 109 tons). The right side of the figure shows the
theoretical extension of the oil production level and not a possible real production curve.
The semishaded area between the "Delphi" and the "Modified Delphi" curves represents
a possible stretch of conventional oil production before a planned but delayed decline.
Source: Delph i estimates based on Desprairies (1977).
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decades before the actual decline phase begins. If the growth rate of oil
production and consumption continues to average 3 to 4 percent per year or
less (as opposed to 7 to 8 percent per year previously), and if new producers
come progressively into the market to maintain a "fluid" supply in the next
decade, there is no urgent need to introduce the most expensive unconven-
tional oil resources, except in a few countries and for political reasons. In
fact, this is true for new fuel supplies from Alaska and the North Sea and
would probably continue to happen in the early 1980s in other countries
such as Mexico, Egypt, Brazil, and Malaysia. Penetration could begin in the
1990s, with the cheaper unconventional oil resources. Note that this has
already begun in Canada with Lloydminster and Cold Lake heavy oils and
with the Syncrude project and its followers. Valuable progress can be ex-
pected in these fields over the next ten or fifteen years, as for example the
oil shale projects in the United States.
GAS RESOURCES
There are many similarities between oil and gas resources, but also some
major differences. Until recently, interest in gas resources was much less
strong and came much later than for oil resources. Not long ago, finding a
dry gas field somewhere outside the United States was considered a catas-
trophe. The rapid growth of natural gas consumption really started in the
United States only after the Second World War and in Western Europe only
over the last decade after the discovery of the Italian, French, and especially
the Dutch gas fields. At the least, development has been impressive, so much
so that natural gas now holds the share in Western Europe that was foreseen,
in postwar energy forecasts, for nuclear energy.
Yet despite the very rapid increase in natural gas consumption, the indus-
try is still quite young. Less than 8 percent of total estimated gas resources
have been consumed up to now (unfortunately, a good part of it has been
flared), as opposed to almost 15 percent or more for oil. Gas reserves are ex-
panding continuously through revision of old estimates (of associated gas,
mainly) and through many new discoveries of dry gas deposits. The ability
to drill deeper and deeper is favorable to gas findings more than to oil.
Anadarko Basin and Tuscaloosa Trend are two of the important recent
developments in deep gas discoveries. And there is no slackening of the rate
of finding new giant or supergiant gas deposits.
There is a strong consensus among world petroleum experts that natural
gas consumption and production worldwide will continue to increase
over the next decades, possibly until the beginning of the next century,
because of the attractive properties of natural gas utilization and the grow-
ing sources of supply. However, the developed countries-especially those
in Europe-seem to be approaching a limit for regional gas trade operable
through land pipelines, and they will have to resort either to sea gaslines
(e.g., the project across Sicily from Tunisia) or to expensive and still dif-
ficult LNG (liquefied natural gas) maritime transportation between conti-
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Table 2-7. Estimates of ultimate gas resources remaining to be discovered
and world gas reserves for the seven II ASA regions (in 109 m3 ).
Reserves (as of Resources Still to
Region 7 January 7977;0 be Discoveredb
I (NA) 7763 43,500
II (SU/EE) 22,654 59,000
III (WE/]ANZ) 5061 14,500
IV (LA) 2695 15,000
V (Af/SEA) 3560 12,000
VI (M E/NAf) 21,157 78,000
VII (C/CPA) 594 10,000
Total c 63,484 232,000
aBased on data from World Oil (1978).
bBased on data from World Energy Conference (1978b).
cThe two values do not add up to the ultimate value of 280,000 billion m3 given above because
of differences of dates and of origins of the data.
nents. A balance must be found between these constraints and the large
availability of associated natural gas, mainly in the Middle East, relative
to the high oil production. Rightly, producers, especially from the mem-
ber countries of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC),
are exerting strong pressure to avoid technical and/or economical losses of
this precious resource.
There are still far fewer estimates of ultimate global gas resources than of
oil resources, although efforts to improve this situation are taking place.
Estimates of ultimate oil resources and of gas resources differ in several
ways. Because gas recovery is already high (80 to 90 percent), there is not
the same potential mechanism of additions to reserves by shifting from iden-
tified resources. Additions to conventional gas reserves must thus come from
revisions of known reserves and, principally, from new discoveries.
The selected value-adopted by the WEC (1978b) and by the American
Gas Association from an assessment by the U.S. Institute of Gas Technology
(IGT)-is about 280,000 billion m3 of gas remaining to be produced world-
wide after 1 January 1976. 1 A tentative distribution of the gas resources
amng the seven I1ASA world regions is given in Table 2-7,m together with
calculated gas reserves, using World Oil (1978) data (as of 1 January 1977).
According to WEC (1978b), probably as much as 75 percent of these gas
resources could be produced at less than $14 per barrel of oil equivalent
(1974 U.S. dollars) by 2000 or later and the remainder at less than $20
per barrel of oil equivalent.
IThe value given in the WEC (l978b) study is 10,508 EJ or Exajoules-that is, 279,000 billion m 3
(assuming 9,000 kcallm 3). This value was derived from the range of values 9960 to 10,395 E] -that is,
264,000 to 276,000 billion m 3 of the Institute of Gas Technology.
ml r was necessary to make some special assumptions for this distribution because the gas regions
considered by IGT and WEC are different from the oil regions.
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During the Second IlASA Conference on Energy Resources (Meyer 1977)
there were extensive discussions of "unconventional" gas resources-that is,
gas in geopressure zones, gas in tight formations (sandstone, Devonian shales,
etc.), and methane from coal fields, landfill gas, gas hydrates, and so forth,
not to mention syngas from coal. There was some consensus that these re-
sources are probably very appreciable, each perhaps equivalent to or even
one order of magnitude greater than conventional resources, but that it is
presently impossible to make a global estimate. Because of the youth of the
industry and of gas consumption, and because of the sufficient supply of
conventional gas at reasonably low cost, there has been little incentive to
look for these new, technologically difficult and economically more ex-
pensive, gas resources. The United States is the only country that faces a
possible gas shortage; and indeed, it is only for the United States that pre-
liminary data are available and that the technology is being seriously
explored. (In fact, depending on price policies and incentives, the situation
in the United States could evolve between shortage and excess supply, as
experienced in recent years.)
In Table 2-8 data on additional gas resources in the United States are
given. These are large resources. Experiments are being carried out on
coal bed degasification. Gas in Devonian shale and in tight formations
is being produced on a small scale and is awaiting progress in fracturing tech-
nology. In 1979, a pilot well was drilled in Texas to assess gas in geopressure
zones and, especially, to determine which possible share of estimated volume
in place could be recovered: a low 5 percent would lead to recoverable re-
serves of 4000 to 70,000 billion m 3, the latter figure being equivalent
roughly to present total global gas reserves.
Turning to possible production levels, as shown in Figure 2-7, we see that
(adopting WEC assumptions) gas production could increase to a level of
around 3700 to 4000 billion m3 per year between 2000 and 2010 or 2020.
With the same reasoning as for oil, we judge that a constant level could be
maintained for a few decades, instead of beginning to decline as soon as the
maximum level has been reached. It is also worth mentioning that the
present reserves-to-production ratio for gas is higher (around a value of fifty
years) than for oil. In the year 2000, the remaining global gas resources
would still be about 160,000 billion m3 , a sufficiently high value to allow
constant production to be maintained for a few decades (possibly accepting
Table 2-8. Estimated additional gas resources, United States.
Source
Coal bed degasification
Devonian shale
Tight formations
Geopressured gas
Estimated Volume in Place
(70' m 3 )
8630-23,100
14,470-17,260
17,260
85,000-1,444,400
Source: Based on data from World Energy Conference (1978b).
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Figure 2-7. Gas: possible production and lifetime of ultimately recoverable global
resources (conventional gas only; 280,000 m3 ). The right side of the figure shows the
theoretical extension of the gas production level and not a possible real production curve.
The semishaded area between the "WEC" and the "Modified WEC" curves represents a
possible stretch of conventional gas production before a planned but delayed decline.
Source: Based on data from WEC (1978b).
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a progressive decrease of the reserves-to-production ratio) and to provide
time for a progressive phasing in of new, unconventional resources.
OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Figure 2-8 shows the various fossil fuel production levels proposed in this
chapter. Again, these are possible maximum production levels, assuming that
decisions are taken in time and that there are no political restrictions-that
is, no political embargoes but not excluding a ceiling on future production.
For fossil fuels, a level of about 20 billion tce could be reached in 2020 and
could continue for many decades if necessary-that is, assuming the demand
for fossil fuels will be this high (which seems improbable to us) and/or that
no new, cheap, and plentiful energy source will be available shortly (which
seems more probable to us). This, in our opinion, would allow sufficient
time to achieve a smooth transition from fossil fuel use.
We have shown the "continuity" of oil resources and of the oil industry
(Figures 2-4 and 2-5). We consider it worthwhile to extend such considera-
tions to include fossil fuel resources as a whole, especially within the frame-
work of our fifty-year time horizon, while recognizing the problem of
predicting the future.
Looking back fifty years to around 1930, we see that coal was the prime
energy source: its annual production level then was about 1300 million tce.
Coal technologies have progressed since that time, and surface coal mining
is presently the fastest developing coal production technology.
Oil production in 1930 was about 200 million tons, of which 6.4 million
tons came from the Middle East. The Arabian fields had not yet been dis-
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Figure 2-8. Fossil fuels: possible production levels and lifetimes. This is a theoretical
curve, aiming to show the potential leveling of fossil fuel production.
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covered; water injection was at a start; and the first offshore platform would
not appear for another twenty years. In 1930, more than 95 percent of the
natural gas was simply flared, with annual production around 50 billion m3 .
Because of the progress of coal technologies and especially of oil and gas
technologies, we can view the task facing the fossil fuel industries coura-
geously. In this context, we offer the following comments on the growing
industrial continuity of apparently very different fossil resources. n
Figure 2-9 illustrates some of the technological exchanges between coal
and petroleum industries in the field of extraction. Similar diagrams could be
made for downstream steps, refining, conversion, and so forth. In other
words, any carbon fuel can now be technically converted into any other
(coal 4 gas 4 methanol 4 gasoline 4 and so on).
As to the extraction process, perhaps over the next few years it would be
simpler to speak of "mineable" carbon compounds (coal, tar sands, and oil
nNote that physical continuity has been shown by some authors, extending the considerations and
similarities of Figure 2-4 to all carbon compounds.
FOSSIL ENERGY RESOURCES 69
Figure 2-9. Integrated fossil extraction industry. Arrows indicate technological ex-
changes between the two industries.
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shales recovered through surface or underground mining) and of "drillable"
carbon compounds (oil, heavy crude oils, gasified coal, in situ tar sands or
oil shales, and gas recovered through drilling and fluid handling). Indeed,
this would require a change in the vocabulary of coal people, since they con-
tinue to speak of "bore hole mining," "solution mining," and so forth. Some
of these drilling operations seem to be at hand (e.g., enhanced oil recovery
or steam-driven heavy crude production), while others seem further away,
but all of these will benefit from common technologies (e.g., drilling, fractur-
ing, fluid control) that we believe can potentially be developed by the
year 2030.
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3 THE COAL OPTION
INTRODUCTION
The technically accessible resources of coal are very large and dwarf most of
the other relevant fossil energy resources. In view of likely limitations on the
adequate supply of crude oil and natural gas, we have analyzed the potential
role of coal as a global long-term energy option.
The fact that, compared to oil and gas, coal is a vast resource could tempt
us into considering it an infinite resource. It is not. While solar energy will
last for billions of years and nuclear power for at least millions of years, the
"vast" supply of coal can be measured in centuries of human use. So as not
to lose the impact of this important matter, our analysis of the coal option
goes beyond 2030, the nominal end point of our energy study, and up to
2100.
Modern energy systems began with coal and made the fundamental tran-
sition to oil and gas as these resources started to compete successfully. The
system infrastructure shifted more and more to an emphasis on amenity and
convenience, using secondary energy forms such as electricity, gasoline,
district heat, and towngas. Thus, if coal is to be used as a principal energy
resource in the future, it must contribute uniquely to supplying these sec-
ondary energy forms. The function of coal must be seen in terms of its
capability to provide the raw input for the production of synthetic liquid
fuels, which, over the next fifty years, could constitute an indispensable
component of the total demand for energy.
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However, the reserve and resource situation, as well as the global environ-
mental implications, suggest that coal cannot be exploited again as the domi-
nant source of primary energy, as it was from the early nineteenth century
until the 1920s. This is because such a dominant role could have only a brief
run in the longer theater of history. Only if we are frugal in our use of coal
will it last for many centuries. The fact that the carbon in coal is in a chemi-
cally reduced form makes it an important exception to the generally oxi-
dized state of most of the earth's carbon. A too rapid release of carbon into
the atmosphere in the form of carbon dioxide, the combustion product of
coal, could have serious global environmental consequences.
Nevertheless, a substantial increase in the existing supply capacity of coal
appears to be a prerequisite for the transition from the use of clean oil and
gas supplies to the use of dirtier fossil fuels and ultimately to the use of non-
fossil fuels (e.g., hydrogen) during the twenty-first century. Therefore, the
possibilities of a coal revival via new coal conversion technologies are ana-
lyzed in this chapter. Two case studies are discussed that demonstrate that
modern coal liquefaction and gasification techniques could serve over the
short term as a basis for the longer term transition.
To repeat a salient point: if a more dominant path for coal were chosen
than that outlined here, the results would be the depletion of the world's
fossil resources at the same time that an imprudently large amount of carbon
dioxide would be dumped into the atmosphere.
A HISTORIC REVIEW OF COAL
Modern energy systems depend on crude oil and natural gas, yet they have
supported an extension of a technical system that evolved on the basis of
coal. By plotting the share that each of these primary energy forms has
contributed over time to the global energy balance, a remarkably simple
and rigid process becomes visible. Figure 3-1 illustrates the contribution of
various primary energy sources by means of a logarithmic scale that is suit-
able for displaying market substitution mechanisms.
Over the past several decades, oil and gas have expanded their market
shares at the expense of coal. This substitution process followed an earlier
substitution of coal for the renewable energy source, wood. It is tempting
to extrapolate the lines of fate that Figure 3-1 seems to suggest. Before any
projections can be made, however, it is important to distinguish between
causes and effects of the past evolution. We therefore consider the general
conditions of the past within which coal use matured and then gave way
to the uses of oil and gas.
From Wood to Coal
The use of coal dates back some 2000 years, with coal remaining on the
sidelines with respect to energy deployment throughout the Middle Ages.
The depletion of forest reserves in many industrializing countries, giving
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Figure 3-1. Global primary energy substitution. Logarithmic plot of the transformation
f/{l-f} where f is the fractional market share. Smooth lines are model estimates of histori-
cal data; scattered lines are historical data; straight lines show the logistic model substitu-
tion paths.
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rise for example to the fuelwood crises of the nineteenth century, created
an energy demand that could not be met at a local level. Coal was able to
fill this market gap.
Coal's potential was realized once a sufficient centralization of demand
in towns matched the possible centralization of supply in mining districts.
Centralization at each end of the supply chain favored long-distance bulk
transportation of coal-a capability readily offered by the railroad systems.
Coal was favored for a number of reasons: the railroads benefited from the
transportation of this new, high quality fuel; more railroads meant more
steel; more steel meant more coal.
Within a period of roughly eighty years (1840-1920), the countries of
the West completed a transition from wood, the age-old energy source, to
coal, the prototype fossil resource. This transition occurred at the same time
as the even more fundamental transition from a civilization based on agri-
culture to one based on industry. Figure 3-2 illustrates this transition for
the case of the nation of Germany during the period 1840-1920. The rapid
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Figure 3-2. Transition to a coal-based economy for Germany over the period 1840
to 1920. Note: The unique growth rate of 3.5 percent per year for both coal towns and
all towns between 1850 and 1900 was possible because of the then available railway
sys tem.
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buildup of the railroad system between 1850 and 1920 coincided with the
increased population concentration in major cities. The rapid rate of popu-
lation growth in the larger towns and cities in the coal districts during the
initial phases of the railroad era and their extended growth after the com-
pletion of that basic transport infrastructure point to the centralization of
both demand and supply of energy that went along with the transition from
wood to coal.
From Coal to Oil and Gas
What led, after such a convincing development in favor of coal, to its stagna-
tion and relative decline in the primary energy market, which began around
1920 on a global scale? Figure 3-3 illustrates the dramatic speed of this
process for Germany. (The market shares are plotted for the nation of
Germany from 1850 to 1945; the figures for the Federal Republic of Ger-
Figure 3-3. Contribution of primary energy sources to the energy balance of the FRG,
1860-1975. Logarithmic plot of the transformation f/(l-f) where f is the fractional
market share. Smooth lines are model estimates of historical data; scattered lines are
historical data; straight lines show the logistic model substitution paths.
f /(1-f. fRACTION t f )
1===============================1 0-99
COAL~.. 1\
,
j:::::::==~~====::::::;:=:::;::==:::;t=J=tll~~A=I'T::G::A5:t 0·10
__ I' If •
",n /I r I
19501900
+--t--t---+-""'."""t~--t----: ---...........\-''It---J{f--.p-.-t--+-''~I_+___i,....__f_ 0·01
2000
YEAR
76 ENERGY IN A FINITE WORLD
many are used after 1945.) In this traditional coal country, with an active
coal industry and negligible indigenous oil and gas reserves, coal lost some 50
percent of its primary energy market share during the period 1935-1960.
Although coal's market decline was delayed during the Second World War,
thereafter coal lost its share of the market at a faster rate than had occurred
at this time in, for example, the United States.
The roots of the shift to oil and gas reach back to the beginning of the
coal era. The evolution of urban lifestyles led to a strong demand for more
sophisticated forms of energy than raw coal could provide. Around 1825,
the first gas lights appeared. Coal was converted into towngas, and pipeline
networks grew-slowly at first, as they had to penetrate already builtup
areas. By 1875, electricity grids offered a more appropriate means for light-
ing towns. Gas grids were used principally for the convenient supply of do-
mestic heat for cooking and heating. District heating appeared at the end of
the nineteenth century. Increasingly, secondary energy forms-towngas,
electricity, and hot water-were supplied by means of grids that in turn
depended on coal; hydropower, when available, was the only other source
of electricity.
When oil and gas began their rally into the energy market sometime
around the turn of the century, they followed a demand for quality energy
that processed coal had stimulated and supported over a period of some
eighty years. The replacement of coal by oil and gas was not a matter of fuel
price, nor was it stimulated by a shortage of coal reserves. Oil was an inter-
nationally available energy form that could be moved inexpensively around
the globe in a way that was not possible with coal; in a sense, oil "deregion-
alized" energy. And of course, the development of oil-based automobiles
and airplanes, and especially of modern agricultural technologies, strength-
ened oil's position in the market. Gas, which could be supplied by networks,
freed the consumer, both domestic and industrial, from the need to main-
tain a private fuel storage capability and to arrange for periodic resupply.
Towngas was never seriously challenged by oil and was supplanted only by
natural gas, whose network potential was greater. So strong were the con-
venience features of oil and gas that even the electric utilities in locations
far from coal supplies relied more and more on oil and gas: convenience to a
small customer translates into nonfuel economies for a large one-namely,
capital and labor savings, process simplifications, and environmental and
aesthetic benefits.
In summary, the ability of oil and gas to meet increasingly sophisticated
consumer demand, at both the private and the industrial level, is the basic
reason why coal was forced into retreat so quickly. Even the railroad system
switched to other forms of locomotion (fuel oil and electric traction) for
reasons of fuel and labor efficiency and of pollution abatement in urban
complexes.
These patterns describe the rise and fall of coal use in the more indus-
trialized countries, where development took place mainly during the era of
coal dominance. Also, coal was then abundant in these countries. However,
those countries whose industrial development is taking place now are not
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likely to experience a coal era of this sort. These developing economies
depend principally on fuels that can be transported inexpensively over great
distances. Oil satisfies this condition far better than coal and is the fuel of
choice because of practicality and convenience.
A GLOBAL RETURN TO COAL?
The possible limitations on the adequate supply of conventional oil and
natural gas, together with a growing politization of the limitations of nuclear
energy and the economic constraints of large-scale hard solar, cloud the out-
look for adequate energy supplies. It therefore seems appropriate to question
whether coal could make a comeback as a global primary energy resource.
To explore this possibility, we have developed a hypothetical high coal con-
sumption case, which we will describe later in this section. First, it is useful
to examine the various factors affecting the use of coal.
Coal Resources
There are abundant coal reserves in the ground. But how much of it can ulti-
mately be produced? In Chapter 2, we touch upon the difficulties inherent
in the concept of resources. Because of the different genesis of fossil energy
resources and the widely differing technologies for their exploitation, com-
parisons of coal, oil, gas, and other fossil hydrocarbons lead to considerable
ambiguities. But quantitative differences outweigh qualitative and concep-
tual inconsistencies. There is more energy in coal, accessible with demon-
strated mining technologies, than could be obtained from known oil and gas
fields using present and anticipated technologies.
According to data given in Chapter 2, the ultimately recoverable resources
of conventional and unconventional oil and natural gas worldwide are esti-
mated to be of the order of 1250 TWyr. (This estimate includes 420 TWyr of
heavy crude oil and tar sands and 60 TWyr of shale oil.) The resource base
of heavy crude oil is larger than has been estimated here and is very much
larger for shale oil. Nevertheless, allowing for improved technology, this is
all that seems to be producible at prices competitive with coal. This estimate
of 1250 TWyr-which is more than four times the value of the economically
producible reserves demonstrated in 1977-takes into account new dis-
coveries of conventional oil and natural gas, a significant increase in the
percentage of oil and gas that can be extracted from in situ amounts, and a
substantial increase in the cost of production.
By contrast, economically recoverable reserves of coal worldwide have
been estimated at 600 TWyr. This amount of coal could be mined with
present technologies and without substantial increases of production costs.
The 600 TWyr of coal reserves currently account for 6 percent of the geo-
logically prognosticated world coal resource base of an energy equivalent of
10,000 TWyr. Roughly 30 percent of the prognosticated coal resources-
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3000 TWyr-were identified in explored geological formations (Fettweis
1976).
For technical reasons, only a fraction of the 10,000 TWyr of coal re-
sources could ultimately be produced. Nevertheless, further exploration and
development of production technologies might extend the potential of coal
reserves considerably. Even the resource figures might increase. The World
Energy Conference (1978) pointed to the real possibility of a doubling of
world coal reserves of 600 TWyr within the next forty years. It therefore
seems inevitable that longer term fossil energy opportunities are more
dependent on coal than on all other types of hydrocarbons considered
together. But coal, like oil, is not distributed uniformly. Roughly 85 percent
of the resources are in the United States, the USSR, and China or, in our
terminology, in regions I (NA), II (SU/EE), and VII (C/CPA).a This has
severe implications. It is by no means clear that these regions would assume
a supplier role, as region VI (ME/NAf) does and is expected to do for oil.
Astakhov (1980) estimated the economically recoverable coal resources
at between 2400 and 3700 TWyr. This estimate goes beyond what we have
given for coal in Chapter 2, because Astakhov additionally considered what
is feasible over the entire twenty-first century. However, his range is well
within what we have considered in Chapter 2 and is therefore not incon-
sistent. Here, for our purposes, we adopt the estimate of 2400 TWyr of
recoverable coal resources.
Global Coal Resource Economics
As long as mankind can choose among various energy sources, cost differ-
entials will greatly influence such choices. In order to determine the role
that coal could play over the next fifty years, we assessed the supply costs
for a large amount of coal. Any such undertaking rests ultimately on assump-
tions about technical and political circumstances affecting access to the
physical resources and, equally important, on the supply situation of alter-
native energy forms. Unlike oil, there is currently no global reference price
for coal. Moreover, there are different types of substances referred to as
coal that differ over a broad range of physical properties and in their content
of hydrogen, water, and minerals. These properties in turn affect the use-
fulness of the various coal types for specific applications, their transporta-
bility, and thus their value.
The price of coal is only in part influenced by its recovery cost. As is true
for oil and gas, the price of coal is influenced greatly by the demand for the
product. Thus good quality anthracite-a high grade carbon in great demand
by the metals industries-commands a premium price, far greater than its
recovery cost would suggest. In recent history, the price of coal has followed
the price of oil upward at a discrete differential, maintaining a significant
aSee Figure 1-3 for the definition of the IIASA regions and Appendix 1A for the list of the coun-
tries in each of these regions.
THE COAL OPTION 79
price advantage on a cost per thermal energy content. This demonstrates
that oil remains the world's reference fuel and that when and if coal achieves
this position, its price would be greatly affected by the history of the oil
domination of the energy market.
Nevertheless, we need a point of reference for the evaluation of coal. We
have considered $20 (1975) per ton of coal equivalent (tce) at mine mouth
as the best orientation for coal fed as a base supply to global needs. Thus
$20 is a price at which the system would accept large amounts of coal. The
cost of producing coal at this price is much more difficult to calculate, since
it is dependent on land values, labor rates, and other factors that vary widely
among reglOns.
Transportation and Delivered Prices
Again, coal is unevenly distributed, and its transportation is therefore an
essential element of the overall coal picture. The traditional methods of
transporting coal have been by railroad and ship, both of which are labor
and energy intensive; as the value of these inputs increases, their costs gen-
erally escalate. For coal with high water and ash content (e.g., brown coal),
transportation problems are especially severe. The additional weight in-
creases the already costly transportation operation. Unfortunately, most of
the least expensive coal in the world (e.g., that in the northern Rocky Moun-
tains in the United States) falls into this category. Most lignites and brown
coal cannot be transported at all at acceptable costs. The differential be-
tween a price of $20 to $30 per tce for coal at the mine mouth in the
northern Rocky Mountains and a price of about $50 per tce for coal deliv-
ered to an east central U.S. customer (in lllinois) illustrates the magnitude
of the coal transportation problem using railroads (Corey 1977).
Long-range transportation of coal by bulk carrier is also a possibility.
Again, the transportation costs for coal are much greater than those for oil.
Coal cannot be transported entirely by ship; if either the deposits or the con-
sumers are located inland, the coal must be transported by other means
before it can be shipped. The loading and unloading of coal is more labor
intensive than is oil. Since coal is bulkier per unit of energy content than oil,
even large colliers cannot achieve the economy of scale of the supertankers.
One way of reducing transportation costs is by preprocessing the coal at
the mine mouth into more transportable products. For example, coal could
be pulverized, thereby discarding some of the inclusions, and transported by
slurry pipelines. However, this substitutes the cost of a new infrastructure
(e.g., the pipeline) for the greater continuous costs of railroad operation.
Coal slurry pipelines are not without their own problems, since the slurrying
often requires that coal be further processed at the delivery end.
Currently, the easiest and most economical way to convert coal into a
transportable product is to use it for generating electricity at the mine
mouth. Here, the cost of electrical transmission is offset in part by the need
to maintain large-scale transmission networks for balancing continental loads
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and for providing interregional reserve capacity. That is, the capital structure
of electrical networks is not an intrinsic limit. More constraining is the fact
that economical transmission systems have losses-of the order of 1 percent
per 100 km-which limit mine-mouth generation to a regional capability.
And of course, mine-mouth generation leads to problems of environmental
equity, since the population in the mining area must deal with the environ-
mental costs of coal extraction as well as with the added air pollution from
burning coal. The well-known case of the Four Corners Power Plant in the
southwest United States, where the smoke plume was clearly visible by eye
from orbiting spacecraft, illustrates the problem.
A Hypothetical High Coal Consumption Case
For heuristic purposes let us now assume that problems arising from the
geographical distribution of coal resources can be handled successfully.
Does coal become a global primary energy option somehow in parallel to
nuclear and solar power? How large is a potential of 2400 to 3700 TWyr of
coal resources when looking at it operationally?
In order to assess the basic assumptions and limitations of coal as a pri-
mary global energy resource, we consider its role in terms of global energy
demand. The basic method used to calculate the exhaustion time of a re-
source is to divide known quantities of resources by present or expected
future consumption rates; however, this does not take into account the
intrinsic inertia of the energy system. Any return to coal as the main pri-
mary source of energy would be a gradual process. In line with the dynamics
of past market substitution processes (as will be discussed in Chapter 8), we
developed a hypothetical high coal consumption case up to the year 2100,
quantified in Figure 3-4 and summarized in Table 3-1. It is meant to demon-
strate a limiting case for coal.
The following assumptions were made for the hypothetical coal case. The
coal revival begins in 1980, with a market penetration time identical to that
of oil in the global market of the past (see Figure 3-1). A high-40
TWyr/yr-global demand for secondary energy by 2030 provides a target for
deriving total energy demand. This demand is held constant after the year
2030. Primary energy demand is adjusted in Figure 3-4 for increased con-
version losses as the substitution of coal-derived synthetic liquid and gaseous
fuels for oil proceeds; thus eventually more than 40 TWyr/yr of primary
energy is needed.
Based on these considerations, we conceive that the present downward
trend of the market share of coal would be reversed and that coal consump-
tion would increase to 40 TWyr/yr around the year 2080. This level would,
at that time, be some 80 percent of the total primary energy, a share pre-
viously held by coal around 1870. However, the price of this concentration
of primary energy is a significant resource depletion rate. We therefore made
one more assumption to complete the picture: in 2080, an unspecified addi-
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Figure 3-4. Primary energy consumption in a hypothetical high coal consumption case.
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Table 3-1. Hypothetical high coal consumption case (to 2100).
Assumptions
Coal revival begins in 1980
Secondary energy demand is 40 TWyr/yr in 2030 and thereafter
Primary energy demand is more than 40 TWyr/yr in 2030
Coal consumption is 40 TWyr/yr (or 80 percent of primary energy demand) in 2080
An unspecified additional primary energy source is introduced in 2080 and begins to phase out
coal
Implications
Forty-three percent of stated coal resources required; because coal recovery is only 50 percent
efficient, total coal resource base is used up in 100 years
Oil and gas fill supply gap until 2080; however, oil and gas resources will be used up before 2050
Increased CO, atmospheric levels above prudent level due to coal combustion
Large-scale mining and handling operations
Conclusions
A global energy strategy based entirely or even primarily on coal and other fossil fuels would mean
that these resources would be used up in about 100 years and prudent environmental con-
straints would be violated.
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tional primary energy source is introduced that phases out coal at the same
rate as coal was forced into the global market initially.
A number of systemwide problems were considered in the hypothetical
coal case. Some 4300 TWyr of coal, or 43 percent of the geologically prog-
nosticated resources of coal, would have to be ultimately produced. If only
50 percent of the resource is capable of ultimately being recovered, then
according to our hypothetical coal case, the total resource base of coal would
be practically consumed in about one hundred years. Further, we have
assumed virtually no solar or nuclear contribution before 2080 and the use
of additional energy from oil and gas to fill the gap between energy demand
and supply during the period when coal supply is gradually increasing-that
is, up to the year 2100. In the twenty-first century, the total global energy
needed above and beyond that produced by coal would be about 2000
TWyr. However, the resources of oil and natural gas, including highly specu-
lative unconventional forms (see Chapter 2) amount to about 1350 TWyr.
Of course, if solar and/or nuclear power would be introduced earlier than
2080, they could fill this gap of a complementary primary energy source.
Environmentally, this hypothetical case implies many problems, includ-
ing the potentially serious environmental effects of high atmospheric carbon
dioxide levels. Chapter 10 discusses the carbon dioxide problem in depth;
here, we repeat the conclusions that the present scientific basis does not yet
warrant a curtailment of fossil fuel use, while at the same time policies
emphasizing the use of coal are at present equally unjustified. These state-
ments refer to near-term policies at the scale of current global primary
(commercial) energy consumption, which is some 8 TWyr/yr.
There are other systems problems of producing and consuming up to
40 TWyr/yr of coal-that is, 45 billion to 60 billion tons of coal per year
depending on its average calorific value. Consider the present problems
of mining, transporting, and converting roughly 3 billion tons of coal
(2000 X 106 tce) per year. The difficulties of embedding twentyfold larger
technical operations in the ecosphere of an increasingly populated globe are
enormous. Local pollution and/or social conditions are likely to limit the
deployment of coal on such a scale in those coal countries that have other
energy options, and conservation efforts might constrain coal production
in areas where coal is the only or the main national energy resource.
Here, we recall the purpose of this heuristic exercise-to shed light on
the possibility of a global return to coal. Based on the above considerations,
we conclude that a global return to coal as a primary fuel is impossible.
THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF COAL IN FUTURE
ENERGY SYSTEMS
Having demonstrated a limiting case for coal globally, we now turn our
attention to how this major resource can be used prudently. As we see it,
the strategic function of coal is to fill the liquid fuel gap created by the
transition from clean oil and gas to dirty oil and gas and, ultimately, to
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nonfossil fuels. It is not difficult to foresee in the long run-perhaps beyond
the year 2100-a global energy system in which nuclear and solar power
supply unlimited amounts of primary energy. Still, these primary energies
would have to be converted into a viable secondary energy form. Elec-
tricity and hydrogen are these forms; in Chapter 22 we refer to them as
secondary energies of an "electronic" and "protonic" nature. With coal,
the chemical properties of the carbon atom come into play-namely, its
ability to bind and thereby to carry hydrogen. By means of both allothermal
liquefaction and allothermal gasification, exogenously produced hydrogen
from nuclear or solar can be used along with coal to produce methanol or
methane or other synthetic hydrocarbons. Allothermal coal liquefaction,
using, for example, the molten iron bath technique, offers great potential,
and is therefore discussed in detail in Chapter 22. Here, we note that allo-
thermal liquefaction, as opposed to autothermalliquefaction, should be the
preferred technology since it requires less coal.b
By considering the prudent use of coal, we are turning from a considera-
tion of primary energy to that of secondary energy. This, then, leads us to
a consideration of the existing and the future energy infrastructure.
Coal Within Today's Energy Infrastructure
Currently, coal is a major energy source for the steel industry and for elec-
tricity production. Based mainly on these two applications, coal provides
some 30 percent of the global primary energy needs. Consequently these
powerful industries worldwide provide the demand for coal mining, coal
transportation, and the continual improvement of coal technologies; most
important, in many countries coal is a socially accepted reality in spite of
its side effects and risks.
Coal industries in many countries face strong competitive pressures. This
is not merely the consequence of cost-price relations. Even after the substan-
tial price increases of crude oil between 1972 and 1974, and in spite of
national policies favoring coal in many countries, the future of coal in the
energy market is unclear.
As mentioned above, labor problems and environmental constraints both
for large-scale mining and for the conversion of coal, as well as the difficul-
ties of transporting solid fuels, make it necessary to view each coal deposit
individually. But these are only a few of the difficulties of embedding in-
creased large-scale coal deployment into the global energy system. Between
the beginning of the oil era and the present, the infrastructure built initially
around coal has been transformed. More specifically, coal as a commodity
has been displaced not so much by oil as by secondary energy carriers. It
is significant that the chief consumer of coal-the electric utility industry-
has carried out this transformation.
bFor the autothermal method, the process heat comes from the coal itself, while for the allother-
mal method the process heat is supplied exogenously.
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The Growing Need for Secondary Energy
Energy systems are linked to our civilization more intimately than the en-
vironmental and resource issues might indicate. This fact becomes clear as
we examine the relationship between primary and secondary energy car-
riers. Indeed, the availability or the nonavailability of secondary energy
carriers is currently a more critical matter than the availability or the non-
availability of a specific primary source of energy. For example, a country
could find itself in great difficulty if its supply of crude oil were suddenly
cut off j given an appropriate time for adjustment, it could cope by switch-
ing to the use of more coal and natural gas, for example. Nevertheless, it
is almost inconceivable for a modern economy to operate without gasoline
and even more so without electricity. Indeed, the secondary energy balance
of a country or a region, rather than its primary energy balance, is a useful
aggregate indicator of individual lifestyles and settlement patterns within
the framework of climatic and environmental circumstances.
Several criteria determine the success or failure of a specific secondary
energy form-technical suitability for the final consumer; effective conver-
sion, transportation, and distribution systems; and concentration of side
effects at the supplier end rather than at the consumer end. The first cri-
terion was responsible for eliminating most of the "exotic" forms of second-
ary energy (e.g., mechanical cable transmission and hydraulic grids) in the
early phase of the industrial revolution. The second criterion has been most
actively used throughout the twentieth century and is responsible for the
success of liquid fuels and electricity in the secondary energy market. The
third is likely to be applied more vigorously in the future.
How did the demand for secondary energy evolve? Recent changes in the
secondary energy balance of the FRG are shown in Figure 3-5 in terms of
market shares of secondary energy delivered to the various energy consum-
ers in both solid and liquid forms and through grids. Grid supply comprises
district heat, pipeline gas, and electricity. Energy for the transportation
sector and coke for the steel industry were excluded, since for these specific
markets consumers have no other energy alternative. Similar patterns have
evolved in many other countries, in spite of marked differences in the availa-
bility of indigenous primary energy sources.
Two independent substitution processes took place in the FRG during the
period 1950-1975, as can be seen in Figure 3-5. The first is the very rapid
transition from solid fuels to liquid fuels for heating purposes; this corre-
sponds to the shift during this period from wood and coal to crude oil in the
primary energy balance of this country. A slower, but very distinct, substitu-
tion process that began in the nineteenth century is indicated in the figure
by the ever-increasing share of energy supplied by grids. This reflects the
gradual shift from individual handling of "dirty" fuels to centralized supply
of clean, automatically controllable forms of energy.
For economic and technical reasons, the buildup of supply grids depends
on sufficiently high energy demand densities and thus on the process of
urbanization. (The relationship between energy densities and human settle-
ment patterns is discussed in depth in Chapter 23.) Similarly, congestion
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Figure 3-5. Secondary energy supply, FRG, 1950-1970. Logarithmic plot of the trans-
formation fl( 1-f) where f is the fractional market share. Smooth lines are model estimates
of historical data; straight lines show the logistic model substitution paths; model esti-
mates follow historical data and are therefore not easily distinguishable on graph.
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and local pollution because of urbanization gradually constrain the opera-
tion of less sophisticated individual energy conversion systems based on solid
and liquid fuels. Two independent observations underline this fact. First,
the saturation effect in the market share of liquid fuels (Figure 3-3)
occurred before the oil crisis of 1973-1974, at a time when oil was the
cheapest of all forms of energy available to the consumer. Second, the frac-
tion of secondary energy supplied by grids depends strongly on the size of
towns. In the large urban complexes of the FRG, up to 75 percent of the
stationary energy demand is currently met by the use of grids; this amount
is some 20 percent or less in small towns and villages. Urban planners for
large cities have favored district heating systems on environmental grounds.
The positive effects are well documented by the urban pollution-monitoring
systems. But while the demand for energy supplied by grids will certainly
increase, networks cannot supply all the final energy that will be required.
Within tomorrow's energy infrastructure, coal must be used prudently-
that is, it must be adapted to suit the specific features of secondary energy
requirements. As we shall discuss below, these requirements center around
the need for secondary liquid fuels.
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Secondary Liquid Fuel Requirements
The demand for liquid fuels is almost irreducible. Globally, some 40 percent
of the secondary energy currently supplied is met by liquid distillates and
derivatives of petroleum (e.g., gasoline, kerosene). In industrialized socie-
ties, some 20 percent of the total demand for secondary energy is for liquid
fuels for transportation purposes. Currently, liquid fuels appear to offer an
indispensable combination of energy density, portability, and direct appli-
cability to the task. In these societies there are also demands from discon-
tinuous operations (e.g., diesel generators for shift operations in industrial
plants) of smaller consumers in outlying districts of urban areas and even
higher demands in small towns and villages. In less industrially developed
countries, liquid fuels are of even greater importance: indeed, in most
countries such fuels are the only forms of high quality commercial fuel
available to consumers, particularly those in rural areas.
Here we estimate that for the world of 2030 and beyond some 10
TWyr/yr of liquid fuels would be needed. Our reasoning is that a low energy
demand world (of about 25 TWyr/yr of primary energy) would not bring
much change in end use patterns from current patterns; 10 TWyr/yr of
liquid fuels is some 40 percent of the current contribution to secondary
energy supply. A high energy demand world (of about 40 TWyr/yr of pri-
mary energy) would involve very different circumstances, and there would
be more opportunities for substitution as a result of both greater innovation
and greater necessity. In this high demand estimate, 10 TWyr/yr of liquid
fuels is only a little more than the amount that would be needed by the
transportation sector. But this 10 TWyr/yr could be supplied from petro-
leum and from allied fuels for only a limited period of time. Thereafter,
liquid fuels would have to be derived from other sources.
What alternatives exist, other than liquid fuels from fossil carbon-from
coal? The only possible competitor appears to be certain heavy oil-for
example, shale oil. However, since these oils must be recovered from rocks
in which there is only a small amount of this material, they may not be as
acceptable, both for economical and environmental reasons, as coal.
So we observe that coal-derived liquid fuels are probably the most appro-
priate means for meeting these secondary liquid fuel requirements, with the
caution that this observation, while plausible, is not absolute. Still it points
to the prudent use of coal.
Environmental Considerations of Carbon-Based
Liquid Fuels
As far as time is concerned, we judge that liquid fuels derived from coal
would be needed for about one-hundred years or perhaps even more. This
period is long enough for us to hope, with some confidence,.that hydrogen
or other noncarbon energy carriers would be able to fill the need for liquid
fuels or that technologies will be developed for deriving carbon from lime-
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stone or atmospheric carbon dioxide. With the exception of the problem of
high carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere (see Chapter 10), other effects
of carbon combustion appear to be minimal; after all, mankind has been
experimenting with fuel combustion for some time.
As is suggested in Chapter 10, deriving 10 1Wyr/yr from the direct com-
bustion of coal might be an imprudent action if carried out over a long
period. On the basis of admittedly limited data and knowledge, it is con-
ceivable that such actions could ultimately cause global climatic changes
too quickly for mankind to adjust to. Using the same data base, it is also
possible to suggest that 5 TWyr/yr of coal combustion, causing a little more
than present carbon dioxide emissions, would bring about changes at a
rate accordingly slower to permit adjustment. Deriving 10 TWyr/yr from
petroleum would thus lead to an annual release of carbon dioxide into the
atmosphere equivalent to that of some 5 TWyr/yr of coal combustion; the
remaining 5 TWyr/yr in this instance would result in the emission of water.
Deriving 10 TWyr/yr from methane would produce the same level of carbon
dioxide emissions as would be derived from 3 TWyr/yr of coal combustion.
Thus, 10 TWyr/yr of energy from liquid fuels-be it a synthetic olefin or
an alcohol-appears to be a prudent approach because it still allows for
adjustments to be made of the coal and hydrogen shares, as well as for
flexibility.
Ideally, what is needed is an asymptotic 10 1Wyr/yr carbon-based liquid
fuel supply whose internal energy is not derived at all from fossil fuel com-
bustion. Under these circumstances, the use of coal as a raw material for the
synthesis of liquid fuels would not increase carbon dioxide emissions over
present amounts. In fact, this means recycling and thus investive uses of the
coal resources. (See Chapter 21 for a discussion in detail of investive uses of
resources.) Of course, it will turn out that this approach is probably too cau-
tious. Nevertheless, it is commensurate with the current level of concern
about the problem of nuclear waste management. The adoption of such a
cautious approach to an asymptotic value of carbon-based liquid fuels would
probably make it permissible to exceed the interim carbon dioxide emission
rate for perhaps a few decades, while the asymptotic structure is being built
up.
As already alluded to, the amount of energy stored in carbon atoms is
a related environmental question. The most energy stored per carbon atom
is obtained when the maximum number of hydrogens are bound to the
carbon. Among liquids, the only possibilities are saturated aliphatic hydro-
carbons of medium weight (roughly octanes to dodecanes) and methanol.
These substances are well known. Gasoline is a mixture of hydrocarbons
composed principally of octanes; kerosene is composed largely of dodecanes;
and methanol is so-called "wood alcohol." The properties of methanol and
gasoline are given in Table 3-2.
Environmentally, there is little real choice among the three substances.
Kerosene and methanol are less flammable than gasoline, but kerosene can-
not be readily used in automobiles. Conversely, kerosene is the preferred
fuel for jet aircraft. Since gasoline evaporates more easily than methanol, it
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Table 3-2. Properties of methanol and gasoline.
Properties
Chemical formula
Molecular weight
Specific gravity (kg/I)
Boiling point t°C)
Freezing point (GC)
Specific heat of combustion (kcal/kg)
(kcal/I)
Vapor pressure 33c C (kg, cm 2 )
Ignition temperature (DC)
Solubility in water
Viscosity, 25 0 C (cps)
Exposure limits in air (parts per million)
Methanol
CH 3 0H
32
0.79
64.7
-97.8
4800
3800
0.32
470
infinite
0.5
200
Gasoline
C, H 18 (isooctane)
114 (isooctane)
0.72-0.76
38-204
-40
10,400
7300
0.6-0.84
427-510
nil
0.5
1800 (isooctane)
60 (benzene)
is therefore more flammable; but the ignition temperatures of both sub-
stances are similar, making them essentially substitutable for each other in
internal combustion engines. Maximum allowable ambient air concentra-
tions are lower for methanol than for octanes; but in view of the greater
volatility of octanes, the handling methods that are acceptable for one are
generally acceptable for the other. The principal difference is that methanol
is soluble in water, which permits safer and easier flushing of spills and also
probably enhances its rate of biological destruction.
From these points of view, methanol has somewhat better environmental
features than the other two competitive substances. Conversely, methanol
is approximately twice as heavy and twice as bulky as gasoline for a given
energy con tent, a fact that has environmental and economic significance
for problems of fuel transportation.
COAL OVER THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS
The transition to the strategic role of coal outlined above will not happen
overnight, and coal must therefore survive in the energy market over the
next twenty years. The prices of available natural gas and conventional oil
are, and for many years will be, relatively attractive. Therefore, over the next
twenty years, two criteria have to be applied to coal use-the use of coal
must be economically justifiable; its use must permit an orderly buildup of
the coal industry, and in particular of the coal supply industry, to the levels
required when coal becomes a major source of liquid fuels. Or in other
words, How do we get from here to there?
First, an immediate but limited role for coal as a primary fuel is desirable.
Second, priority should be given to exploitation processes, such as coallique-
faction, that are compatible with the long-term production of "liquid
coal. "
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Currently, there are wide differences in the situation of coal industries
in different countries. In a few countries, coal production has expanded
considerably in the past and is likely to do so in the future; Poland and the
Soviet Union are examples. Other countries, among them the United States,
have experienced stagnation in coal consumption; and others-for example,
the United Kingdom or more so the FRG-have recently seen a decline in
coal consumption.
In order to identify the best means for using coal prudently, we examined
the short-term possibilities for coal in the United Kingdom and the FRG.
For various reasons, the coal industries in these countries must adapt to
strong competitive pressures from other primary energy sources. We there-
fore concluded that strategies to improve the position of coal in these coun-
tries would most probably work elsewhere.
The in-depth studies were supported by and performed in collaboration
with institutions of the coal industries in the United Kingdom and the FRG
and reported on by a joint task force (Sassin, Hoffmann, and Sadnicki
1977). A rather consistent, yet somewhat unexpected, potential for an ex-
tension of the coal markets for the two countries was identified. Starting
from a projection of the demand for final energy forms, the task force con-
centrated on those coal conversion technologies that would soon be techno-
logically mature, that would offer a competitive secondary energy form in
those submarkets where present sources could be substituted, and that
would focus on sufficiently broad existing submarkets.
According to the task force, the internal trends of the energy market
would not allow for a resubstitution at the final consumer end of liquid or
gaseous hydrocarbons by the solid fuel, coal. Consequently, the prudent use
of coal in the coming decades was not considered a simple return to the pat-
terns of the primary energy markets of the past. Instead, "new coal," com-
prising both mining and conversion into competitive secondary energy
forms, was defined as a new energy source that must penetrate the future
energy market. It would compete against not only crude oil, nuclear energy,
and other energy sources but even against traditional ways of using coal,
which would gradually be phased out.
The main channels that would be opened for coal within the next twenty
years by promising new conversion technologies are shown in Figure 3-6 for
the specific situation of the FRG. In the figure we specify the various appli-
cations in which four coal-derived secondary energy forms-electricity,
district heat, industrial steam, and pipeline gas-are expected to compete
successfully. It also gives the assumed time periods in which penetration
could begin, as well as the number of years needed for new coal to dominate
the various applications. In determining these penetration times, we con-
sidered the estimates of the economic competitiveness of each of the tech-
nologies as well as the difficulties of competing with other supply channels
and of adapting consumers to a somewhat different supply mode.
Figure 3-7 gives the estimated maximum supply of coal in the FRG up
to the year 2000, assuming the projected implementation of new conversion
technologies. It can be seen that the traditional technologies for the uses of
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Figure 3-7. Uses of coal by existing and new technologies, F RG, 1970-2000.
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coal (e.g., for steel production and as a feed for existing coal power stations)
are likely to maintain their position, at least up to the year 2000. While
Figure 3-7 does not quantify the most likely development of the coal mar-
ket in the FRG, it does show a conceivable upper limit for development,
provided that events do not override the identified potential.
A similar pattern, but with a time shift of ten to fifteen years, has evolved
for the United Kingdom. The likely delay for the larger scale use of coal in
this instance reflects the discovery and exploitation of the oil and gas fields
in the British sector of the North Sea. Figure 3-8 therefore extends to the
year 2020. The results of the calculations are illustrated in the diagram in a
disaggregated form with respect to projected supply possibilities. A con-
ceivable increase in coal supply is shown for the United Kingdom.
For both studies, it was assumed that coal would begin to be favored-that
is, coal use would be expanded-under one of two conditions: either the
coal-derived secondary energy carrier would command a lower customer
price than its competitors; or the incremental cost of coal would not require
any price increase over existing prices at the consumer level. The second,
less restrictive, condition was usually found to apply: maximum coal poten-
tial is unlikely to be explored under competitive market conditions.
As the data for the FRG indicate, the vigorous stimulation of coal utili-
zation would nevertheless require ten years before new uses of coal would
take on significance. Both case studies have shown that the introduction
of new coal conversion technologies would not have an immediate effect
on energy consumption rates. In Chapter 8 we give other, more conven-
tional examples of market substitution, which prove that consumer's deci-
sions of the past predetermine the market behavior for quite some time.
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Figure 3-8. Coal supply allocation, United Kingdom, 1970-2020.
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Furthermore, the rapid increase in the consumption rates of coal, once
"new coal" has been introduced, would necessitate major investments in
indigenous coal production at a time when the coal industries are likely
to be suffering from stagnating sales. The alternative-to resort to massive
immediate near-term coal imports (Figure 3-8)-is not consistent with the
underlying assumption of a vigorous national coal policy from which the
analyses started.
COI\lCLUSIONS
What general conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of these various
aspects of a potential coal revival? Clearly, there must be a near-term revi-
talization of the world coal industries.c Otherwise, coal would not be able to
fulfill its dual strategic role as a near-term primary energy source and as a
long-term source of liquid fuels that may be needed over the next century
or more. However, these two goals are not automatically harmonious. Given
what we see as the historic and "natural" evolution of energy industries,
along with all their supporting infrastructures, these dual roles are somewhat
cl n our analysis we have not dealt explicitly with the complex, albeit important, subject of the
global coal trade in the revival of coal. However, we note with interest the ongoing World Coal Study
(WOCA) organized by Carroll Wilson of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in the United
States.
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in conflict and could give rise to ambiguous signals for those who would
work to activate the current coal industry from its state of relative stagna-
tion. A coal revival therefore needs to be carefully and consciously managed
in ways that would counteract the natural decline tendencies and that would
allow the industry to fulfill what might be regarded as, historically, the
extremely vital transition to the long-term energy future.
In effect, we must revive an industry-actually create a new industry-at
the same time that we do not expect it to exceed certain limits. To do that
will require all the systems-analytic skills at our disposal, as well as keeping a
continual eye on the growth and evolution of the alternative energy technol-
ogies and industries that must be nursed into being to support the lives of
generations of people living long into the future.
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4 THE NUCLEAR OPTION
INTRODUCTION
Nuclear energya could supply very large amounts of energy for periods of
time far beyond the experience of individuals and society. Even within the
period of this study-up to the year 2030-nuclear could supply large
amounts of energy without requiring novel technology. We examined
nuclear's potential contribution by constructing a reference case in which
nuclear power is called upon to supply of the order of 17 TWyr/yr of
primary energy by 2030. This would be a major, but not an overwhelming,
contribution at that time to meeting the demands of a high energy demand
world. However, this is more than supply allocations based on purely eco-
nomic considerations.
Nuclear power is peculiar: most nonscientists see it as mysterious and
complicated, but much more is known about it, by and large, than about
other sources of energy. The scientific basis of nuclear fission is well under-
stood: nuclear engineering is established by practical experience, and there is
large expertise in many countries. Even the impacts of nuclear energy (e.g.,
aNuclear energy refers to both nuclear fission and nuclear fusion. Most of the attention throughout
this chapter is on nuclear fission; nuclear fusion is considered, with its particular capabilities and char-
acteristics, only in relation to the functions of fusion reactors as sources of nuclear fuel for fission
reactors.
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the biological effects of ionizing radiation) are better known than those of
most of its competitive sources of energy.
As to its application, nuclear power seems to have been pressed into the
format of merely replacing or complementing an older and long-existing
technology-steam generation in electrical power stations. Today's nuclear
reactors are designed to raise steam at temperatures of 250 to 300°C, sized
and sited to conform to the requirements of electrical power grids, designed
for maintenance at schedules convenient for electrical demand schedules,
and required to be compatible chemically with the steam to be raised.
Therefore, the question is whether the real potential of nuclear power has
been really understood. One gram of fissionable material yields roughly
3 X 106 times more energy than one gram of carbon. Nuclear power is not
just a replacement for the old coal-fired station, but practically an infinite
energy source. What happens when a source becomes infinite?
First, because of the very high concentration of energy in fissile material,
nuclear fuel can be transported anywhere on the globe, with an infinitesimal
cost in money or energy. Therefore, nuclear power might be better under-
stood when it is put in the context where it belongs-the large-scale, long-
range, and global supply of energy. The attribute "global" is not an epithe-
ton ornans and thereby incidental; it is essential. It could be the key to the
proper understanding of nuclear power: its potential can be fully appreciated
only when nuclear energy is viewed in global dimensions as a contributor to
the balance of energy supply and demand in the world's regions.
The global dimension is a spatial category. There is also the dimension of
time. Nuclear power is peculiar in that respect as well. It can be argued both
that nuclear power is too late and that it is too early. It might be considered
too late because it contributed little to overcoming the oil crisis of the
1970s. From our point of view, this testifies to the parochial development of
nuclear power; for, being tied to the electrical sector, which has only 10 per-
cent of all secondary energy, it could do proportionally only that fraction of
the job. Nuclear power might also be considered too early, even with regard
to the theme of this book; the impact of the transition-from today's infra-
structure using principally cheap oil and gas to an infrastructure using coal,
nuclear, and solar power-has not been really felt. Any urgent need for
nuclear power would lie only in the decades ahead.
This is the broad background against which the potential of nuclear power
should be assessed. By necessity, then, we consider different types of nuclear
systems-and different applications-from the ones that are known today.
The global dimensions and the temporal extensions of nuclear power also
have their negative sides, which have made the technology controversial. The
global dimension was introduced ab initio by the military uses of nuclear
energy. It is widely recognized that the nuclear stalemate between East and
West is the basis for the political order of this planet. Peculiar freedoms for
smaller nations, even including possibilities for local wars, have indeed
evolved over the last decades. This evolution has taken place under the
umbrella of nuclear second strike capability in East and West-the expression
of the nuclear stalemate.
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Also, the implications of handling large amounts of fission products and
plutonium are often, consciously or unconsciously, considered globally. A
number of global political treaties can be seen in this context: the Antarctic
Treaty prohibits both nuclear explosions and disposal of radioactive waste
on that continent; the Limited Test Ban Treaty contains provisions not only
for arms control but also for protecting the world environment; the Outer
Space Treaty provides that even the moon will be kept free of "harmful
contamination." By contrast, the vexing problem of carbon dioxide con-
tamination of the atmosphere (see Chapter 10), which is aggravated by
large-scale fossil fuel combustion, has received no political attention whatso-
ever. The perception of arms control and environmental concerns as global
concerns is obvious when one considers the existing arms control and dis-
armament agreements as a whole. The fact that the hotly debated problem
of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is considered a problem of peace-
ful nuclear energy underscores the global nature of nuclear energy even
further; the explicitly intended Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Inter-
national Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) are explicitly global undertakings.
For the temporal dimension of nuclear, one can only point to the long-
term duration of the potential impacts on the biosphere from the release of
fission products and actinides, especially from plutonium activity. While it
can be reasonably argued that this aspect of risk applies a fortiori to toxic
inorganic compounds (e.g., heavy metals) that persist forever, nevertheless
the nuclear risk has received the most attention. Here, we can merely intro-
duce the nuclear controversy. A checklist of issues would include the
following:
Reactor safety. What is a credible accident? Farmer's (1976) probabilistic
approach and the so-called Rasmussen report (USNRC 1975), as well as
the Lewis committee critique (USNRC 1978), seem to indicate that
serious accidents are very unlikely to occur. What low frequency of acci-
dents can be considered acceptable? Starr (1969) has asked: How safe is
safe enough? What procedure can be used to answer this question? The use
of probabilistic procedures leads to the question: How sure is sure
enough? Hafele (1975) has asked whether new categories of risk must be
considered in view of the global consequences of modern technology. We
may also ask whether basing risk acceptance on public perceptions is
morally defensible (Schaefer 1978).
Radiation effects. What population is affected, and how badly, by radiation?
What are the consequences? Although exaggerated claims of radiation
effects by Gofman and Tamplin (1971) and others have been authorita-
tively refuted, new claims (e.g., Mancuso, Stewart, and Kneale 1978)
continue to draw attention and require refutation (Sanders 1978; Marks,
Gilbert and Breitenstein 1978). What standards of radiation are acceptable
for the general population: the 170 mrem per year set by the Interna-
tional Commission on Radiation Protection (ICRP); the 25 mrem per year
of the U.S. Environment Protection Agency (USEPA); the 5 to 15 mrem
per year of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC); or less?
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On what basis should consequences be evaluated: by comparison with
background, with existing mortality and morbidity rates, or in other ways?
Should workers at nuclear facilities be permitted exposure levels above
those for the general population? If so, how much?
Nuclear waste disposal. What is the nature of the problem? Do we have the
basic information to make probabilistic assessments (Breckhaeft et al.
1978)? Is waste disposal in fact a trivial problem (B.L. Cohen 1977)?
How does the long-term view affect the assessment of the problem: should
we consider morbidity over human generations, centuries, millennia, or
what? Does geological disposal of plutonium aggravate the problem? What
are the risks of handling nuclear waste, including those of the components
of decommissioned facilities?
Nuclear weapons. Issues thought to have been settled by the safeguards of
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the NPT are being
discussed anew. Do fuel reprocessing and national ownership of breeder
reactors increase incentives to avoid or to violate international agree-
ments? Would agreements on nuclear disarmament resolve this problem
or aggravate it? What about terrorism and theft? Is security adequate?
Because of modern experience of international terrorism, of the explosion
of an Indian nuclear device, and of the North-South confrontation, many
observers believe that the nonproliferation problem has not been tackled
yet.
Public attitudes. How much of public opposition to nuclear power is the
result of the transference of fears or hostilities from other problems-for
example, nuclear power as a symbol of nuclear war, nuclear power as a
target of opportunity for opponents of centralized technology? Con-
versely, how much support results from the symbolic transfer of positive
attitudes, such as faith in science or in progress?
The ordering of the issues presented above leads from identified, and to
that extent tangible, problems to problems that open into the broadest areas
of human controversy. Sometimes, it seems as though the nuclear contro-
versy is only the tip of an iceberg-the iceberg being a general and deep-
seated cultural dissatisfaction in Western countries. These concerns and
developments could well lead to a situation where a country (such as
Austria, as of now), or a group of countries, would not explore the potential
of nuclear power. The many extensive studies of policy projection have not
resolved this question. Meanwhile, the nuclear controversy continues and
evolves even further.
Probably the issues cannot be resolved by further head-on studies. If they
really are at the tip of an iceberg, it is the iceberg underneath the water that
is moving the tip and not the forces acting on the tip.
In that situation, it is essential to examine nuclear power within the
broader context of which it is a part. We argued above that to do this one
should have a global and long-range perspective. The following questions
are therefore pertinent: What is the balance of energy demand and supply
over the next fifteen to fifty years in the various world regions, and what
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role will nuclear power play in that balance? What is the alternative to
nuclear power in that context, and what is its price, monetary and
otherwise?
Nuclear power should also be looked at from the viewpoint of technical
opportunity. It has been argued that nuclear power was developed for the
sake of technological innovation as an end in itself rather than for the
amelioration of a perceived energy problem. Yet as a practical matter, not
much is known about the application of nuclear power beyond its use for
generating electricity.
Perhaps the opposition to the further commercial deployment of nuclear
electrical-generating capacity indicates that the most important uses of
nuclear power have not yet been developed. We hope this is the case. We
therefore emphasize later in this chapter those applications and settings for
nuclear power that go far beyond existing practice and, indeed, that cannot
be factored into our supply analysis for 2030 except in the most general
(and therefore necessarily vague) way.
STATUS AND SYSTEMS
The Status of Nuclear Fission Power
Nuclear fission power is not in its infancy. Any new technological develop-
ment must pass the three thresholds of scientific feasibility, technological
feasibility, and commercial feasibility. The workhorse of nuclear fission
power, the light water reactor (LWR)-a class of reactors that includes both
the pressurized water reactor (PWR) and the boiling water reactor (BWR)-as
well as the Canadian CANDU heavy water reactor (HWR), the British ad-
vanced gas-cooled reactor (AGR), and the Soviet Voronezh reactor (VR),
have all passed these thresholds. Besides these reactors, there are new types
under advanced development, such as the liquid metal fast breeder reactor
(LMFBR) and the high temperature reactor (HTR). Table 4-1 lists the status
of fission reactors worldwide. As of the end of 1978, the total capacity of
operating reactors worldwide was roughly 110 GW (e). Through 1993, when
the reactors presently under construction or on order would also be in
operation, this total capacity is expected to be about 390 GW(e).
Operating reactors need a nuclear fuel cycle to serve them. There is a
distinction made between the front end and the back end of the fuel cycle.
The front end comprises uranium mining; uranium processing (milling)
into yellowcake; conversion of yellowcake into the gas uranium hexa-
fluoride; and in most cases, the enrichment and conversion of this gas into
uranium dioxide and fuel fabrication. The status of the front end of the fuel
cycle is shown in Table 4-2. The back end of the fuel cycle comprises inter-
mediate fuel element storage, chemical reprocessing, intermediate waste
disposal, waste solidification, and final waste disposal.
Later in this chapter we shall examine the availability of uranium. For
existing and firmly planned reactors, known resources are adequate. The
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Table 4-1. Nuclear power plants worldwide. a
Total
Installed Capacity
Number Installed Average Cumulative Annual
Installed Capacity per Size Growth
Yea,b Plants Year (GW(e)) MW(e) Number GW(e) Rate (Percent)
132.93 41 5.443
1966 6 1.719 286.50 47 7.162 31.6
1967 5 1.217 243.40 52 8.379 17.0
1968 7 2.165 309.29 59 10.544 25.8
1969 11 3.384 307.64 70 13.928 32.1
1970 6 3.099 516.50 76 17.027 22.3
1971 10 5.755 575.50 86 22.782 33.8
1972 22 11.412 518.73 108 34.194 50.1
1973 15 8.541 569.40 123 42.735 25.0
1974 20 14.544 727.20 143 57.279 34.0
1975 19 14.464 761.26 162 71.743 25.3
1976 14 9.913 708.07 176 81.656 13.8
1977 19 15.160 797.89 195 96.816 18.6
1978 17 14.647 861.59 212 111.463 15.1
1979 44 35.580 808.64 256 147.043 31.9
1980 40 33.013 825.33 296 180.056 22.5
1981 39 34.938 895.85 335 214.994 19.4
1982 36 32.701 908.36 371 247.695 15.2
1983 32 31.974 999.19 403 279.669 12.9
1984 31 30.823 994.29 434 310.492 11.0
1985 23 24.902 1082.70 457 335.394 8.0
1986 14 15.409 1100.64 471 350.803 4.6
1987 9 9.536 1059.56 480 360.339 2.7
1988 11 11.997 1090.64 491 372.336 3.3
1989 6 7.190 1198.33 497 379.526 1.9
1990 4 4.226 1056.50 501 383.752 1.1
1991 4 4.880 1220.00 505 388.632 1.3
1992 0 0 0 505 388.632 0
1993 2 2.530 1265.00 507 391.162 0.7
"Plants either operable, under construction, or on order (30 MW(e) and over) as of 31 December
1978. Additional twelve power plants with a total of 10,487 MW(e) are not included here since the
expected date of commercial operation is not known.
bActual or expected date of operation.
Source: Based on data in Nuclear News (1979).
other front end steps are also in hand (Table 4-2). Enrichment, once the
most heavily guarded of all the "secrets" of nuclear energy, has been devel-
oped independently in several countries. Indeed, several technologies have
been developed, and more are in the laboratory. Enrichment plants are com-
plex and expensive, so they are not likely to be built on speculation. But as
has been demonstrated repeatedly, they can be built. An enrichment plant
capable of servicing about forty LWRs can be built in about the same time as
it takes to plan and build a LWR in the United States, and its construction
cost is four or five times that of a LWR. Thus, we can assume that enrich-
ment capacity will be built as needed.
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Fuel fabrication also seems to be in hand. Most reactor manufacturers
have either built up their own capabilities for fabricating fuels or made
arrangements for cooperation with independent fuel fabricators. These firms
are numerous, and the ability to erect new fuel factories has been demon-
strated many times. These plants are, after all, essentially special purpose
machine shops. In time, and in particular as radioactive recycled fuels are
used extensively, there will be a need for new processes, remotely operated
and preferably automated. Also envisaged are larger plants, co-located with
fuel-reprocessing plants, built ultimately in nuclear fuel cycle centers. This
arrangement would simplify procedures, decrease costs, and increase the
security of moving fuel materials from one fuel cycle facility to another.
The processes at the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle are the chemical
reprocessing of spent reactor fuel and the ultimate disposal of high level
radioactive waste from this reprocessing. Neither reprocessing nor waste
disposal is an urgent problem at present. However, time is needed to develop
the related facilities and institutions that will certainly be needed before the
year 2000 and probably by 1990.
Reprocessing is required to recover the valuable fuel materials (isotopes
of uranium and of plutonium) that are present in spent reactor fuel and to
simplify and make more reliable the disposal of high level waste. Waste dis-
posal is needed as a matter of simple prudence, to avoid accidents that could
occur during protracted storage of wastes.
As to reprocessing, the problems are not technical. The situation is similar
to that of enrichment. Processes have been developed in many countries,
and more are available from the laboratory. Several plants are operating
with the solvent extraction process, the preferred commercial method. Yet
the number of plants in operation and of those scheduled for operation
in the next decade is insufficient for the volume of activity that is to be
handled. One can therefore anticipate a growing world stockpile of unre-
processed, spent nuclear fuel.
More reprocessing plants could be built. That is not the problem. Again,
as with enrichment, the required time and costs of constructing a reprocess-
ing plant capable of handling the output of fifty to seventy-five LWRs are
about the same as those for constructing a LWR. Thus, there are no over-
riding financial problems. The real question is whether reprocessing plants
will be built. At present, the civilian industry can only call on the services of
the French plant at La Hague, and scheduled additions to world reprocessing
capacity are limited to the expansion of the La Hague plant and to the com-
pletion of a large, rebuilt facility at Windscale in the United Kingdom.
Other countries have chosen to, or have been persuaded to, defer their plans,
pending the resolution of questions raised about reprocessing and problems
of safeguarding. The problem appears to be partly political, too; opponents
of nuclear power are frank about their use of tactics to delay resolution of
these questions with the hope of "choking off nuclear power in its own
effluents." So here again, it seems that we must look at the part of the
iceberg that is under water.
Nuclear waste disposal is in a state similar to that of reprocessing. There
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seem to be no technical problems of solidifying wastes into forms that are
chemically stable and of emplacing them deep underground, either in mined
cavities or in deep boreholes. Furthermore, the chances of significant leakage
of the wastes back into the biosphere within the time that it takes for most
of their radioactivity to die away are effectively nil, and the concentrations
that might be released after that could only be, at worst, low enough to add
very small amounts to natural radioactivity. These factors are poorly under-
stood by the pUblic.
As with reprocessing, the political impact of opposition to waste disposal
plants has delayed the execution of specific projects in many countries.
Indeed, France and Japan are currently the only countries with definite
waste management projects. The United States, with about one-half of the
nuclear power in the world today, has only one small pilot project, intended
principally for wastes from its military programs, and even that is being
delayed pending political negotiations.
In sum, the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle seems to be in hand and on
schedule. The back end is in hand only in the technical sense and is well
behind the schedule necessary for nuclear power to play an increasing role in
the decades ahead. The resolution of the questions of the back end and the
bringing into being of the necessary reprocessing plants and waste disposal
facilities are the unfinished business of today's nuclear power.
Burners, High Converter Reactors, and Breeders
The LWR is a representative of a class of reactors that is designed to use one
neutron out of the two to three fission neutrons. The one neutron is needed
to maintain the chain reaction in which one fissionable nucleus after another
is fissioned, thus permitting a steady power production by burning the fissile
atoms. This class of reactors is referred to as burners.b
Apart from burner reactors, there is a second class of reactors, called
breeders, designed to use more than two neutrons out of the two to three
fission neutrons; not surprisingly, this technology is more difficult. Again,
one neutron is used to maintain the chain of fissions. The other neutrons
are used to convert fertile nuclei such as uranium-2 38 (238U) and thorium
(232Th) into fissile nuclei. c A converted fertile nucleus thus replaces the
fissile nucleus whose fission led to the liberation of energy. This is a funda-
mental difference: in effect, the fissile atom is no longer burned. Instead, it
is the fertile nucleus that is being burned. The fissile atoms no longer func-
tion as fuel, but as catalysts for converting fertile nuclei into fuel and for
burning them.
bThese reactors produce some new fissile atoms that can be fissioned. However, this conversion
does not qualitatively alter the fact that burners use, basically, only the fissile atoms that exist in
nature.
cA fissile nucleus is one that can be used to fuel a reactor: uranium-233 (233 U), uranium-235
(235 U), and plutonium-239 (239 Pu) are the most important nuclei.
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While the difference between these two classes is pronounced, there are
burner reactor designs that approach (but do not achieve) the situation of
breeding. These are referred to as either advanced converters or near
breeders. Examples are special versions of the HWR and of the HTR. But the
LWR can also be made a near breeder (U.5. Congress 1969; Edlund 1975).
Approximating the situation of breeding means increasing the share of
fertile nuclei that ultimately are fissioned while maintaining the character
of the fissile nuclei as fuel to be burned. Currently, with uranium still rela-
tively inexpensive, advanced converters or near breeders are estimated to
produce more expensive power than an economically optimized burner, say
the LWR or the CANDU type of HWR. However, as the real price of
uranium increases, their competitiveness with the burners improves. To
some extent, the future of advanced converters and particularly of near
breeders depends on how economical the breeders turn out to be. If the near
breeders are cheaper to build and operate than breeders, one could envisage
a rather long transition period in which near breeders first capture the
nuclear market and then asymptotically share it with breeders. If the
breeders are cheaper, or as cheap as near breeders, then the market share of
near breeders does not ever become large (for a cheap breeder can easily
be converted into an even cheaper near breeder). We will discuss the opti-
mum use of reactors and breeders later in our discussion of possible strategies
for meeting the requirements of a high nuclear world.
Breeding and Uranium. Natural uranium has a ratio of fertile to fissile
atoms of about 140: 1, and thorium consists of only fertile nuclei. Therefore,
orders of magnitude are won by breeding, in terms of ore consumption. And
this acts doubly: by reducing the ore consumption drastically, it is not neces-
sary in the foreseeable future to go to low grade ores. Practically speaking,
one could start by using the depleted uranium that would be left over from
all the isotope separation performed thus far. This uranium has an energy
content of some 600 TWyr, comparable to the economically recoverable
global coal reserves (see Table 2-4). Moreover, we shall see that the planned
evolution of the nuclear power industry would increase this stockpile of
depleted uranium by more than an order of magnitude. Thus, in the near
term and even for several millennia, resource constraints are largely elimi-
nated by breeders.
Stated in another way: Nuclear power thereby becomes nuclear power.
This is so when the resource of fissile nuclei, which nature has given, is con-
sidered a stockpile rather than a mine-that is, when an appropriate part of
nature's fissile nuclei has been converted, by appropriate nuclear reactions,
to a store of nuclei whose further importance is as catalyst and not as fuel.
Such catalytic uses of resources we would like to call "investive" uses as
opposed to "consumptive" uses. In our definition, an investive use implies
that something is put to profitable use, but retains its value; a consumptive
use implies loss of value-using something up. (By arbitrarily adopting these
terms, we depart from accepted usage and trust that inferential meanings
give us concise expressions with which to make an important distinction.)
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The strategic importance of breeding makes it necessary to present this
technology in more detail. The most advanced and proven version of the
breeders is the liquid metal fast breeder reactor (LMFBR). Table 4-3 lists the
major LMFBRs currently in operation or under construction worldwide.
Earlier experimental reactors, which are numerous, were deleted from this
listing. It is fair to say that for LMFBRs both scientific and technological
feasibility have been reached. The target now is commercial feasibility. The
safety of fast breeders is not considered a basic problem; as with the LWR
and with other reactors, they can be designed to meet predetermined safety
criteria. The development and operation of the LMFBRs is a broad and inter-
esting area in itself, with a vast literature (e.g., Hafele et al. 1977).
Besides the fast breeder, there is another class of fission breeders, the
thermal breeder (TBR), in which the neutrons are "moderate" to thermal
(low) energies. Two versions of the TBR are the molten salt reactor (MSR),
for which experimental units have been successfully operated (Robertson
1971), and the light water breeder reactor (LWBR) (U.S. Congress 1969),
for which an experimental reactor core is now being irradiated. Both of
these reactors breed new fuel at a much slower rate than do the fast breed-
ers, even when one compares the production rate of surplus fuel with the
system inventories. It is often considered that if the MSR and the LWBR
have interesting prospects, they would be in the role of near breeders; they
would be much more economical if not forced literally to produce more fuel
than they consume.
Nonfission Breeders. If sufficiently broadly interpreted, there are even
more breeders than the two classes of fission breeders mentioned above.
There is also the fusion D-T (deuterium-tritium) reactor. The neutrons
released in fusion are used to make more of the tritium, which is needed as a
Table 4-3. Power plants of liquid metal fast breeder reactors, worldwide.a
Construction
Installed Capacity
Stage Net Cumulative
Yea,b Country Name (Percent) MW(e) Net MW(e)
1973 USSR BN-350 (Shevchenko) 100 350 350
1973 France c Phenix (Marcou Ie) 100 233 583
1976 United Kingdom Dounreay PFR (Highland) 100 250 833
1980 USSR BN-600 (Sverdlovsk) 600 1433
1983 France c Super Phenix (Isere) 15 1200 2633
1984 FRG c SNR-300 (Kalkar) 46 295 2928
1985 Japan Monju (Tsuruga) 0 300 3228
Indefinite United States Clinch River (Oak Ridge) 0 350 3578
aOperable, under construction, or planned as of 30 June 1978.
bActual or expected date of operation.
cThe construction work in France and the F RG has continued, especially for the Super Phenix
reactor. Therefore the construction stage, as expressed in this table, is more advanced today.
Source: Based on data in Nuclear News (1979).
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fusion fuel. They do this by reacting with tritium. With the neutron energies
available from fusion reactors, one can get somewhat more than one tritium
atom back from lithium reactions. Therefore, the process can be arranged to
breed tritium, since some of the neutrons can be used for other purposes, as
yet unspecified. Deuterium and tritium are made to fuse in a sophisticated
plasma configuration or in a rapidly heated (e.g., by laser or charged particle
beam) pellet. Upon fusion of these nuclei, energy is released. Since tritium
does not occur in sufficient quantities in nature, it must be converted
from lithium, which then acts, together with deuterium, as a fuel. Lithium is
thus comparable to natural uranium (or more precisely to 238U), and tritium
to the fissile material. Deuterium is not a limiting material.
The similarities go further. The fission breeder and the fusion breeder have
an inventory of fissile and fusion able material, respectively, that must be
preserved. Both breeders have a radioactive inventory that must be confined,
and in both cases the radioactive waste must be disposed of. The two breed-
ers have therefore qualitatively very much in common. Nevertheless, when
properly designed, the fusion breeder can have smaller amounts of radio-
activity associated with it. This does not happen automatically just because
fusion is fusion; only the potential exists currently for such proper fusion
designs (Edlund 1975).
More needs to be said here about fusion. So far its development has been
aimed at achieving scientific feasibility-that is, producing more energy by
fusion than is consumed by the fusion devices. This is now expected fairly
soon (CONAES 1978) and obviously is a strong encouragement for the
further development of the fusion breeder. But one should also consider
industrial and then commercial feasibility, both of which are goals that will
not be easily reached. If attainable, the time required is speculative and
controversial. We hold the view that commercial feasibility with an elec-
tricity market share of, say 10 percent, is at best unlikely before 2030. Thus
for the purpose of tis book, we do not take the fusion breeder into account
explicitly. Should fusion be well established before 2030, it would then
share the functions that are assigned to the fast breeder: their operational
features in the broader context of energy strategies are practically the same.
We note also that the resource situations of the two breeders are comparable.
In both cases, the easily available resources are equivalent to a few hundred
thousand terawatt years, so that for all practical purposes, each of the
breeders permits an unlimited supply of energy.
In the more distant future, the fusion reactor could possibly go a step
further, to allow fusion of deuterium with deuterium. Under these circum-
stances, the energy resources would be further enhanced by a factor of
1000; energy supply would then be even "more unlimited."
Besides "pure" fission breeders and "pure" fusion breeders, there are two
ways that fission and fusion may be combined to achieve net production of
fissile material. Both of these consider the use of a fusion reactor as the
central part of the system.
The ratio of energy production to neutron production in the D-T fusion
reaction (17 MeVIneutron) is much lower than it is in the fisson reaction
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(80 MeVIneutron); also, the energy per nuclear reaction is more than an
order of magnitude smaller for fusion than for fission. In this sense, fission is
"energy rich," and fusion is "neutron rich." One therefore conceives of the
possibility of "adding" the energy of fission to that of fusion by using a
fusion reaction to drive a subcritical assembly that is used as a fission blanket
of a fusion device. At low multiplication, it is easy to construct such a
blanket, which both breeds its fissile material and provides the required
regeneration of tritium for the fusion reactor.
The resulting combination, often referred to as the hybrid reactor, could
conceivably be superior to either a pure fusion system or a pure fission
system. It is, however, also conceivable that the hybrid reactor combines the
disadvantages of both systems.
Bethe (1979) prefers a (nominally) nonmultiplying thorium blanket for
the fusion reactor. The 14 MeVIneutrons from the D-T fusion reaction are
energetic enough so that they can be relied on to produce fission and other
neutron production reactions in the thorium. Again, these neutrons, over and
above those needed to regenerate tritium, can be captured in the thorium to
make 233U. Bethe considers the fusion device to be principally a nuclear fuel
factory, with only such power conversion as can be attached to the system at
minimum cost. Variations of such system concepts have recently been
proposed.
Related to these fission-fusion concepts is the concept of making fissile
material from neutrons generated in accelerators. The chief advantage that is
claimed stems from the absence of any initial fissile material requirements.
However, this process has been criticized as doing little more than could be
done with a well-designed critical reactor, with the accelerator behaving
functionally as an extremely expensive control rod.
In contrast to the fusion concepts, accelerator breeders are technically
feasible today. The key items are the accelerators themselves. Proton linear
accelerators, feeding about 0.3 microamperes of protons at about 1 GeV
energy, could be built with only little extension of present technology.
Cost estimates of fissile material produced from them range from optimistic
values of $40 to $60 per gram of 239pU (which is higher by a factor of two
to three than plutonium for normal nuclear reactors) to upwards of $140
per gram (Van Atta 1977).
EXPLORING THE POTENTIAL
Up to now, we have been concerned with the systems capabilities of the
nuclear option. We have seen that there are no constraints because of
technical problems. And by using breeder reactors, resource constraints
essentially do not exist.
Yet nuclear power has had a wave of plant orders and commissioning,
followed by a trough of low demand. This market performance is gen-
erally explained by the uncertainties generated by the nuclear controversy.
A curious feature of this controversy is the discrepancy between the most
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careful scientific evaluations of the problems and the popular perceptions
of these risks. Chapter 11 discusses this situation with regard to risk assess-
ment. Here, we characterize the controversy as appearing to be the visible
part of a larger, submerged entity-the tip of an iceberg. The forces that
move the iceberg are still unknown.
Having said all this, the fact remains that we see no technological, systems,
environmental, or health rationale for not deploying nuclear power. The
controversial issues that are not resolvable are mainly those relating nuclear
power to nuclear weapons. Indeed, we can speculate that the human associa-
tion of nuclear power with Hiroshima and Nagasaki represents a large piece
of the iceberg. The solution to the nuclear weapons controversy must be
political, diplomatic, and institutional. It has not been the purpose of the
IIASA Energy Systems Program to analyze such problems. The fact that
solutions have been proposed is encouraging.
Nuclear power is different, not only from fossil power, but even from the
solar option. Fossil fuels are, sooner or later, depletable j solar and nuclear
are not. Unlike solar, nuclear already has an infrastructure that could permit
it to be deployed on a massive scale during the next fifty years.
Nuclear power is an option. The world may choose to exercise it strongly,
weakly, or not at all. If the world makes one of the two latter choices, the
remainder of this chapter is of academic interest. But if the world chooses to
exercise nuclear power strongly, we must look at the needs and conse-
quences of doing so. In any case, a decision must consider not merely the
risks-which have received attention in numerous publications-but also the
potential of nuclear power. The remainder of this chapter explores this
potential.
Introduction Rates of Nuclear Power
The status of nuclear power is the starting point for considering feasible rates
of the further introduction of nuclear power. Given the complexities of the
energy problem in the decades ahead, time becomes a limiting resource.
Cohen (1979) noted:
What is feasible depends on the frame of reference. In a wartime mobilization, many
things are possible which cannot be accomplished by business as usual. The purpose of
planning, however, is to avoid, as much as possible, the necessity for crash programs
that try to make up for the lack of foresight. We may not be able to attain our goals
by business as usual, but it should be our ambition to depart from it as little as
possible: to make plans which work with and not against normal economic forces
and normal economic rhythms.
In determining what is potentially feasible, we assume that political and
social constraints are to be resolved. The question of whether such resolution
can or will occur is only pertinent to the question of whether this potential
will actually be explored. The problem of determining the introduction rates
THE NUCLEAR OPTION 109
of nuclear power achievable in the near term can be approached in one or
two ways-by looking at the history of reactor commercialization or by
estimating a priori the time required for new developments to be completed
and for a supply industry to be created.
History of the Introduction of L WRs. The development of water-cooled
nuclear reactors for commercial use in the United States had its roots in
technologies and large-scale installations established previously for military
purposes. Plants for the production and purification of uranium, as well as
gaseous diffusion plants for uranium enrichment, were available on a scale
that would not be required by the civilian power industry for roughly
twenty years. To that extent, the early introduction rates of LWRs in the
United States did not follow the usual pattern.
The first commercial commitments of the LWR in non-nuclear-weapon
states was in 1966, most notably in the FRG and Japan, where enrichment
plants did not exist; but the fuel for the reactors had to be imported from
nuclear weapon states, at least at first. We therefore use this year as the
starting point for our discussion (see Table 4-1). The maximum number
of plants worldwide that can be completed by 1990 is nearly impossible to
change in the upward direction in most market economy countries, and in
many of them little can be added to the total before 1993. To the extent
that new projects will balance delayed ones, the period up to about 1990 is
already part of the history of the introduction of LWRs.
In the period 1975-1985, there is a wave of installations corresponding to
a wave of orders ten years earlier. In the peak period, 1979-1984, over 175
GW(e) are expected to be commissioned. The decrease in the installation rate
after 1985 stems from a decrease in orders after 1975. A variety of institu-
tional problems are responsible for this decrease, including political opposi-
tion to nuclear power during this period and slower than expected growth of
electrical supply industries in those countries with the technological infra-
structure to operate many nuclear power plants.
A Priori Estimates of L WR Introduction Rates. The nuclear industry in the
member countries of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (OECD) is operating below its capacity. Almost all manufacturing
firms have experienced a higher level of activity than they now have. In
these countries there are more than a dozen manufacturing organizations,
each of which is capable of supplying at least 8 GW(e) per year, so that the
total manufacturing capability is now of the order of 100 GW(e) per year.
In the United States, 40 GW(e) per year could be handled. The imbalance
between supply capabilities and current rates of ordering is such that unless
orders are resumed, some firms are likely either to reduce their operations or
to leave the nuclear supply business completely. Thus, in 1973 in the United
States, the planned trajectory for LWR installation between 1990 and 2000
was 17 ± 3 GW(e) per year (Atomic Industrial Forum 1973); currently it is
even lower, and it may not be realistic to expand this to more than 30
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GW (e) per year, even if all the special institutional constraints on nuclear
power were removed.d
World supply capability would be increased somewhat by including coun-
tries outside the OECD. These countries do not have specific social con-
straints on nuclear power growth; thus they are markets that are more
predictable, at least statistically, than are the nuclear markets of the OECD
member countries. But for now and for the near future, they are not large
markets.
Considering all these factors, we judge that the nuclear industry world-
wide, if called upon to do so, could supply of the order of 150 GW(e) per
year by the period 1995-2000. This requires a 50 percent expansion of sup-
ply capability during the next fifteen years-an expansion that could be
accommodated either by increased capability of firms already in the busi-
ness or by the entry of a few new firms who are already in the nonnuclear
electrical supply business. On the other hand, we judge that even a strongly
accelerated, worldwide program of nuclear power installation could not
increase the global growth rate of nuclear power stations for the period 1995-
2000 to more than 150 GW(e) per year. In order to put this number in per-
spective, bear in mind that the global annual increment of power plants in
general (nuclear or fossil) is presently only about 100 GW (e) per year. At a
total world industry growth rate of 4 percent per year, such increments
would become 240 GW(e) per year by the year 2000-that is, after twenty-
two years. A figure of 150 GW (e) per year by the year 2000 for nuclear alone
is therefore consistent. Nuclear's contribution would amount to about 62.5
percent of the new capacity. This is a large fraction, meaning that nuclear
would represent most of the new capacity installed as thermal plants for
baseload operations. Naturally, these numbers represent upper limits. Pro-
jections of growth are significantly lower, as shown in Table 4-4.
Estimates of Introduction Rates of Nuclear Power
Using the Market Penetration Technique
A possible approach to estimating introduction rates of nuclear power is
through price and cost estimates. For the period from now until 2030, costs
must be considered uncertain; so, as with other technologies, we refrain
from too rigorous econometric approaches. Nevertheless, nuclear power is
the cheapest new source of central station electric power in many parts of
the world today, and in that sense, it is already a reference technology.
Here we use the approach of market penetration, as will be explained in
Chapter 8. The salient features of this approach are its broad, long-range time
interval, applied backward or forward in time, and its strength in phenomeno-
dThe number is inferred from the "national commitment" scenario of the Supply/Delivery Panel,
Committee on Nuclear and Alternative Energy Systems (CONAES), U.S. National Research Council.
The information is from Chapter 5 of the panel's report, which at the time of this writing was in draft;
thus the number is cited as private information, subject to revision.
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logical terms. Of the more than 300 cases investigated at IIASA, all followed
a logistic curve of market penetration with high precision. It seems that these
logistic curves, continuous over long time periods, describe a system's feature
of market penetration, which is more robust than cost-price optimization at
any given time might suggest.
We now apply this technique to nuclear power. The objective here is three-
fold: first, to see whether the growth rates of nuclear power displayed in the
previous sections are internally consistent; second, to establish a frame of
reference for trajectories in which nuclear power plays a principal role (e.g.,
explorations of what we have characterized as its "real" potential); and
third, to determine whether suggested strategies for supplying nuclear energy
are optimistic or conservative.
Figure 4-1 plots the global market penetrations for coal, oil, and natural
gas. As distinguished from other displays of these data in this book, here
only the fitted curves are shown, rather than the actual data. The "system"
properties of the substitution phenomenon are emphasized. In particular,
the curves for natural gas and oil show the same penetration rate-about a
4.9 percent increase of f/(l-f> per year, f being the market share of the
Figure 4-1. Global market penetration rate of energy sources and considered penetra-
tion rates for nuclear power.
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particular technology. Even the curve for coal indicates a similar penetration
rate (parallel slope) in the ascending part of the curve.
Three points, marked x, for nuclear power are shown on the dashed
straight line marked (a) of Figure 4-1. These are successive benchmarks.
The point for 1975 is taken from actual data. In that year, nuclear supplied
0.119 TWyr/yr (l.5 percent) of the 8.2 TWyr/yr global commercial primary
energy. The point for 1990 is the fraction expected for nuclear in 1990. As
already noted, the projection (Table 4-1) of almost 390 GW(e) of global
capacity in 1990 would be difficult to change in either an upward or a down-
ward direction. Assuming that the nuclear capacity factor is two-thirds and
that the efficiency of conversion of heat to electricity is one-third, this
amounts to 0.78 TWyr/yr of thermal energy. For 1990, we estimate a global
total energy demand of 12.7 TWyr/yr. Thus,f/ (l-f) for nuclear in that year
is 0.0654 (6.54 percent). Finally, we have projected an average world
buildup rate of 100 GW (e) per year in the 1990-2000 period, as a result of
setting a 150 GW(e) per year target for the year 2000. This would lead to
1.4 TW(e) installed by the year 2000 and an average production of thermal
energy from nuclear sources at a rate of 2.8 TWyr/yr; based on a high figure
of 19.1 TWyr/yr of primary thermal energy, we arrive at f/(l-I) = 0.172
(17.2 percent) for nuclear power in the year 2000.
The dashed line drawn through these points (Figure 4-1) is a rather good
fit, indicating that the year 2000 "target" does not violate any continuity
principles of the system. The early curve of market penetration often has a
slope that deviates from the long-term one, up to the point at which a 10
percent market share is achieved, and the year 2000 point in particular
shows the influence of stimulation of the nuclear option. If this curve were
continued out to the year 2030, it would project a nuclear contribution of
60 to 70 percent of the world's total energy by that year. We consider this
barely possible technologically and very unlikely.
Thus, the dotted lines (Figure 4-1) are market penetrations of nuclear
power at the system rate already exhibited by oil and natural gas-4.9 per-
cent per year in fIO-f). These are drawn from the three benchmark points
marked x. By starting with the year 2000 point, nuclear power would have
about 43 percent of the total energy market in 2030; by starting with the
year 1990 point, nuclear power would have about 32 percent of the market
in 2030. The 1975 benchmark projects to an 18 percent market share for
nuclear power in 2030. The points labeled High scenario and Low scenario
are the nuclear shares of the respective JJASA scenarios described in Part IV
of this book; the point marked S is the market share of the here considered
upper limit of 17 TWyr/yr that nuclear power would have in a high energy
demand world of 36 TWyr/yr in 2030. As we shall describe subsequently,
17 TWyr/yr (corresponding to 10TW(e) of installed capacity) is the number
we selected to explore the potential of nuclear energy.
A projection is not a prediction, and we cannot draw unassailable con-
clusions from this exercise. Nevertheless, an inspection of Figure 4-1 shows
clearly that if the system behaves similarly for nuclear power as it did for
natural gas and oil, then 17 TWyr/yr of nuclear energy is not an unreason-
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ably high number to use for exploring the nuclear potential. It is below what
the historical market penetration curve would project after a somewhat
stimulated acceleration of nuclear installation in 1990-2000. Moreover,
the IIASA supply scenario allocations for nuclear power in 2030 (see Figure
4-1) are slightly conservative, if the market penetration of nuclear power
beyond 1990 follows historical trends.
Reference Figure for Exploring the Potential of
Nuclear Power
We noted that an accelerated program of nuclear power supply at the end
of this century could bring this energy source into a position where, given
continued normal market penetration, it could contribute 47 percent of all
primary energy by the year 2030. We now explicitly define this projection
as the basis of a high nuclear strategy for exploring the potential of nuclear
power.
Specifically, we have chosen a number-1 7 TWyr/yr of thermal power-on
the basis of combining a market penetration factor, il (l-I), of two-thirds,
and a high primary energy demand estimate of 36 TWyr/yr in 2030. Our
logic is simply that the buildup rate required for a high nuclear strategy is
compatible with a world that emphasizes energy supply.
What does 17 TWyr/yr imply for the nuclear system? First, it requires a
buildup of generating capacity to about 1.6 TW(e) by 2000, followed by a
buildup to 10 TW(e) by 2030. This implies a rate of addition in this latter
period averaging about 285 GW(e) per year, a number that is less than twice
that postulated for the year 2000. This seems feasible.
The discrepancy between 10 TW(e) and 17 TWyr/yr is the distinction
between installed electrical capacity and thermal energy generation per
year-that is, thermal power. We have assumed that, by 2030, most reactors
would show advanced thermal performance, so that the efficiency of con-
version of heat to electricity would be 40 percent. High temperature gas-
cooled reactors and liquid-metal-cooled fast breeders already approach this
efficiency. Finally, we assume a capacity factor of two-thirds for the nuclear
system in 2030. That is, mathematically,
average thermal power =
electrical power 10 2
--------"--- X capacity factor or 17=-X-
conversion efficiency 0.4 3
We emphasize that the designation of 10 TW(e) as the nuclear system
capacity is only nominal. Not all of this capacity would be used to generate
electricity. High temperature and low temperature process heat would be
available as well, to be used in industrial processes. Specifically, nuclear
energy could then be used for generating forms of secondary energy other
than electricity. But by designating 10 TW(e), we indicate the number of
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plants in the nuclear system by 2030-that is, 3000 to 10,000 units of 1 to
3.3 GW(e) capacity.
A Reference Trajectory for a High Nuclear Demand
World and the Related Demand for Uranium
In subsequent sections of this chapter we deal, among other things, with
requirements for uranium resources to meet the demands of a high nuclear
world. For this, we used a reference trajectory for the schedule of nuclear
power installations (Table 4-4). The numbers given for equivalent electrical
capacity do not necessarily refer to generation for distribution in an electri-
cal grid. Also, gross additions include replacements under the ad hoc assump-
tion of a thirty-year service life. Growth rates, however, are net; they refer
to growth after deductions for retirements. For comparison, recent trajec-
tories published by the IAEA and by the World Energy Conference (1978)
are also given.
A comparison of Tables 4-4 and 4-1-the latter having projected some
390 GW(e) of nuclear power by 1990-illustrates why we call this a high
nuclear world. It would take a prompt upsurge in nuclear orders and the
early completion of the new projects to bring the nuclear capacity in 1990
to the range of 500 to 600 GW(e) illustrated by most of the rows in Table
4-4, and the IAEA "high" of 909 GW(e) seems quite unachievable. Com-
parisons of the IIASA trajectory with the IAEA "low" and with the WEC
figures (Table 4-4) shows that up to the year 2000 our thinking is consis-
tent with other sources that are optimistic about nuclear power. Neverthe-
less, we emphasize that our trajectory is a pure construct, whose purpose is
Table 4-4. Trajectories for potential nuclear power installations worldwide
(in GW(e)).
Year
7980 7990 2000 2070
IIASA high nuclear reference trajectorya 160 580 1630 3640
Annual addition b 24 64 154 305
Annual growth rate (percent)C 15 11 9 8
Nuclear capacity, IN FCE high 188 698 1654
Nuclear capacity, IN FCE low 167 531 1082
Nuclear capacity, IAEA high 207 909 2227
Nuclear capacity, IAEA low 162 558 1403
Nuclear capacity, WEC 152d 521 d 1543
2020 2030
7030 10,000
359 252
4 1
5033
aEqu;valent electrical capacity, not necessarily for distribution on electrical grids.
brncludes replacement after thirty years of service.
c Net growth rate, after deduction of replacements.
dlnterpolated by IIASA.
Sources: Data for the IAEA figures are from Lane et al. (1977); WEC (1978); and INFCE (1979).
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simply to provide a uniform framework for comparing reactor strategies
under conditions of high requirements for nuclear power.
With the reference trajectory, it is possible to evaluate the corresponding
uranium demand. An upper limit is easily obtained for the so-called "once-
through" fuel cycle-that is, the irradiated fuel elements from LWRs go into
intermediate or final storage, and no recycling of uranium or plutonium
takes place. A figure of orientation for the specific consumption of such a
once-through fuel cycle is 131 tons of natural uranium per GW(e) per year.
This figure is based on LWR fuel at 3 percent enrichment, irradiated to a
burnup of 32,000 MWd/tU (megawatt days, thermal, per ton uranium) in
a reactor system of 0.31 efficiency of thermal-to-electrical energy con-
version operating at a 0.7 capacity factor. The enrichment process was
assumed to have a tails assay of 0.15 percent 235U, corresponding to eco-
nomic circumstances in which the relative cost of uranium to separative
work is much higher than it is today. Table 4-5 gives the cumulated uranium
demand of the reference trajectory, involving the once-through fuel cycle.
Beyond the year 2030, the cumulative consumption of uranium for the
once-through fuel cycle would continue to grow. The generating capacity
of 10 TW(e) would mean a consumption of some 1.3 million tons of natural
uranium each year.
Uranium Resources
There is an ongoing debate about existing high grade natural resources inside
and outside the United States. This quantity is important, because, as we
shall see, it can be used to determine both the worldwide potential of a
nuclear fission supply system in the absence of breeder reactors and, as a
corollary, the rate at which breeder reactors can or should be built to
achieve a truly long-range system. In essence, uranium resources both define
and constrain the transition period for the fission energy system to move
from burners to breeders.
Uranium resources include deposits that are not economical or are only
surmised rather than confirmed, while uranium reserves are considered as
known, economically recoverable, deposits. At any given time, some of the
resources are considered well known, even though they have not been
delineated and assayed as carefully as reserves. These are called reasonably
assured resources. In addition, some resources can be surmised to exist as
Table 4-5. Cumulative uranium demand of the reference trajectory.
Year
Uranium demand, including
initial inventory ('06 tons)
7990
0.7
2000
2.5
2070
6.7
2020
, 5.0
2030
27.5
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Table 4-6. Estimated global a uranium resources (106 tons).
Reasonably Estimated
Forward Assured Additional
Costb Resources Resources Sum
< $80jkg 1.65 1.51 3.16
(1.75) (1.54) (3.29)
$80-$130jkg 0.54 0.59 1.13
(0.73) (0.80) (1.53)
Sum « $130jkg) 2.19 2.10 4.29
(2.48) (2.34) (4.82)
aExcluding Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and China.
blncludes production costs only; specifically excludes cost of exploration, land acquisition, and
other sunk costs. Prices tend to be 1.5 to 2 times forward cost.
Source: Based on data from OECD-NEAjIAEA (1978). Numbers in parentheses are revised
estimates by the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, given in the draft final report of INFCE
(1979) .
undiscovered deposits in existing mlOlOg districts or in unexplored but
geologically favorable districts. These are called estimated additional re-
sources. The sum of reasonably assured resources and additional resources
form a total of global uranium resources, which must be used for planning
individual projects or the immediate future of the nuclear industry. The
findings of the joint OECD-NEAIIAEA study (1978) on this matter are
summarized in Table 4-6.
For the purposes of this book, Table 4-6 represents a beginning, rather
than a conclusion, for a number of reasons. First, we are interested in those
resources that may be available over a considerable period of time, rather
than those that have been discovered. Second, we are interested in the global
availability of these resources. Finally, there is potential interest in uranium
whose economic recovery price might be well in excess of $130/kg of
uranium. In sum, then, we extrapolate from Table 4-6 to an estimate of the
amount of natural uranium that might be available globally after half a
century of careful exploration and at whatever price might be economic.
The only completely honest answer to the question of what these ultimate
resources might be is: we do not know. Such hints as we have from present
knowledge of the nature of uranium deposits are, at best, qualitative. These
hints are as follows:
• Uranium deposits were formed, for the most part, more than one billion
(109 ) years ago. This means that the continental distribution of uranium
today can to some extent be extrapolated back to its distribution before
the latest episode of continental drift. In these terms, some parts of the
world that might be good places to look have not been very well
explored.
• Most of the U.S. reserves consist of uranium in sandstone deposits. They
are characterized by sharp mineralization boundaries, so that the usual
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rule of resource economics-that resources increase rapidly as mmmg
proceeds beyond the deposits of highest concentration (and lowest price)
-is confounded. Other types of uranium deposits are hydrothermal
veins, for which a similar situation might be expected, and pebble con-
glomerates, for which the normal rules of resource economics should
hold. We simply do not know how much uranium will be found in
deposits that are currently below commercial grade.
• A vast amount of uranium exists in shales at quite low concentration (30
to 300 parts per million [ppm] uranium). The technological cost of ex-
tracting it is very high now, but there is always the possibility that new
technologies (for example, in situ leaching) would make it economically
accessible. More problematic is whether the environmental costs of ex-
traction would be acceptable.
An earlier OECD-NEA/IAEA report (1977) gives information both on the
amount of drilling for uranium and-when taken together with the figures
for reasonably assured resources of uranium (specifically, resources pro-
ducible at a forward cost of less than $130/kg)-on the finding rates. These
data are shown in Table 4-7.
The United States, with the largest uranium reserves, has one of the
smaller finding rates (Table 4-7). Perry (1979), among others, draws the
reasonable conclusion that this combination of events does not mean that
the United States is unusually well endowed, but only that it has been rela-
tively well explored. In the absence of any better assumption, and because
Table 4-7. Uranium findings and finding rates.
Australia
Central African Empire
Argentina
India
Finland
Philippines
Italy
Turkey
Germany, Federal Republic of
Spain
France
United States
Japan
Portugal
Mexico
Drill Holes
(10' m)
~1100
55
200
306
25
8
74
196
205
638
5151
82,500
393
435
723
Findingsa
(10' tons)
345
16
42
54
3.2
0.3
2.2
4.1
5.6
16
123
1918
7.7
9.2
7.1
Finding
Rates
(kg/m)
314
290
212
178
128
38
30
28
28
25
24
23
23
21
9.8
aFindings include all resources producible at a forward cost of less than $130/kg, plus cumulative
prod uction.
Source: Based on data from OECD-NEA/IAEA (1977).
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the United States has a large enough area and a large enough diversity of
geological provinces, it seems reasonable to take it as a representative sample
of the world.
According to the 1977 OECD-NEA/IAEA report, the United States has
some 1.7 million tons of uranium resources at a forward cost of less than
$130/kg and has already produced some 0.22 million tons of uranium,
adding to a total resource base of some 1.92 million tons. It has a land area
of 9.4 X 106 km 2, which translates to some 0.20 tons of available uranium
per km 2 of earth surface. Using Perry's method, we then estimated global
uranium resoures by taking a figure of 0.18 tons per km 2 and multiplying
this by the area of each of the seven IIASA world regions considered in this
booke , to arrive at a global figure of 24.5 million tons. These results are also
compared with the values in OECD-NEA/IAEA (1977) (Table 4-8). For
regions IV (LA), V (AflSEA), and VI(ME/NAf), which include most of the
developing countries, the IIASA projection shows very considerable supplies
of uranium. This is in agreement with the results of a procedure proposed
by Alexandrow and Ponomarev-Stepnoy (1974). Using their approach,
Belostotsky (1977) estimated global uranium resources at some 17.5 mil-
lion tons, based on older OECD-NEA/IAEA (1975) data. Updated inputs
would lead Belostotsky to estimate world uranium resources at some 21.5
million tons, which is essentially in agreement with IIASA's figures, con-
sidering the crudeness of both methods of estimation.
Let us not lose perspective. One can argue that it is impossible to get 24.5
million tons or that it is possible to get more than 24.5 million tons of rela-
tively economical uranium. The point is simply that we might expect to find
of the order of 15 to 30 million tons of uranium when most of the world's
regions have been explored as completely as the United States.
A comparison of Tables 4-5 and 4-8 leads to the observation that a
nuclear capacity of 10 TW(e) in the year 2030 using the LWRs in a once-
through fuel cycle would use up the uranium resources that we have postu-
lated to be available globally. This statement refers to globally averaged
considerations. In some regions, supplies would be used up much earlier than
2030.
Reactor Strategies and Uranium Consumption
If we continue to rely on today's LWRs, which are designed for a once-
through fuel cycle, then by the year 2030 we would use up even Perry's
expanded estimate of uranium resources. Something must therefore be done
before 2030 if our nuclear reference case is to be more than a boom and bust
episode of resource consumption and depletion. Otherwise, the real potential
of nuclear energy will not be brought out. Properly used, nuclear energy not
only can playa major role in energy supply within the next fifty years but
eSee Figure I -3 for the description of these regions and Appendix I A for the list of countries in
each of the regions.
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Table 4-8. Adjusted uranium resource estimates.
IIASA World Regions
I (North America)
II (Soviet Union and Eastern Europe)
III (Western Europe, Japan, Australia,
New Zealand, South Africa, Israel)
IV (Latin America)
V (Africa except Northern Africa and
South Africa, South and Southeast Asia)
VI (Middle East and Northern Africa)
VII (China and centrally planned
Asian economies)
I-VII
Polar regions (including uninhabited islands)
World
Area
(l0· km')
21.5
23.5
15.5
20.6
33.6
9.8
11.5
136.0
12.5
148.5
OECD-NEAjIAEA
Estimate
(l0· tons)a
2.53
1.26
0.08
0.33
0.08
4.29
4.29
(14.2-26.4)b
IIASA
Estimate
(l0· tons)
3.87
4.23
2.79
3.71
6.05
1.76
2.07
24.48
2.25
26.73
aExcluding regions II and V II.
blncluding the speculative resources given in OECD-NEA/IAEA (1977).
could play such a role for a long time thereafter. This durability must be
assured by proper reactor strategies.
There are three ways of continuing the nuclear option beyond 2030: (1)
to exploit more dilute sources of uranium than are currently used; (2) to
rely on improved reactors and fuel cycles; or (3) to head for an asymptotic
solution directly, which involves the use of breeder reactors. We discuss each
of these approaches in the following sections.
Yellow Coal: Exploiting Dilute Sources of Uranium. Our analysis of global
uranium resources was an extrapolation of the quantity of relatively rich
uranium ores that might ultimately be found-that is, 2000 ppm (0.2 per-
cent) down to perhaps 500 ppm. These ores are economically recoverable up
to a forward cost of $130/kg of uranium considered here. Except for the
uranium produced in small quantities as the by-product of gold and phos-
phate mining, all of the nuclear facilities considered in Table 4-2 work with
uranium ores of this ppm level.
There has been very little discovery of intermediate grades of uranium,
assaying between 300 to 500 ppm of uranium. However, it is known that
many types of shale contain 30 to 300 ppm of uranium, with the average
being 70 ppm. The quantity of shale is vast.
The amount of uranium that exists in these extremely low grade ores is
enough to satisfy the needs of a very large-scale nuclear industry for a very
long time. However, the problems of recovery are at least as forbidding as
the quantity is attractive.
The recovery of uranium at a 70 ppm concentration would take a large
amount of money. The forward cost would increase from $130/kg of
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Table 4-9. Requirements for the operation of a 1 GW(e) power plant.a
LWR (2000 ppm ore)
Coal
LWR (70 ppm ore)
Land
30- Year Total
(km' )
3
10-20
33
Mining
Personnel
(man-yr/yr)b
50
500
300
Material Handling
Involved
30- Year Total
(10· tons)
aCorresponds to an electricity chain producing 6.1 TWh with a thirty-year life span.
b 1 man-year = 2000 hours.
cOverburden factor: 15 m 3 per ton (averaged).
dOverburden factor: 3 m 3 per ton (averaged).
uranium to at least several hundred dollars per kg. But the change from
2000 to 70 ppm has more than just price implications: the requisite mining
operation would be very large.
To illustrate this, we refer to the WELMM concept (which will be pre-
sented in Chapter 9), and indeed specifically to the situation illustrated in
Table 4-9. These WELMM results are for two types of LWR operations: (1)
the LWR using 2000 ppm uranium ore, and (2) the LWR operation using 70
ppm ore. A third type of operation, that of coal mining, was also considered.
The results of a comparison of these three mining operations are shown in
Table 4-9.
Obviously, in terms of land use, manpower, and materials handling, the 70
ppm LWR operation approaches that of coal mining. When envisioning the
use of uranium after our assumed 24.5 million tons of high grade uranium
ore have been consumed, we must also consider the impacts, which are
similar to those of obtaining the same energy from coal. For both the 70
ppm LWR and the coal mining operation, there are societal, environmental,
and land use implications. Putting aside the problem of carbon dioxide emis-
sions from combustion (see Chapters 3 and 10), we see that the 70 ppm LWR
operation is, in fact, more difficult. Almost all the uranium ore taken out of
the ground becomes solid (but not very radioactive) waste, whereas at least
half of the rock removed in coal mining is, in fact, coal. Using very dilute
uranium therefore turns this operation of nuclear power into that of mining
"yellow coal."
For purposes of orientation, we apply the data of Table 4-9 to our refer-
ence case of 10 TW(e) of installed nuclear capacity. The resulting data,
which are given in Table 4-10, are on a grand scale. The area, 330,000 km2,
is approximately the size of Italy, and three million workers may be 0.1
percent of the total work force worldwide. The approximately 3.6 X 1012
tons of solid waste and/or overburden is a thirty-year total, corresponding to
approximately 120 X 109 tons per year. To put this number in perspective,
the largest bucket-wheel excavators currently used in open pit mining are
capable of handling about 240,000 bank m3 (day. Roughly, 1100 of such
dinosaurs, each with an operation weight of 13,000 tons, would have to
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work with a 70 percent load factor throughout the year-a large operation,
but not physically impossible.
We can similarly analyze the situation of getting uranium from the sea.
While the resource base of such uranium has been estimated at about 5 X
109 tons, the concentration of uranium in the sea is only about 1.5 X 10-3
g/m 3 (Weast 1974). The annual demand for 10 TW(e) of the once-through
fuel cycle LWR would be approximately 1.3 million tons of natural
uranium. In order to recover this, it would be necessary to process some
870,000 km 3 of sea water annually. For comparison, the worldwide runoff-
that is, the flow of all rivers to the seas-is only about 37,000 km 3 . One may
conclude by observing that this is a large operation and only conceptually
possible.
Earlier, we observed that there is the factor of about 3 X 106 between the
energy yields of 1 gram of fissionable material and 1 gram of coal. What a 70
ppm LWR operation does in effect is to reduce this factor to one. Out of the
approximately 131 tons of natural uranium that a single, 1 GW(e) LWR uses
per year, only about one part in 200 (5 X 10-3 ) becomes actually fissionable
because of enrichment plant tails losses and incomplete burnup. Thus a 70
ppm LWR operation means a further dilution of about 7 X lO-s. And
indeed,
3 X 106 X 5 X 10-3 X 7 X lO-s ~ 1
In sum, assuming, consciously or unconsciously, a LWR once-through fuel
cycle using 70 ppm grade uranium ore means a return to the well-known
scale of operation: it is equivalent to mining coal or, more exactly, to mining
"yellow coal." We are faced with the old problems of large-scale mining and
the new problems of solid waste, including both residues of rock milling and
radioactive wastes.
The "Stretch Out" Approach. As noted, the use of LWRs of current design
on a once-through fuel cycle would commit essentially all of the world's high
grade natural uranium during the buildup phase of our reference case. This is
a wasteful use of uranium compared to what could be accomplished, even
without breeders.
Table 4-10. Requirements for maintenance of a 10 TW(e) LWR operation
using 70 ppm ores.a
LWR (70 ppm ore)
Land
30- Year Total
(km 2 )
330,000
Mining
Personnel
(706 man-
yr/yr;b
3
Material Handling
Involved
30- Year Total
(70 12 tons)
aCorresponds to an electricity chain producing 6.1 TWh with a thirty-year life span.
b 1 man-year = 2000 hou rs.
cOverburden factor: 3 m 3 per ton (averaged).
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Let us recall that the once-through fuel cycle is just that: no recycling is
allowed. Given the reprocessing of spent fuel and the recycling of uranium
only, the demand for "virgin" uranium could be reduced by about 20 per-
cent; additionally, the recycling of plutonium reduces this demand another
15 percent. This capacity exists in LWRs of today's design. Also, by using
fueling designs that include thorium and its conversion product, 233U, some-
what less natural uranium becomes necessary. By going to enrichment
schemes that produce uranium tails more depleted than 0.15 percent 235U,
an additional 15 percent of the uranium requirement might be saved. All in
all, it is conceptually possible to run a LWR system, with reprocessing, using
233 U and more separative work, which would require about half as much
natural uranium as does the existing LWR system.
Table 4-5 indicates that up to the year 2000 some 2.5 million tons of
natural uranium would be required and between 2000 and 2030, some 25
million tons. If we were to employ all the techniques just mentioned for
achieving a more efficient use of natural uranium, then this 25 million
tons would be reduced to roughly 12.5 million tons. Adding the amount
estimated to be consumed up to the year 2000-about 2.5 million tons-we
get a total of roughly 15 million tons of natural uranium that would be con-
sumed by 2030. This is still not far below what might be ultimately avail-
able, but it perhaps gives some time.
How much time? We recall two numbers. First, 10 TW(e) installed
capacity under reference case conditions would consume some 1.3 million
tons of natural uranium per year. Using the efficient mode of LWR opera-
tions just described, the amount of natural uranium needed would be about
half that-or some 0.65 million tons per year. Second, if we assume that
the world now has about 23.5 million tons of high grade natural uranium,f
by 2030 there would be only about 8 million tons left. In brief, we would
have about ten years left before we are forced into mining "yellow coal."
By employing all possible means-uranium recycling, thorium and 233U,
lower enrichment tails-and using reactors that are intrinsically more effi-
cient in uranium use than are today's LWRs, it is possible to do even better
than that. Heavy water reactors (HWRs) or graphite moderated, gas-cooled
reactors can be designed to use only half as much natural uranium as LWRs.
These are not extreme cases but systems that are simply extensions of exist-
ing reactor designs. Suppose only 7.5 million tons of natural uranium are
were needed between 2000 and 2030, as a result of switching to these
reactors. Recalling that there are assumed to be some 23.5 million tons of
natural uranium and that some 2.5 million tons are needed up to the year
2000, then by 2030 there might be some 13 million tons left, with perhaps
"only" 325,000 tons of natural uranium being used annually. Thus, perhaps
thirty-five to forty years of nuclear power could still be fueled.
This is not very long on the scale of human history. But this does give us
on the order of one human generation before a permanent commitment to
nuclear power might have to be made.
fThis figure is based on the estimate of 24.5 million tons of natural uranium from Table 4-8, minus
the estimated 1 million tons of natural uranium already extracted.
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A Word About Thorium. Since an input of thorium is required for main-
taining the fuel cycles described in the stretch out approach, comments on
its availability are in order. The OECD-NEA/IAEA (1977) reports 490,000
tons of thoriumg as reasonably assured resources and some 833,000 tons
of thorium as estimated additional resources. These figures parallel the
data given in Table 4-6. There is little doubt that much more thorium will
be found when it is searched for as intensively as uranium has been.
Thorium is three times as abundant as uranium in the lithosphere (Weast
1974), and yet current reserves are more than adequate for the nonnuclear
uses that dominate today's demand for thorium. There is no thorium in the
sea, but the expected land resources, which for estimating purposes may be
taken as approximately equal to those of uranium, are superabundant even
for a large and durable nuclear fission economy. Thus, we do not see thorium
as imposing any limits on the "stretch out" approach outlined above.
Breeders: The Asymptotic Solution. Advanced converters and near breed-
ers can stretch out the time over which nuclear power can rely on high grade
natural uranium. But sometime in the twenty-first century, the supply will
run out; if not in 2030, almost certainly by 2070. At that point, a nuclear
option would have only two choices: (1) mining "yellow coal" or (2) using
breeder reactors.
Let us recall a few points already made. Burners have about a 1 percent
efficiency use of the uranium mined. Advanced converters and near breeders
stretch uranium supply by a factor of four or five and use at best 5 percent
of the uranium mined. Breeders, by relying on a stockpile of fissile atoms as
catalysts for burning fertile atoms, use almost all of the energy potential of
uranium and can also be designed to use all of the energy potential of
thorium that can be made available. In other words, if our reference trajec-
tory were based on the use of 23.5 million tons of natural uranium in
today's LWRs, by 2030 there would still be 23.3 million tons of fertile
atoms that could be burned in breeders, plus any thorium that might be
available. This translates into 60 thousand terawatt years of energy-and this
would be fuel already extracted and separated from host rocks.
And if more uranium is needed a few millennia hence, it would be available.
The factor of about one hundred in efficiency of resource use between
LWRs and breeders brings even the mining of "yellow coal" into manageable
proportions. To quantify this, the results of a WELMM analysis for the 70
ppm LWR operation and for the breeder (LMFBR) operation are compared
in Table 4-11. The land, mining personnel, and material-handling require-
ments are all reduced for the LMFBR by two orders of magnitude. We no
longer have "yellow coal"; instead, we have mining operations on a familiar
scale. The environmental improvements are obvious.
In sum, burner reactors are cheap, but lead to consumptive uses of the
stockpile of fissile material that nature has given us. Their use alone leads
quickly to one of two situations-to no nuclear power or to mining "yellow
gNatural thorium consists of the isotope 232Th . The symbol 232Th is therefore used interchange-
ably with natural thorium.
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Table 4-11. Requirements for operating a 1 GW(e) planta (6.1 TWh(e)
=1 yr operation at 70 percent capacity factor).
LWR (70 ppm uranium ore)
LMFBR
Land
30- Year Total
(km 2 )
33
0.2
Mining
Personnel
(man-yr/yr;b
300
2
Material Handling
Involved
30- Year Total
(70· tons)
aTo calculate the requirements for running a 10 TW(e) operation, multiply the listed numbers
by 104 •
b1 man-year = 2000 hours.
cOverburden factor: 3 m 3 per ton (averaged).
coaL" Near breeder reactors ameliorate the fuel supply problem without
eliminating it. They are somewhat more expensive than burners and could
buy time, if it is needed, for technological development, resource explora-
tion, and perfecting the institutions that might be required to safeguard the
nuclear fuel against being diverted to weapons use.
Building Up a Breeder System
Breeder reactors are essential if nuclear power is to achieve its "real" poten-
tial. They could possibly be expensive, even compared to near breeders. But
the proper perspective in which to view this expense is to realize the savings
that breeders bring in resource costs-that is, the cost could be reasonable
and justifiable. We now examine three possible strategies for getting from
the present situation (burners and only a few experimental or prototype
breeders) to the situation such that by 2030 there could be 10 TW(e)
installed capacity and no further demands on uranium resources because of
enough breeder reactors. These are the classical reactor strategy, the con-
verter breeder strategy, and the multipurpose strategy.
The Classical Reactor Strategy. Because LWRs dominate the nuclear in-
stallations of today, the standard or what we call the "classical" reactor
strategy has been to consider combinations of LWRs and breeder reactors.
The idea was to make use of fissile plutonium,h which is produced in LWRs,
for the installation of breeders, thus having a gradual buildup of breeders
that would eventually replace the original burners. For instance, 1 GW(e)
LWR of today's design produces between 150 and 200 kg of fissile plu-
hNot all the isotopes of uranium and plutonium can be fissioned easily. Those that can are called
fissile: for plutonium. the fissile isotopes are 239 pu and 241 Pu; for uranium. they are 233 U and 235 U.
When we refer to either fissile plutonium or fissile uranium, we mean the total content of these fissile
nuclei.
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tonium per year of operation at a load factor of 0.7. This plutonium pro-
vides the first core-the inventory-of breeders.
We use the LMFBR as a representative of breeders in general, because it is
the most well known and the most advanced of the breeders. But the argu-
ments below apply qualitatively to other breeders.
Roughly 5 tons of fissile plutonium are required as reactor and fuel cycle
inventory per 1 GW(e) of LMFBR capacity. It is easy to determine the
dynamics of such combinations. Using typical values for the breeding prop-
erties of LMFBRs, Nakicenovic and Perry (1979) computed the distribu-
tion of power between today's LWRs and LMFBRs and the cumulative
natural uranium demand of the classical reactor strategy. The results are
presented in Figure 4-2. The LMFBR builds up to an installed capacity of
5.7 TW(e) by the year 2030; it arrives at the 10 TW(e) installed capacity by
the year 2040. Thus, by the year 2030 there is still 4.3 TW(e) of installed
capacity supplied by LWRs, but this decreases rapidly.
For the classical reactor strategy, the cumulative natural uranium demand
by the year 2030 is about 13.6 million tons. The asymptotic cumulative
natural uranium demand-some 15 million tons-is reached around 2040, at
which time virtually all the reactors would be fast breeders. The require-
ments for natural uranium were derived assuming uranium recycling. The
very low, steady consumptive demand of the fast breeder reactor (FBR) is
insignificant: the vast amounts of depleted uranium coming from the enrich-
ment of the natural uranium used in LWRs are used up first.
In sum, the classical reactor strategy leads to a one-time consumption of
natural uranium of the order of 15 million tons. This is comfortably below
Figure 4-2. A classical reactor strategy.
c:
"'c:
o
....
<0
o
o
15
20 "tJ
c:
'"E
'""tJ
E
.=c:
~
:1
25
10 E
:1
....
'"c:
'"5 .~
..!!!
:1
E
:1
U
2030
Reference
trajectory
LWR-U 5
--
.-
-"
"
"....
202020102000
_.- LWR-U5 once-through strategy (consumptive use)
--- Classical reactor strategy finvestive use)
",
,,/
,/
--/" ,/'''
.--,/'
--
--.~:.-- ---
o+---------<--------+---------t-----'L------+-------.L
1990
12
~ 10
.~ 8
u
'"0.
'"u
:0 6
'"U
:1
c:
"tJ 4
~
'"1;;
c: 2
Year
126 ENERGY IN A FINITE WORLD
the approximately 23.5 million tons of high grade natural uranium resources
envisaged (Table 4-8); in other words, the 23.5 million tons of natural
uranium considered here are easily consistent with the uranium requirement
of the classical reactor strategy. However, the 4.3 million tons of natural
uranium (Table 4-6), which for planning purposes are reserves, are too small
a quantity to be consistent with this strategy. Thus, unless the expectations
that led to Table 4-8 are fulfilled, the classical reactor strategy is just not
good enough.
Eliminating the Burners. The advantage of the LWR in today's nuclear
market is its low capital cost. However, the LWR is a relatively inefficient
converter of fissile uranium to fissile plutonium-the most efficient converter
being a breeder. And in fact, if the goal were to minimize natural uranium
consumption, only the LMFBR would be installed from the beginning (Spin-
rad 1979c). Then, the fuel used initially would be enriched uranium (of the
order of 20 percent enrichment); gradually the LMFBR would shift to the
use of plutonium fuel that is self-generated. The Soviet Union seems to be
envisaging, at least to some extent, the use of breeders in this way.
We can put an upper bound to the resource demands of this approach.
This upper bound is the result of assuming that all breeders are fueled
initially with enriched uranium. This approach does not take advantage of
the ability to fuel later breeders with the surplus fissile plutonium from ear-
lier breeders. How much uranium is involved in this upper bound?
We assume that 10 TW(e) are required. If this amount were plutonium
fueled, each GW(e) reactor would require about 5 tons of fissile plutonium
for its critical core and associated fuel cycle inventory. Thus, with 50,000
tons of fissile plutonium, one could endow a 10 TW(e) industry that would
need no further inputs of fissile material.
Although 23SU is not as efficient a fuel as fissile plutonium, in a breeder it
is not a bad fuel. About 1.2 atoms of 235U are needed to replace 1 atom of
fissile plutonium. This replacement need only be done initially: the plu-
tonium formed from the initial enriched uranium would be recycled and
would therefore be enough to keep the reactor, first, in operation and, later,
in operation as a plutonium breeder. Thus 60,000 tons of 235U, in the form
of 20 percent enriched uranium, is the approximate endowment for 10
TW (e) of breeders. If this amount of 235U is obtained in an enrichment plant
putting out tails at 0.15 percent 235U assay, then the natural uranium
requirement would be 10.5 million tons.
We made an approximate calculation of the effects of introducing 10
TW(e) of breeders by building 333 GW(e) of breeders each year for thirty
years, of recycling all the fissile plutonium and 23SU, and of introducing as
much virgin 235U as is needed to keep the system operating: the requirement
for natural uranium is about 8 million tons. Further, the breeder system
would become independent of natural uranium requirements before 2030.
Even smaller quantities of natural uranium, 5 to 6 million tons, would be
needed if the demand schedule were relaxed by five years. To this amount
must be added the natural uranium consumption of burner reactors during
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the buildup period, which could be 2 to 5 million tons, depending on
whether advanced converters or today's LWRs are used.
Up to now, we have considered strategies whose only constraints on the
introduction of breeders were those of providing the fissile fuel to get the
breeders going. But breeders cannot be provided overnight. As with any
new type of technology, one must examine the constraints of market pene-
tration-that is, we must study the dynamics of penetration of breeder
reactors into the market for nuclear power.
Economics and Market Penetration. Reference to Figure 4-2 shows that
the classical reactor strategy is principally a LWR strategy until about 2015,
after which LMFBRs begin to dominate new construction. Resource-efficient
methods of LMFBR buildup can save a great deal of natural uranium as
compared to that needed in the classical strategy, but the early substitution
of LMFBRs for LWRs is necessary if the breeders are to have maximum
impact. It therefore becomes important to ask how quickly LMFBRs might
be able to penetrate the nuclear market.
Cohen (1979) analyzed this question using the method of Peterka (1977),
which postulates that, besides considering the actual cost differential of
power from different sources, high capital requirements must also be consid-
ered, since they, too, inhibit market penetration. Their results, exhibited in
Table 4-12, indicate that LMFBR penetration would be very weak unless,
simultaneously, LMFBRs achieved capital cost parity with LWRs and the
cost of yellowcake became very high. (Yellowcake at $100 (l978)/lb is the
cost equivalent of $260/kg of contained metal.)
Peterka's method was analyzed by Spinrad (l980a), who showed that the
inhibiting effect of high capital cost in Peterka's model results from the
assumption that utility system expansion must be self-financed. Removing
this assumption, Spinrad'~ model remains mathematically similar to
Peterka's, but depends more strongly on comparative power cost. But even
Table 4-12. Economic penetration of LMFBRs, by the Peterka model
(1978 $).
Cost of Yellowcake
Capital Cost of L WR
Capital Cost of LMFBR $220/kg $4411kg $6611kg $882/kg
($/kW) (GW(e)) (GW(e)) (GW(e)) (GW(e))
700/700 410 1490 4210 7500
700/850 100 330 1000 2500
1000/1 000 280 710 1720 3600
1000/1200 75 180 400 940
1000/1500 80 160
Assumptions: Total nuclear installation follows the reference trajectory. Penetration period is
1995-2030. Separative work cost is $100/kg-U. Capacity of LWRs in 1995 is 970 GW(e). Capacity
of LMFBRs in 1995 is 10 GW(e).
Note: For details on the Peterka model, see Peterka (1977).
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with this change, and with inflation-free costing (Spinrad 1980b), mar-
ket penetration of LMFBRs begins to occur rapidly only when the price
differential of power strongly favors LMFBRs. This situation occurs only
when prices of natural uranium go beyond $200/kg of uranium. Such a situa-
tion is only likely to be realized well after the year 2000.
A Converter-Breeder Strategy. We are confronted with two observations.
First, the rate at which LMFBRs can be introduced would probably be
slower than that envisaged for FBRs in the classical reactor strategy. Second,
it seems to be prudent and responsible to envisage eventually only investive
uses of natural uranium-that is, to count on the use of only a finite amount
of high grade natural uranium on the order of 20 million tons. Ideally, we
would like to use less than this amount. This makes the eventual installation
of breeders a prerequisite for large-scale uses of nuclear power. We consider
now a strategy for meeting the 10 TW (e) installed nuclear capacity by the
year 2030 by means of converters and breeders. This is illustrated in Figure
4-3 and explained below.
The slower rate of introduction of breeders can be compensated by the en-
hancement of the neutron balance of burners, which means an enhancement
of their conversion ratio. They must become more nearly near breeders. One
possible way of achieving this is to use 233U in advanced converter reactors
(as well as in advanced LWRs); it is then possible to bring the conversion
ratio up to 0.9, whereas present LWRs based on the uranium-plutonium
cycle have values close to 0.55. It is also necessary to consider recycling
uranium (including 233U and 235U in spent fuel) in advanced converter reac-
Figure 4-3. A converter-breeder system.
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tors. This means spent fuel reprocessing, which is required for breeders as
well as for the efficient use of converters. Because the back end of the
nuclear fuel cycle is already delayed relative to the front end, spent fuel
reprocessing is even more important for the future than for the present.
In order to present a consistent picture of resource efficiency we contem-
plate a change in the tails assay of uranium enrichment plants. Instead of
0.15 percent 235U tails assay assumed previously, we now consider 0.1 per-
cent 235U. This has its price: the enrichment capacity required thereby be-
comes larger by a factor of about 1.2.
In the converter-breeder system envisaged here (Figure 4-3), the radial
blanket of LMFBRs is the source of 233U. Schikorr (1979) has shown that
the core characteristics of a LMFBR remain essentially untouched irrespec-
tive of whether the radial blanket is filled with 238U or with 232 Th. Schikorr's
work supports earlier proposals of a similar nature (e.g., Bragli and Schultz
1974; Lang 1968; Wenzel 1971). We assume slightly improved breeding
ratios by going to values of 1.3 through proper design measures in breeders,
such as increased fuel volume shares in the core. The 240 kg of 233U pro-
duced per GW(e) and per year of LMFBR operation, at an available load
factor of 0.7, are then put into converter reactors that operated previously
on an uranium basis. The plutonium from these reactors is not recycled in
them, but is fed to the LMFBRs.
The schedule for the installation of LMFBRs was determined exogenously
in such a way that around the year 2030 the plutonium balance is closed: all
converters then operate on a 233U basis. A small LMFBR growth in capacity
of the order of, say, 1 percent per year is still possible by devoting a small
share of its breeding capabilities of its own growth after 2030 (Nakicenovic
and Perry 1979). The asymptotic requirement of 1 percent growth per year
fixes the asymptotic ratio of converters to breeders. Data explaining the
schedule of LMFBR introduction are given in Table 4-13. The yearly addi-
tions to LMFBR capacity reach a maximum around 2020. After that, the
fissile plutonium for new breeders, which comes from the 235U converters,
begins to decrease. Of course, one could flatten out the curve by using more
highly enriched (20 percent) uranium to supply LMFBRs, rather than invest-
ing the same amount of 235U in new converters, but this does not change the
results significantly.
Considering the target ratio of converters and breeders and requiring that
total capacity follow the reference trajectory, we arrive at Figure 4-4. Com-
pared with the classical reactor strategy, the converter-breeder strategy uses
almost the same amount or uranium, but does so at a more deliberate rate
of market penetration for breeders. The converter-breeder strategy is only
about 60 percent breeders by 2030, whereas the classical strategy required
about 80 percent of all reactors to be breeders at that time. It, too, is just
not good enough.
A Multipurpose Strategy. The use of improved converters, particularly
those employing the 233U_232Th cycle, permits attainment of an asymptotic
condition in which no important uranium resources are needed and yet only
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Table 4-13. LMFBR introduction schedule of the converter-breeder strategy
(GW(e)).
Year
2000 2070 2020 2030 2035
LM FBR capacitya 114 480 1470 3678 4288
LMFBR annual additions b 18 61 153 133 76
Annual growth rate (percent)c 16 13 10 3 1
aEquivalent electrical capacity, not necessarily for distribution on electrical grids.
blncludes replacement after thirty years of service.
c Net growth rate after deduction of retirements.
a fraction of the reactors are breeders. As we go from improved converters
to advanced converters, the fraction of required breeders drops further. We
are therefore led to explore a multipurpose strategy in which advanced con-
verters are deployed as rapidly as possible. The type we use for illustration is
the high temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR), in view of the potential of
this system for applications other than electricity.
But some applications of nuclear power-research reactors are a current
example-might be better performed using reactors that are "pure" burners,
with no conversion at all. There are doubtless applications for low and
medium temperature steam for which LWRs are optimal. Thus, we are led to
consider an asymptotic system made up of breeders, LWRs, HTGRs, and pure
burners. Assuming good breeding (i.e., a breeding ratio of 1.25) and good
conversion in the HTGRs (i.e., 0.9), we set up a trajectory (Spinrad 1979c)
Figure 4-4. A converter-breeder strategy .
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that emplaces, by 2030, 10 TW(e) of nuclear power in the form of 5000
GW(e) of HTGRs; 3500 GW(e) of FBRs; 1000 GW(e) of LWRs; and 500
GW(e) (equivalent) of special purpose burners.
The trajectories constructed for the multipurpose strategy shown in
Figure 4-5 add up to our reference trajectory (see Table 4-4). The critical
problem would be the buildup of the HTGR system as a replacement for
LWR additions after LWRs have reached the 1000 GW(e) level.
The system is fueled in the following way: LWRs and the special purpose
burners are fueled from enriched natural uranium until a surplus of 235U or
233U develops in the other reactors. In the study summarized here, this
occurs in the year 2021. LWR and breeder fuels are recycled for their fissile
uranium content. Any plutonium that is produced is used in the FBRs. Also,
FBRs are fueled from self-generated plutonium. Any additional FBR
capacity beyond what can be fueled by available plutonium is made up by
enriched uranium. By 2021, there is enough plutonium so that 235U remain-
ing in FBRs can begin to be removed from them; this 235U is then redirected
to LWRs and burners. By 2028, the input of fissile plutonium from LWRs
and of self-generated FBR plutonium makes it possible to produce net 233U
in FBR blankets.
HTGRs are fueled with enriched 235U and thorium. All fissile uranium is
recycled. By 2030, no further input of 235U is needed, since 233U from the
FBR blankets is ample to support the HTGR system.
The system as a whole becomes a net fuel producer (about 1 percent per
year increase in fissile isotopes) by 2035. Ultimately, it is fueled by 233U pro-
duced in FBR blankets. This production supports the requirements of LWRs,
Figure 4-5. A multipurpose strategy.
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burners, and HTGRs. The FBRs are slightly less than self-sufficient for their
fissile plutonium, but LWR production of plutonium balances that account.
The schedule of uranium demand levels off at about 12.5 million tons of
uranium cumulatively used (Figure 4-5). Because of the cross-feeding of
fissile isotopes, it is not possible to detail which reactors are most responsible
for this demand.
We arrived at a figure of 10 to 15 million tons of natural uranium as a
resource requirement to achieve an asymptotic supply of 10 TW(e) in these
strategies. The figure of 15 million tons of natural uranium is still within the
range that we consider feasible here. But a word of caution should be added.
Any delay in introducing advanced reactors, and in particular breeders,
increases rapidly the amount of uranium needed to achieve the investive
mode.
A Nuclear Fuel Cycle for 10 TW(e)
What are the fuel cycle implications of a 10 TW(e) equivalent nuclear opera-
tion? What throughputs and losses are implied when 10 TW(e) are in
operation on a continuing basis, beyond the year 2030? Avenhaus, Hafele,
and McGrath (1975) studied the problem for a specific system of reactor
types; the qualitative features are not changed for other combinations of
reactors, which are at steady state after the investive phases of resource use
are completed. The most important findings follow.
Under consideration is a reactor system in which LMFBRs and thorium
high temperature reactors (THTRs) are operated on a steady state basis, as
explained in Figure 4-6. Avenhaus, Hafele, and McGrath considered a system
producing 3.6 TWyr/yr, with the FBR and the THTR contributing 50 per-
Figure 4-6. A reactor system for investive uses of uranium resources.
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Figure 4-7. Annual throughputs and losses (in tons) for a 17 TWyr/yr, FBR/HTR
operation. Only closed balances for Pu, U3 , and total (U 8 and thorium) are shown. The
6 ton mass defect associated with 17 TWyr/yr is not accounted for.
Power Power
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1,037 tons U3
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1,536 tons losses to waste
cent each. For exploring our 17 TWyr/yr-10 TW(e)-nuclear case, we
retained this fifty-fifty partitioning and simply scaled up all the findings by
a factor of 4.8.
Total Throughputs and Losses. Figure 4-7 gives in a simplified format the
throughputs and losses that go along with an operation of 17 TWyr/yr of
nuclear power. This mass balance is remarkable in a number of ways.
Less than 8500 tons per year of both natural uranium and thorium make
up the generation of 17 TWyr/yr. If this energy were generated by coal, the
annual mass flow of coal alone would be of the order of 18.3 X 109 tons-a
factor of 2 X 106 more. Or in other words, we are now considering a unique
feature of nuclear power. Of this 8500 tons per year, about 44 percent-or
3600 tons-is 238U. If 15 million tons of natural uranium had been mined to
establish the investment of reactors and of the fissile materials needed, then
virtually all of the 15 million tons are available and stored. It is virtually all
the 238U. This would last at a rate of about 3605 tons per year for some
4500 years! This means the complete elimination of uranium mining after the
year 2030. Global consumption of thorium would be about 4565 tons per
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year. This is again a negligible amount; it means practically no thorium
mmmg.
The annual production of fission products is about 6634 tons. In solidified
waste form, this would be a cube of roughly 20 X 20 X 20 m coming from
the whole globe each year. In the case of coal, the analog would be the
generation of some 60 X 109 tons of carbon dioxide per year on the order of
3.5 percent of the natural carbon dioxide content of the global atmosphere
each year.
The heavy elements discarded in waste (losses) are about 1536 tons per
year. Of this amount some 144 tons-or 1.7 percent of the total waste
(fission productsi and losses)-are 233U, fissile plutonium, and higher acti-
nides, all of which are of potential long-term concern.
The yearly handling of fissile uranium and plutonium material is about
6211 tons. In view of extremely low maximum permissible concentrations
(MPCs) for these materials, this requires extremely tight confinements, as
will be discussed later in this chapter.
Total Number of Nuclear Facilities. A fuel cycle operation of 17 TWyr/yr
from an installed generating capacity of 10 TW(e) would require the follow-
ing nuclear facilities:
• Ten thousand nuclear reactors, each of an equivalent of 1 GW(e) or 3000
of 3.3 GW (e) rating. The present number of electrical power stations,
nuclear or nonnuclear, worldwide is of the order of 15,000.
• Ninety-four fuel fabrication plants capable of handling 1500 tons per
year.
• Ninety-four chemical reprocessing plants capable of handling 1500 tons
per year.
• Six hundred and fifty intermediate (five-year) waste storage facilities
(tanks) of 1000 m3. Seven such facilities would go with each reprocess-
ing facility.
• Forty-seven final waste storage facilities-one for every two reprocessing
plants, for example. The inventory of radioactivity practically saturates
after twenty years of input. Each final waste storage facility therefore
contains, under equilibrium conditions, the equivalent of twenty years
multiplied by 6634 tons per year for the total of the forty-seven facilities
-that is, 2823 tons per facility of stored fresh fission products
equivalent.
Confinement of Radioactivity. The potential of nuclear power cannot be
achieved without paying a price. Nuclear power by its very nature is con-
nected with radioactivity, and handling this radioactivity on the scale
assumed here requires meticulousness comparable to what has up to now
iFission products are the new nuclei that are produced by fission. Most of them are intensely radio-
active. with half-lives of a few years or less.
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been necessary only for handling very toxic chemicals or dangerous biologi-
cal systems (e.g., bacterial cultures). This is the price.
For a rational approach to this problem, it is necessary to identify several
levels of consideration. First, there is the total inventory of radioisotopes in
nuclear reactors and other nuclear facilities. Conceptually, this just sits there.
Under normal operating conditions, the inventory can physically leave the
nuclear facility only at a certain rate.
This rate leads to a second level of consideration, described by the con-
finement factor (CF). (This is defined as the ratio between the annual flow
of a radioactive isotope in question through a given nuclear facility and the
related annual release of that radioactive isotope.) In most cases, the CF is a
large number. The concept of the CF can also be applied to accidental condi-
tions. In that case, it is the inverse fraction of the total inventory that is
released in an accident.
On the third level of consideration are the pathways of the released radio-
active isotopes in the environment. These result in ambient concentrations
of radioactive isotopes at places where persons are exposed to them. Path-
ways usually result in dilution, as one can evaluate the volumes of air or
water that dilute the released amounts of radioactivity between release and
any points of biological impact. One must also consider pathways that could
lead to increased concentrations of a particular radioactive isotope, in spite
of potentially available large volumes of air and water for dilution. The
famous pathway for iodine-grass-cowmilk-baby is a case in point: it enhances
the danger by a factor of 700. It also works the other way around. For
instance, fissile plutonium seems to sit on the ground once it has gotten
there, withstanding further spreading by incorporation into living systems.
Fourth, the radiobiological level comes into consideration. It relates an
ambient concentration to the doses and dose rate of persons exposed to it.
The doses and dose rates are what cause biological effects.
By considering those levels of dose that have acceptably trivial impacts,
one arrives at maximum permissible concentrations (MPCs), from which it
is possible to work backward to infer how large the appropriate CFs have to
be. Table 4-14 shows the factorization relating releases to radioactive dose
rates of persons. It is convenient to compare the dose rate B with the
already existing natural background Bo For quick orientation, it is sufficient
to take B o = 110 mrem per year.
Table 4-14. Factorization of radioactive impacts on persons.
c~~m)
B
Annual Flow Confinement Dilution Exposure
Q X CF- 1 X X p
(Ci) celeaSe) (:~) (m ~~/Y)X X Xsec flow
First level Second level Third level Fourth level
Dose Rate
(Body Burden)
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Avenhaus, Hafele, and McGrath (1975) used this methodology to evaluate
the design requirements for containment factors in a large-scale development
of the nuclear fuel cycle. It was applied in determining the CFs needed for
the nuclear facilities of the preceding section. The most critical isotope
releases involve 8sKr, 3H, 129 1, Pu, and actinides.
A distinction is made according to whether dilution takes place through
air or through water. Further, a distinction is made between localized im-
pacts and impacts that eventually spread out all over the globe. In the case of
localized impacts, only the neighborhood of a particular nuclear facility is
affected; thus it can be considered a point source. In that case, no integra-
tion of all the other facilities takes place; only the actual inventory of the
one facility matters. In the case of impacts that are widespread, partial or
total integration of the impacts of all the other facilities takes place. In Table
4-15, we give the CF for each isotope and facility required to make each
contribution to the relative dose rate BIBo well below 1 percent.
A few comments on the information in Table 4-15 are in order. In the
case of 8sKr, total integration of all outputs to the global atmosphere takes
place. Present reactor designs lead to contributions that are at the BIBo =
0.01 border line when 17 TWyr/yr are produced; accordingly, a slight
improvement of the confinement of 8sKr, by a factor of three to ten over the
next decades, is probably necessary. This should not be too difficult. By con-
trast, present designs of reprocessing plants with no 8sKr retention would
lead to contributions BIBo ~ 2, and this would be unacceptable. Confine-
ment factors of one hundred must therefore be postulated. This is tech-
nically within reach, but requires development.
Tritium releases into the air are essentially local, and no global integration
needs to be considered. This is because at the global level, the natural pro-
duction of tritium is far greater than that from the nuclear industry. Present
design of reactors seems to be satisfactory. In the case of reprocessing plants,
confinement factors of up to one hundred may be considered necessary,
depending on evaluations of the actual biological hazards. More information
on pathways of tritium, varying from case to case, it also required. Con-
finement factors of the order of one hundred are within reach, but are not
exactly straightforward. Special sites for the reprocessing plants could lead
to a relaxation of such confinement requirements.
Table 4-15. Required confinement factors for making each relative dose
rate contribution well below 1 percent.
85 Kr
3H into air
3H into water
Pu into air
Pu into water
Actinides
129 1
Reactors
Present designs, slightly improved
Present designs
Present designs
Reprocessing
100
100
100
109
109
109
-103
Fabrication
10'0
10'0
10'0
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Tritium releases into water may lead to a partial integration of related im-
pacts in a given river basin-thus, the confinement requirements. Again, with
the same remarks as for air releases, this may lead to postulating a CF of one
hundred, which is possible, but not easy. Both krypton and tritium are
believed to have relatively small consequences, biologically, for a given dose
rate. If this belief is confirmed and accepted, some relaxation of CFs, per-
haps by a factor of ten, might be reasonable.
Plutonium releases into the air constitute a local impact, but such releases
must be very limited. A CF of 109 in the case of reprocessing facilities and
a CF of 1010 for fabrication facilities are tough conditions. For instance,
plutonium-contaminated scrap must be handled with extreme care. Never-
theless, CFs of 4 X 1010 have already been confirmed experimentally in
operating pilot plants. Since it is reasonable to expect further progress in the
decades to come, such confinement must be considered possible, even at an
industrial scale.
Plutonium releases into water, as in the case of tritium, may become
regionally integrated. On the other hand, the MPC of plutonium in water is
significantly higher than that of plutonium in air. The same CFs for plu-
tonium in water as in the case of air-109 and 1010, for reprocessing and
fabrication, respectively-seem to be appropriate and can be obtained when
the technical effort is large enough. The actinides (ex emitters including 239pU
and other ex emitting transuranium isotopes) appear to be similar to plu-
tonium itself as far as the CFs are concerned.
1291 is a special case. It appears only in small amounts, but decays with a
half life of 17 X 106 years: this is large enough for the problem to last a
very long time, but small enough to make an impact. If one assumes the
release of iodine into the air, only a region within, say, 10 km must be con-
sidered because of the low chemical release rate of iodine. In the long run,
such released 1291 would reach equilibrium with all of the stable iodine in
the biomass. The biomass density on land is about 0.23 tons/m2 . As the
average iodine content in the biomass, including water, is about 0.3 ppm,
the release of 1291 from reprocessing plants with a CF equal to 103 would
lead to a relative buildup of 1.6 X 10-4 per year without saturation. Within
a few decades, this could therefore reach the BIBa = 10-2 limit under con-
sideration here. Thus, one thinks of higher CFs. In the case of dilution into
large amounts of sea water, the 1291 should not be a problem. However,
the 1291 situation requires further study.
In conclusion, the fuel cycle operation of a 17 TWyr/yr nuclear world
appears feasible. It has its price meticulousness, and this is not a straight-
forward thing. Whether such a price is worth paying is a relative question,
not an absolute one. What is the alternative? Does it have a better price?
Each situation must be evaluated on its own grounds, which becomes a
complex matter. The considerations of this section provide only a general
orientation and should be taken only as an indication of the orders of magni-
tude. Fortunately, there is a vast literature on more specific evaluations.
Nuclear Safety. The large-scale deployment of a 17 TWyr/yr nuclear power
industry is not only a problem of considering normal operative conditions.
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Equal attention must also be paid to the problem of accidents. At IIASA,
very little research has been done on this subject, because the state of the art
is sophisticated and specialized and the problems can be attacked only by
examining systems and system types in engineering detail. Small groups, such
as the IIASA Energy System Program, cannot contribute substantially. The
breakthrough by Rasmussen and his group (USNRC 1975) have provided a
methodology. It was a detailed procedure, requiring dozens of man years,
and yet of necessity the results have large uncertainties (USNRC 1978). It
has proven impossible to do better with general and flat considerations.
One remark seems pertinent here. In evaluating design targets for confine-
ment effects exhibited in the previous section, we considered not only
normal operating conditions but also accidental conditions. The principal
approach was to consider expectation values. Essentially this means that the
radioactive inventory release in Table 4-15, Q X Cp-I, which has the dimen-
sion Ci/sec, is replaced by the product of three factors: (1) a frequency (or
probability) of accidental release per second (P); (2) the radioactive inven-
tory I (curies) subject to dispersal in an accident; and (3) the conceivable
fractional exposure time d (sec per year) of persons affected by such an
accident.
As a formula, the substitution is (Farmer 1976):
Q X Cp-I -+ P [sec-I] X I [Ci] X d Isec] = 0-
3.15 X 107 [sec sec
This permits the use of the same formal procedures as in the situation of
normal operating conditions. However, whereas for normal operations one
evaluates the CF needed to meet target values for the relative increase of the
dose rate BIBo , now the probability density P is the required parameter for
meeting such target values. In the evaluation by Avenhaus, Hafele, and
McGrath (1975), the reactor did not turn out to be the most critical facility:
the intermediate and final waste storage had the smallest target values of P.
Both with regard to the ranking and to the absolute values of these target
values, the results of these studies are contradictory to common perceptions.
However, the target values are probably easier to achieve in static facilities,
such as waste storage systems, as opposed to active ones, such as reactors and
reprocessing plants.
Because the method deals with expectation values, a large number of small
accidents is conceptually equal to a small number of large accidents. That is
just not the way the public perceives the problem of nuclear safety. There is
a large discrepancy between mathematical approaches that seem to offer a
rigorous treatment of nuclear safety and the risk situation as it is perceived.
This discrepancy is discussed in Chapter 11.
Using Nuclear Power
Up to now, nuclear power has been considered principally as a source of
large-scale, centralized electricity. This role will undoubtedly continue, yet it
THE NUCLEAR OPTION 139
relies on only one unique characteristic of nuclear energy-the size of the
resource base of fertile materials available as fuel. Once breeding has been
established, the availability of this resource base will be confirmed. What
then?
Other uses have been tried and are indicative. One example is the wide-
spread use of nuclear power to propel naval vessels, particularly submarines,
and the much more tentative experimental uses for propulsion of various
types of civilian vessels-for example, the Lenin, the Mutsu, the Savannah,
and the Otto Hahn. A more tenuous example is the provision of remote base
power in Greenland and An tarctica. Still other uses have been suggested: for
the most remote bases (we currently contemplate in space or deep under-
sea); for factory ships and floating cities; for district heat and chemical heat.
Does nuclear power have, in fact, special characteristics that suggest these
futuristic applications or only tentatively explored applications? The answer
is clearly yes. Three properties are significant:
Nuclear fuel is extraordinarily compact. The factor of more than 106 in
energy availability per unit weight, compared to oil, means that it can be
transported almost anywhere inexpensively and a very long-lasting stock-
pile of fuel can be stored conveniently at the site of use.
The nuclear chain reaction requires no air to burn the fuel and consumes
nothing that must be supplied by the environment. This fact makes
nuclear power attractive for submarine propulsion and potentially useful
for exploring or operating bases undersea or in space.
Fission produces energy of such high quality that the potential exists for
generating very high temperature heat. Nuclear heat can be generated at
high temperatures and transferred, still at high temperatures, to an inert
working fluid such as helium. This gives the possibility of using nuclear
heat directly for chemical reactions that have special environmental
requirements, such as absence of combustion gases.
The multipurpose strategy previously illustrated was, in fact, investigated
with these advanced, sometimes futuristic, applications in mind.
Electrical Networks. Nuclear electricity is generally considered, both inside
and outside the nuclear industry, as being associated with very large units-1
GW(e) and up. The initial economic breakthrough of nuclear power occurred
when economies of scale were reached with units of 500 MW(e) or higher
capacity, and the trend has continued. There is no doubt that large units will
be the backbone of the industry for some time to come. Indeed, their aggre-
gation into "energy parks" with associated nuclear fuel facilities is a topic
of active research today. We conclude this section with an illustration of a
nuclear energy park use that is likely to become extremely important.
This is not all there is to nuclear electricity. It may turn out that one of
the most important aspects of nuclear power will be to improve the electrical
network by locating smaller plants at appropriate nodes of the grid. It is well
known that transmission losses can be reduced and system reliability im-
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proved by judicious location of a generating plant. Can we use the "portabil-
ity" of nuclear power to advantage for this purpose?
It seems possible. Particularly for smaller nuclear plant sizes, there are
intrinsic reasons why public safety can be improved over standards now set
for large plants. For example, for smaller reactors, the ability to supply shut-
down cooling becomes an almost trivial engineering problem, and locating
the reactor underground becomes much easier. It is also generally the case
that is is not so costly to "overengineer" a small system as a large one. Of
course, economies of scale would necessarily be sacrified, but a considerable
recovery of the sacrificed economies might be achieved from lower reserve
requirements and from greater ability to rely on factory construction, to use
components already standardized for other applications, to schedule con-
struction labor forces more flexibly among several units under construction,
and to shorten construction schedules. This might be sufficient to close the
cost gap to the point that decreased transmission losses and improved grid
reliability make the final difference.
The physical independence of a nuclear power plant from an umbilicus of
railway fuel supply and the absence of the crucial air pollution hazard would
make nuclear power the choice for such plants: the only environmental
requirement would be waste heat removal capability. But the point is more
than just using nuclear power in a different way. A fine-grained electrical
generation network has so much resilience that it can virtually function as an
energy storage system as well. Such a network can, for example, accommo-
date more easily the inclusion of intermittent sources, such as sun and wind
power. And under these circumstances, it may be possible for the network to
substitute more for liquid fuels than it could otherwise do. In short, nuclear
power might really be the key to using electricity effectively.
Small Heat Sources. As soon as we open up nuclear power to the small as
well as to the large sources, many new applications become possible. In the
industrialized regions of the world now, and in the industrializing regions in
the future, a very large fraction of the energy requirement is in the form of
low to medium grade heat. Most of the energy for these industrial applica-
tions comes from oil- or gas-fired boilers. Individual units of less than 20
megawatts output are very common. There is such a large amount of energy
used in such units that cogeneration of electricity can make an important
contribution to the electrical system.
A similar product is steam or hot water for district heating systems. Where
waste heat from an electric power plant is not available, a fossil-fueled boiler
is again used.
Twenty years ago much effort was put into designing nuclear systems to
do these jobs. In particular, small packaged reactors in the megawatt range,
containing fuel to last a decade or longer, were investigated. Most of this
effort was shelved in favor of putting the limited nuclear manpower to work
on central station power systems. More recently, there has been a revival of
interest, and such designs as SECURE (Nelsson and Hannus 1977) are begin-
ning to appear. With modern advances in automatic operation, the chances
THE NUCLEAR OPTION 141
are very much improved that such systems can be designed to be operable by
a small crew, which is a major consideration for this application.
If such reactors are economical, they could account for almost as much
nuclear power as might be generated for central station electricity. For this
purpose, small LWRs seem very appropriate, and that is why these reactors
were included in our multipurpose strategy.
Indeed, even one of the by-products of nuclear power might be useful for
these low temperature heat applications. Suitably encapsulated, solidified
fission products could spend their early years as package heat sources, until
their decay has proceeded to the point that they are not powerful enough
sources; at this point, their geological disposal is greatly simplified. Inter-
estingly, small reactors and isotopic heat sources satisfy all of the perfor-
mance requirements of soft energy systems, illustrating that the hard-soft
dichotomy is ideological rather than social or physical. (See Chapter 24 for
a discussion of the hard-soft controversy.)
Remote and Mobile Energy Sources. The uses of nuclear reactors for ship-
ping have only begun to be explored. Most of the reasons for the tentative
nature of this exploration are included under the heading "public acceptance
problems"; yet there has been no outcry about the much more extensive use
of reactors in naval vessels and in particular in submarines. Indeed, the excel-
lent safety records of ships in nuclear navies is one of the bright stories of
nuclear power. We thus consider it axiomatic that, given public acceptance,
nuclear power will playa great role in shipping. Its immediate value in that
context is in freeing up the space normally occupied by ship's fuel, making it
convertible into payload.
It take only a little imagination to consider unconventional uses of nuclear
vessels. The famous Northwest Passage from Europe to Alaska is accessible
by submarines under the Arctic ice pack. Submarine cargo ships? Or, given
such ships, would they be used also in transoceanic shipping, capable of
submerging to avoid storms? What about transoceanic tugboats? The concen-
trated fuel of a reactor is entirely capable of hauling a string of barges-per-
haps DRACONE type plastic cargo carriers-around the world.
One goes further and further into science fiction-floating cities, manned
bases deep under the ocean, bases in space. Will a reactor be carried to the
first permanently manned lunar base? To Mars? Any place far, any place
without air, any place without strong and constant sun-these are the places
for which there does not seem to be a rival to nuclear power.
This group of applications, from mundane cargo hauling to planetary
exploration, requires special purpose reactors. For many uses, severe design
requirements are eased if the power source can be run on enriched fuel-
either highly enriched or enriched at least to the point of denaturing (20
percent 23SU in 238U, about 10 to 12 percent 233U in 238U). These are the
pure burner reactors of the multipurpose strategy.
Electricity and Hydrogen. Even given all the opportunities listed above, the
generation of large amounts of electricity and the uses of nuclear heat for
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chemical synthesis will probably still be the principal applications of nuclear
power. Of the 10 TW(e) of equivalent nuclear capacity by 2030 in the multi-
purpose strategy, 8.5 TW(e) were allocated to reactor types (FBRs and
HTGRs) apptopriate for these basic purposes. Recall that at 40 percent
conversion efficiency and a capacity factor of two-thirds, this is a thermal
output of about 14 TWyr/yr.
This is about as much electricity as is projected to be needed in the IIASA
High scenario (see Chapter 17). The 8.5 TW(e) of capacity translates into
5.7 TWyr/yr of generated electricity, and the IIASA High scenario calls for
4.7 TWyr/yr in 2030. But we must recall that electricity would also be gen-
erated from other energy sources (solar, hydroelectric power, and other
renewable sources) and would be cogenerated in some industrial applications
using coal, oil, and LWRs. Thus we have considerable surplus capacity for
both electricity and high temperature heat in the multipurpose strategy.
What uses are contemplated?
Hafele and Sassin (1975) confronted this problem; the solution is exam-
ined in Chapter 3. The new major energy sources produce heat and elec-
tricity, whereas the looming shortages in the world are of gaseous and liquid
fuels. The natural partner of electricity in the future turns out to be hydro-
gen, a gaseous fuel that can be used in the synthesis of liquid fuels from coal.
Both electricity and hydrogen are energy carriers with no or negligible
entropy content; both are environmentally clean. Ideally hydrogen upon
energy delivery would react only with oxygen, leaving pure water as the
burning product. (In most practical cases hydrogen would react with air,
leaving water together with some nitric oxides in the ppm range).
Hydrogen would be a partner for electricity because it can be stored and
transported. At present, electricity can be stored only in small amounts or
indirectly; today's technology of electrical batteries permits the storage of
energy only on the order of megawatt hours. For larger amounts of energy,
hydrostorage is used, but this is expensive and limited to a few terawatt
hours in most cases. The very large hydroelectric power facilities of the
Bratsk-Ilimsk area of East Siberia provide, in principle, a storage capacity of
up to 30 TWh; in all practical cases the storage capacity is less than that. Yet
the quantity it would be desirable to store adds up to hundreds of terawatt
hours for a 10 TW(e) world.
Electricity can be transported by means of high voltage lines, but the costs
are relatively high (Figure 4-8). Therefore, in practice no more than a few
gigawatts are transported over, say, a few hundred kilometers, and the aver-
age electrical kilowatt hour travels less than 100 km before it is consumed.
The transportability of electricity is limited, and the easy transportability of
hydrogen is very welcome.
The uses of hydrogen as final energy require a significant adaptation of
the existing infrastructure. Figure 4-9 shows the branching out of ever
smaller scales of energy handling of more local features of existing infra-
structures such as industrial facilities, houses, and transportation devices.
Such adaptations require time. It is therefore appropriate to look for solu-
tions that could accept the infrastructure as it is and that would play at least
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Figure 4-8. Comparative costs for the transport of energy over a distance of 1000 km.
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an intermediate role by buying time. A few decades could mean a lot. A
most prominent candidate for such a function is methanol. Roughly 50
percent of its energy content is due to the carbon atom in it; the other
50 percent is due to two of its four hydrogen atoms. The salient point is: it
is liquid.
The uses for methanol and its partner (or competitor) gasoline have also
been discussed in Chapter 3. The synthesis steps require hydrogen and, in the
most coal-conserving processes, heat from external sources. The most
straightforward route to hydrogen (see Chapter 22) is electrolysis, while
alternate routes make use, wholly or partially, of high temperature heat.
Electrolysis is often criticized as being inefficient. The reactors we have
concentrated on have efficiencies up to 40 percent. Given an efficiency of
the electrolyzer of 60 percent, this leads to an overall efficiency of 24 per-
cent only. But let us recall our argument: Nuclear power becomes nuclear
power, and not "yellow coal," by the eventual use of the breeder, with an
investive (not consumptive) use of a finite amount of uranium. Such inves-
tive use then permits the practically unlimited production of energy because
the residual requirements of fuel are indeed negligible. A low thermal effi-
ciency is therefore no longer critical. Instead, the problem is waste heat
handling, and the criterion is capital cost efficiency at the gigawatt scale.
This is a new context, and although electrolysis is an established technology,
it must be looked at anew. A similar fresh look must be taken at the ap-
proach of splitting water by staged chemical processes, which follows up the
pioneering work of de Beni and Marchetti (1970).
Thus, the next major task of nuclear energy is to produce not merely
several terawatts of electrical power, but to store free energy in hydrogen at
a several terawatt rate as well. If nuclear energy is not allowed to do the job,
something else must do it. The most likely "something else," solar power,
is discussed in Chapter 5. The two forms of primary energy, nuclear and
solar, can be thought of as competitive, but we prefer to think of them as
complementary, since it is likely that both will be needed and both will be
used on a large scale.
REFERENCES
Alexandrow, A., and N. Ponomarev-Stepnoy. 1974. "Experience of Nuclear Power Sta-
tions and the Further Development of Atomic Energy." Paper presented at the Confer-
ence on Twenty Years of Soviet Nuclear Energetics, USSR Academy of Sciences,
Obninsk. In Russian.
Atomic Industrial Forum. 1973. Resource Needs for Nuclear Power Growth. Washington,
D.C.
Avenhaus, R.; W. Hafele; and P.E. McGrath. 1975. Considerations on the Large-Scale
Deployment of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle. Energy 2: 323-63.
Belostotsky, A.M. 1977. Another Approach to the Assessment of Uranium Resources and
Future Ore Requirements. In Fusion and Fast Breeder Reactors, W. HaJeIe et ai.
RR-77-8. Laxenburg, Austria: International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.
Bethe, H. 1979. The Fusion Hybrid. Physics Today 32(5):44-51.
Bragli, R.H., and K.R. Schultz. 1974. Thorium Utilization in an FBR/HTGR Power Sys-
THE NUCLEAR OPTION 145
tern. Proceedings of the American Power Conference. Chicago: Illinois Institute of
Technology.
Breckhaeft, J.D. et al. 1978. Geological Disposal of High-Level Radiative Waste. Circu-
lar 779. Washington, D.e.: u.s. Geological Survey.
Cohen, B. L. 1977. Health Hazards of Nuclear Power: Reply. American Scientist
65(1): 15-16.
Cohen, K. 1979. Notes on Fission Energy. WP-79-72. Laxenburg, Austria: International
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.
Committee on Nuclear and Alternative Energy Systems (CONAES). 1978. Controlled
Nuclear Fusion: Current Research and Potential Progress. Report of the Fusion
Assessment Resource Group, Supply and Delivery Panel. Washington, D.e.: National
Academy of Sciences.
De Beni, G., and e. Marchetti. 1970. Hydrogen, The Key to the Energy Market. Euro-
spektra 46:23-46.
Edlund, M.e. 1975. High Conversion Recycle in Pressurized Water Reactors. In Advanced
Converters and Near Breeders, edited by J.P. Howe. New York: Pergamon.
Farmer, F .R. 1976. Risk Quantification and Acceptability. Nuclear Safety 17:418-21.
Fuji, H. 1978. Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities in the World. Draft report. Vienna: Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency.
Gofman, J.W., and A.R. Tamplin. 1971. Poisoned Power. Emmaus, Pennsylvania: Rodale
Press.
Hafele, W. 1975. Hypotheticality and the New Challenges: The Pathfinder Role of
Nuclear Energy. Anticipation 20:15-23.
Hafele, W., and W. Sassin. 1975. Applications of Nuclear Power Other Than for Elec-
tricity Generation. RR-75-40. Laxenburg, Austria: International Institute for Applied
Systems Analysis.
HaJele, W.; J.P. Holdren; G. Kessler; and G.L. Kulcinski. 1977. Fusion and Fast Breeder
Reactors. RR-77-8. Laxenburg, Austria: International Institute for Applied Systems
Analysis.
Hausserman, H.; P. Hogroian; R. Krymm; J. Cameron; O. Pedersen; and G. Woite. 1977.
Demand and Supply Estimates for Nuclear Fuel Cycle. IAEA-CN-36/493. Vienna:
International Atomic Energy Agency.
INFCE. 1979. International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation. Working Group 1 on Avail-
ability of Nuclear Fuel and Heavy Water. Final Report. Draft. INFCEIW6.1/17.
Vienna.
Lane, J .A. et al. 1977. Nuclear Power in Developing Countries. Proceedings of the Inter-
national Conference on Nuclear Power and Its Fuel Cycle. IAEA-CN-36/500. Vienna:
International Atomic Energy Agency.
Lang, L.W. 1968. Thorium Can Reduce Power Costs for Thermal and Fast Reactors. ANS
Transactions 11: 38-39.
Mancuso, T.F.; A. Stewart; and G. Kneale. 1978. Radiation Exposures of Hanford Workers
Dying of Cancer and Other Causes. Health Physics 33:369-85.
Marks, S.; E.S. Gilbert; and B.D. Breitenstein. 1978. "Cancer Mortality in Hanford
Workers." Paper presented at the Symposium on the Late Biological Effects of Ioniz-
ing Radiation, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, March.
Nakicenovic, N., and A.M. Perry. 1979. Nuclear Strategies with Limited Uranium Re-
quirements. WP-79-129. Laxenburg, Austria: International Institute for Applied
Systems Analysis.
146 ENERGY IN A FINITE WORLD
Nelsson, L., and M. Hannus. 1977. "SECURE Nuclear District Heating Plant." Helsinki:
AB ASEA-Atom, Sweden, and oy Finnatom AB. Unpublished.
Nuclear News. 1979. World List of Power Plants. 22(2):59-77.
OECD-NEA/IAEA. 1975. World Uranium Potential: An International Evaluation, 1975.
A Joint Report by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, the
Nuclear Energy Agency, and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Paris: Organisa-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development.
--. 1977. Uranium Resources Production and Demand. A Joint Report by the Agency
of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development and the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency. Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development.
--. 1978. World Uranium Potential: An International Evaluation, 1978. A Joint Report
by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, the Nuclear Energy
Agency, and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Paris: Organisation for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development.
Perry, A.M. 1979. World Uranium Resources. WP-79-64. Laxenburg, Austria: Interna-
tional Institu te for Applied Systems Analysis.
Peterka, V. 1977. Macrodynamics of Technological Change: Market Penetration by New
Technologies. RR-77-22. Laxenburg, Austria: International Institute for Applied Sys-
tems Analysis.
Robertson, R.C., ed. 1971. Conceptual Design Study of a Simple Fluid Molten Salt
Breeder Reactor. ORNL-4541. Oak Ridge, Tennessee: Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
Sanders, B.S. 1978. Low-Level Radiation and Cancer Death. Health Physics 34:521-38.
Schaefer, R.C. 1978. What A 1'1' We Talking About When We Talk About "Risk". RM-78-
69. Laxenburg, Austria: International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.
Schikorr, W.M. 1979. Assessment of Thorium and Uranium Fuel Cycle in Fast Breeder
Reactors and High Temperature Reactors. CP-79-19. Laxenburg, Austria: lnterna-
tionallnstitute for Applied Systems Analysis.
Spinrad, B.I. 1980a. Market Substitution Models and Economic Parameters. RR-80-28.
Laxenburg, Austria: International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.
--. (l980b). Effects of Accounting Rules on Utility Choices of Energy Technologies in
the United States. RR-80-27. Laxenburg, Austria: International Institute for Applied
Systems Analysis.
--. 1979c. Resource-Efficient Nuclear Scenarios. WP-79-62. Laxenburg, Austria: Inter-
national Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.
Starr, C. 1969. Social Benefit Versus Technological Risk. Science 165: 1232-39.
U.S. Congress. 1969. Hearings of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Washington,
D.C.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC). 1975. Reactor Safety Study: A n Assess-
ment 0/ Accident Risks in the U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants. WASH-1400-
MR. Germantown, Maryland.
--. 1978. The Risk Assessment Review Group Report to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission. NU REG-CR-D400. Germantown, Maryland.
Van Atta, C.M. 1977. Brief History of the MTA Project. CONF-770107-1. Oak Ridge,
Tennessee: Energy Research and Development Administration.
Weast, R.C., ed. 1974. Handbook of Chemistry and Physics. Cleveland, Ohio: CRC Press.
Wenzel, P. 1971. Crossed Uranium-Plutonium and Thorium-Uranium Fuel Cycles for a
THE NUCLEAR OPTION 147
Developing Nuclear Power System with Thermal Converters and Fast Breeder Reactors.
Kernenergie 14(718):231-35.
World Energy Conference (WEC). 1978. World Energy Resources, 1985-2020. Guildford,
United Kingdom: I.P.c. Press.
RELATED IIASA ENERGY SYSTEMS
PROGRAM PUBLICATIONS
Baecher, G.;]. Gros; and M. McCusker. 1975. Balancing Apples and Oranges: Methodol-
ogies for Facility Siting Decisions. RR-74-33.
Cohen, J.]. 1975. A Systems Analysis Approach to Nuclear Waste Management Problems.
RM-75-20.
Gros, ]. 1975. Power Plant Siting: A Paretian Environmental Approach. RR-75-44.
Gros, ].G.; R. Avenhaus;]. Linnerooth; P.O. Pahner; and H.]. Otway. 1974. A Systems
Analysis Approach to Nuclear Facility Siting. RM-74-29.
Grenon, M. 1975. Note on Molten-Salt Reactor Strategies. RM-75-32.
Hafele, W. 1973a. The Fast Breeder as a Cornerstone for Future Large Supplies of Energy.
RR-73-5.
--. 1973b. Hypotheticality and the New Challenges: The Pathfinder Role of Nuclear
Energy. RR-73-14.
--.1976. Energy Strategies and the Case of Nuclear Power. RR-76-10.
Hafele, W., and A.S. Manne. 1974. Strategies for a Transition from Fossil to Nuclear
Fuels. RR-74-7.
Hafele, W., and W. Schikorr. 1973. Reactor Strategies and the Energy Crisis. RR-73-13.
Hafele, W.; R. Avenhaus; W. Sassin; and ].M. Weingart. 1975. Nuclear Energy and Its
Alternatives. RM-75-73.
Konno, H., and T.N. Srinivasan. 1974. The Hafele-Manne Model of Reactor Strategies:
Some Sensitivity Analysis. RM-74-19.
Manne, A.S. 1974. Waiting for the Breeder. RR-74-5.
Melentiev, L.A.; A.A. Makarov; and A. Belostotsky. 1976. Systems Studies of Nuclear
Energy Development in the U.s.SR. CP-76-12.
Otway, H.]., and W. Edwards. 1977. Application ofa Simple Multiattribute Rating Tech-
nique to Evaluation of Nuclear Waste Disposal Sites: A Demonstration. RM-77-31.
Suzuki, A. 1974. An Incentive-Tax Model for Optimization of an Inspection Plan for
Nuclear Material Safeguards. RR-74-19.
Suzuki, A., and L. Schrattenholzer. 1974. Sensitivity Analysis on Hydrogen Utilization
Factor of the Hafele-Manne Model. RM-74-30.
Thomas, K.; E. Swaton; M. Fishbein; and H.]. Otway. 1979. Nuclear Energy. The Accu-
racy of Policy Makers' Perceptions of Public Beliefs. WP-79-4.

5 THE SOLAR OPTION
INTRODUCTION
Is the sun the answer to the energy problem? Can it provide all the energy
required for a growing world and, if so, when and under what circumstances?
In keeping with the general approach of this book, in this chapter we con-
ceptualize a future based on energy from the sun, with the purpose of
stretching our thinking to the limits and thereby learning about constraints,
timing, and other pertinent features. This parallels what we have done in the
preceding chapters on coal and on nuclear power, where we have also fo-
cused on supply options that are global in nature.
As we explained earlier, in addition to global options, there are energy
sources that are locally significant. Solar power in particular has both a local
and a global aspect. Often the locally significant applications of solar power
are labeled "soft," and in Chapter 24 we shall elaborate on the notion of soft
and hard energy systems. Furthermore, in Chapter 6 we shall discuss in detail
renewable energy sources, all of which essentially come ultimately from solar
power. Thus the discussion here of the global "hard" aspect of solar should
be viewed as a complement, rather than as a contradiction, to the treatment
of soft solar yet to come. Still, we find it important to distinguish between
hard and soft solar power, because analyses of these different aspects of solar
are often based on two very different sets of attitudes and perspectives. And
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such differences must be kept in mind when evaluating various arguments
and analyses.
What would a hard solar option look like? Consider the following asser-
tion. Sunlight-hard, centralized solar power-could eventually be the pri-
mary and, conceptually, even the exclusive source of heat, electricity, and
synthetic fuels (liquid or gaseous) for the entire world-continuously and
eternally on a scale generally regarded possible only with fusion or with fis-
sion via the fast breeder reactor. This could be achieved through a global
network of solar conversion facilities, coupled with appropriate energy
transport and storage systems. And this appears to be possible within ac-
ceptable constraints on energy payback time, capital investment, and avail-
able suitable land. Environmental and social consequences are not negli-
gible, but they appear possibly less problematic than those associated with
fission or fusion alternatives used on the same scale. The political conse-
quences are likely to be the most far reaching; while the fast breeder reactor
in principle permits countries to eventually achieve complete energy inde-
pendence, running the world from sunlight would require extensive, per-
haps unprecedented, international cooperation.
Is this long-term possibility realistic? What does it take to have a solar-
energy-supplied world? Here we consider the possibilities, in light of the
observations of this book about the limitations of fossil resources and the
potential range of energy demand over the next five decades.
TH E SOLAR RESOLI RCE
Each day the earth receives from the sun 100,000 times more energy than
is produced in all the world's electricity-generating plants. The average
power input from the sun is some 178,000 TW(th). The challenge is to find
practical ways to tap even small portions of this incredible flow of natural
energy.
The energy density of solar radiation is too low to be used directly; in
comparison, that of fusion or fission can be considered too high. Therefore,
these resources must be transformed into convenient energy carriers that
match the set of energy end uses of future social systems. As we have al-
ready indicated, increased urbanization of human society can be expected
in both the developing and the industrialized countries. Around the year
2030, the developing countries will likely reach a level of urbanization
close to that in the developed countries today. Because human settlements
are becoming more extensive, dense, and technological, their metabolic
needs must increasingly be provided through the use of secondary energy
carriers characterized by high thermodynamic quality as well as flexibility of
conversion, storage, and transport. That can be done by electricity and
chemical fuels, both liquid and gaseous. In Chapter 3 we have elaborated on
this subject; therefore we shall not go into further detail here, but rather
concentrate more directly on solar energy.
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Table 5-1. Characteristics of solar radiation as an energy resource.
}
Annual
average
horizontal
The solar constant
Effective radiation temperature of the sun
Maximum direct beam irradiation at sea level
Region, !rradiance
Tropic, deserts
Temperature zones
Less sunny regions
(e.g., Northern Europe)
Average annual direct beam irradiance in
sunny regions
Monthly average direct beam radiation in
sunny, arid regions
Source: Weingart (1978).
kWh/m'-Day
5-6
3-5
2-3
7-8
5-10
1353W/m'
5760 K
-1000 W/m'
W/m' (average)
210-250
130-210
80-130
290-330
210-420
The average annual distribution of solar radiation and the locations of
potential solar sites are shown in Figure 5-1. For quick orientation, Table
5-1 presents a summary of the information in the figure. Solar radiation
varies by a factor of three from sunny arid regions to the less sunny regions
of northern Europe. Monthly variations over the year can be almost negli-
gible in equatorial regions but vary by a factor of ten from summer to winter
in northern Europe. Extremes in the availability of direct beam radiation
are even more severe. In areas such as the United Kingdom and central and
northern Europe, where as much as 85 percent of total irradiation in the
winter months is received as diffuse radiation, the use of tracking or tilted
solar collectors cannot really compensate for the seasonal variations in sun-
light. This translates into a central question: How can these areas obtain a
substantial share of their energy needs from sunlight? With this question in
mind, let us now examine the various solar technologies as they appear at
present.
SOLAR TECHNOLOGIES
The development of most potentially important solar technologies is just
beginning, and present activities are emphasizing hard, complex, and perhaps
inelegant technologies because they are closest to our other industrial and
engineering capabilities. The attempt to mimic precisely with solar energy
facilities the behavior and function of traditional fossil fuel facilities for
power and heat may be as inappropriate for solar technologies as it is
(though for other reasons) for nuclear technologies. Basic research is open-
ing up entirely new possibilities, particularly in solid state and photobio-
chemical conversion processes. It is quite possible that the large-scale use of
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sunlight in the future will be with technologies not yet available and perhaps
even with technologies still unknown.
A large number of thermodynamic pathways are in principle available
for the conversion of direct and diffuse radiation; eight specific configu-
rations are shown in Figure 5-2. To make use of any energy resource re-
quires combining, in an integrated system, energy conversion processes
and energy transport along with power conditioning and control func-
tions. For any specific pathway, the variety of possible engineering reali-
zations is enormous.
Moreover, economic judgments are difficult to make since it may take
nearly a century for some mix of solar technologies to make a substantial
Figure 5-2. Some thermodynamic classes of solar energy conversion.
INSOLATION
Solar thermal conversion
Solar thermomechanical conversion
Solar thermal electric
conversion (STECI
STEC +
electrolysis
Solar thermochemical conversion
Solar electric conversion (e.g.• photovoltaic)
Solar chemical conversion (e.g.. photosynthesis)
Solar electrochemical conversion
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fractional impact on energy use. To compare an expensive but emerging
technology with a cheap and disappearing one (oil and gas) is inappropriate;
the economics of solar technologies should be compared with those of the
other energy sources that will also be available on a large scale during the
same period-for example, fusion and the fast breeder reactor. Under opti-
mistic circumstances, the cost of large-scale production of solar-derived
synthetic fuels may be on the order of $60 per barrel of oil equivalent.
(Gasoline, before taxes, is $20 to $40 per barrel.) While the world could
probably live reasonably well from high grade fuels at this price, an enor-
mous amount of fuels derived from nontraditional fossil sources will almost
certainly be available at substantially lower prices. Still, uncertainties in the
technical and economic characteristics of all these options, plus societal
reactions to many of them, make it impossible to identify primary reliance
on anyone option as the preferred path. A diversity of options remains
our best insurance policy against future uncertainties.
Solar Thermal Electric Conversion
Heat at temperatures as high as 4000°C can be produced by concentrating
direct solar beam radiation on an absorber.'This heat can be used to operate
an engine or turbine, which in turn can be connected to an electrical gener-
ator. This specific sequence of processes is commonly referred to as solar
thermal electric conversion (STEC). In one specific configuration (Figure
5-3), the "central receiver" system, thousands of sun-tracking mirrors or
heliostats focus solar energy on a receiver located atop a high (l00 to 250 m)
tower. The receiver in turn produces the superheated steam or hot gases
required to drive either a conventional Rankine steam cycle or a high tem-
perature Brayton cycle. To generate, for example, 100 MW(e) busbar output
assuming 500 W1m2 average insolation and a capacity factor of 0.5, a total
land area of 0.2 km 2 would be required for the direct transformation of
sunlight to electricity, in the case of 100 percent efficiency. But because
of the overall conversion efficiencies for a STEC power plant-of between
15 and 25 percent from direct beam solar radiation incident on the heliostat
surfaces to electricity-the mirror area required to generate 100 MW(e) is
approximately 0.9 km2 , which corresponds to about 3.8 km 2 of total land
area. Since many of the factors that enhance conversion efficiency also en-
tail added costs, it is not yet clear what the relationship between energy cost
and total power plant efficiency will be. Figure 5-4 describes the evolution
of area requirements for a 100 MW(e) STEC plant in view of cumulating
efficiency losses.
The solar engine has a century of history behind it, but only since 1973
has there been a substantial effort to develop a variety of STEC power plants
to commercial reality. A large number of thermal cycles, spanning a range
of a few kW(e) to a few hundred MW(e), are under engineering development.
In Europe, Japan, and the United States, prototype (precommercial) STEC
plants are in construction. Many of these (Winter 1978), which will be in
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the range of 0.5 to 10 MW(e), will be operational shortly after 1980 (Table
5-2). Fully commercial plants are expected in the 1990s. One reason that
technical progress has been so rapid is that the engineering principles are all
well understood. Major design problems have included development of inex-
pensive heliostats and solution of materials problems in the high temperature
absorbers.
We studied a variety of published estimates (e.g., Weingart 1978) of the
estimated costs for a central receiver STEC plant operating under optimum
meteorological conditions. These are summarized in Table 5-3. Six different
plant designs and estimates are arranged in identical categories, with indirect
costs being computed as a straightS 0 percent of direct costs and the total
(direct plus indirect costs) escalated from the year of the estimate to 1977.
As can be seen, the average of the five most favorable of these estimates is
some $2300 per kW(e).
Present cost estimates for commercial STEC systems are high compared
with more traditional fossil and nuclear fuel cycles. Yet even these costs
will be difficult to achieve. Cost estimates for the prototype STEC systems
Table 5-2. Central receivera and distributedb solar thermal electric facilities
(constructed, planned, or contemplated).
Installed Cumulative Elec- Cumulative
Capacity tric Installed Number of
Year Country (MW(e)) Capacity (M W(e)) Facilities
Mid·1960 Italy 0.1 0.1
1969 Francec 1 MW{th)
1977 USA (CR)c 0.4 0.5 2
1978 United StatesC 5 MW{th)
1978 France (DR) 0.3 0.8 3
1978 FRG (DR) 0.01 0.8 4
1979 United States (DR) 0.15 1 5
1979 FRG (DR) 0.05 1 6
1980 France (CR) 2 3 7
1980 United States (DR) 10 13 8
1980 United States (DR) 10 23 9
1980 Spain (CR) 1 24 10
1980 lEAd (CR) 0.5 24.5 11
1980 lEAd (DR) 0.5 25 12
1980 (tall (DR) 1 26 13
1981 Spain (CR) 1 27 14
1981 United States (CR) 2 29 15
1982 Japan (CR) 1 30 16
1985 United States (CR) 100 130 17
1985 United States (0 R) 100 230 18
aCentral receiver facility (CR).
bDistributed receiver facility (DR).
cTest facilities.
dlnternational Energy Agency (lEA).
eEuropean communities (private communication, Gunter Schuster).
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Table 5-3. Estimated costs for central receiver STEC power plant designs.
Cost Component JPL McD Martin B& VjEPRI B& VjEPRI Smith
$jkW(e;G (l)b (2)b (3)b (4)b (5)b (6)b
Land and site prep-
aration 10 32 150 27 10 11
Structures and facilities 32 110
Heliostats and collectors 935 678 760 1933 620 616
Absorbe r/ rece iver 230 143 180 658 348 99
Boiler plant 250 230 182 658 NA 200
Turbine plant 250 230 83 145 262 200
Electric plant 250 230 83 145 262 200
Miscellaneous plant
equipment 250 5 98 52 10
Condensor and cooling 250 61 98 NA
Storage 122 122 169 127 7 60
Direct costs 1547 1210 1550 3196 1299 996
Total direct and
indirect costs
updated to 1977 2700 2100 2700 5560 2260 1610
Note: Average total cost estimates excluding (4): 2274 $kW(e).
NA-Not applicable.
aCapacity factor =0.5; 1977 U.S. dollars.
b(l) JPL let Propulsion Laboratory (Selcuk 1975).
(2) McD McDonnell Douglas (1973,1974).
(3) Martin Martin Marietta (F. Blake et a1.1975, 1976).
(4),(5) B&V/EPRI Black and Veatch (1976).
(6) Smith O. Smith (1976).
mentioned above are in the range of $8000 to $20,000 per kW (e). But pro-
totype systems are always more expensive than their commercial progeny. A
combination of engineering, industrial, and meteorological considerations
suggest that achieving the commercial goals is possible, though difficult.
Though we discuss this subject later in this chapter in more detail, it is
instructive at this point to do some rough cost calculations based on STEC
material requirements. The steel required for current prototype heliostats
weighs on the order of 50 kg/m 2 of reflecting area (in order to withstand
stresses); given that optical and thermal subsystem efficiencies limit total
STEC conversion efficiencies to between 15 and 25 percent, then at least
9 m2 of heliostat area are needed per kW(e) busbar (500 W/m 2 average
isolation, capacity factor of 0.5). Production costs for the cheapest products
of the most rationalized and largest mass production activity in the world
today-the automotive industry-are about $3.50 per kg. We know from
extensive experience in a variety of industries that other mass-produced
machines cost (excluding profit, distribution, installation, etc.) roughly
$3.50 to $5.00 per kg. If heliostats produced on a comparable scale cost
$3.5 per kg of steel, then the heliostats alone (excluding glass and concrete)
will add $1575 per kW(e).
It is worth inspecting the estimates for heliostat costs a little more closely.
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The results of a detailed study of the costs of mass-produced heliostats are
shown in Figure 5-5. In this study, a number of production processes were
considered, ranging from a seven-year research, development, and construc-
tion period for limited production of 2000 heliostats to the establishment
of an automotive industry type of process producing 250,000 heliostats
per year. The study (McDonnell Douglas 1976) suggests that an asymptotic
cost of $60/m2 of reflecting area might be eventually achievable. This will
be a remarkable accomplishment, even under optimal conditions, in view
of the experience of the automotive and other industries, if these costs can
really be achieved, even within a factor of two. The development of fully
commercial STEC systems is expected to take several decades and to require
research and development costs of about one billion (09 ) dollars (Caputo
and Truscello 1976).
Taking the cost range of Table 5-3 we can estimate the cost of STEC-
derived electricity under several climatic (insolation) conditions. At a 10 per-
cent fixed charge rate (FCR), the levelized busbar cost of electricity would
be on the order of 50 to 100 mills per kWh (e) in desert areas (where 1
mill = $0.001); in less sunny regions (e.g., the United Kingdom and central
and northern Europe), the range would be 200 to 300 mills per kWh (e).
By contrast, long distance high voltage DC transmission from Spain to Oslo
or from Phoenix to Boston is estimated to cost about 10 mills per kWh (e)
(Caputo and Truscello 1976). The production of STEC electricity in sunny
Figure 5-5. McDonnell Douglas heliostat production rate and cost projections. Source:
McDonnell Douglas (1976).
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regions, such as large areas of Spain and Portugal, Turkey, southern Yugo-
slavia, and southeastern Bulgaria, as well as shipment to the less sunny areas
of Europe, would be far cheaper than on site generation.
Thus if large-scale use of STEC-generated electricity is ever to be an op-
tion for the densely populated, cloudy regions of the world, it will be by
coupling STEC plants in the south with load centers in the north. It might
then be possible to provide electrically driven services in Oslo with STEC
electricity from Spain at the same unit cost as with locally generated elec-
tricity costing 35 to 50 mills per kWh (e) today.
What does all this mean? STEC plants are really an attempt to imitate
with concentrated sunlight what we do today with coal, oil, and gas (and
nuclear reactor cores)-namely, the production of steam to run a turbine
generator unit. There have been no real scientific challenges to the develop-
ment of such systems, although the engineering accomplishments have been
exceedingly impressive. Yet these cumbersome machines, requiring thou-
sands of heliostats, huge concrete towers, sophisticated thermal absorbers,
heat transport and storage units, turbines, generators, cooling towers, and so
forth, may really turn out to be museum pieces by the end of the century.
The combustion of fossil fuels, which have an enormous energy density and
can be converted to shaft horsepower via combustion at very high efficien-
cies, is probably not the best model for the design of a solar power plant.
Rather, the techniques that use the high inherent energy (on the order of
1 eV) of the visible light photons, as well as techniques that bypass the
Carnot cycle and the complexity of thermal-mechanical systems, will proba-
bly be the really important approaches to solar energy conversion over the
long run. Among such techniques, the most well known are those that
involve photovoltaic cells.
Photovoltaic Electricity and Fuels
Two very important features of photovoltaic cells are that they are inher-
ently modular and responsive to both diffuse and direct radiation. These
features have far-reaching implications that can hardly be overestimated.
First, in middle latitudes it is not impossible to devote even relatively large
amounts of land (on the order of several thousands of km 2 ) to solar power
uses, but not in large units. Instead, such land is usually available only in
"bits and pieces," and exploiting its potential therefore requires a tech-
nology adapted to modular applications. In a later section of this chapter,
specifically that on the architecture of a global solar system, we examine
this point in more detail. Second, the possibility of using diffuse as well as
direct solar radiation makes photovoltaic applications viable even in areas
where the cloudiness is rather high. In actual cases, such as Austria, poten-
tially this can make a great difference when photovoltaics are compared to
STEC. Finally, photovoltaic systems have no moving parts, have potential
lifetimes that substantially exceed those of existing commercial power
plants, and exhibit efficiencies of up to 20 percent. Thus, these technolo-
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gies are potentially very important for the industrialized world and could
have revolutionary consequences for the developing world: the crucial
problem is economic.
Of the possible approaches, the single crystal silicon cell, which is the most
developed as a result of aerospace activities, is currently the frontrunner.
It has made steady progress toward commercial terrestrial applications,
but the U.S. program is still a factor of twenty from the 1986 cost goal of
$0.50/wp for a module (peak watt based on maximum insolation of 1
kW1m 2 ), and a silicon module efficiency of 12 to 15 percent is expected at
the cost goal. In addition to the silicon single crystal program, gallium arse-
nide, with its higher efficiencies (about 20 percent), high concentration capa-
bility, and insensitivity to higher temperatures (up to 200°C), as well as
amorphous silicon, thermophotovoltaic designs, vertical multijunction sili-
con, poly crystalline silicon, and cadmium sulfide-copper sulfide, are in the
early development stage.
There is some expectation that $1.00/wp can be reached using mass pro-
duction techniques with current technical approaches based on single crystal
silicon (Metz and Hammond 1978), and recent studies indicate that even
$0.40/wp is achievable (Aster 1978). However, cost reductions of this order
may turn out to require the development of another approach. Since there is
a large number of candidates in the early stage of development, some re-
searchers are confident that at least one approach will reach the $0.50/wp
goal. However, because it is early in the research and development stage for
these other approaches, this speculation has an unknown pedigree, and
strong support can be found on both sides. The photovoltaic module would
be the dominating part of a photovoltaic system. The rest of the system
would be made up of the support structure (which, if cost goals are reached,
is likely to be a fixed plate tilted at approximately the latitude angle), power
conditioning (DC to AC), and power collection.
Estimates of photovoltaic plant performance and cost are shown in Figure
5-6, based on single crystal silicon on a tilted plate structure costing $17.50
per m2 with a global radiation of 1900 kWh/m2 -yr on this tilted plate. With
this set of assumptions, some concentration (2: 1) is attractive economically.
A simple concentration scheme can be used with a fixed angle but asym-
metrical "V" trough, which is adjusted biannually (Caputo 1976). This re-
duces both the energy cost slightly (by less than 10 percent) and the area
requirement by about 15 percent. A compound parabolic concentration
(CPC) may be used with a three to five times concentration that is adjusted
five to ten times a year. However, the cost estimates of Figure 5-6 simply
use a flat plate scheme without concentration.
Through the use of very strong optical concentration, it is possible to re-
duce the area requirements for the active solar device by a factor of hun-
dreds or even thousands. With adequate cooling, device efficiencies as high as
25 percent have been observed (Table 5-4). Thus, the main effect of concen-
tration may be to stretch the otherwise limited materials (such as gallium),
rather than to decrease the total cost of photovoltaic electricity.
At the cost goal of $0.50/wp and without storage, the estimated capital
Table 5-4. Characteristics of photovoltaic conversion units under intense
concentrated illumination.
Erri- Temperature
Material Concentration ciency (OC) Cooling Investigator
GaAs/GaAIAs 500-1800 0.20 < 50 Forced Varian (1975)
Silicon 1500 0.25 15 Forced Chappel and White (1977)
Silicon 50 0.10 100 Passive Sandia (1976)
Silicon 300-500 0.10 < 50 Passive RCA (1976)
Silicon 300-1500 0.20 20 Forced Schwartz (1976)
Source: Weingart (1978).
Figure 5-6. Photovoltaic electricity cost.
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cost is about $1500 per kW(e) at an annual capacity factor of 0.25 and at a
global insolation level of 1900 kWh per m2 per year, which is typical of
sunny regions. The resulting electricity cost is $0.073 per kWh, as shown
in Figure 5-6. Of the two main parameters-dollars per wp and module
efficiency-it is the former that is the dominant cost driver. A factor of two
reduction in dollars per wp (l.0 to 0.5) at constant efficiency would reduce
energy cost by 40 percent. However, a factor of two increase in module
efficiency (6.5 to 13 percent) would reduce energy cost only by 18 percent.
Electricity, Hydrogen, and Solar Power
For both the case of STEC and that of photovoltaic solar power conversion
there remains an inherent problem of matching supply characteristics with
those of demand, both in space and time. To solve this problem, large-scale
energy transportation and storage technologies are required. This is in con-
trast to the case for nuclear or coal sources, where the basic principle of the
energy conversion process involves the liberation of binding energy, either
chemical or nuclear.
The need for cheap storage and transportability leads to either liquids or
a gas as a partner to the solar primary energy source. The most interesting
candidate is probably hydrogen, and (as will be discussed more fully in Chap-
ter 22) two principal direct routes to the generation of hydrogen are elec-
trolysis and thermolysis.
Thermolysis, in particular, might be appropriate in combination with solar
power, and estimated costs for a commercially mature system operating
under ideal (desert) conditions suggest that this route might produce hydro-
gen for approximately $50 per barrel of oil equivalent (Weingart 1978).
These calculations are summarized in Table 5-5. Using available technology,
a pipeline system could transport this hydrogen from Turkey to Oslo or
Table 5-5. A rough estimate of solar-hydrogen production costs.
Assumptions: High Insolation (-/O~~ W/m 2 )
Thermochemical Route to Hydrogen
Capital Costs:
Solar high temperature thermal a
Hydrogen for thermolysis
At 100% effective load factor, a fixed charge
rate of 10% thus corresponds to
Note: gasol ine prices without taxes range from
1650 $/kW{th) [o(standard deviation)
= 300 $/kW(th)]
600 $/kW{th) [a = 400 $/kW(th)]
2250 $/kW(th} [a ~ 500 $/kW(th)
44 $/bbl oil equ.[o ~ 10 $/bbl oil equ.]
20 to 40 $/bbl oil equ.
aCos t estimates for production of high temperature heat (> 600°C) by solar central receiver
systems of Jet Propulsion Laboratory (Selcuk 1975); McDonnell Douglas (1973, 1974); Martin
Marietta (Blake, Walton, et al. 1975); Black and Veatch (1976); and Smith (1976).
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from New Mexico to Maine for about $2/MWh (Beghi et al. 1972; Weingart
1978); the hydrogen could be reliably stored for several years or more in
aquifers, in depleted oil and gas fields, or in similar geological formations. At
least as far as STEC-generated electricity is concerned, it will probably be far
cheaper to produce solar fuels on the required scale in the sunny arid regions
and to use transcontinental shipment by pipeline and global transport by
tanker than to operate the plants in most of the regions now occupied by the
industrially advanced countries.
Biotechnology
Biotechnology refers to a very broad class of systems that have at their
heart photosynthetic and biological energy conversion processes. For ex-
ample, the development of high efficiency plants that are then cloned and
raised for feedstock for fuels and chemicals would represent a new level of
industrialization of biomass systems. Other biotechnologies, such as those
under study by Calvin (1976a, 1976b) and Broda (1976), would combine
biological processes into a mechanical matrix to convert sunlight and water
into hydrogen and oxygen. Calvin points out that plants have long "known"
how to use the energy of sunlight to split water, but do not evolve hydrogen
explicitly since it is needed only for internal energetic processes within the
plant itself for reduction of carbon dioxide. It may be possible to develop
new biological structures that in fact do evolve hydrogen (Mitsui 1978; Vagi
and Ochiai 1978), and at IIASA, Marchetti (1978) has considered the con-
cept of hydrogen-producing trees. Again, as in the case of electricity pro-
duction via STEC and photovoltaics, it may be that new, almost unexplored
approaches to the production of fuels will be far more attractive, both eco-
nomically and in terms of other impacts, than the cumbersome, purely
mechanistic approaches such as the thermochemical hydrogen production
route.
The Solar Satellite Power Station
Above we have argued that the features of solar power lend themselves to
a natural linking with the features of hydrogen. Principally it was the neces-
sity of energy storage and transportation that led to that linking. However,
there seems to be one possible exception to this argument for combining
solar power and hydrogen. This is the extraterrestrial solar power generation
concept, provided primarily by Peter Glaser of Arthur D. Little, Inc. It con-
siders a light weight solar satellite power station (SSPS) in a geostationary
orbit in the neighborhood of the equator. The power station, at roughly
36,000 km above the earth, is nearly always exposed to direct and intense
sunlight of 1353 W/m 2 . The radiant energy would be collected by the solar
cells and then transported to the earth by high frequency microwave beams
that are able to reach receiving antennas on the earth even at great distances
away from the equator. Figure 5-7 illustrates the SSPS scheme.
Figure 5-7. Solar satellite power station. Solar collector in stationary orbit has been
proposed by Peter E. Glaser of Arthur D. Little Inc. Located 22,300 miles above the
equator, the station would remain fixed with respect to a receiving station on the ground.
A five by five mile panel would intercept about 8.5 X 107 kW of radiant solar power.
Solar cells operating at an efficiency of about 18 percent would convert this into 1.5
X 107 kW of electric power, which would be converted into microwave radiation and
beamed to the earth. There it would be reconverted into 107 net kW of electric power, or
enough for New York City. The receiving antenna would cover about six times the area
needed for a coal-burning power plant of the same capacity and about twenty times the
area needed for a nuclear plant. Source: Summers (1971).
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Sometimes one hears the argument that this scheme is too futuristic
and, above all, inherently too capital intensive. While we appreciate the per-
spective of such an argument, we are not persuaded by it, for we are en-
visaging a time horizon of fifty years. And given the latest developments in
space shuttle technology, it is no longer necessarily so that required advances
in SSPS technology are more difficult to achieve than the widely expected
breakthroughs in photovoltaics or biotechnology that we have alluded to
above. One should also realize that the SSPS scheme has inherently a capital
cost bonus. For terrestrial STEC there is a factor of approximately four be-
tween peak power plant rating and the baseload rating (where this factor in-
corporates assumed storage losses of 25 percent). Thus, the cost per baseload
kW(e) is at least four times the cost per peak kW(e); including storage costs,
as such, would increase the factor even further. For SSPS, the factor is one;
the sun always shines in space.
Here we would like to discuss briefly three issues that are of a systems
nature. We thus leave aside technical feasibility and costs associated with
SSPS.
First, what are acceptable microwave radiation densities-that is, the
lowest standards for continued exposure? There are wide differences in
international standards-between 100 W1m 2 continuous exposure for the
United States and 0.1 W1m 2 in the East European countries. Applying the
lowest standards of 0.1 W/m 2 effectively includes situations where animals
and human beings might pass through the SSPS-generated microwave beam.
Once passage through the beam is prohibited, power densities of 800 W/m 2
at the center of the beam appear acceptable, while the lowest health stan-
dards of 0.1 W/m 2 would be met at the outer fringes of the antenna-about
10 km from the beam center. The antenna area requirements would then
not be excessive. By contrast, the application of the 100 W1m 2 standard
throughout the beam would imply a partial replication of industrialized
areas (with energy consumption densities of 50 W1m 2 ) in terms of the related
antenna area. In fact, 100 W/m 2 density would easily match the conditions
of normal solar insolation in many areas.
The second issue is the possibility of hostile access to the high frequency
beams or the accidental deviation of the beam from the center. Glaser main-
tains that the microwave beam directional system and the phase control
achieved by means of a pilot signal from the center of the antenna preclude
deviation and exposure beyond allowable standards. In the event of failure
or of hostile manipulation of the microwave-pointing system, the coherence
of the high frequency beams would be lost, and the beam would not be
focused, resulting in beam spread and dissipation of energy. The power den-
sity would drop below 0.1 W/m 2 , maintaining the inherent safety of the
system.
The last issue has to do with possible discriminatory access to SSPS. This
problem leads to the same institutional considerations as for nuclear energy.
While it should not be underestimated, it should not be considered insur-
mountable over the long run.
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Having reviewed the various hard solar technologies, we can move on to
the question of what a global solar system might look like-that is, how the
different technologies and different scales of application might all be inter-
connected. In addressing this question, we note that in view of the enormous
areas required for solar conversion on the global scale and the high costs of
such systems, we must deliberately, aggressively, and imaginatively search
for solar systems that have low mass per unit area, high efficiencies, and very
long lifetimes (centuries or millennia). For while sunlight may constitute an
ultimate energy endowment, solar energy systems that must be replaced
every three or four decades are no endowment at all. (The subject of endow-
ments is discussed along with the concepts on negentropy and information
in Chapter 21.)
ARCHITECTU RE OF A GLOBAL SYSTEM
In order for sunlight to be a primary source of energy for civilization it will
be necessary, through the use of energy storage and transport, to decouple
this resource in space and in time from the patterns of energy demand. This
will require integrated energy systems with a spectrum of sizes ranging from
individual domestic solar water-heating systems to a global solar fuel net-
work. A system or network of systems using sunlight to provide the neces-
sary heat, electricity, and fuels for the world would ultimately be globally
extensive and technologically complex and would display enormous regional
variation in its character and evolution.
For example, Scandinavia might evolve an integrated system incorporating
large quantities of biomass fuels from Sweden and Finland, wind-generated
electricity and fuels from Denmark, and hydropower-generated electricity
and fuels from Norway and Sweden. Energy requirements for water and
space heating, which now constitute roughly half the total energy needs of
the region, could be reduced through more effective energy conservation
measures, passive solar design, and active solar heating (especially for hot
water). Such a scheme would permit "small is beautiful" and "big is neces-
sary" to merge harmoniously.
This global system would have the following features:
• Local use of solar-generated heat for space heating, water heating, and
industrial process heat where economically and logistically suitable.
• Local and regional use of small-scale, solar-mechanical, electrical-, and
fuel-generating units, especially in developing countries.
• Solar electric power plants of various sizes located throughout the world,
primarily in sunny regions, interconnected through large integrated elec-
tric utility systems over distances of many thousands of kilometers.
• Solar fuel generation units primarily in sunny regions and interconnected
globally via pipeline and, for a few locations (Japan), by tanker (cryo-
genic or liquid fuel).
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Again we note that the more local uses of solar power are dealt with in
Chapter 6, while in this chapter we deal rather with the hard aspect of solar
power (which is what permits solar to potentially assume a significant share
of the power supply). Merging these two aspects requires a sensitive fitting:
small consumption shares of, say, low temperature heat should be provided
by power sources designed principally for that purpose, while larger seg-
ments of demand-for instance, for an aluminum plant-must come from
more centralized sources. Ultimately a careful systems-oriented integration
has to be carried out, and this almost always requires that one examine spe-
cific cases-for example, Western Europe-in great detail.
While we have not developed such an analysis at IIASA, we anticipate
that the degree to which a global solar system can be fine tuned (that is,
the degree to which different supply sources can be ideally matched to
appropriate kinds of demand) is limited. The problem is that the more per-
fectly matched sources and demands are, the less capability there is to sub-
stitute different sources in meeting a particular demand. It is just such a
substitution capability that is the salient characteristic of existing inter-
connected grids. However, it remains to be seen from specific case studies
how severe the limitation really is. Still, even without detailed case studies,
it is possible to explore to some extent the characteristics and constraints
associated with a global energy system, and that is our purpose in this
section.
The scale of future energy use, even in the most modest strategy and using
the most efficient of solar technologies, would require substantial land areas.
However, despite pressures from increasing food demands, urbanization,
the need for forests, and the maintenance of ecological diversity, the arid
sunny wastelands of the globe will remain essentially unused and potentially
available for large-scale use.a In the United States, Europe, and elsewhere,
the land requirements per se may not be the crucial constraint. The case of
Austria has been analyzed in detail at IIASA by Korzen (1979) as an indica-
tive example of an industrialized, densely populated European country.
Here we report a few findings of the Korzen study to demonstrate the kind
of detail that must be considered when solar power is studied for practical
application.
For large-scale introduction of solar energy use, wastelands and not the
best agricultural areas should be used. In Austria, fallow land and marginal
farm land present possibilities for solar utilization. Furthermore, fallow land
can be found in the Austrian lowlands as well as in the Alpine regions. For
example, industrialization, a changed social structure, and the loss of capital
have led to the situation in the Austrian province of Burgenland where 70
km 2 can be counted as fallow land, not for agricultural reasons but for social
ones. Small farmers, who owned only a couple of hectares and were not able
to invest or buy additional land, have not been able to survive with the gains
aThe potentials and constraints in global land use and population densities are discussed in greater
detail in Chapter 23.
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from agriculture. Many have therefore emigrated to other countries or
changed to industrial jobs.
In the Alpine regions of Austria, large meadows in altitudes between
1400 to 2000 m remain largely unaided by technology, and therefore many
of them are unlikely to be used for agricultural purposes. The inclination
of the slopes can be used as a parameter for estimating the present and fu-
ture fallow land potential. The highest tilt of slopes on which agricultural
activities can be expected is, for the Alpine areas, around 40 to 50 percent
and for lowland agricultural areas around 25 percent. The Institute of Agri-
cultural Economy in Austria estimated a fallow land potential of around
3000 km 2 in the Alpine region and 4000 km 2 in the lowlands. For solar
energy use, only the south-oriented slopes in both cases are of interest.
Calculations show that in the Alpine region, around 1700 km 2 of grassland
(with a tilt of more than 40 percent), and in the lowlands around 2300 km 2
(with a tilt of more than 25 percent) are southwest- to southeast-oriented.
These are the areas with potential for solar energy use.
The second largest wasteland potential lies in pieces of marginal farm
land. For tax reasons, the quality of all agricultural areas in Austria is
assessed in terms of the potential gain from each piece of land, given the
local earth quality and climatic conditions. These data are listed on com-
puter tape. If a limit for the low quality areas, the marginal farm land, is
defined, the potential area for all of Austria, for each federal province, for
each community, and so forth can be determined. The reference to each
single piece of marginal farm land can also be obtained and verified on a
map. In this way, more than 60 percent of the total agricultural area of
Austria was evaluated, and from the results, the total marginal farm land
potential of Austria was estimated to be 4700 km2 However, the whole area
cannot be used solely for solar energy applications. Many of these marginal
farm land pieces are disperse and therefore may not be usable, particularly
for a centralized solar conversion system such as STEC. Other marginal farm
areas are either within the borders of wildlife areas or are on northern slopes.
On the other hand, there are communities where the marginal farm land
seems to be accumulated-for example, in areas where the average quality
of the land is extremely low.
Both land potentials (fallow and marginal farm land) demonstrate that
there is a considerable area that could potentially be made available in
Austria for solar energy use. If all the anticipated constraints are included in
the estimation, an overall usable land area of perhaps 2500 km 2 could be
made available even in a densely populated country such as Austria. This
corresponds to 3 percent of the total land area of Austria. This is not to say
that it would be easy to utilize this whole area. Because of complex land
ownership arrangements, this potential could be made available only with
extensive social changes.
A comparable analysis done for the southwestern United States indicated
that between 2 and 16 percent of the total land in an eight state area was
available (Aerospace Corporation 1974). These states (California, New
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Mexico, Arizona, western Texas, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, and Oklahoma)
represent one-third of the total continental U.S. land area, and the range
from 2 to 16 percent represents 0.05 to 0.40 X 106 km 2 . The approach
taken listed reasonable exclusion criteria, such as land with a tilt greater
than 20 percent, land with any reasonable crop or grazing potential, and
land owned by Indian tribes or used as a local, state, or federal park. Some
more stringent criteria were also introduced that, for example, excluded
all federal lands (which in one of these states amounted to half the land
area).
On a global perspective, the waste, desert, and mountainous regions of
the world exclusive of uninhabited islands and polar areas cover 62 X 106
km 2 (Doxiadis and Papaioannou 1974). Let us first assume that 20 X 106
km 2 of this land is worth considering as arid, sunny wasteland available
for central solar systems. Then, in line with the percentages for Austria and
the southwestern United States as arrived at above, let us take 5 percent of
this number as an estimate of land with some potential for solar utilization.
The result is I X 106 km 2 • (Note that for an electricity generation density
of 20 W/m 2 , this corresponds to 20 TW.) A completely independent esti-
mate (based on FAO 1969) of potential sunny wasteland excluding sandy
regions and low use grazing land comes up with 4.3 X 106 km2 . If sunny
and other nonwaste regions were included, the number could be ultimately
as high as 10 X 106 km 2 • The lesson to be learned from these sorts of cal-
culations is that as long as only physical conditions and relations are re-
viewed, land availability is not likely to be an ultimately binding constraint
on solar development. Let us then turn to storage and transportation.
The price of solar-derived energy would be (approximately) inversely
proportional to the magnitude of the available insolation. For direct con-
version technologies, this means that the least expensive secondary energy
production would be in the sunniest regions. For centralized uses of those
technologies (solar thermal electricity, solar thermochemical production
of hydrogen), which respond only to direct beam sunlight, location in arid
sunny regions would be essential.
It is expected that in the near fu ture electricity can be transmitted several
thousand kilometers with low losses via high voltage DC transmission, thus
permitting the linking of geographically dispersed solar power plants within
larger integrated electrical networks. This system integration of dispersed
solar generating capacity can substantially increase the reliability of solar
units relative to anyone specific site. All of Europe is within such high volt-
age transmission distances of Portugal, Spain, and Turkey; also in the near
fu ture, undersea cables from North Africa could bring solar electricity to
Europe. However, advances in central storage technologies, plus extensive
load-leveling management practices (using dispersed storage), would be
required before solar electricity could provide the bulk of base and inter-
mediate load requirements. For now, only a few European countries (Aus-
tria, France, Italy, and Switzerland) have some seasonal hydrostorage, thus
permitting the initial stages of a solar-electric partnership in the near future.
For our Austrian study, we have looked into this possibility in greater
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detail. Assuming a ground cover ratio of 0.5, a 30 percent efficiency, and
the 2500 km 2 of available land as mentioned above results in 405 TWh/yr
of potentially available secondary energy from solar power. For purposes of
comparison, the secondary energy consumption in Austria in 1976 was 204
TWh/yr, out of which 33 TWh/yr were in the form of electricity. Figure
5-8 gives two-year insolation diagrams for two stations-namely, Sonnblick
(in the Grossglockner area) and Salzburg. The average values are also indi-
cated in the diagrams, and it turns out that for these cases, something like
15 percent of the solar power generated would have to be stored over
roughly a six month period if electricity production is to be constant
throughou t the year. For Austria in general the value of 15 percent may be
optimistic, and more realistically, we should consider a range from 15 to
30 percent. Applying such a range to 405 TWh/yr gives 61 to 122 TWh/yr,
while applying it to 33 TWh/yr yields 5 to 10 TWh/yr. Comparing these
numbers with the existing hydrostorage capacity of Austria and other coun-
tries as shown in Table 5-6, one sees that an undertaking on the order of
the Bratsk-Ilimsk development project in Siberia is needed if we are to pro-
vide a storage capacity of only 30 TWh. Effectively this means that hydro-
storage can be only an intermediate stage in the buildup of large-scale hard
solar power. Eventually, it is chemical energy storage-specifically hydro-
Figure 5-8. Monthly direct solar insolation over a two-year period. Source: Based on
Weyss (1977: Figure 12).
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Table 5-6. A storage capacity in large electricity networks.
Electricity
Storage Capacity
Production
(pumped hydro)
Network (TWh) (TWh) (%)
Electricite de France 180 12 6.7
Bratsk-Ilimsk, Siberia 135 30 22
Austria 34 2 6
gen-that must be introduced. Strategically that means that the development
of the new technology of hard solar power is linked to the development of
the new technology of hydrogen. In Chapter 22 we further elaborate on this
line of argument; however, a few comments are in order here.
Large-scale generation of hydrogen and liquid fuels, long distance energy
transport, and seasonal energy storage would permit the complete decou-
pIing of the solar source and energy needs. Liquid fuels (e.g., methanol)
could be produced by combining hydrogen with carbon from coal or directly
from the atmosphere or ocean. Hydrogen could be transported over even
continental distances of 5000 kilometers or more, with available or develop-
able pipeline system technologies. With the exception of Japan, which must
be served by liquid fuels via tanker, virtually the entire world is within prac-
tical hydrogen pipeline transport distances (5000 km) of large regions of
arid, sunny land.
Thus, the ultimate potential contribution from the large-scale global use
of hard solar power would seem to be substantial as far as land, storage, and
transportation are concerned. We shall now go further and consider what
other constraints there might be that would limit how far and how fast we
can actually exploit that potential.
MARKET PENETRATION
The penetration rates of solar energy options will depend on the competitive
situations of all energy sources, and uncertain cost estimates for most poten-
tially significant solar options limit the procedures that can be used to de-
termine the solar market penetration rates. In addition, there are strong
reasons to believe that the present cost estimates will come down in the
future-in some cases (e.g., photovoltaics), dramatically and fairly rapidly.
Initially, during the developmental phases, external capital is used to sup-
port new technologies even if their direct costs are somewhat higher than
the competition. However, after these achieve a market share of a few per-
cent and commercial maturity, their penetration rates depend on their com-
petitive situation: nonprofitable technologies are rarely supported for very
long time periods. This will also be the case, we expect, with solar options
once they achieve significant shares of the primary energy market.
Rather than attempting to estimate market penetration rates by devel-
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oping cost projections, let us try another approach. In the past it has always
required roughly one century for any of the various traditional primary
energy forms to increase its share of the world primary energy supply from 1
to 50 percent. While an understanding of the time required for new energy
systems to make major contributions to energy supply is crucial to any
realistic assessment of the potential role of solar or nuclear energy, whether
in a single country or worldwide, the present projections of future U.S.
energy demand and the possible contributions from solar energy display
enormous dispersion. This is illustrated in Figure 5-9.
Consider now the market penetration dynamics in the world as given in
Figure 5-10. We see that historical penetration rates were rather slow and
fairly regular for all primary energy sources and that, therefore, one should
be wary of those who would argue that either the nuclear or the solar option
can proceed much faster; there are no historical precedents on the world
level to justify that. More historical examples of market penetration are
Figure 5-9. Scenarios and projections of total energy demand and the share potentially
available from solar energy, United States. Curves marked by underlined numbers de-
scribe projections of total energy demand; those marked by numbers not underlined are
projections of that share of total energy demand that is potentially available from solar
energy. Sources: (1) The MITRE Corporation (1973); (2) Morrow (1973) "maximum
solar"; (3) Morrow (1973) "minimum solar"; (4) Wolf (1974); (5) Lovins (1976); (6,7,
8) Reuyl et al. (1976); (9) ERDA (1975); and NAS (1977); (10) Weingart and Nakiceno-
vic (1980); (11) BNL (1975) "future ref. energy system."
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Figure 5-10. World primary energy substitution, 1860-2030. Logarithmic plot of the
transformation f/{l-f) where f is the fractional market share. Smooth lines are model
estimates of historical data; scattered lines are historical data; straight lines show logistic
model substitution paths.
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given in Chapter 8, but the general conclusion is that only in smaller world
regions and countries are more rapid penetration rates possible. The market
penetration dynamics in Figure 5-10 are extended beyond the historical
period, to the year 2030. For the purposes of Figure 5-10, while keeping
in mind all the precautions explained in greater detail in Chapter 8, we have
simply estimated a penetration rate for solar energy that is consistent with
those of other energy sources in the past.
Thus, we can get an impression of what the potential rate of penetration
might be in the situation in which solar thermal, electric, and fuel technolo-
gies are directly competitive with other secondary energy sources and accept-
able in social, environmental, and political terms. For example, assuming a
1 percent market share for solar in 2000 leads to a market share of 6 percent
by the year 2030. Exogenous to the market penetration technique is the
absolute level of the total primary energy use. Taking a figure of 36 TWyr/yr
in 2030 leads to 2.2 TWyr/yr of solar energy production. Alternatively, if
we select 22 TWyr/yr in 2030, 1.3 TWyr/yr of solar energy results.
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Many people have argued that with adequate government incentives, the
rate of market penetration of solar technologies can be far greater than that
suggested by the application of the historical penetration rates of other
energy sources. But what is the role and effect of government incentives?
First, proper incentives, including adequate support for research and devel-
opment, can substantially compress the time required to bring a technology
to commercial readiness. Second, the initial stages of commercialization can
be shortened through such incentives. This is not in dissonance with the
observation that the market penetration dynamics of various energy forms
can exhibit rather steep slopes when the total fractional penetration is a
few percent or less. However, once penetration has reached several percent,
the dynamics of the system take over. Government support can no longer
sustain extremely rapid growth; market and system effects become domi-
nant; and the penetration behavior becomes smooth and regular. We might
say that below a few percent, the government can speak. Above a few per-
cent, the system speaks.
So the bad news from this analysis is that it could take the better part of
a century to make the transition to abundant energy forms; the good news
is that in less than a century we can make the transition. Thus, seen from a
rather long-term perspective, solar power has a potentially promising future.
The salient question, then, is whether existing energy sources can bridge the
time gap, and it is this question that is at the center of the quantitative
energy strategy analysis of Part IV of this book. Fortunately, the answer is,
It could be done.
MATERIAL REQUIREMENTS
The construction, operation, and decommissioning of solar facilities used at
the multiterawatt level will probably result in substantial material require-
ments as shown in Table 5-7. Some feeling for these requirements can be
obtained from considering, first, that all solar energy systems must be exten-
sive in order to convert the incident radiation to other forms of energy.
And, second, because these systems must operate in a variety of natural
environments, they must also have sufficient structural stability to insure
operation and survival under occasional extreme conditions as well as under
continuous "routine" environmental conditions. This requirement translates
into a mass density per unit area. The minimum density of a system that
can withstand the weather for decades is likely to be at least 10 kg/m 2 . This
might be a tough, thin film, photovoltaic system interconnected and sup-
ported by lightweight space frame techniques. If placed on a roof with mini-
mum framing, the material density would be closer to 5 kg/m 2 .
Present U.S. prototype (McDonnell Douglas, 1977; Martin Marietta 1977;
Honeywell 1977) heliostats for STEC plants weigh about 50 kg/m 2 , consid-
ering the steel but excluding glass and concrete. The concrete and sand are
considered to add about 155 kg/m 2 to the heliostat weight. The rest of the
plant adds about 165 kg/m2 of concrete and 10 kg/m 2 of steel.
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Table 5-7. Annual material requirements for 1 TWyr/yr.
350
269
645
144
5030
1870
Mirror Area Net Material
70. km 2a Density
TWyr/yr kg/m 2
Central Solar Thermal c
Steel material in heliostats
electrolysis 0.Q129 50d
thermochemical 0.0048 30e
Total material
electrolysis 0.0129 390f
thermochemical 0.0048 390f
Photovoltaic
central g 0.035 10
roof toph 0.0538 5
Material
Required
70· Ton/y,b
TWyr/yr/yr
aMirror area per TWyr/yr primary equivalent based on 25 percent end use electricity, 25 percent
transportation liquids, and 50 percent heat.
bMaterial per TWyr/yr in metric tons.
c2750 kWh/m 2 yr direct beam insolation.
d Average of U.S. prototype heliostats using glass.
eNovel design using stretched aluminized mylar.
fCentral receiver plant includes concrete (83 percent), steel (14 percent), glass (3 percent).
g2000 kWh/m 2 yr global insolation.
h1200 kWh/m 2 yr global insolation.
The steel and glass in some European prototype designs-for example, that
of Soterm and Cethel (Saumon 1977), weigh about 80 kg/m 2 . Some unique
heliostat designs (Boeing 1977) have achieved 30 kg/m 2 for steel and glass
even at the prototype stage, but with just as high a concrete requirement. A
more recent design by General Electric (1978) keeps the low steel and glass
requirement (~30 kg/m 2 ), but substantially substitutes rock for the con-
crete. Although the mass is similar, rock has a reduced environmental impact
per ton.
Figure 5-11 shows these data as a function of, first, the annual increase
in solar energy production and, second, the total solar contribution after
one-hundred years. To reach a total solar contribution of 35 TWyr/yr after
one-hundred years would then require increasing solar energy production
at the rate of 0.35 TWyr/yr per year, and this requires almost 640 X 106
ton/yr for the solar thermochemical hydrogen system (~65 X 106 ton/yr
of steel, ~ 20 X 106 ton/yr of glass, and the rest concrete). As a rough mea-
sure of what this represents, 1975 annual global production of concrete was
700 X 106 ton/yr, steel was 630 X 106 ton/yr, and glass was 1070 X 106
ton/yr. The 1975 global production of concrete was therefore similar to
what would be required to increase solar energy production by 0.35 TWyr/yr
each year; 1975 steel production was approximately ten times more than
what would be required, while 1975 glass production was more than fifty
times more. As is clear from Table 5-7, the reduced material requirements
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for photovoltaics make them relatively more attractive, especially if rooftop
(or south-facing wall) systems are used.
However, the material requirements presented here should more properly
be compared to the global materials use projected in the future. In the High
scenario described in Part IV of this book, the steel production in 2030 is
projected to be four times today's, while concrete production is five and a
half times today's. The projected use of concrete for solar construction is
therefore about 14 percent of 2030 production.
Thus, only concrete requirements would exceed 5 percent of projected
production by 2030 for the assumed case, and that would occur only if
central solar systems are considered to provide 0.35 TWyr/yr of new energy
production each year. This is a conservative estimate in that this type of
central solar system is concrete intensive. If distributed collectors without
central towers are used instead of central receiver solar systems, then half
the concrete and about 10 percent of the steel is not required.
The relative amount of construction material required for solar thermal
electricity is obviously many times that required for a coal or nuclear power
plant. For steel, the ratio of material for a solar compared to a coal energy
system is about 12:1, while it is about 17:1 for a nuclear energy system
(light water reactor). For concrete, a solar plant requires about sixty times
that of a nuclear energy system. The basis for comparison is per unit elec-
tric energy generated over the plant lifetime of thirty years (Caputo 1977).
In Chapter 9, which deals with the WELMM aspects, such comparisons are
elaborated in greater detail.
The construction and maintenance of a solar system of global scale would
thus require large amounts of materials, unless material-efficient designs are
achieved. In order for sunlight to be translated into a globally interesting
energy option, we must develop systems that are inherently low in mass or
of extremely long lifetime or that allow a high use of recycled materials.
This suggests that technological breakthroughs that permit low mass, high
environmental resistance, and long lifetime are not just desirable, but ulti-
mately essential, even if we consider only the plant replacement rate beyond
the initial buildup period.
We should note that these observations on material requirements for the
installation of solar power in the TW range are fully consistent with the
notion of consumptive and investive uses of resources as developed in Chap-
ters 4, 21, and 25. Indeed solar "fuel" is free, but it requires large-scale
investments of materials-that is, resources-to have that solar "fuel" col-
lected and transformed into a viable secondary energy carrier, be it elec-
tricity or hydrogen. These investments of resources then continually pay
off by providing such secondary energy. What has to be considered, then, is
the size of the investment, the rate of depreciation, and the rate of providing
secondary energy. The investive use of resources has to be compared with
consumptive uses such as a level of mining fossil resources that would be
comparable to the yearly depreciation associated with the investive uses of
resources. In fact, Figure 5-11 was conceived and should be read with such
a comparison in mind.
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ENVIRONMENTAL AND CLIMATIC IMPACTS
The potential consequences, both environmental and climatic, of deploying
a global solar energy system are of special concern. From experience in the
field of fission power, we know that in the beginning of the technological
development period, the large-scale aspects of a technology are often not
thoroughly examined (or even perceived). Only when large-scale activity
commences do such considerations become visible and important. From
hindsight we realize that the development of a strong, systems-oriented
technology assessment of the fission option, including social valuing inte-
grated with the political process, probably would have made a substantial
contribution to the recognition and resolution of problems that are now
inhibiting the use of such technologies.
While solar energy conversion systems are relatively benign, they will
be no exception to the rule that the large-scale use of any new technology
bears unexpected and often undesired consequences. Although there appears
to be a popular mythology that the use of sunlight is completely "clean,"
this mythology will fall when the large-scale operations associated with solar
power are fully appreciated. Of principal concern are the environmental
impacts that are connected with the provision of the large amount of ma-
terials discussed above.
Davidson and Grether (1977) have shown that on the average, the addi-
tional effluents will be negligible even for a bullish solar economy in the
United States when compared with the total impact of all activities in the
economy. Still, steelmaking and the like are highly local activities, where the
burden of pollution is felt directly. The air of Gary, Indiana, may be fouler
because STEC plants keep the air clear in New Mexico. Solar fuels may warm
houses in northern France at the expense of widespread disruption of desert
ecosystems in Spain. Another study estimates the life cycle health effects
of a central solar electric baseload power plant to be two orders of magni-
tude lower than those for "clean" coal electricity-that is, coal mining with
U.S. 1969 dust standards enforced and 99+ percent of sulfur removal prior to
combustion (Caputo 1977). This estimate includes fuel acquisition and
operation as well as the indirect activities involved in plant construction and
acquiring construction materials.
A second principal concern is with conceivable impacts on the climate,
for possibilities of climatic modification arise when we consider covering
upwards of a million square kilometers of sunny land with solar conversion
machines (Williams, Kromer and Weingart 1977). An anomaly in one part
of the total climate system, which is highly complex and nonlinear, may be
expected to trigger a series of changes in other variables, depending on the
type, location, and magnitude of the initial anomaly. When considering
the impact of large-scale deployment of solar-thermal electricity generation
on climate, we are concerned with anomalies introduced in the interaction
between the land surface and the atmosphere. The physical characteristics
of he1iostat arrays can influence several climatic boundary conditions, in
particular the albedo, surface roughness, and hydrological characteristics
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of the land surface (Jager, Chebotarev, and Williams 1978). However, since
there is no direct observational evidence of such anomalies, discussion must
be based on observations of analogous situations in the climate system or
upon the results of numerical models of climate. At this point we will not
report on energy and climate, which is done in Chapter 10, but rather
simply refer to that chapter, where we study these problems more fully.
CONCLUSIONS
First, it is clear that when one considers possible, sustainable global energy
systems, a menu of solar energy technologies has its place alongside nuclear
breeder reactors. Both sorts of systems provide essentially inexhaustible
long-term energy sources for mankind.
Second, we have made a distinction between soft and hard solar power,
where the former refers to mostly local and indirect uses of solar power
and has a limited potential of a few TWyr/yr (see also Chapter 6), while the
latter refers to direct and mostly centralized uses of solar power having a
practically unlimited capacity potential. It is expected that future energy
systems will be made up of a mixture of both types of solar power uses.
Third, a global solar option would exhibit enormous heterogeneity, re-
flecting the great variations among different regions in terms of physical
resources and climate.
Fourth, for large-scale solar power, land availability is not expected to
be a binding constraint in the end.
Fifth, for the application of solar power on a large scale, material re-
quirements (e.g., steel and concrete) will be unusually large and may prove
a serious constraint.
Sixth, large-scale storage capacity will probably turn out to be the key
requirement for significant, continuous, and reliable uses of solar power.
Hydrostorage may be an early, but intermediate solution. Eventually chemi-
cal storage, such as hydrogen, will be needed.
Seventh, for solar energy to take over a significant market share of the
world's primary energy demand will probably require, on average, a few
decades. Not more than a few TWyr/yr should be expected before 2030.
Thereafter, solar energy could make a significant contribution.
Eighth, high capital costs appear as a more immediate obstacle to the
early introduction of solar energy. However, there is room to expect tech-
nological breakthroughs that could improve the capital cost situation
significantly.
Ninth, although the environmental consequences of such large-scale use
of sunlight will not be entirely benign (since, for example, they include the
health effects of material-intensive industries), they appear manageable and
lower than those of conventional fossil systems.
Tenth, the emergence of a global solar energy system could perhaps bring
with it an unprecedented international interdependence and cooperation
and a substantial potential for development and growth in many poor but
sun-rich regions.
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6 RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
Since their origin, homo sapiens have met their energy needs from renewable
energy sources. Fuelwood, and later the sail and the windmill, in use for mil-
lennia now, are prominent examples. These represent a group of energy tech-
nologies that obey the principle of collecting and exploiting what nature
would "waste" in any case. The step away from the age-old principle of "col-
lection" to that of "production" of energy from finite resources was taken
only with the first industrial revolution, basically in the nineteenth century.
This step is not complete yet, nor does it indicate that the principle of col-
lection is out of date.
Before we focus on the potential of renewable energy sources, it is helpful
to reflect briefly on the situation at the time modern energy systems came
into being. Coal was then the dominant energy source. The key to under-
standing this process lies in the densities of energy demand and supply. This
subject is discussed in detail in Chapter 23; here, we consider it only briefly.
Population densities in the past were limited by the amount of food that
could be produced on a given area of land (Marchetti 1979). Wood, the main
source of heat in nonindustrial societies, was (and still is) abundant in areas
where a stable population deploys a nonintensive type of agriculture. There
is always more indigestible hydrocarbon substance in the structural body of
plants than digestible human food. Although solid trunks were preferred,
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farm wastes and bushes growing on fallow land provided a source of energy
if forests were not abundant. Thus, for millennia the cultivation of food did
not force the population to enter a parallel enterprise of cultivating energy.
Harvesting natural forests was sufficient in most areas to maintain a renew-
able energy source.
Many times in recorded history, however, the technique of civilization
brought into being large population centers, such as ancient Rome and Baby-
lon. The densities of habitation outstripped the local capabilities to renew
forests. The response of going farther afield for wood and converting it to
charcoal for greater ease of transport and end use was also invented many
times and is the prototype of fuel conversion technology. But inevitably, the
forests became depleted over an increasing radius, and "fuelwood crises"
developed-unless they were averted by popUlation destructions brought
about by war or pestilence.
In the early nineteenth century in Europe, two developments coincided
that dramatically raised both the demand for energy and the density of that
demand. Improved agricultural techniques solved the pressing food prob-
lems, and local populations grew. Mechanical devices were invented, and
early industrialization boosted the process of urban concentration. This con-
centration called for technical responses as soon as villages became towns-
that is, when urban agglomerations containing tens of thousands of people
become common. Fuelwood in the developing areas of Europe became
scarce and expensive within a few decades; in addition, water to run mills
was in short supply in some places. The fixed productivity of local forests
forced exploitation of forests far away from areas of demand. Transport
difficulties arose: only wood of a certain minimum quality, or charcoal, could
be transported (usually using rafts of limited payload). Thus, many parts of
Europe had fuelwood crises in the second half of the nineteenth century.
These crises were solved by the large-scale development of coal, coupled with
the buildup of railway systems.
The key problem was energy demand density, which overtaxed local
renewable resources and forced the development of both conversion pro-
cesses and transportation systems. Along with the alleviation (for a period)
of the nineteenth century energy crisis, these developments also paced the
formation of today's advanced society, with its characteristic features of
interdependence, specialization, and conurbation. Importantly, they also
foreshadowed the increasing share of energy needed to run "the system,"
for both conversion and transportation are energy intensive.
Technology has made tremendous progress since then. We are in a much
better position than our great-grandfathers to convert and transport energy
effectively. But the central problem of renewable energy sources remains-
the low energy supply density. Along with this is the need for land and the
potential environmental interference that could occur (as the fuelwood crisis
now being experienced in many less-developed regions testifies). Low energy
densities also mean large demands on labor and harvesting devices for the
initial step of energy collection: technologies without such a step have an
important economic advantage.
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As the discussion of the problems of fuelwood has illustrated, the pros-
pects of renewable energy sources are determined by three essential con-
ditions-availability of land, environmental acceptability of the diversion of
power from a particular subsystem of the natural environment, and eco-
nomic viability with respect to other energy supply systems. These condi-
tions must be fulfilled simultaneously. The potential of renewable energy
sources is not proportional to anyone of the above factors independently.
The most favored applications today-solar heated homes, waterpumps
driven by a windmill, or biogas plants for farms or villages-represent cases
where the relevant factors coincide-the right energy form at the right place,
available roughly at the right time.
There are numerous opportunities for renewable energy sources to be
deployed successfully. The major question is not whether these exist, but
how much they can contribute, relative to the demands of society.
ENERGY FLOWS IN THE HNIRONIVIENT
We consider first the global aspects of renewable energy sources. The numer-
ous devices falling into this family of energy technologies have one universal
feature: they divert some of the natural energy flows present in the environ-
ment to serve a useful purpose.
Before we address specific technologies, a brief survey of natural energy
flows is in order. Following a concept developed by Hubbert (1971),
Figure 6-1 lists the mean annual throughput of energy-that is, the average
power flows through the atmosphere, the hydrosphere, the bedrock of the
earth's surface, and the biosphere.
The environment receives energy from three independent primary sources
-sunlight, geothermal energy, and planetary motion in the solar system. The
dominating inflow of power is the sunlight arriving at the upper layers of the
atmosphere. The extraterrestrial power density is 1.35 kW/m 2 perpendicular
to the direction of the sun. The total energy flow of sunlight intersected by
the earth is 178,000 TWyr/yr. a Part of the solar radiation is scattered on its
way through the atmosphere, and part is absorbed. On clear days up to 80
percent of the initial intensity is measured in places like the Sahara and the
southwest United States. In midlatitudes, the power densities measured on a
horizontal area reach a maximum of 35 to 45 percent of the extraterrestrial
value. The yearly averages calculated on a twenty-four-hour day are 250
W1m2 b in central areas of the Sahara with up to 4000 h of sunshine per year
and about 100 W/m 2 in Central Europe with 1500 h of direct insolation.
The area densities referred to here are per unit of horizontal area. Mirrors
that can be oriented so that they always face the sun (heliostats) can see
larger energy densities per unit mirror area-up to 350 W/m 2 .
aThroughout this book energy flows are given in TWyr/yr. although in the literature they are usu-
ally given in units of power (i.e .. TW).
bThroughout this book energy flow densities are given as power densities.
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About 30 percent of the incoming radiation leaves the earth directly after
reflection at the cloud, the dust particle, and the surface levels; about 70
percent is absorbed. Of the amount absorbed, approximately 83,000
TWyr/yr are found as sensible heat of air and water and 41,000 TWyr/yr as
latent heat from the evaporation of water from the oceans and the wetland
surface. This latent heat in the atmosphere is eventually released upon con-
densation. The absorbed solar energy leaves the earth finally in the form of
infrared (heat) radiation.
The natural power flows generated by sunlight and the two other sources
in man's "direct" environment (i.e., the thin boundary layers between the
atmosphere, land, and the oceans) are much smaller than the direct energy
transfer from sunlight. The continental runoff dissipates potential energy
into heat via friction at a rate of only 5 TWyr/yr. Winds, waves, and the
kinetic energy of ocean currents dissipate roughly 370 TWyr/yr, the majority
being contributed by wind at high altitudes. The net conversion rate of solar
energy to biomass is of the order of 100 TWyr/yr (Bolin 1979; Woodwell et
al. 1978). (For comparison, sylviculture and agriculture currently draw a net
power flow of some 2.5 TWyr/yr from this subsystem.)
The second primary source of energy, geothermal energy, feeds a compar-
atively small power flow to the accessible environment. By means of heat
conduction, 35 TWyr/yr enter the atmosphere and the oceans from the bed-
rock of the earth. Only 1 percent of this amount comes by way of volcanoes
or active geothermal fields through convection mechanisms, giving rise to
significant temperature differences above the ambient conditions.
The third primary source, causing a still lower power flow, is planetary
motion in the solar system. Approximately 3 TWyr/yr are dissipated through
tidal movements in the oceans.
Within man's direct environment, only a few natural power flows are both
large and valuable enough to be suitable for exploitation at a significant
level, using global primary energy consumption of roughly 10 TWyr/yr as a
reference value. The most important flow is solar irradiation absorbed at the
land surface: this amounts to 25,000 TWyr/yr. The available natural trans-
formed "secondary" power flows-wind at accessible heights over the con-
tinents, formation and degradation of biomass, continental runoff, and wet
geothermal sources-add up to about 150 TWyr/yr. If one includes the ocean
surface as an environment accessible to man for harvesting, this figure would
roughly triple. However, these natural power flows in the atmospheric,
biologic, and hydrologic system cannot be diverted beyond a certain point
without causing major environmental changes. The underlying feedback
mechanisms leading to potentially detrimental instabilities are a result of the
thermodynamic principles governing the various energy conversion steps in
the environment. To illustrate this, we rearranged the energy balance given
in Figure 6-1.
Figure 6-2 allocates the dominant natural power flows through the envi-
ronment in relation to the main natural energy conversion processes. The
data are rough estimates and are averaged over a multitude of interlinked
subphenomena (see, e.g., Vonder Haar and Oort 1973 j Bolin 1979).
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Figure 6-2. Major thermodynamic processes of the global environment (power levels
in TWyr/yr).
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The absorption of sunlight at ambient temperature is the most significant
natural conversion step in the environment. The thermodynamic quality of
sunlight would theoretically allow for a conversion into mechanical, electri-
cal, or chemical energy, with an efficiency of more than 90 percent. It is
for this reason that we considered the direct use of sunlight separately in
Chapter 5. This capability is almost quantitatively lost in the absorption
stage, however. Water and air, upon incremental heating, change their
specific gravity. In the gravity field of the rotating globe, this gives rise to
slow vertical and horizontal movements of both air and water. The atmo-
sphere and the hydrosphere act like coupled thermodynamic machines,
operating between the small temperature differences of the air-water and the
air-land interface and the upper layers of the troposphere and, in part, of
the stratosphere. Air and ocean water function simultaneously as working
media and as inert "pistons," producing their own mechanical motion, which
leads to convective heat transport. The most sensitive coupling between
different types of energy flows is to be found in the oceans.
The ratio between the mechanical energy of the warm ocean currents and
the heat they carry poleward is of the order of 1: 10,000. The total kinetic
energy of the ocean currents is about 0.2 TWyr/yr, and any significant
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harvesting of it would block a much larger heat flow and create a major
climatological problem.
The kinetic energy produced and dissipated in the atmosphere is much
larger than that in the oceans. Most of the energy is caused by the vertical
turbulent motions in the cloud systems. Per unit of mechanical power, air
transports thirty to forty units of sensible and latent heat. The large-scale
wind fields transporting hot and humid air poleward and cold and dry air
toward the equator have an average mechanical power of the order of 350
TWyr/yr. The net heat carried poleward averaged over the year is roughly
8000 TWyr/yr. Because of this ratio-about 1:25-an interface with the wind
pattern is not so dramatic as in the case of the ocean currents.
We find an analogous situation in the biosystems. A few percent of the
sunlight absorbed by plants is converted via the photosynthetic process into
chemical energy of hydrocarbons; the rest is transformed into heat at
ambient temperature. The changes in the physical power flows caused
by the present agricultural practice, which produces 2.5 TWyr/yr of useful
products, not counting the energetic values of farm and forestry residues,
are of the order of 25 to 100 TWyr/yr. These changes are mainly because of
changes in the albedo and the evaporation rates, which in turn are caused by
the change in the physical characteristics of the ground cover. The ratio-
between 10: 1 and 40: I-relating change in the power flow through the
system to the power flow of useful products withdrawn, is of the same order
of magnitude as the ratio for wind.
Figure 6-2 illustrates that the appropriate reference figures against that
one has to compare man's energy needs are the "high quality" power flows-
that is, mechanical energy and chemical energy, rather than the heat flows,
occurring at ambient temperature. Except for the direct use of solar energy,
only wind provides a comfortably large figure (350 TWyr/yr) and not too
large a catalytic effect on nature's machine if it were to be harvested. How-
ever, most of the wind is not accessible for man. The most favorable wind
fields are in high altitudes and over the oceans. Up to a height of 200 m
above ground, where technical plants can be built, wind dissipates a few tens
of terawatts through friction mechanisms with the land (see, e.g., Corby
1969).
This observation leads to the question of what fraction of various natural
power flows is really accessible. A corollary question, then, is how much of
what is accessible can be harvested without disturbing the natural system
too much. A third question is how much of that is likely to be technically
and economically producible. In the following sections we examine the
various potentials of these energy sources.
THE TECHNICAL POTENTIAL OF RENEWABLE
ENERGY SOURCES
Renewable energy technologies interlink with natural power flows through
the environment and man's specific energy needs, which are tied to his gen-
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eral activities in space and time. For the consumer, an ideal source of power
would have the following characteristics-high power density, continuous
availability, and delivery as an energy form that can be converted easily into
all forms as useful energy with minimum losses. To the extent that these
characteristics are not satisfied, there is a corresponding restriction on the
application of a technology. For example, a discontinuously available source
that does not produce a storable product can be used only for an intermit-
tent application.
In industrially advanced societies, a high degree of interconnection of
energy sources and a variety of options available for many types of applica-
tion soften some of these restrictions. For example, an intermittent
electrical source, such as wind power in certain locations, can be absorbed
easily into an electrical network that has an appreciable amount of backup
capacity in the form of thermal stations or stored hydroelectricity. Similarly,
the possibility of oil, gas, or electrical domestic heating makes it possible to
save energy by solar heating, without the risk of freezing during a cloudy
spell. Thus, the technical potential of renewable resources, most of which
have some defects when measured against the ideal, is maximized in a society
that is highly developed technologically and has an infrastructure of com-
mercial energy forms within which renewables can be embedded. Later we
shall discuss how to "balance" this technical potential: in such technologi-
cally differentiated societies, the opportunities for exploitation of a given
energy technology may be restricted by the competitive economies of other
energy technologies.
The situation is different in less developed societies. There, the standards
of utility are not as high. The definitions of "continuous" availability and
"easy" convertibility into useful energy are less demanding when the alter-
native is no availability and/or no applicability. Conversely, deliverability
takes on greater importance in the absence of integrating networks and back-
up supply options. All in all, this tends to reduce the technical potential of
renewable energy sources. Nevertheless, the lack of alternative options im-
proves the economic potential of specific technologies in developing regions.
Thus, in addition to technical potential there are other levels of potential
for renewable energy sources-application potential and economic potential.
Technical potential imposes upper limits everywhere, while application
potential and economic potential reduce these limits. The types and degrees
of restrictions imposed by application limits and by economic factors vary
among regions, countries, and districts.
Table 6-1 groups different kinds of renewable energy technologies accord-
ing to their suitability to meeting the requirements of an ideal supply as just
defined. The first group comprises solar technologies that divert power from
the environment before the high thermodynamic quality is lost in the normal
absorption process of sunlight. With a total flow of 25,000 TWyr/yr arriving
at the land surface, the technologies of Group I divert energy from the only
nonexhaustible renewable resource. Solar technologies are discussed in Chap-
ter 5 and are mentioned here only for completeness.
The natural power flows supporting Group II, technologies for indirect
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solar use, are much smaller in absolute terms than the natural power flow
associated with direct sunlight. Also, the average power densities characteriz-
ing waves, wind, precipitation, and photosynthetic activities are lower than
those for Group I. Local concentration of power flows in the atmosphere,
the ocean surface layer, and storage in hydrosystems as well as in biosystems
compensate in part for this disadvantage. Group II comprises the old com-
bination, wood plus hydroelectric power, that was substituted for by oil plus
electricity. Wind and waves, also in Group II, offer a much larger physical
potential (see Figure 6-1) than hydroelectric power and biomass, but this
potential is reduced by the fact that only a small fraction of their energy is
directly accessible in the first few hundred meters of the air or in the imme-
diate coasts of the continent.
The technologies mentioned in Group III, indirect solar use, are defined
in order to understand their contexts. Heat pumps do not really tap direct
natural power flows; they use the thermal storage of water bodies, the
ground, or even the ambient air. In order to be effective, heat pumps must
provide extremely low temperature heat; thus, they suffer from the poor
transportability of sensible heat. Consequently, they must operate as close
as possible to the point of energy demand and are dependent on local
reservoirs of a suitable temperature level. As they require substantial
amounts of mechanical power, supplied from elsewhere, heat pumps must be
viewed more as an energy-conserving device than as an energy source.
Ocean thermal electric conversion (OTEC), is the main entry of Group III.
OTEC is considered in two ways-as a way of diverting part of a natural
energy flow, from warm surface waters to cooler deep waters of the oceans,
and as a way of tapping energy stored from a past energy flow, the storage
of solar heat in the upper layers. OTEC's limits are both environmental (How
much could be tapped before major changes in energy flows are initiated?)
and technical-the heat stored is of very low thermodynamic quality.
Geothermal energy, Group IV, is usually considered only with regard to
wet sources, principally steam or hot water near the earth's surface. Such
sources arise from geothermal anomalies and are present only in a few dis-
tricts. The temperature of geothermal water or steam is high enough to use
for electrical generation at moderately low efficiencies (as compared with
fossil- or nuclear-fueled thermal units). It is high enough to be useful for
many direct applications of low temperature heat, domestic or industrial,
but only if it can be applied near the source. There are developments aiming
to use dry geothermal heat from deep boreholes (several kilometers) or from
dry geothermal anomalies. As with OTEC, these developments are schemes
for mining past heat storages, rather than for diverting a natural heat flow.
To be precise, the time required to deliver geothermal heat in quantity to a
large body of rock, so as to heat it to a useful temperature, is large compared
to the time over which that heat might be extracted.
For the sake of completeness, Table 6-1 also contains tidal energy as a
separate group, V. Tidal power plants exist in France, with an installed elec-
trical capacity of 240 MW(e), and also in the Soviet Union.
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We now review in slightly greater detail the considerations affecting the
technical potential of the various renewable resources.
Biomass
Of the approximately 100 TWyr/yr of fuel equivalent biomass (net) pro-
duced from solar energy, about 23 TWyr/yr are fixed in swamps, grasslands,
and tundras; 29 TWyr/yr in forests; 10 TWyr/yr in cultivated land; and the
remainder in the oceans (Bolin 1979). Direct human food consumption is
about 0.4 TWyr/yr (four billion (09 ) people at 2000 kcal per day), while
the consumption of animals is crudely estimated at 0.6 TWyr/yr. About
0.8 TWyr/yr are estimated to be withdrawn from forests as harvested wood
(FAa 1975). We estimate that about 0.7 TWyr/yr of the net carbon product
is associated harvest from field and forest products that is returned to the
soil; this would be the rate of production of agricultural and sylvicultural
"waste" associated with human harvesting activity.
How much of this biomass can, or should, be harvested is a matter for
speculation. In Europe, perhaps half of the total land that was available in
primitive times is now being harvested, with acceptable degradation of the
biosphere. In tropical forests, there are indications that even this much
harvesting would bring about considerable soil degradation and loss of
photosynthetic potential. A harvest of 40 percent of the 62 TWyr/yr of
land biomass fixation would probably be the maximum that we can pru-
dently cultivate. This is still an impressive 25 TWyr/yr. Of this, by the year
2030 a world population of eight billion people, double that of today, would
demand about 1 TWyr/yr to be in food (not food crops) and 1 TWyr/yr
in lumber and paper crops (producing between them about 2 TWyr/yr of
"waste"). With these crops, there would be a need for about 10 TWyr/yr
of associated production in cultivated land. Under these subtractions, the
25 TWyr/yr reduces to 11 TWyr/yr of available production, plus about 2
TWyr/yr of waste, or a total of 13 TWyr/yr. Of this, at least half would be
lost in collection and conversion processes: some would be preferably re-
turned to the soil as a conditioner, and some (leaf and twig losses in forests,
stubble in field crops) would be uncollectable (the efficiency of conversion
of wood to charcoal is about 50 percent, the efficiency of conversion of sugar
or cellulose to fuel is less than 30 percent, and so on). By this process we
arrive at a total of 6 TWyr/yr of fuel, equivalent on the average to high
quality coal, that would be technically available from biomass.
This is the sort of limit we can contemplate when we "turn planet earth
into a garden." It implies a sophisticated, very careful management of the
"photosphere." The 6 TWyr/yr subsumes such uses as the formation of
biogas from animal residues, the use of wood as fuel directly in villages
and in forest products operation, and a residual fuel value of nonrecyclable
waste paper and wood. These may be important locally, and the use of wood
as a cooking fuel in particular seems to double the amount of primary
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energy available. However, this last increment is illusory, as the efficiency
with which heat is delivered to food that is cooked over wood is generally
much lower than when (even) charcoal is used.
Hydroelectricity
Of the 5 TWyr/yr of mechanical power available from continental runoff of
water, no more than 3 TWyr/yr can be relied on technically. The remainder
is considered technically unavailable for one of several reasons:
• Some fraction of the water flow energy must still be allocated to over-
come the frictional losses of stream beds; otherwise, the water would
evaporate without going downstream.
• A certain water velocity must be retained in natural stream beds in order
to maintain riverine ecologies.
• Even if other uses of land and water were possible, it seems virtually
impossible to channel all the water for hydroelectric power; some of the
flow energy appears in myriad small streams at headwaters or in "lazy"
rivers near their outlets.
Because of these aspects, even such advanced projects as those of the Tennes-
see Valley Authority (TVA) and the Bonneville Power Authority (BPA) in
the United States actually capture much less than half of the runoff poten-
tial of their respective river basins, and it is unlikely that a larger fraction
could be harvested anywhere else in the world.
The potential of glacier power-tapping the hydro potential of glaciers
(Partl 1977, 1979)-is small and can be considered as having been included in
the hydroelectric power total.
Wind
We estimated the technical potential of wind by considering the wind energy
available at heights up to 200 m above ground level. Geographically, we
limited the areas to continental regions within 1000 km (on the average) of
coasts running from 500 northern to 500 southern latitude. We excluded
polar regions and high mountain, uninhabited areas. This exclusion may be
considered an intrusion of the economic sphere on the technical potential
since, at least for the generation of network electricity, it seems economi-
cally impractical to get the product competitively to the consumer.
There are a number of both pessimistic and optimistic assumptions in our
estimate, which amounts to 3 TWyr/yr of wind power. On the pessimistic
side:
• We assumed that total capture of the low level wind energy at coasts
would create a several hundred kilometer zone of lower wind velocities
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in its lee. In other words, the windmills would act like a chain of low
hills. Thus, we could not expect to capture more than the total low level
wind energy entering the coast.
• We ignored the smaller contributions of winds in the interiors of conti-
nents.
On the optimistic side:
• We assumed that wind machines could be emplaced whenever the average
wind fields are favorable, ignoring the difficulties of doing so in regions
where these machines might be particularly vulnerable to destructive
storms.
• We assumed that large wind machines can be used. As far as the technical
potential is concerned, 200 m wind machines capture more of the wind
energy than do smaller machines.
One must not forget that wind power (as also hydroelectric power) gen-
erates high quality energy. Its product is electricity or stored mechanical
energy (as with pumped water). To the extent that this high quality energy
can be used, it is worth about three times as much as the same energy in low
quality heat.
Ocean Currents and Waves
The contribution from ocean currents and waves is very small (0.005
TWyr!yr). As noted, the kinetic energy of ocean currents is only 0.2
TWyr!yr, and this kinetic energy plays a major role in shaping climates. Any
significant harvesting of it cannot therefore be considered.
There are many schemes proposed for harvesting the energy of waves, par-
ticularly in the United Kingdom, where wave power is estimated as high as
8 to 9 GW. The main problem is that devices must be able to convert energy,
with high efficiency, from 3 m waves while being able to withstand the
onslaught of 30 m waves. This observation pertains essentially to all coasts
where wave power has significant potential. No devices with this capability
are yet in the offing.
Ocean Thermal Electric Conversion
OTEC would tap a heat source of extremely low thermodynamic quality,
but it would provide access to extremely large quantities of such heat. Al-
though OTEC is a speculative technique, it requires a closer look for two
reasons: first, it could provide a significant source of energy once the tech-
nological difficulties were overcome; and second, through its analysis we can
see how estimates of the theoretical or the technical potential of renewable
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energy sources depend on assumptions about how much interference with
the mechanisms of the earth system can be tolerated.
We first review the thermal phenomena of the oceans, as they form the
basis for understanding how OTEC would perturb the global system for dis-
tributing heat energy.
About 3000 TWyr/yr of solar energy is directly absorbed by the oceans,
the largest part of this being in the equatorial zone between the two tropics.
This heat is transported poleward by the giant ocean currents, such as the
Gulf Stream and the Japanese (Kuroshiu) Current. Almost all the heat is
delivered to the atmosphere in the temperate and subpolar zones, which are
thereby blessed with much more moderate climates than would otherwise be
the case. Some small fraction of the heat is delivered to polar seas, as a
source of energy to melt ice. About 50 TWyr/yr is ultimately dissipated by
convective mixing with cooler deep layers of the ocean (Wick and Schmitt
1977). It is this energy dissipation that, at low efficiency, is converted into
the approximately 0.2 TWyr/yr of kinetic energy in the ocean currents.
Simply to complete the physical description, we note that there is also a
delivery of heat from the earth's mantle upward into the ocean. This geo-
thermal energy is converted into chemical-free energy in the ocean, but at
such low efficiency as to be essentially dissipated. The depths of the ocean
remain cool, in spite of heat deliveries, by the mixing of very cold saline
waters delivered from polar regions, compensated in mass balance by the
mixing of water across the thermocline.
Specific OTEC systems suggested in the literature transfer heat from the
warm surface water of tropical or subtropical oceans directly to deeper cold
water. The efficiency of conversion to electricity is extremely low-about
3 percent when the warmer tropical water is used exclusively. Technical
difficulties in capturing all the heat in surface waters (because of having to
discharge water so that it is not drawn back into the system and so forth)
limit the electric power capability to 0.25 W/m 2 of tropical ocean surface
(ASA 1975 c). Taking the area of the tropical oceans to be 90 million km 2,
this translates into a technical potential of 22 TWyr/yr of electricity and a
diversion of 720 TWyr/yr from differentiated surface layers of the ocean to
greater depths.
If all of this 720 TWyr/yr were subtracted from the heat transported
north, the climatic impact would be very severe indeed. There would, of
course, be compensating "induction" effects. For example, if the result
would be the cooling of the ocean currents, so that at the beginning of their
poleward migrations their temperatures would be, say, 18°C instead of 25° C,
they would lose less heat on their journey and pick up some more heat from
the sun. Nevertheless, one would still expect a major impact.
Taking a completely different viewpoint, Wick and Schmitt (1977) used
the rate of heat transfer across the thermocline to develop a yardstick for
estimating the technical potential of OTEC. The natural transfer between
these two reservoirs is equivalent to a thermal power flow of 50 TWyr/yr
across a temperature gradient of 12°C. Taking the same technical efficiency
for OTEC systems as above, we arrive at a technical potential for OTEC sys-
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tems of 1 TWyr/yr-only 4.5 percent of the nonequilibrium value of 22
TWyr/yr. In fact, harvesting this potential would be most practical at loca-
tions where cold water is warmed in any case; these are regions of upwelling
with smaller available temperature differences-and corresponding lower
heat-to-electricity conversion efficiencies.
We are faced with a dichotomy between less than 1 TWyr/yr of electricity
recoverable from possibly nonpenurbing sources of OTEC and over 20
TWyr/yr of electricity that might be associated with large perturbations. We
selected 1 TWyr/yr as the proper value to use for estimating the technical
potential of OTEC for a number of reasons, not the least of which is that we
shy away from schemes that would draw on the heat stored in all the tropical
ocean surface. Even 1 TWyr/yr would be a gigantic undertaking; and in view
of the need to study the systematic side effects of going further, that seems
to be a prudent upper limit for a few generations.
OTEC is an almost perfect example of the difficulties in arriving at re-
sponsible estimates for the global technical potential of renewable energy
sources. It highlights the need for a much more intimate knowledge of the
hydrosphere, the atmosphere, and the ecosphere before these systems are
tapped on a grand scale. The problems of environmental disruption seem to
depend as much on the amount of energy tapped as they do on the type. But
for some of the natural flows, the problems are more complex than they are
for most types of manufactured energy.
Heat Pumps
Heat pumps appear in Table 6-1 in the same group as OTEC (Group III).
This placement refers to the characteristic of storing solar energy in land or
fresh water or as heat in air. Unlike OTEC, heat pumps do not actually
produce net energy. Their function is to permit mechanical energy to be
transduced into low quality thermal energy at high efficiency; this is done by
"running a refrigerator backwards" to dump the cool fluid into a reservoir
and use the warm fluid-air or water-for specific purposes such as domestic
heating or low temperature industrial heat. Water, soil, or air that is not too
cold is such a reservoir. The amount of heat that can be made available in
this way is two, three or more times as much as the mechanical energy that
is expended.
Today's heat pumps do not approach their maximum theoretical effi-
ciency, and large amounts of heat can be generated by them only if the
reservoir is water. Their use on a global scale cannot be large, but they may
become important locally. As envisaged, they represent to us an efficient
way of utilizing high grade energy (electricity) for applications that would
otherwise consume fuel. We therefore did not include heat pumps in our list
of energy sources. In the discussion of the IIASA High and Low scenarios in
Part IV of this book, we bear in mind that heat pumps are a possible way of
conserving fuel. They could be subsumed under the conservation factors that
are implicit in the future evolution of energy demand.
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Geothermal Energy
Our estimate of the total geothermal energy potential considers only the wet
heat sources that are known to exist in populated regions. We have already
discussed dry sources and their speculative potential. There does not seem to
us to be any chance that dry sources would be available to any large extent
within the next fifty years. In any case, these resources are not renewable,
although they are very large (Armstead 1978). (The total heat stored within
the top 6 km of the earth's crust at temperatures above 200°C was estimated
as being far greater than the energy content of all global fossil fuel resources;
but practically, there is no reason to expect that a large-scale technology to
fracture deep rocks around boreholes and to extract heat over long enough
periods of time before the fractures are healed can be developed and em-
placed where desired.) Other speculative resources, such as the geopressured
brines of the Gulf of Mexico coast of the United States, are also excluded.
The Geothermal Resource Group (1979) conducted studies of the geo-
thermal potential of the United States, which seems to have a somewhat
better than average resource of wet geothermal energy. Rapid development
of U.S. resources could yield of the order of 0.7 TWyr/yr by 2010. The
reference report did not consider resource depletion, but we assumed that
this power is close to the maximum that could be extracted on a steady state.
By multiplying by four to account for a whole world resource, we arrived at
3 TWyr/yr.
Another estimate of geothermal potential (see Wick and Schmitt 1977)
suggests that only about 0.1 TWyr/yr of electrical power, corresponding to
0.5 TWyr/yr of heat, plus some tenths of a terawatt for direct application,
is all that could be sustained. From this, we might infer that up to 1 TWyr/yr
of heat might be considered available. We averaged the two estimates to pro-
pose a technical potential of 2 TWyr/yr for wet geothermal heat.
Tidal Energy
From the total of 3 TWyr/yr of dissipated tidal power, a very small fraction
is accessible for operating turbines: only a few coasts have a form that trans-
forms the kinetic energy of the global tide wave into sufficient tidal levels. In
the few favorable coastal areas the scarcity of basins for intermediate water
storage (i.e., natural bays which can be closed off by dams) reduces the tech-
nical potential of tidal power to a very low level on a global scale-about
0.04 TWyr/yr (ASA 1975c; Wick and Schmitt 1977).
Total Technical Potential as Secondary Energy
The technical potential of the renewable resources previously discussed is
listed in Table 6-2. The total, some 15 TWyr/yr, is quite impressive-almost
twice the current rate of total global primary energy consumption. Achieving
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Table 6-2. Technical potential (as secondary energy) of renewable resources.
Type
Biomass
Hydropower
Wind
Waves and ocean
currents
one
Geothermal
(wet)
Tidal
Total
Power
(TWyr/yr)
6
3
3
0.005
2
0.04
=15
Comment
Requires cultivation of virtually all of the
productive land of the world.
A high quality product, equal to three times
as much fuel. Includes minor potential
from glaciers.
High quality energy but utilization must deal
with difficulties of energy storage.
Minor quantities are available, but they do
not add up to anything significant.
Potential is greater if ocean heat can be di-
verted on a gigantic scale. Still speculative.
Much more stored heat is available for "min-
ing" but technology is not available.
Very localized potential.
this technical potential would be possible only if the world organizes itself
around renewable energy-arranging settlement and industry patterns so as
to concentrate them even more than at present around energy resources
rather than around other resources or cultural and environmental benefits,
and disregarding any cost problems that might arise in considering the com-
petition among fossil, nuclear, solar, and other renewable energy supplies.
APPLICATION POTENTIALS
Certain types of renewable sources are in widespread use simply because
there are no alternative energy supplies available. The use of biomass as a
cooking and heating fuel in subsistence economies is one example; the use
of run of the river water power for gristmills and sawmills is another.
There is another class of technologies that can provide a large amount of
energy, but it is available in such a form that only a small fraction can be
used. One example is the use of direct sunlight as a small-scale heat source,
which can provide domestic hot water as well as supply building heat as
needed.
The common features of these applications are that they are user oriented
and demand limited. By user oriented we mean that the renewable energy
source is collected as needed by the user and applied directly to his purposes.
By demand limited we mean that the amount of energy harvested in these
applications is dictated by demand rather than by supply.
User orientation bypasses most of the infrastructure and/or the network-
ing of commercial energy systems. To some degree, and depending on the
local economic conditions, this frees the user from the costs of maintaining
the infrastructure and networks. This economic benefit must be balanced
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against the costs of capitalizing the required, small-scale equipment. When
the balance is positive, and when other conditions (e.g., convenience and
maintenance) are favorable or neutral, it is then a rational decision to adopt
the user-oriented technology.
This justification, although phrased in marketplace economic terms, may
also be applied to subsistence economies. For such economies, infrastruc-
tural costs are high; long distance transportation, for example, is very costly
compared to income, and indeed the concept of "long distance" is reduced
to 100 km or less. And for such economies, capital is essentially labor. The
investment in a user-oriented energy system is often a decision to invest labor
in such activities as wood chopping, charcoal burning, or dung collection.
The notion of user orientation is central to the concept of soft energy
systems, discussed in Chapter 24 of this book. Here, we examine only the
feature that user orientation implies demand limitation. The reason is that
there are only specific economic settings and energy applications for which
user orientation is appropriate. We have, in fact, mentioned the two most
important cases-fuelwood for cooking in subsistence economies and insola-
tion for space and water heating. (Interestingly, these represent almost the
economic extremes of the world, for fuelwood is the energy source of the
world's poor people, while solar heating is of greatest value to the affluent
countries of the north.) Even when we expand the notion of user orientation
to consider a village or a neighborhood as "user," we do not expand the
applications very much. Mechanized transportation, most urban functions,
and specifically industry require concentrated energy, as is provided by com-
mercial fuels and electricity.
Renewable Energy Densities
The key point in considering application limitations is energy supply density.
Any user-oriented collection system must provide enough energy in a limited
space. Apart from direct insolation, only the natural flows of Group 11-
waves, wind, hydroelectric power, biomass-are concentrated enough to
supply reasonably heavy demand densities. The situation is reviewed semi-
quantitatively in Figure 6-3.
The figure lists two types of power densities. On the left-hand side, the
densities of natural power flows averaged over global or continental areas are
displayed. For example, the 0.02 W1m2 for hydroelectricity represents the
average rainfall, minus evaporation, collected at the average height above
sea level of the continents. These are the inputs for harvesting. On the right-
hand side, the collection densities of various technologies for favorable, but
not unusual, cases are listed. For comparison, the center of the figure also
gives power demand density ranges for urban areas and for the seven IIASA
world regions. c
CSee Figure 1-3 for the definition of these regions, and Appendix IA for the list of the countries
in each of the regions.
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Figure 6-3. Energy supply densities.
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Figure 6-3 suggests that renewable energy sources might meet local energy
demand in certain parts of the world, particularly in rural areas with low
demand densities. For urban areas, only direct sunlight has a proper density.
Other renewable energy sources require collection, concentration, and trans-
mission or distribution from the large and favorable areas to the more con-
centrated demand centers.
Biomass in Rural Areas
Although some contribution from wind, water power, and even geothermal
energy in selected locations can be counted upon, the dominant renewable
energy source in rural areas is fuelwood. If we broaden the term to include
"biomass," we can also accommodate straw, dung, and biogas in the total.
Khan (1980) estimated the possibilities of utilizing renewable sources on
a local basis for all developing regions except China and other Asian, centrally
planned economy countries (IIASA world region VII). His basic assumptions
about total energy demand and total energy supply potential coincide largely
with those of Revelle (1979). Including towns and cities as potential users
of local renewable sources, Khan arrived at a renewable contribution of 1.0
TWyr/yr out of an assumed total energy demand of 6.2 TWyr/yr for a devel-
oping world population of 4.7 billion in 2030. Adjusting Khan's results by
adding a proportional contribution for region VII, one is able to scale up the
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socially and practically achievable limits to an application potential of 1. 35
TWyr/yr out of the 4 TWyr/yr production potential given by Revelle for the
whole developing world. Of this, of the order of 0.1 TWyr/yr would be elec-
tricity from hydro and wind; only about 0.1 TWyr/yr would be user-collected
solar heat; and the remaining 1.15 TWyr/yr would be biomass-mostly char-
coal, but including biogas from wastes.
The figure for user-collected solar heat is smaller than many might think.
This is because there is little or no demand for comfort heating in most of
the developing countries; virtually all the direct solar energy goes for hot
water heating. Solar cooking has been introduced repeatedly but has failed
to gain acceptance. Khan's figures include a considerable consumption of
biomass fuels, principally charcoal derived from wood, by small industries.
In reviewing Khan's results, we are struck by the similarity between the
uses he assumed and those (except for comfort heating) made by the indus-
trialized world before the coal era. If industrial development recapitulates
the experiences of the IIASA world regions I (NA), II (SU/EE), and III
(WEll ANZ), the application potential of user collected energy in developing
regions would not increase.
We conclude that there is an application limit on user-collected energy in
the developing regions that is about 1.35 TWyr/yr. Any further energy sup-
plied by renewables must enter commercial channels and be considered for
its economic and social merits.
Forest Product Biomass
An interesting application of user-harvested energy is being made by the
technologically advanced forest products industry of North America and
Europe. In the course of processing commercial forests to turn wood into
lumber and paper, a very large amount of scrap is generated. Of this, what
cannot be turned into secondary products such as fiberboard is potentially
available as fuel.
According to industry spokesmen, they anticipate using this scrap as fuel
for their own industrial operations. The amount of usable scrap would be
just about enough to satisfy the energy demands of the lumber and the pulp
and paper industries and would allow them to be free of purchasing large
blocks of commercial energy.
We estimated how much energy this might be in the following way. In
1974, the commercial energy used by the U.S. lumber industry and the pulp
and paper industry combined was 0.04335 TWyr/yr (derived from informa-
tion from the U.S. Bureau of the Census 1976). This energy is, of course, in
secondary energy carriers-industrial oil and, to a lesser extent, electricity.
In 1974, some energy was self-generated from scrap, leading us to round the
number upward to 0.05 TWyr/yr. For comparison, based on information
from the U.S. Bureau of the Census (1976), an estimate was made of avail-
able primary energy in the scrap of these industries equivalent to about 0.06
TWyr/yr, which is commensurate with the assumption that the scrap could
fuel these industries.
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If increasing per capita demand is balanced by increased energy efficiency
of the industry from now until 2030, we can associate 0.05 TWyr/yr with
200 million people in the United States in 1974 and then scale the number
up to the corresponding energy demand of the 1600 million people assumed
to inhabit regions I (NA), II (SU/EE), and III (WE/JANZ) in 2030. The
result is a demand of 0.4 TWyr/yr associated with the forest products indus-
try of the north temperate zone. This, from its method of estimation, is
secondary energy equivalent. If we now assume that regions IV (LA), V
(AflSEA), VI (ME/NAf), and VII (C/CPA) together could ultimately achieve
an equal forest products industry (or, basically, that the tropical forests
could match the outputs of the temperate zone ones), we get a figure of
0.8 TWyr/yr for the total secondary energy potential of wood used in
this way.
An estimate of the wood harvest that went into products in the United
States in the year 1978, based on information from the U.S. Bureau of the
Census (1976), translates into approximately 0.12 TWyr/yr. For purposes of
this crude estimation, it thus appears that for each terawatt year actually
harvested annually, some two-thirds become products and one-third becomes
the source of energy to make the products. If we extrapolate to a self-
generated energy consumption of 0.8 TWyr/yr for the forest products indus-
tries of the world, this would come from harvesting 2.4 TWyr/yr of wood, of
whch 1.6 TWyr/yr would be lumber, paper, and other nonfuel products. This
is more nonfuel wood product than was assumed in the first assessment of
the technical potential of biomass.
Renewable Energy in an Affluent Society
The case study, Distributed Energy Systems in California's Future (U .S. De-
partment of Energy 1978), documents an investigation of how an affluent
society might use renewable energy. It is important because, as the title
indicates, the thesis of the study was to get the maximum out of distributed
(but not necessarily noncommercial) energy sources.
California represents a very favorable case for renewable energy sources:
it has a moderate population density; it is endowed with both a nearly
optimal climate and a wealth of renewable sources; and it has an advanced
economy with an unusually large service sector. These characteristics persist
through the study period, which assumes continuous economic and popula-
tion growth up to 2025. A considerable conservation effort was also assumed,
paced by energy prices that were taken as four times the present values in
constant dollar terms: the total energy demand was therefore held to today's
value, in spite of a twofold increase in population and a factor of 3.1 in-
crease in gross state economic product.
The study concludes that California could become nearly self-sufficient in
energy by 2025 by producing 0.13 TWyr/yr from biomass, wind, solar heat,
geothermal sources, and hydroelectricity-all of which are renewable sources.
Solar electricity from centralized utility collectors was not taken as needed,
since the postulated electrical demand could be met by other sources that
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were already in existence (e.g., hydroelectricity) or considered more desir-
able (e.g., wind, geothermal). Photovoltaic solar systems were not consid-
ered because of the uncertainty of their economic prospects. All biowaste
from present forestry and agriculture, 50 percent of all noncommercial
forests, conversion of bush and grassland into wood plantations, and installa-
tion of wind energy farms using 6 percent of the land of the state would be
required, in addition to exploitation of California's considerable hydroelec-
tric and wet geothermal potential. A shortfall in the liquid fuel supply of
0.023 TWyr/yr still persisted; it was suggested that a partial or total answer
to this fuel shortfall might be achieved by adding harvesting of "kelp farms"
off the coast to the arsenal of renewable supplies to be used. Table 6-3
summarizes the supply characteristics of the California study.
Interpreting these data for estimating user orientation requires some
definitions and assumptions. While the California study emphasized the
distributed nature of the sources-a characteristic of all renewable energy
supply systems-it also involved centralized processing of most of these
sources. In fact, virtually all the biomass energy was used to make liquid
fuels that are destined to enter into the commercial distribution system for
motor fuels and industrial feedstocks. To a rather good approximation, the
user orientation of this source is zero. The same is true of the electricity
generated by wind, geothermal, and hydropower. These systems form an
excellent commercial supply mix, using geothermal for base loads and
accommodating fluctuations in the wind system generation through the
storage and peaking capabilities of the hydroelectric system. Thus the con-
cept is clearly one of supplying electricity through a utility network and,
indeed, a large one: the user orientation is, again, zero. Interestingly, in this
study the fraction of end use that is taken up by electricity rises from about
10 to 29 percent in 2025.
Table 6-3. Supply characteristics of the California study.
Source Type
Biomass
Insolation
Wind
Geothermal
Hyd roe lectricity
Source
Municipal and
agricultural
wastes
Energy farms
Solar heata
collection
Cogeneration
Wet fields
Storage dams
Energy Supplied
in 2025 (TWyr(yr)
0.016
0.021
0.052
0.006
0.025
0.011
0.005
Energy Form
Liquid fuel
Liquid fuel
Heat
Electricity
Electricity
Electricity
Electricity
aApproximately 40 percent of the solar heat is used in the residential, commercial, and agricul-
tural sectors at low temperature. About 2S percent of the solar collection is used for on site, high
temperature industrial heat, and most of the cogeneration is associated with this. The remainder is
low to medium temperature industrial heat.
Source: Based on data from U.S. Department of Energy (1978).
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Only with regard to insolation is user orientation observable. Apparently
all the solar heat that is collected is applied to user purposes at the point of
collection. Cogeneration of electricity is indicated whenever a solar heat
source is required to produce high temperature heat or steam, but not all this
electricity is consumed by the industry that generates it. We therefore made
a further assumption that one-third of the cogenerated electricity is user
oriented. We end up, then, with an estimate of 0.052 TWyr/yr or solar heat
and 0.002 TWyr/yr of solar electricity that are used by the person, commu-
nity, or firm that collects it, without passing into commercial channels.
We must make some heroic extrapolations to use this information for esti-
mating the user-oriented contribution that direct insolation might make to
the energy supplies of the whole of regions I (NA), II (5U/EE), and III
(WE/JANZ). These regions are essentially classified under a single assump-
tion that the population density of use, postulated for the year 2025 for
California in the study, is the same for all of these regions asymptotically.
There are a number of balancing features.
• California is sunny, on the average more consistently than most of the
inhabited parts of these regions (favorable to heavy use in California).
• California would still be more affluent (favorable).
• California is, relatively, closer to the equator and solar intensity is higher
(favorable).
• The California climate is mild, requiring less building heat (unfavorable).
• The study assumed an unusually strong degree of conservation (unfavor-
able). The term "unusual" is introduced here in the context of other
studies only and is not intended to reflect on the realism of this
assumption.
• California has a greater than average supply of other renewable energy
sources (unfavorable).
Taking our advanced region population projections (see Chaper 14) of
1562 million people by 2030 and dividing it by the 38.6 million population
used in the California study, we arrive at a normalization factor of 40.5; and
applying this to the results of the California study, we then get 2.1 TWyrIyr
of direct insolation heat and 0.08 TWyr/yr of electricity as the user-oriented
contribution that might be inferred for insolation in regions I (NA), II
(5U/EE), and III (WE/JANZ).
Total User-Oriented Renewable Energy Supplies
We are now in a position to estimate how much of the 15 TWyr/yr of the
technical potential of renewable resources, as augmented by user-oriented
solar energy collection, can be considered user oriented. This division is
important because it is the user-oriented portion that is least vulnerable to
the competitive economics of commercial energy forms. Our results are sum-
marized in Table 6-4.
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Table 6-4. User-oriented supplies of renewable resources.
Technology
Type
Biomass
Hyd roelectricity
Wind
Insolation
Application
Subsistence fuel a
Small-scale industry
Forest products
Rural electricity
Rural electricity
Domestic and
industrial heating
Self-generated electricity
(cogenerated)
Energy Forms
Charcoal, biogas
Charcoal, biogas
Industrial fuel
Electricity
Electrical equivalent
Low to medium quality heat
Electricity
Quantity
(TWyr!yr)
-1
-0.15
0.8
-0.05
-0.05
2.2
0.08
Totals by Source Type (TWyr!yr) Totals by Application Category (TWyr!yr)
Biomass 1.95 Secondary industrial solid fuel 0.8
Hydroelectricity 0.05 Other secondary fuel 1.15
Wind 0.05 Electricity or equivalent 0.18
Insolation 2.28 Comfort and process heat 2.2
Total 4.33 Total 4.33
aAlthough charcoal is the dominant secondary form, the "biomass" total for subsistence fuel
also includes the more versatile form, biogas, as well as miscellaneous uses of wood, straw, and crop
residues as fuel.
Several caveats must be repeated at this point. The second, and even the
first, decimal place in the totals is not meant to imply precision: it is there
only as an exhibition of proper addition. Even the first significant figures are
not firm-they are only approximations to potential values. Finally, the
numbers in Table 6-4 are potential values. They are meant to provide the
basis for exploring limits. We do not think they will be exceeded, but there
are many possibilities for shortfalls. For example, the major category of the
biomass of the forest products industry, which is a surrogate for industrial
uses of cultivated wood, could be less if the industry is more conserving in
energy use than has been assumed. It could also be less if the industry finds
more profitable uses for its wood waste, continuing a trend that has been
apparent for a long time. Similarly, the major category of user-collected
insolation could be much smaller if the cost of solar panels does not become
considerably less than it is today. (This subject is treated in the subsequent
section on economics of renewables.) Finally, the uses of subsistence fuel
would shrink if a large fraction of the poorer countries succeed in improving
their material circumstances; grids and commercial fuels are far more con-
venient than self-collected wood and charcoal.
After these gloomy warnings, two potential additions should be noted.
If photovoltaic cells reach a cost level that places self-generated solar elec-
tricity within the cost range of delivered electricity, then they add greatly to
user-oriented supplies. However, we judge that this would require a technical
breakthrough and therefore did not consider this in our calculations. Among
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other things, the costs of such cells would have to include compensation for
the diseconomies that would be introduced into the commercial grid, which
would still be needed for backup; these diseconomies include the provision
of generation and distribution facilities that operate at a low load factor.
Alternatively, the self-generated electrical supply cost must still be economi-
cal when costs of electricity storage are included.
Another potential addition could come from direct uses of sunlight in the
developing regions-IV (LA), V (AflSEA), VI (ME/NAf) , and VII (C/CPA).
Here most of the population live in climates that have little need for comfort
heating in homes and offices. When the annual energy demand for this pur-
pose is small, meeting the need by electric resistive heating or by fueled
stoves is economically preferable to active solar heating and would probably
remain so even if the price of solar panels is greatly reduced. This is indicated
by a very small quantity-about 0.1 TWyr/yr-that Khan (1979) included in
his estimate for the contribution of direct insolation; only that amount
appears in the summaries of Table 6-4. But there are industrial opportunities
for using solar heat, and these may ultimately be adopted in industrially
developing countries. High capital cost for solar heating systems would,
however, inhibit rapid installation of such systems, and their use before 2030
would undoubtedly be very limited.
ECONOMIC POTENTIAL OF RENEWABLE
ENERGY SOURCES
Achieving the 15 TWyr/yr technical potential estimated in Table 6-2 would
imply not only building up each technology to its maximum practical level
in each locality, but also installing a number of secondary systems for stor-
age, transportation, and distribution. Otherwise, one could imagine ineffi-
cient matching of production with consumption in specific localities (e.g.,
wind power for heating or wood for electrical generation). The degree to
which these considerations limit the exploitation of resources depends on
the level of the infrastructure put into place by other energy technologies
and also on economics. Economic considerations are also of importance in
determining whether renewable systems can compete with more concen-
trated forms of manufactured energy, when the choice is available. Sophisti-
cated efforts to assess the realistic chances of renewable energy sources must
therefore deal with economic questions.
The question of what is economical and what is not is open ended. Eco-
nomic conditions throughout the world vary at least as much as the technical
potential for harvesting energy from the environment. Among others, three
factors introduce a major uncertainty into cost comparisons of energy
supply technologies. First, oil and natural gas, the "reference" energy
sources of today, have prices that are administered and thus provide a poten-
tially unstable basis for comparison. Second, research and development are
likely to bring down the cost level of renewable sources and also of com-
peting sources such as coal, nuclear energy, and unconventional hydrocar-
210 ENERGY IN A FINITE WORLD
bons: research could also create new competitors, and in the long run even
a new reference energy carrier. Finally, many localized renewable sources
are distributed unequally, require significant amounts of land, and constitute
a real environmental burden and specifically a burden not necessarily borne
by the energy users. As with nonrenewables, "social costs" and royalties
should be charged to compensate, changing the relative price of the unit of
energy finally delivered by the technology in question.
The situation is reflected in widely different estimates of the future costs
of renewable energy found in the literature. Thus, a serious analysis cannot
hope to produce more than rough estimates. For the sake of transparency,
we present a comparison of the economic situation of renewable energy
sources on one cost factor only. Table 6-5 uses the investment costs relative
to the achievable energy output per year as the main yardstick.
Since renewable energy sources do not consume resources, operation and
maintenance costs are in principle the only additions to the fixed capital
charges to arrive at the total energy costs. The fixed 10 percent charge on
Table 6-5. Electricity from renewable sources: examples of capital costs
and contributions to electrical cost.
Contribu-
tion of
Capital
In vest- Cost to
ment Assumed Electricity
Costs Duty Cosrb (U.S.
Plant (1975$ Cycle centsjk W
Technoloq)! Capacity jk W(e)) a (hrjyr) per hr) Technical Status
Hyd roel ectri ci ty
High head 250 MW(e) 800 4000 2.0 Mature, deployed
Low head 250 MW(e) 1400 4000 3.4
Tidal Power 1.6 GW(e} 400 2000 1.95 Under design, ex-
perience with
large pilot plants
Wind 6 kW(e) 1600 2500 6.4 Some commercial ex-
3 MW(e) 450 2500 1.8 perience, projects,
studies under way
OTEC 100 MW(e) 650 6500 1.0 Studies
For comparison
Direct solarc 100 MW(e) 3000 6000 5.0 Prototypes
Oil fired (including 300 MW(e) 650 4000 3.0 Mature, deployed
oil well and
transport)
aThese cost levels refer to layouts used to estimate technical potentials. The layouts were evalu-
ated for cost as though each technology were mature. No storage or transportation systems are in·
cluded.
bEvaluated using 10 percent fixed capital charge.
cHeliostats at 2 X U.S. Department of Energy cost targets; includes nine to twelve hours of energy
storage, southwestern United States.
Sources: Based on data from ASA (1975b, 1975c, 1975d).
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capital investment is a benchmark figure only. Both monetary interest rates
and the lifetime of plants are variable, and both higher and lower percentage
rates can apply in reality even for a specific technology. The economics of a
hydroelectric power plant in Africa cannot be compared directly to those of
a plant of a similar size in, say, Canada.
Table 6-5 compares technologies that produce electricity from renewable
sources. Examples were chosen to illustrate what we believe to be typical
cases. The cost data are based on a priori estimates of construction costs for
plant layouts considered in ASA (l975b, 1975c). They pertain to the North
Sea-English Channel area with regard both to geographical and to economic
setting. The assumed factors were determined by natural conditions, rather
than by consumers' habits. No transportation and storage costs are included.
For orientation, long-term storage of electricity, necessary in the case of load
factors of much less than 4000 h per year, might add a complete hydro-
storage cycle and consequently raise the investment costs by an amount
close to the entries for hydroelectricity in this table.
Table 6-5 displays the well-known fact that hydroelectricity has long been
competitive in cost with fossil-fueled electricity. Long lifetimes of plants,
minimum requirements of operating personnel, and built-in storage capacity
do not significantly increase the production costs over and above the 10 per-
cent capital charge rate given. Tidal power, given favorable conditions, makes
economic sense if the expected low investment costs are achieved. High
investment costs for small units make wind power much more attractive in
large units. The capital charges for wind power could be higher, however, if
the wind systems require frequent repair and/or replacement, as has been ex-
perienced. Finally, OTEC too, if it is demonstrated to be technically reliable,
is economically very promising.
Both higher and lower investment costs than those offered in Table 6-5
can be found in recent studies. However, this table is not intended as source
material for Delphi studies-as estimates of most probable values. Its value,
for technologies that have not been thoroughly commercialized, is to
demonstrate that the order of magnitude of cost targets proposed for these
technologies brings them into the region of economic interest. For OTEC in
particular, and also to some extent for wind and tides, only time will tell
whether these targets will have been realistic.
Table 6-6 lists technologies that provide material energy carriers, either
fuels or hot water, for consumption locally. In contrast to that in Table
6-5, the cost comparison in Table 6-6 is made at the point of final consump-
tion and not at the first collection step. This is done because hot water and
steam cannot be transported over large distances and because fuels derived
from renewable sources are also localized. Two different standards of costing
are given in Table 6-6, depending on whether investment or operating
charges are dominant.
The first three sources-fuelwood, biogas, and wet geothermal energy-
compare favorably with the retail price of light fuel oil today. The cost
figures for fuelwood include its conversion into charcoal, to allow for com-
parable efficiencies with the other sources in heating systems. Fuelwood and
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biogas data are based on an extremely low labor cost allocation, a circum-
stance that exists only in some developing countries. There is room for com-
pensation, however, by institutional changes-for example, land reforms could
in some cases provide cheap land, suitable for more efficient wood planta-
tions. Industrial exploitation of active geothermal fields provides economic
advantages that were already justifying such operations at a time when oil
prices were much lower.
The remaining technologies-geothermal district heating, small-size heat
pumps, and residential solar heat panels-provide residential and small com-
mercial hot water and comfort heat only. These data are based on informa-
tion from ASA (1975a, 1975d). The reference figure of $20 (1978) per
barrel of oil consequently must be replaced by $70 per equivalent barrel of
oil as heat delivered to a residential heating system. The relatively low capital
cha.rge figure for geothermal was taken from a feasibility study for exploiting
a local geothermal anomaly in the vicinity of a large town in the Federal
Republic of Germany (ASA 1975d): hot, dry rocks, which were excluded
from Table 6-2, are more frequent than wet geothermal fields, but the cost
of exploiting them is likely to be many times greater. Heat pumps appear
cost effective where electricity is cheap and ground water can be tapped, but
not elsewhere. In regions of mild climate and corresponding low annual heat-
ing demand, heat pumps compete with resistance heating, which has a low
investment cost. Solar panels are expensive and require an incremental
investment for a full capacity backup system; the cost of the solar part of
the system must be reduced by a very large factor before this economic
difficulty is overcome.
REALIZABLE POTENTIAL
It is now possible to combine the considerations of technical potential, the
generally more favorable economic prospects of user-oriented supplies, and
the broad economic aspects of renewable energy systems into a summary
estimate of their realizable potential. By this we mean the rate at which
renewable energy can actually be expected to be harvested under generally
favorable conditions and within a fifty-year time span.
In considering economic factors, the notion of generally favorable condi-
tions is not violated. There is a great range of economic driving forces in the
world, both within the IIASA world regions and, especially, intraregionally.
Thus, for any given technology we can expect that, ceteris paribus, very
favorable economic circumstances will exist in some regions and very forbid-
ding ones in others. For the world as a whole, the fraction of technical
potential that can be realized, even given generally favorable prospects,
would be neither very close to zero nor very close to unity for any specific
technology. What economic factors provide is some shading in between.
An estimate such as is attempted here is necessarily subjective; we see no
other way to do it. But some confidence can be derived from statistics: by
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adding up contributions source by source, biases would tend to cancel to the
extent that they are not all slanted in the same direction.
Biomass
A technical potential of 6 TWyr/yr is given for biomass (see Table 6-2). This
is secondary energy. The 1.15 TWyrIyr listed in Table 6-4 as usable in poor
rural areas is also secondary energy-charcoal and biogas. The 0.8 TWyr/yr
listed as self-harvested by the forest products industry is also, from its
method of estimation, secondary energy. Thus, after these two sources are
subtracted, there remains a further potential for 4.05 TWyr/yr of secondary
energy to be commercially processed from biomass. How much of these
three components-energy in poor rural areas, energy used in the forest
products industries, and commercial energy-can be called "realizable"?
The main practical problem in poor rural areas is the mismatch between
the supply of the main resource-wood-and the population distribution.
Many countries already face a fuelwood crisis, while others have forests that
are waiting for exploitation at a commercial scale. In region V (AfiSEA) in
particular, the amount of fuelwood contemplated for harvesting of energy
could consume almost half the annual growth of existing forests; and most
of the region's forests are in Africa, while most of its people live in Southeast
Asia. The situation could be improved by reforestation in the form of culti-
vated community woodlands; but in many cases these would be competing
with food crops for the land. Yet the economic prospects for the use of fuel-
wood are excellent in these areas: the only alternatives are subsidized supply
of electricity or commercial fuels, both of which are very expensive in this
setting.
We adopted the judgment that for such areas, in balance, more than three-
fourths of the application potential of biomass is likely to be called upon.
The balance would have to be supplied commercially. Arbitrarily, we
assigned 0.8 TWyr/yr of the resulting 0.9 TWyr/yr to the solid secondary
energy carrier, charcoal, and 0.1 TWyr/yr to biogas.
We see no reason to reduce the 0.8 TWyr/yr gathered and used by the
forest products industry. To the extent that some commercial energy (e.g.,
electricity) might be purchased, reductions of supply within the industry
might be compensated by increments to world electrical generation that
could come from wood as a fuel for this purpose in favorably situated dis-
tricts. Of the 0.8 TWyr/yr, we consider 0.7 TWyr/yr as coal equivalent and
0.1 TWyr/yr as electricity.
We could only guess the fraction of the commercial 4.05 TWyr/yr of
biomass energy that could actually be exploited. The limiting considerations
are, in a broad sense, those of competitive land use and of economics. As to
land use, we take it as a theorem that the best and most accessible farm and
forest land will be cultivated for food crops and for timber. The basic
demands of a world with eight billion people necessitate it. Energy farming
would be lower priority land use. This, though, would imply that most of
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the land that could be made available for energy crops would be relatively
far from demand centers. In turn, this emphasizes the need for an efficient
conversion system to transform biomass into liquid fuels that can be trans-
ported easily.
Let us examine once again the realizable biomass potential in a more re-
fined way. In a world of eight billion people, we have suggested that 1
TWyr/yr might be from food crops and 1 TWyr/yr might be from agricul-
tural waste. Animal consumption might take 0.6 TWyr/yr. Between the agri-
cultural waste and the droppings of domestic animals, perhaps 0.2 TWyr/yr
of biogas could be generated. This subsumes the biogas generation already
suggested as a target for poor rural population (0.1 TWyr/yr). Associated
with all this is 10 TWyr/yr of biomass production in cultivated land.
The other major growths of biomass are in swamps, which are now con-
sidered to play too great a function as an "ecological kidney" to tamper
with, and in grasslands. One might contemplate some extension of energy
crops into existing grasslands, but few of those that remain in the world are
likely to be profitable. In the United States, for example, the grasslands of
the western plains are being withdrawn from cultivation as too vulnerable
to dust storms that accompany periodic droughts. It is difficult to conceive
of more than 1 TWyr/yr of energy crops-probably grasses for straw, for the
most part-coming from this source.
Of the 29 TWyr/yr of forest biomass growth, harvesting 25 percent of
the primary growth, rather than the 40 percent suggested in assessing techni-
cal potential, would be an audacious goal in itself over the next half-century.
Actually, recovering much more than half of the biomass in living trees could
be a task in itself. The 6 TWyr/yr of primary energy equivalent seems there-
fore to be an upper limit for practical withdrawals. Of this, however, 1.6
TWyr/yr has been accounted for as the withdrawal in poor rural areas to
make 0.8 TWyr/yr of charcoal, and 2.4 TWyr/yr has been counted as the
withdrawal of forest products industries, of which 0.8 TWyr/yr is used to
provide energy-equivalent in this case to coal energy-for those industries.
This leaves not more than 2 TWyr/yr of further, collectible primary energy
from forests.
From all these sources, then, we obtain:
• 1.5 TWyr/yr of coal equivalent, whose consumption is already earmarked
(poor rural areas, forest products industries);
• 0.1 TWyr/yr of electricity whose use is likewise earmarked;
• 0.15 TWyr/yr of biogas;
• 3 TWyr/yr of wood and straw for use as seen fit.
Urban Waste
Although urban waste is not really from a source different from biomass, it is
nevertheless a resource that must be considered incrementally. The reason is
that most urban waste comes from that part of the biomass that was not spe-
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cifically harvested for energy purposes or processed into energy carriers. The
principal component as far as energy content is concerned is paper, but lum-
ber and food wastes are also a part of it.
Not more than one-fourth of the 1.6 TWyr/yr that goes into paper and
wood products would, after recycling, end up as urban waste. But such mat-
ter is difficult to use as a fuel, even as a substitute for or additive to coal.
Rather than use half of 0.8 TWyr/yr, or 0.4 TWyr/yr, that would be inferred
from our comparison to forest waste, we use three-fourths of the latter num-
ber, or 0.3 TWyr/yr, and consider this to be "charcoal equivalent."
Hydroelectricity
There are a variety of water requirements that compete with the ability to
develop fully all of the energy that is technically available-irrigation needs,
preservation of scenic and special ecological values, and maintenance of
navigation. There are also technosocial restrictions that apply-loss of land
value to storage impoundments and allocation of water and power rights.
All of these are estimated to constrain the total hydroelectric potential to
half of what is technically available before economic factors are considered j
it is assumed that economics is, in general, favorable for the amount of
hydroelectricity (1.5 TWyr/yr) that is considered realizable here.
Wind
Economics, aesthetics, and competing land values are reinforcing constraints.
Siting wind farms either far from urban centers (in order to cut down on
television reception interference and to remove competition with other
urban land use) or far from scenic and recreational areas reduces the number
of potential sites and increases investments in transmission. Also, we assume
that electricity generated from wind is integrated into a system that has a
major storage capacity or that can permit the thermal baseload to be
maneuvered according to demand. Under this latter circumstance, the wind
system would have to be assessed with at least part of the cost of suboptimal
use of that baseload. Even including uses of wind for dispersed rural energy,
principally for water pumping and for very small-scale electrical demands,
it does not seem reasonable to expect that more than one-third of the techni-
cal potential of wind power (l TWyr/yr) can actually be realized.
Geothermal
Of the two estimates mentioned previously that were averaged to estimate
the technical potential of (wet) geothermal, we have taken the lower one as
being more likely to be realized. One-half of the 1.0 TWyr/yr so estimated is
expected to be used as low temperature heat, while the other half is assumed
to be used for generating electricity at 20 percent conversion efficiency.
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User-oriented Solar Heat Collection
Although this technology was discussed, qua technology, in Chapter 5, its
application context is more appropriate to that of other renewables, and it is
therefore included here. Table 6-4 lists 2.2 TWyr/yr of user-oriented (user-
collected) solar heat as an upper bound because of application limitations.
Of this amount, we assume that about half of the solar heat is for residential-
commercial purposes (comfort heat and hot water) and about half is for
industrial purposes (heat at various quality levels, including heat of suffi-
ciently high quality that electricity can be cogenerated from it).
Table 6-6 illustrates the essentially uneconomic position of solar heat
when existing solar panel technology is the basis for costing. Under these
conditions, it is difficult to imagine direct, small-scale solar heating capturing
a large share of its potential market. Low temperature agricultural heating is
a very favorable market, and low and medium temperature industrial heating
is a moderately favorable one; high temperature industrial heating, on the
same economic basis as for comfort residential and commercial heating,
would be a poor market.
We have therefore applied the following factors to the end uses of solar
heating recorded in the California study, on which our solar application
potential estimate was based-space heat (0), water heat (1), agricultural
heat (1), industrial low and medium temperature heat (0.5), and industrial
high temperature heat (0). Using these factors as weights, we find that just
about 40 percent of the total solar energy projected for the California study
has a good chance of being realized worldwide. This rounds off to 0.9
TWyr/yr of direct use of solar heat.
Other Renewable Resources
Here we include ocean currents, waves, tides, and OTEC. Of these, the first
three have an almost negligible technical potential. OTEC has extremely
speculative economics and is in such an early stage of development that
probably not all problems have been identified. The realizable potential
figure for OTEC systems envisages realizing half of what was listed as the
technical potential of OTEC and amounts to 0.5 TWyr/yr of electricity.
Soil storage and other heat reservoir schemes involving heat pumps are not
included since they are not ways of using renewable energy as an energy
source. Instead, they work by using natural energy flows as catalysts to im-
prove the efficiency of applications of manufactured energy.
This is not to say that these schemes are unimportant; quite the contrary.
Their influence on the quantity of manufactured energy needed, particularly
to operate low temperature heat delivery systems, could be very great. And
indeed, there is a whole continuum of ideas combining solar heat storage
with heat pumps that spans a range from almost no contribution to a very
significant contribution of solar energy to the heat delivered.
In this sense, the presentation offered here has underestimated solar heat-
ing potential. The same could be said about passive solar heating-an ancient
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device, exemplified by Gothic cathedrals and American Indian adobe
pueblos alike, for using solar heat storage to minimize even seasonal heating
requirements. Modern technical knowledge makes it possible to employ a
variety of architectural and structural devices to do the same for less massive
buildings.
But by insisting on treating all these methods as demands rather than as
supplies, we avoid double counting, for treatments of conservation indeed
usually already incorporate their effects on the demand side.
Tabulations
Tables 6-7, 6-8, 6-9, and 6-10 present the numbers just derived in a more
organized form. Table 6-7 presents the realizable potential of renewables by
source, and Table 6-8 organizes the data in terms of energy form. Table 6-9
presents conversions to equivalent primary energy forms. The potential for
renewables is equivalent to that from 14-15 TWyr/yr of fossil fuels or
nuclear power (if it is assumed that one must make an equivalent mix of
secondary energy carriers).
These tabulations indicate that renewable energy sources, collectively, have
promise of the same order of magnitude as fossil fuels or nuclear power. One
should not underestimate them, nor should one overstate their case. The
6.6 TWyr/yr of potentially realizable secondary energy from renewable
resources and the 3 TWyr/yr additional primary energy from biomass planta-
tions must be interpreted as an upper bound to the practical. It is a figure to
be used for exploring limits, in the same spirit as 10 TW(e) of installed
nuclear power was used in Chapter 4.
Table 6-7. Realizable potential of renewables, by source.
Source
Biomass
Hyd roe lectricity
Wind
Direct solar heat
Geothermal (wet)
Other rene wable
resources
Application
In poor rural areas
Other farm waste
Forest products industries
Energy plantations
Urban waste
Quantity
(TWyr/yr) Energy Form
0.8 Charcoal
0.1 Biogas
0.1 Biogas
0.7 Coal equivalent
0.1 Electricity
3.0 Primary energy to be processed
0.3 Coal equivalent
1.5 Electricity
1.0 Electricity
0.9 Low temperature heat
0.5 Low temperature heat
0.1 Electricity
(mostly OTEC)
Total
0.5
,;,9.6
Electricity
Table 6-8.
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Realizable potential of renewables, by energy form.
Energy Form
Coal equivalent (solid fuel)
Electricity
Gaseous fuel
Heat
Primary energy to be processed
Total
Quantity
(TWyr!yr)
1.8
3.2
0.2
1.4
3.0
,0,9.6
Table 6-9. Primary energy equivalents of renewable energy potential.
A. If made from oil, conversion factors used are:
(1 unit primary fuel = 1 unit primary oil)
1 unit charcoal = 0.8 units oil
1 unit electricity = 3.0 units oil
1 unit gas = 1.2 units oil
1 unit heat = 0 units oil (could be waste heat from electricity)
1.8 X 0.8 + 3.2 X 3 + 1.2 X 0.2 = 11.28 ,0, 11.3 TWyr!yr
+ 3.0
,0, 14 TWyr!yr
B. If made from coal, conversion factors used are:
(1 unit primary fuel = 1 unit primary oil)
1 unit charcoal = 1 unit coal
1 unit electricity = 3 units coal
1 unit gas = 1.4 units coal
1 unit heat = 0 units coal (could be waste heat from electricity)
1.8 X 1 + 3.2 X 3 + 1.4 X 0.2,0, 11.7 TWyr!yr
+ 3.0
,0, 15 TWyr/yr
C. If made from nuclear energy, conversion factors used are:
(1 unit primary fuel = 1 unit primary oil)
unit charcoal
unit charcoal
unit electricity
unitgas
unit liquid
unit heat
= 1 unit nuclear
= 1 unit nuclear heat
= 3 units nuclear heat
= 5 units nuclear heat
= 4 units nuclear heat
= 0 units nuclear heat (could be waste heat from electricity)
1.8 X 1 + 3.2 X 3 + 0.2 X 5 = 12.4 TWyr/yr
+ 3.0
,0, 15 TWyr/yr
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Table 6-10. Comparison of technical and realizable potential.
Technical Realizable
Potential Potential
Source (TWyr(yr) (TWyr(yr) Constraints Comment
Biomass 6 5.1 Land use Partial mismatch between
sources and customers. The
only renewable source of
reduced carbon.
Hydroelectricity 3 1.5 Ecological, social High quality product (elec-
tricity). Very small frac-
tion available from
self-collected sources.
Wind 3 1.0 Land use, economics High quality product (elec-
tricity), but must be used
mostly in conjunction with
grids or hydro. Small frac-
tion could be self-collected
(for water pumping).
Geothermal (wet) 2 0.6 Resource uncertainty Relatively low temperature
heat. Best used for comfort
and process heat, but con-
vertible to electricity at
±20 percent efficiency.
Direct solar heata Enormous 0.9 Economics Only self-collected applica-
tions counted; mostly hot
water in sunny locations.
OTEC 0.5 Economics, market Still speculative.
penetration
Tides, ocean 0.04 0 Computational b Amount available insignificant
cu rrents, 0.005 compared with uncertain-
and waves ties of other estimates.
Total ,,;,15 ,,;,9.6
aNot included in Table 6.2. For general discussion see Chapter 5.
bThe number is so small that it rounds off to zero at the significant level of the table.
OBSERVATIONS
The global supply figures just inferred, amounting to about 9.6 TWyr/yr of
potentially realizable energy from renewable resources and representing an
equivalent of about 15 TWyr/yr of primary heat energy, show that renew-
able energy sources must be given the same consideration as fossil fuels,
nuclear power, or centralized solar power. But there is one difference:
this large sum does not come from a single source or from a single tech-
nology. Instead, it is derived from adding up a number of smaller sources
and technologies. This affects our thinking in two ways that have oppos-
ing implications. On the one hand, it is easy to consider, say "only 1
TWyr/yr of wind power" and conclude that it can make only minor con-
tributions to solving world energy problems. When this is done on a source-
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by-source basis, the promise of the renewable supplies can be lost in the
statistical "noise" of the energy problem. On the other hand, when the
addition has been made, it is all too easy to look at the total complacently,
without realizing that to achieve the promise, it will be necessary to pursue
not one, but a whole host of separate research, development, commercializa-
tion, and marketing activities that differ in scope and character.
Under these circumstances it is necessary to emphasize that the large
potential we have listed for renewable energy supplies has the same signifi-
cance, in this study, as the similarly large potential for, say, nuclear power.
In both cases, they are explorations of the limits of the possible. Almost
certainly, what the world will achieve will be less. We must therefore exam-
ine here what caveats must be considered, what problems have been set aside
in our previous discussion, and what structural and infrastructural changes
are implied if the world is to harvest all this energy from renewable sources.
Energy Density Revisited
A general understanding of the impact of the harvesting effort on the world
can be gained by comparing energy densities of our 9.6 TWyr/yr estimate of
potentially realizable energy with those derived from the California study
and from the Revelle (1979) study of rural energy. A descriptive summary is
presented in Table 6-11.
The California study represents an all-out effort by a society that prob-
ably has the means to make such an effort and has, besides, unusually favor-
able resources to work with. A very remarkable output of 0.3 W/m2 is
achieved, but one might characterize the land use as virtually total.
The Revelle study also portrays an all-out effort, but with a lower level
of technology. At that level, the 0.09 W/m2 that are made available are
also contingent on the total commitment of land use. From this perspec-
tive, the "world" column in Table 6-11 could also be described as a near
total commitment of land, hydro, wind, geothermal, small-scale solar, and
intensive cropping of all accessible grass and forest land; the 9.1 TWyr/yr
supply from renewable resources would be more in the spirit of an upper
limit than an expected early achievement. Doubling the energy yield to the
level suggested by the technical potential shown in Table 6-2 would entail
both advancing into marginal areas of economic and technological feasibil-
ity and assuming that the whole world can reach the level of sophistication
that California hopes to reach by 2025.
We can also reverse the question to ask: What population densities could
be sustained on an energy density of 0.1 W/m2 ? The energy use that we take
as a target for modest standards of living in rural areas is 1 kW per capita.
(For reference, bare subsistence requires about 0.3 kW per capita.) Thus, a
population density of one hundred people/km2 could be sustained. How-
ever, many parts of the earth are expected to have a much higher population
density by 2030. The inference is that these geographic regions, which
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Table 6-11. Renewable energy supply: a comparison of limiting cases.
Case
Population in territory
(year 2025 or 2030)
Inhabitable area of
territory (10· km 2 )
Yield from renewable
resources (TWyr/yr)
Land use implications
Population density
(inhabitants per km)
Energy su pply density
(W/m 2 )
California (in 2025l
38.6 X 10·
0.4
0.13
100% of commercial forests
and agricultural land
plus 50% of noncom-
mercial woods, brush,
and grassland; wind,
solar, hydro, geothermal
97
0.3
Rural
Developing
World
(in 2025)b
3,250 X 10· c
43
4
All forests pi us
wastes from
doubled agri-
cultural yields
plus hydro,
wind, solar
heat
0.09
Possible World
in 2030
8,000 X 10·
80
Nearly total land
dedication or
ded ication of
a major part
plus advanced
technology
for all avail-
able sources
100
=0.11
aUSDOE (1978).
bBased on data from Revelle (1979).
cExcluding urban population in cities of more than 100,000 inhabitants in same territory.
dExcluding ocean-based sources.
include Europe, South Asia, and the Far East,d must have a large fraction of
their energy needs supplied by high density energy carriers even after maxi-
mum use is made of renewables. In Southeast Asia and China, even survival
conditions could not be met with the use of renewable resources only.
We can characterize these two energy density considerations by two
observations. First, the potentially realizable renewable supply goals require
taking a big step toward "cultivating" the entire globe. Second, the variable
population densities in different parts of the world do not permit total
reliance on renewables, even if modest standards of living are assumed.
Market Penetration
Up to now we have not considered the constraints on the buildup of new
technologies that are classified under the heading "market penetration."
With regard to two energy sources, we can be secure on this point. Hydro-
electricity is a mature technology and one whose penetration is still much
dThese regions, as used here, are defined according to the U.N. Statistical Bureau.
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more limited by the matching of resource availability to demand than by any
other institutional factors. Biomass in rural areas (fuelwood, dung, and agri-
cultural waste) already supplies 7 percent of the world's energy needs,
although most of the biomass being used now is noncommercial. If we talk
of a 40 TWyr/yr, high energy demand world, biomass requires only about 10
percent of the market share to correspond to 4 TWyr/yr of supply. Thus,
biomass needs only to increase its market share gradually as energy demands
grow.
The other, relatively major, technologies may have more difficulties
penetrating markets. This would be particularly problematic with two
electricity-generating technologies-wind and OTEC. These technologies dif-
fer from existing ones in supply characteristics: wind is still considered to
be a sporadic source of energy and will be treated as such until its con-
tinuity of supply is better understood; and OTEC requires either transmis-
sion of electricity from an offshore base to load centers on land or,
conversely, the migration of specialized electric consumer industries (such as
aluminum refining) to the sea. In both cases, not merely the technologies
but also new infrastructures are required if they are to be deployed on
a grand scale: they occupy specialized niches in the ecology of energy
supplies.
Other Institutional Factors
We have pointed out that new infrastructures would certainly be needed if
OTEC is deployed on a large scale: manufacturing industries might have to
learn how to migrate to the oceans, along with their labor forces and
materials-handling structures. In this sense, OTEC might only be a part of a
much larger, very futuristic development-the resettling of a part of the
human race in floating cities. This might ultimately become desirable or
necessary in any case, but the entire development would take a very long
time.
Similarly, the infrastructural problems of embedding wind into electrical
utility systems have been mentioned. These problems might be more acute if
user-collected photovoltaic electricity comes into use. Among other things,
they involve questions of equity. Who pays how much for the cost of
lowered capacity factors within the electrical grid?
Finally, the large-scale use of biomass would require many institutional
adjustments in view of both land use allocations and a heightened need for a
global ecological monitoring program, probably also associated with a global
ecological control program. This will be discussed later in this section.
The global nature of this bundle of supply systems is immediately appa-
rent when we consider the "world as a garden"-as implied by an emphasis
on biomass, by the extraterritoriality of OTEC, by the potential continental-
scale effects of harvesting wind or of capturing water on a grand scale, and
by the ecological or climatological constraints on several of the renewable
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energy sources. As with oil, coal, and nuclear power, matters of global orga-
nization could be the real limiting factors of renewable resources.
This observation is reinforced by the "lumpiness" of many renewable
resources (i.e., the nonhomogeneous distribution worldwide of wind, hydro-
power, and geothermal in particular) and also by the fact that the renewable
supply systems have their maximum capability when they are coordinated
with other sources of grid energy and with transportable energy. The theme
keeps recurring: no single supply system can meet our needs as a "stand
alone" system. Each has features that support the others. Even if one or
the other could supply all the world's energy needs, the energy system would
work better when all the resources are used. Each resource would then be
able to serve the market in which it functions best; more importantly, the
resilience of the energy system would be maximized.
By considering the energy system in this way, one is able to see the role
that economics plays. Economics allocates human activity. It balances inputs
of labor, capital, and resources according to the values that people place on
these inputs, in order to produce outputs whose value is set in some way. So
it is with the energy system. The competitive nature of various energy supply
options is resolved by comparing costs. Of course, external costs must be
incorporated, and the art of doing this is not completely developed. And
costs may be different on the average than at the margin. When costs are
compared, they are always based on the context of an existing system-and
they will continue to be compared in that way.
Where these economic factors will lead us depends on future develop-
ments. All that is certain is that some of the renewable energy supplies will
turn out to be too expensive to achieve the realizable potential we have
estimated and some will exceed that potential.
Research, Development, Commercialization
There is an extensive literature documenting the research and development
of each of the new renewable energy systems. Therefore, it is only necessary
to point out that for most of the renewable energy systems the real problem,
qua supply system, is commercialization: getting enough examples into
operation so that decisions can be made on technical, economical, and envi-
ronmental information, rather than just on forecasts.
There is one exception which must be repeated here. Ecologically and
environmentally, the whole is more than the sum of its parts. At he level of
many terawatts of energy supply from natural energy flows, it becomes
mandatory to understand fully all the feedbacks: how "nature's machine"
works, and what affects it. To put it succinctly, achieving the realizable
potential of renewable energy sources requires a flowering of the earth
sciences (oceanography, meteorology, hydrology, geology, etc.) and of the
biological sciences. The required level of research completely transcends that
which is currently devoted to these fields.
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The Significance of Biomass
Of all the renewable energy supplies, only biomass (including urban waste)
produces fuel. The others supply other secondary energy forms-hot air,
water, or electricity. We have observed in studying uses for coal that there
is an irreducible demand for storable fuels, particularly for liquid fuels. In
the discussion of the coal option in Chaper 3 we noted that in the long run,
the global constraint imposed by the carbon dioxide problem sets a limit on
the amount of coal that can be used for making liquid fuels; in Chapter 22
we specify a preferred technology wherein coal is hydrogenated with energy
and hydrogen coming from nonfossil sources.
The significance of coal is that it is by far the largest fossil resource of re-
duced carbon. But biomass is a nonfossil resource of reduced carbon. It also
has the property that biomass carbon is accumulated from atmospheric
carbon dioxide, so that after some period of equilibration, the use of bio-
mass as fuel has a net effect of zero on atmospheric carbon dioxide buildup.
From this point of view, biomass is an exceptionally attractive energy source.
In the long run, then, it seems especially desirable first, the stimulate
maximum biological production of reduced carbon and, second, to develop
efficient and economical ways of making liquid fuels from this biomass. The
classical route for this second step is natural sugars to alcohol, via fermenta-
tion. Alcohol from sugar cane, or from grain, represents existing technology.
However, over the long run, agricultural land devoted to crops for energy is
likely to be preempted by the higher value of using agricultural land to pro-
duce food. Thus, we are naturally led back to wood as the chief source
material for "bioliquids." One route being developed is the biological
degradation of cellulose, which is a sugar polymer, to its constituent sugars,
followed by fermentation.
But in the long run, we must reckon with the fact that fermentation is not
efficient in its use of carbon. The energy for the process is actually supplied
by biological burning of some of the sugar, as is evidenced by copious pro-
duction of carbon dioxide; and less than 30 percent of the original energy
content actually appears in the liquid fuel that is produced. Moreover,
natural alcohol is rather expensive. For example, its present cost is more
than twice that of gasoline from oil, on an energy content basis, when taxes
and subsidies are eliminated.
The example of coal provides a more efficient possibility whose adapta-
tion to biomass only needs to be sketched out here. An initial step, pyrolysis
of wood, essentially reduces the wood to charcoal, with by-product liquids
also produced (methanol, turpentines). The charcoal is now substituted for
coal in the allothermal route to methanol (see Chaper 22). We simply recall
here that, in this route, heat energy and hydrogen are both added to the
carbon, so that the resulting liquid fuel has about twice as much energy
content as the carbon from which it was made. Thus, with pyrolysis carried
out using an external heat source (e.g., concentrated solar or high tempera-
ture nuclear heat), the result is the total conversion of biomass carbon to
liquid fuels and an increase in its stored energy as well.
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Given this promise for the long-run use of biomass, we must take a closer
look at what it means to harvest around 20 TWyr/yr of contained primary
energy for the food, fiber, and partial energy needs of eight billion people;
this is about the sum of the cultivated biomass that is needed when one adds
up food, fiber, energy, and associated cultivated land. This is of the order
of one-third of all continental biomass production. Including wood as an
energy resource, it also subsumes one-quarter of all wood production. If we
consider the concept of "the world as a garden" to include the preservation
of a reasonable fraction of the world in its natural state, then 20 TWyr/yr
by the year 2030 indeed requires commitment to a garden world.
The deployment of a biomass-based liquid fuel system on the scale being
discussed here demands active control for global ecological stability. The
control of soil erosion, the management of water systems, the stabilization
and management of the nitrogen cycle and the phosphorus cycle, and the
decreasing resistence of cultivated plants against pests are well-known prob-
lems today. With a further sizable reduction of the naturally stable ecosys-
tems, a successful deployment of biomass energy will eventually depend on
a globally instituted environmental and ecological control system. What
quantitative limitations will thus be imposed can hardly be guessed at now.
The limitations can be accentuated only by the further limitations that the
ecological side effects of other renewable energy systems (wind, hydro-
electricity) will require. The need for macroecological research becomes
an overriding constraint.
SUMMARY
There are a variety of natural energy flows from which energy can be cap-
tured for human purposes. They include, in addition to the direct energy
from the sun, the energy content of biomass, flowing streams, wind, waves,
ocean currents, and tides. They also include the turnover of heat from the
oceans' surface layers to the depths and the heat flowing from the earth's
interior to the surface. Our ability to make use of this energy depends on the
energy densities in the various forms, their locations, and the extent to
which they can be diverted without significantly affecting climate and
ecology or adversely affecting high value land uses. The technical potential
estimated in consideration of these constraints is about 15 TWyr/yr of sec-
ondaryenergy.
There are additional factors that serve to restrict the amount of energy
that can be harvested from these resources. Some resources can be used only
at or near their point of collection and are thus application limited. On the
other hand, user orientation-that is, the ability of the user to collect his or
her own supply-is a favorable indicator that the resource will in fact be
used. Examples of user orientation can be found in the use of biomass as
fuel in poor rural areas and, separately, in the use of wood waste as an
energy source for forest products industries. Application limitation is seen
in the use of direct insolation, which is a vast resource, for domestic and
industrial heating. This special aspect of direct solar energy has been incorpo-
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rated in the discussion of renewable resources because of its similarity to
biomass as a supply mode for user-oriented collection systems.
Other limitations arise from economic considerations, from more detailed
supply-demand mismatches of sources and consumers, from detailed ecologi-
cal and social factors, and from prudence in deploying unevaluated or not-
well-developed sources. Even with these constraints, about 9.6 TWyr/yr of
energy from renewable sources can be considered to be practically realizable.
This is equivalent to about 15 TWyr/yr of primary energy from fossil fuels or
nuclear heat to provide an equivalent mix of secondary energy forms. The
mix is 1.8 TWyr/yr of solid fuels, 3.2 TWyr/yr of electricity, 1.4 TWyr/yr
of low temperature heat, 0.2 TWyr/yr of gaseous fuel, and 3 TWyr/yr of
primary biomass. The contributions of the various sources are biomass,
including waste, 5.1 TWyr/yr; hydroelectricity, 1.5 TWyr/yr; wind, 1
TWyr/yr; geothermal, 0.6 TWyr/yr; solar heat, 0.9 TWyr/yr; and waves, tides,
and OTEC together, 0.5 TWyr/yr.
The maximum use of renewable sources presupposes the fulfillment of
two major general conditions. First, renewable sources must be used in con-
junction with other energy supply systems that will still be needed to pro-
vide reserve supplies and base loads in grids and/or to supply poorly endowed
regions and districts; this will ensure stability and resilience of the total
energy system. Second, since the use of renewable sources represents a large
potential ecological disturbance, a global ecological monitoring and control
system is indicated. This, in turn, must be based on much-improved knowl-
edge of how the natural energy flows affect the globe-a knowledge that can
only be gained by a commitment to large-scale research in the pertinent
disciplines.
Among the renewables, biomass is especially important because it could
be a self-renewing source of fixed carbon for use in producing liquid fuels. If
economic obstacles can be overcome and ecological conditions satisfied,
biomass could displace coal for liquid fuel production.
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7 A REVIEW OF ENERGY SYSTEMCONSIDERATIONS
In the preceding chapters of this part we discussed opportunities and limita-
tions of several energy systems. By and large, these were examined indi-
vidually. We compared some of these systems with possible levels of demand
and looked at how various supply strategies might translate potentials into
realities. We now put these individual essays together, which involves ele-
ments of review as well as comparisons, categorizations, and judgments. Here,
we examine some peripheral issues, such as the economic status on which
many decisions are made and the roles of reference energy carriers in stabil-
izing energy systems.
FOSSIL FUELS
Within the period covered by this study-up to the year 2030-there will be
a slow but continuous transition from the present use of relatively cheap and
clean gas and oil to an extended period of using fossil fuels that cost more to
extract and process and have larger and larger environmental impacts. We call
these "dirty" fuels.
Translated into expectations for the ultimate recovery of fossil fuels, we
estimate that conventional oil fields are capable of delivering 420 TWyr
of energy, including the effects of enhanced recovery j unconventional oil
(heavy oil and tar sands), another 420 TWyrj shale oil, 60 TWyr (on the
229
230 ENERGY IN A FINITE WORLD
Table 7-1. Estimated recoverable fossil fuel resources.
Amount
Type (TWyr)
Conventional oil 420
Unconventional oil 420
Shale oil 60
Natural gas 350
Coal 2400
Total =3650
Comments
Includes anticipated additions to reserves via sec-
ondary recovery, offshore exploration, and ex-
ploitation of smaller fields.
Heavy oil and tar sands; must be processed before
"oil" is recovered.
A huge resource, but one whose exploitation has
possibly insurmountable environmental problems.
Requires heavy investments to deliver to consumers
(e.g., new pipelines, liquified natural gas, super-
tankers).
About half in easily recoverable formations; perhaps
an additional 1200 TWyr, beyond the 2400 TWyr
listed, could be obtained from exotic deposits
(i.e., permafrost areas).
Less than half is in "cheap to recover" formations or
locations.
assumption that environmental problems will be very difficult); natural
gas, 350 TWyr; and coal, 2400 TWyr. Table 7-1 presents these data with
comments.
The resource base of fossil fuels is large, but only if it includes resources
that will cost much more than they do now. About half of the conventional
oil and natural gas are recoverable inexpensively. The rest comes from a
variety of sources that are associated with higher production costs-poorer
fields that require drilling more holes and capitalizing drilling and land costs
against smaller product yields; production from continental shelves, deeper
basins, and polar regions; and secondary and tertiary extraction. All these
activities are, moreover, associated with larger environmental impacts than
are used now. If we assume (as we probably must) that cleaning up spills,
reclaiming mined out lands to useful purposes, and arranging for disposal
of pernicious effluents are all operations whose costs must be internalized,
then these dirty fuels become even more expensive.
Coal represents at least two-thirds of our estimated recoverable fossil fuel
resources. But mining coal is not a "clean" operation at best, and the more
coal that is mined, the more land that has to be torn up and reclaimed.
Just as with oil, as the best sources are used up, one must further accept
poorer grades, work harder to extract them, and process and ship what is
mined. And some of the environmental impacts of using coal, such as large-
scale mobilization of toxic materials in slag and ash piles, may persist for
millions of years.
The standard observation of resource economists-that one never runs out
of a resource but simply reaches a point where it is cheaper to use a sub-
stitute-is entirely correct in the case of fossil fuels. We can postulate fossil
resources lasting from one to a few centuries, depending on how they are
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used. So, there is no imminent danger of running out of coal and oil. But
we can begin to see the point at which we simply will choose not to use
them.
Much before this point is reached, we expect to see a transition in the way
fossil fuels are used. Within half a century, and indeed around 2030, we see
fossil fuels being used principally for applications where there are no accept-
able substitutes-that is, transportable and storable fuels. For such uses we
see no substitutes for liquid fuels. For these, we envisage an asymptotic
market up to twice as large as the total fossil fuel consumption today. It
would be supplied by converting coal andlor heavy oil to gasoline, kerosene,
and methanol.
In order to see some semiquantitative features of the situation, we cate-
gorized the entries of Table 7-1 in a simpler way. Table 7-2 lists the
recoverable resources of fossil fuels dichotomously into "cheap" and "ex-
pensive" oil and gas and "cheap" and "expensive" coal. If globally, on the
average, 10 TWyr/yr of "cheap" oil and gas were used, then the supply
would run out in forty years. Since the world is nonhomogeneous, there
would be some regions where local "expensive" oil and gas would be used or
"cheap" coal would be substituted for oil, in order to avoid importing oil
from other regions. As a result, fifty years from now we can contemplate
a world that still has some "cheap" oil and gas left, but also has begun to
tap "expensive" oil and gas and to substitute some of its cheap coal for oil.
Prudent resource management would be supported by the increasing
price of fossil fuels, so that an era of their restricted use as liquid fuel carriers
could last several centuries. Their use in this form might also be required by
another possible limitation-the buildup of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.
The effects of this buildup are uncertain, but until there is evidence that
they are not severe, prudence dictates keeping carbon dioxide release within
reasonable bounds. The projected order of magnitude of liquid hydrocarbon
combustion-10 TWyr/yr-seems to be within reason on the basis of what we
know now. There is the proviso that if the liquid fuels are to be derived by
the hydrogenation of coal, then the hydrogen should, over the long run,
be supplied exogenously (in the allothermal method as mentioned in Chapter
3). Processes for burning coal to su pply the energy for hydrogen production
can be considered only transitional while the proper technological structure
is being built up.
The resource base of coal is large enough so that the use of coal as a
chemical reagent for producing liquid fuel could continue for several cen-
Table 7-2. Fossil resources, dichotomized.
Resource
Cheap oil and gas
Expensive oil and gas
Cheap coal
Expensive coal
Amount (TWyr)
400
850
1200
1200
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turies. Other high quality uses of coal, such as its use as a chemical reagent
for reducing iron ore, also could be accommodated. Any attempt to build up
coal consumption to global levels approaching 25 TWyr/yr or more-that is,
to make coal the principal energy source of a high-energy-consuming world-
would very much shorten the time over which "liquid coal" could be used;
it would also raise the rate of carbon dioxide emissions to above that now
considered prudent. Plans for a coal future should therefore emphasize
applications and processes that are compatible with the strategic role of
coal as a source of liquid fuels.
BIOMASS AND/OR COAL AS LIQUID FUEL?
After the "cheap" oil has run out, the next obvious step for getting a con-
tinued supply of liquid fuels is to use "dirty" oil. Following that step, or
perhaps avoiding it if environmental factors are favorable, is the synthesis
of liquid fuels from coal. But if we recollect that coal, too, is ultimately a
depletable resource, albeit a very large one, we can speculate about what
might happen when the coal runs out. At that point, the only available
source of chemically reduced carbon would be biomass.
If eventually, then why not now? Could biomass supplant coal sooner?
Should we be looking harder now at liquid fuels from biomass as a more
desirable route than coal? We do not see any clear indication as to the
preferable route. There are advantages both to coal and to biomass, summa-
rized in Table 7-3.
Coal's advantages are all intrinsically technological. Indeed, they are the
same as those that led to the replacement of wood by coal during the indus-
trial revolution. The advantages of biomass are generally environmental
and thus reflect more recent global concerns.
Vitiating the advantages of coal are two factors. First, the existing in-
frastructure of coal use is a decaying one. New life must be breathed into
coal mining, coal hauling, and coal burning. Case studies dealing with the
revitalization of coal use have shown that institutionally, coal must be
treated as a new industry. Second, with the shifts from burning coal directly
to using it as a synthesis chemical, the amount of necessary preprocessing
mcreases.
The advantages of biomass cannot be taken for granted either. Very large
land areas are needed for a harvesting effort capable of providing, ultimately,
up to 6 TWyr/yr of liquid fuels globally. Added to the needs of humanity for
Table 7-3. Coal versus biomass as a liquid fuel.
A dvantages of Coal
More concentrated
Needs less preprocessing
Disturbs less land, per TWyr extracted
Uses existing infrastructure
Advantages of Biomass
Limited CO, problem
Renewable
Land disturbances less severe
More equitably distributed relative to population
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food and natural fiber, fully one-third of the biomass grown on land would
then be under cultivation. Even if we assume for biomass, as is recommended
for coal, that the maximum of process heat and hydrogen is derived from
nuclear and solar origins, then about 25 percent of all forests would have to
be harvested. Completely autothermal processes, such as fermentation or
processes that rely on wood burning to produce heat and charcoal for
further steps, would require a much larger number (about 40 percent).
Harvesting even 10 percent of forest growth requires taking a step from
ecological responsibility (always necessary) to ecological engineering. Cen-
turies of experience would probably be needed to harvest 40 percent (or
perhaps even 25 percent) in a truly benign way. For example, the intro-
duction of fast growing monocultures in an attempt to improve biomass
yields and to achieve true "cultivation" of energy crops is an ecological
risk that requires generations of experience to evaluate.
Our rather superficial study of how to make liquid fuels from biomass
suggests that forests, rather than fields, are the more likely source and that
chemical synthetic process routes (e.g., destructive distillation and oxidative
hydrogenation to methanol) are more attractive than anaerobic fermentation
routes (e.g., the alcohol route). In both of these judgments, the chief concern
is to have maximum yields of liquids so as to minimize both land require-
ments and, in particular, the intrusion of energy harvesting on land needed to
grow food and fiber, to provide recreation, and to preserve natural habitats.
The wood-coal dichotomy should be studied in more detail. In particular,
the conversion of wood to liquid fuels should be treated as a separate area
of research involving both systems aspects and process development. Under
these circumstances, we cannot recommend for coal or for wood. Perhaps
the biomass harvest would not be sufficient; but even if it were, we can
forecast that different regions and countries would opt to prefer one or the
other-coal supplies, the suitability of forests for exploitation, and the
demand for imported liquid fuels would vary from place to place. And of
course, we cannot equate to zero the contribution of field crops such as
sugar cane or grains to local liquid fuel supply or that of biogas to local gas
supplies. There are, and will continue to be, opportunities of time and place
for these sources, even though they are unlikely to loom large in the total
energy picture.
Biomass and coal are part of a continuum-living biomass to dead biomass
to peat to lignite to coal. At each step of the chain there is both a loss of
carbon and a concentration of carbon. In looking for ways of substituting
biomass for coal, we are really posing a challenge to human cleverness. Can
we be more efficient than nature has been in turning biomass into concen-
trated energy supplies?
NUCLEAR ENERGY
Potentially, nuclear fission energy can contribute significantly and durably
to global energy supplies. Up to now its principal use has been as a source of
central station electricity, but fission energy can be used also as a source of
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low temperature urban or industrial heat, as the energy source for ship
propulsion, and as a source of high temperature industrial process heat.
This latter application would be favored by the commercialization of high
temperature reactors, whose technical feasibility has been proved by several
examples. The running of a "hydrogen economy" with fission energy is
possible either by direct thermochemical splitting of water or, as is techni-
cally feasible now, by electrolysis.
Because nuclear has an extremely high energy content of stockpiled fuel,
it is the most portable of all energy sources. Therefore, for many countries,
only the large-scale use of this technology offers complete and permanent
relief from continued large fuel imports. Deployed fully or only partially,
nuclear power could be a backup option for these countries. Similarly,
even though reactor types may be chosen that require continued imports of
fuel, both the costs and the supply logistics problems are so small compared
to those of fossil fuels that nuclear fuels would be preferred in international
commerce. For example, such countries as the United States, which might be
in a position to export either uranium or coal, would be under much greater
pressure to export the uranium.
However, several political factors make a large nuclear supply contribution
questionable. A number of issues currently surround nuclear power-notably,
the issues of reactor safety, high level waste disposal, and low level radiation
standards. Most proponents of nuclear power are convinced that these
issues revolve around problems that are technically solved or solvable. Yet
these issues have given rise to a sociopolitical antinuclear movement that has
had considerable success in delaying the implementation of technical solu-
tions and in slowing the development of nuclear power in many countries. A
condition on the Widespread use of nuclear power is therefore the resolution
of these issues with enough consensus, particularly among the technical
communities who are expert in the field, that the political opposition loses
its impact. We believe there is more to the problem than this-that the roots
of the political opposition stem from the association in many people's
minds of nuclear energy with nuclear warfare. This being the case, a further
condition on the use of nuclear power (at least as a major or dominant
energy resource) is the general realization that the threat of nuclear war and
nuclear terrorism is not coupled with nuclear power and is therefore not
diminished by banning it.
If the political opposition to nuclear power loses its impact by, say, 1990
or 1995, nuclear could become a principal energy source for the world by
2030 and permanently thereafter. A requirement for realizing that potential
is the deployment of fissile material breeding before a significant fraction of
the world's high grade natural uranium is used up in less resource-efficient
nuclear reactors and fuel cycles. Herein lies the basic dilemma of nuclear
fission energy at present. If reactors are installed today at a maximum rate,
with the goal of diversifying the global energy resources and solving existing
problems with existing technology, then we must build light water reactors
(LWRs) based on once-through fuel cycles that consume uranium relatively
rapidly. Unless there is an early switch in reactor types and fuel cycles-
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especially to breeder reactors but also to more advanced converter reactors
employing efficient thorium cycles-the world might be forced into burning
"yellow coal"-that is, using uranium from low grade ores whose mining
and processing would be expensive economically and environmentally.
Alternatively, the nuclear contribution would peak and decline until breeder
reactors could build fissile fuel supplies back up. Unfortunately, this latter
alternative might occur just at the time when the energy contribution of
nuclear fission could be of maximum importance-when fossil fuels are
reduced to their asymptotic role.
The rate at which the nuclear option can be built up is limited technically,
although this limit is not severe. A global nuclear energy contribution of 17
TWyr/yr could be achieved by 2030 in a high-energy-consuming world whose
total primary energy demand would be some 40 TWyr/yr. The 17 TWyr/yr
corresponds to an installed electrical capacity of 10 TW(e), operated at a
capacity factor of two-thirds and a heat-to-electricity conversion efficiency
of 0.4. It requires only normal growth of the nuclear supply industry starting
from present technical capabilities and a traditional rate of market penetra-
tion (about 5 percent per year) of this new technology into the energy
system.
A conceivable limitation on the buildup rate of nuclear power could be
the magnitude of the natural uranium resource. We therefore estimated the
amount of natural uranium that might be mined from deposits of reasonable
uranium concentration globally, 500 ppm or more. Our estimate, 24.5
million tons, is based on the concept that the United States, which has been
well explored, is a representative sample of the earth's land mass. This is
really just an extrapolation, but it lends credence to the idea that 10 to 15
million tons of natural uranium are likely to be available for building up a
high nuclear demand world by 2030. If this uranium cannot be found in
concentrated deposits then, it could conceivably be recovered from "yellow
coal." However, we consider this latter possibility a last resort.
We explored a number of strategies for building up the high nuclear
demand world (17 TWyr/yr) by 2030, paying particular attention to total
uranium requirements and the distribution of reactor types that would
eventuate. Table 7-4 presents data for two such strategies. The most impor-
tant finding is that the natural uranium needed to reach the 17 TWyr/yr
target by 2030 is, at the maximum, 15 million tons-which is within our
estimate of what might be available without resorting to "yellow coal."
After the buildup period, no uranium mining would be needed for a very
long time, and the nuclear system could continue to operate at 17 TWyr/yr
or even at a slowly escalating level. A number of auxiliary facilities would be
needed; these are outlined in Table 7-5. The safety factors and confinement
factors-that is, the degree to which the radioactivity associated with nuclear
fission energy must be retained in the various facilities and fuel cycle opera-
tions-were analyzed and found to be technically achieved or achievable with
development.
Our discussion of the nuclear option did not touch on fusion except
peripherally. It does not seem to be a major factor within the period of our
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Table 7-4. Nuclear strategies (for 17 TWyr/yr from reactors of 10 TW(e)
equivalent of installed electrical capacity in 2030).
Requirement
Total natural uranium a
Breeders by 2030
Other reactors by 2030
Breakdown of other reactors
Converter-Breeder
Strategy
15 million tons
4300 GW(e)b
5700 GW(e)b
All advanced converters
on a Th'33 U cycle
Multipurpose
Strategy
12.5 million tons
3500 GW(e)
6500 GW(e)
5000 GW(e) HTGR, Th"'U
1000 GW(e) LWR, 23SU'33 U
500 GW(e) special purpose
"pure burner" reactors
aThis is the quantity of natural uranium that must be mined, cumulatively, up to the point where
the breeders produce enough fissile material to keep the whole system fueled.
bActually, by the year 2035 for this strategy. In it, breeders continue to substitute for converters
after the year 2030. In consequence, the converter-breeder strategy has a slightly better potential
for further growth than does the m ultipu rpose strategy.
Table 7-5. Fuel cycle facilities for a 17 TWyr/yr nuclear industry, 2030.
Operation
Fuel fabrication
Spent fuel reprocessing
Liquid high level waste storage tanks
Waste solidification
Waste disposal
Number or
Facilities
94
94
650
94
47
Individual Facility Capacity
1500 tons of uranium oxide per year
1500 tons of spent fuel per year
1000 m 3 of aqueous high level waste
285 tons of fission products, 1.5 tons
of high activity actinides per year
145 tons of fission products and high
activity actinides per year, 2850
tons of radioactive materials,
equilibrium inventory
study, even if technical and economIC problems were solved. The market
dynamics would be too slow. Fusion might, however, contribute to the
breeding of nuclear fuel, as might the technology of "accelerator breeding."
Current prospects for these technologies do not seem to us to be particularly
favorable, although it is too early to judge their value.
LARGE-SCALE ELECTRICITY GENERATION
FROM RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES
Renewable energy sources, including sunlight, have low energy densities. The
energy must therefore be collected from a considerable area if large-scale
uses are contemplated. This fact generally makes for siting of renewable
energy collectors at some distance from centers of demand; otherwise, severe
land use conflicts would arise. The opportunistic location of sites reinforces
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remote sltmg: hydroelectric and wind power must be generated where
conditions are right for efficient collection of energy, and solar energy is
much more economic if collected in regions of high, reliable insolation.
Thus, most renewable energy forms must be converted into forms that can
be transmitted or shipped over considerable distances.
With the exception of biomass, the renewable sources are collected
either as heat (solar thermal, geothermal, OTEC), as mechanical energy
(hydroelectricity, wind, waves, and tides) or as electricity (photovoltaic).
Since neither heat nor mechanical energy can be transmitted efficiently,
they must first be converted into electricity. Even transmitting energy in the
form of hydrogen requires the production of hydrogen by electrolysis.
Electricity is therefore the proper secondary energy carrier for renewable
energy sources, with only three exceptions-biomass, in which energy is stored
as chemical binding energy; small-scale uses of direct insolation; and some
(wet) geothermal energy, which provides local heat.
Electricity from renewable energy sources can be categorized according
to the nature of the source; the service characteristics of the electricity (base
loads, intermediate loads, multipurpose, or energy contribution); the rate at
which they can be built up to realizable potentials; and the magnitude of
that potential. These categorizations are summarized in Table 7-6.
From the properties listed in Table 7-6, we constructed a strategy for
building up electrical supply from renewable sources. The strategy is only
precise enough for a word description. It assumes, of course, the existence of
favorable economic circumstances.
The approximately 3 TWyr/yr electrical supply capability from renewable
sources that might be in place by 2030 would satisfy a large fraction of
the global requirements for final electric energy. For example, the IIASA
High and Low scenarios (see Chapter 17) project about 4.7 and 3 TWyr/
yr, respectively, as the global demands for electricity in 2030. The buildup
would be paced by the quick development of hydroelectric power and
wet geothermal energy to something approaching full realizable potential,
the slower insertion of wind power, and the more deliberate installation of
large-scale solar electric supplies.
Both wind and solar energy require operation within maneuverable
systems, and wet goethermal energy requires peaking capacity. When large-
scale hydroelectric power is available, it is possible to store energy and to
deliver peak energy within rather broad limits. But hydroelectric power is not
always conveniently located near good wind, solar, or wet goethermal supply
sites. Also, in some regions it is not economically possible to meet electricity
demands by renewable energy sources only (e.g., in Western Europe, Japan,
central and eastern United States, areas of Asia). In such cases fossil or
nuclear sources of electricity would continue to be required, at the global
level of perhaps 2.5 to 3 TWyr/yr of electricity.
This leads to a potential oversupply of electrical energy or to a use limita-
tion on renewable energy sources. Or, if one looks to opportunities, this
situation indicates a future role for electricity as a reference energy carrier.
We would have to alter our viewpoint about reference energy carriers, as
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is discussed subsequently in this chapter. With electricity as the reference
energy carrier, for example, the "hydrogen economy" becomes a virtual
corollary, and the concept of an oversupply of electricity becomes mean-
ingless.
Once we have accustomed ourselves to the notion of electricity as a
reference energy carrier, it becomes possible to think of much larger energy
supplies than a few terawatts coming from sunlight. The amount of available
energy is enormous. Its cost targets, although somewhat higher than those
for advanced nuclear systems (i.e., fast breeder reactors), are not so high that
we can now make a value judgment on economic grounds between these two
potential competitors. Since neither breeder reactors nor solar installations
represent mature commercial systems, it is still to be determined how
realistic these cost targets are. Finally, if public opposition prevents the
breeder reactor from being fully deployed regardless of economics, central
station solar electricity would probably become the principal global energy
source.
Because of very large material requirements, large-scale solar installation
could not be achieved as quickly as, say, nuclear power. Nevertheless, we
can envisage a global economy in which the chief primary energy form is
sunlight, converted to electricity and hydrogen, which is then fed by pipe-
line and wire to the consumer. This is an analogous situation to the high
nuclear demand world outlined earlier.
USER-COLLECTED RENEWABLE
ENERGY SYSTEMS
Natural energy flows can be transformed and transduced on both a small and
a large scale. Sunlight, wind, and biomass can in principle be captured,
transformed, and utilized locally by the final energy consumer. The condition
that the consumer be located at the transformation point severely limits the
contribution of local energy sources to global energy supply
Consider, first, wind. The windmill has been a picturesque and utilitarian
feature of both European and North American life for some time. Its major
use has been for pumping water, both for drainage and for irrigation. It is
appropriate for this purpose, since pumped water is a "stored" product, and
the intermittent operation of the pump is therefore tolerable. Windmills also
were commonly used to provide rural energy, but were largely abandoned
for this purpose when rural electrification became a reality and liquid fuel
deliveries became reliable. Today, windmills may be coming back into rural
use for two reasons-improvements that lower their cost and increasing costs
of delivered energy. They have never been suggested for urban and industrial
use except through the intermediary stage of electric utility operation.
Even so, wind energy might make a respectable supply contribution for
the rural population, except for one important fact: only a relatively small
fraction of the world's rural population lives in regions where the wind has
the characteristics of strength, consistency, and mildness (e.g., low frequency
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of destructive storms) that are needed to make profitable use of wind
energy. Thus, only a small amount of wind energy-less than 0.2 TWyr/yr-is
expected to be generated globally by individual user windmills.
Next, consider biomass, which is also a traditional energy source. Fuel-
wood has been the source of domestic energy for every preindustrial society
and of industrial energy in the early stages of the modern industrial era.
Its rise and fall coincided with overexploitation of woodlands, leading to
fuelwood crises and to substitution of other fuels. Today, fuelwood is used
as an incidental form of domestic comfort heating in some industrialized
countries, in its traditional campfire role, and as a fuel for cooking in pre-
industrial societies.
Harvesting biomass and in particular fuelwood for energy need not lead to
sylvan disaster. Woods and farms produce a large amount of waste biomass.
Although much of this must be returned to the soil in order to retain nu-
trients and retard erosion, some fraction (perhaps up to half) can be gleaned.
And more importantly, properly managed woods and fields can be harvested.
The key to successful harvesting is low intensity-for example, for woods-of
the order of 2 or 3 percent of the stand per year. Following these principles,
woods and fields could be exploited by low density populations up to a
level of 1 TWyr/yr. However, this whole process makes large demands on
labor, which means a loss of opportunity for more productive work; this can
be equated with the abandonment of biomass as an energy source, in favor
of more convenient fuels, as income rises. Let us not forget that coal was
much cheaper than oil and gas in the United States at the time it was essen-
tially abandoned as a domestic heat source.
Finally, consider sunlight. Solar panels for domestic hot water and comfort
heating are a popular topic in the United States and Europe and a growing
industry. While there is hope that solar comfort heating will become eco-
nomic, the point is still debatable; yet as we have seen, this market is not
influenced completely by cost. Thus, one can predict a growing use of solar
heat in the more industrialized, cooler climates of the world.
Nevertheless, the use of solar heat cannot be large on the global scale for
several reasons:
• Much of the world's population lives in warm climates where neither
comfort heating nor hot water is a significant energy demand.
• Increased energy conservation in cool zone residences cuts into the
required energy inputs that solar power must make.
• Solar energy devices seem to require more user sophistication and more
capital than do more conventional forms of energy. The one exception is
passive solar uses (storage of heat from direct illumination in internal
building structures or, conversely, appropriate shade for cooling), which
we did not count as supply modes, but instead incorporated into re-
ductions in demand by conservation. Thus, solar energy devices are less
easily adapted for use by the poor than by the rich.
We conclude, therefore, that these sources might make a useful contribution
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of somewhat less than 2 TWyr/yr, or of the order of 5 to 10 percent, to
global primary energy supplies.
ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
We have frequently referred to the ultimate importance of economics in
choosing among energy supply alternatives, but have refrained from detailed
attention to the specific costs of various options. Economics measures the
capacity to invest for future values or to consume for current wishes. What
costs more reduces these choices.
Detailed cost comparisons are difficult for several reasons. First, costs can
vary greatly from place to place. Capturing wind energy by locating a wind-
mill in a poor area need not cost any more than using one in a good location,
but the cost allocated to a unit of energy output would be much higher.
The cost of coal varies greatly according to the method of mining, the wage
rate of the labor force, and the distance of the user from the mine. Compar-
isons must therefore be at the local level; even aggregating the world by
regions gives a tremendous spread in economics that cannot be described by
region-averaged prices.
Another problem of cost comparisons is that both technologies and the
economic setting change. Only a few of the technologies we have discussed
are technologically mature-LWRs and fossil-fired electrical generation,
hydroelectric power, oil, and gas-fired industrial boilers. Some of the most
interesting technologies have only cost targets at present: one cannot buy
today an economic breeder reactor or a solar-electric converter.
Changes also occur in the economic setting. For example, the relative
values of labor and materials evolve with time. Whether coal that is economic
when mined by a poorly paid labor force will remain so when that force
finds other opportunities for employment is purely speculative. Conversely,
a materials-intensive technology (e.g., central station solar power or OTEC)
is sensitive to the cost of the materials it uses, while the high use of a material
leads simultaneously to an increased price in a sellers' market.
Because of these difficulties, we can categorize systems only by tendencies
and qualitative statements. With this apology, such categorization follows.
There are two basic components of cost--those due to the charges on the
investment of capital and those due to continued impacts of labor, materials,
and fuels. Different evaluators place different relative values on these cost
components, and there are unresolved differences, down to the level of
economic ideology, as to what these charges should be.
First, we examine capital costs. By and large, the capital costs required to
produce fossil fuels, or mineral fuels such as uranium, are low. Therefore,
when such fuels are easily available and usable without conversion, there is
not much capital contribution. This explains why natural gas, which is
both inexpensive to extract and directly usable for many applications, is the
fuel of economic choice in gas-producing regions.
There are capital costs associated with transportation and conversion.
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These costs have been relatively low for the conversion of oil to final hydro-
carbons but will increase as heavier oils come into use. They are low for
coal directly used as a fuel (e.g., for electricity generation) in the mining
district. They become higher as coal is transported to a distant site and
higher still if the coal must be converted to liquid fuel.
The largest capital costs are associated with the conversion of primary
energy sources to electricity. The capital costs of gas- or liquid-fueled power
plants are lowest; followed by those of coal-fired plants; followed closely
by LWRs; by HWRs; then by biomass forms, hydroelectric power, and wind;
then by breeder reactors; and finally by direct solar energy conversion. The
target costs for breeder reactors are, however, in the range of HWR costs
or a bit lower, while the target costs for direct solar electric conversion are
competitive with the other solar options. A summary of capital cost con-
siderations is given in Table 7-7.
Table 7-7. Capital cost considerations.
For Fuels Extraction (land, equipment)
Source
Oil or natural gas
Coal
Uranium
Biomass
For Fuel Transportation (rail, pipeline costs)
Source
Uranium
Oil
Natural gas
Coal
Biomass
For Conversion to Final Energy Fuels (gas or refined liquids)
Source
Natural gas
Oil
Coal
Biomass
Uranium
For Electrical Generation
Source
Natural gas
Oil
Coal
Biomass
LWR
HWR
Hydro }
Wind
Breede r reactor }
Direct solar
Cost
Low
Moderately low
Moderately low
Moderately high
Cost
Extremely low
Low
ModeratelY low
High
Very high
Cost (of conversion plant)
Negligible
Low
High
Very high
Very high (final energy form as
reactor fue I assem bIy)
Cost (of power plant)
Very low
Low
Moderate
Moderate
Moderate, but greater than coal
Moderately high
High per unit of output
Very high, pending development
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Table 7-8. Operating costs of electrical generating systems.
Source
Wind I
Solar
Hydro
Natural gas
Oil
Coal (near mine)
LWR, HWR, breeder reactor
Coal (far from mine)}
Biomass
Cost
Very low
Low
Low
Moderately low
Moderate
High
A second category, that of operating costs, must now be examined. These
are all costs involved with processing fuels or with converting fuel to elec-
tricity, but do not include the fuel itself. We list these only for electrical
generation. They include labor and material costs in mining, transportation,
and fuel preparation. For the nuclear option, they include the operating
costs of fuel purification, enrichment, fabrication, reprocessing in certain
fuel cycles, and waste disposal. For the coal option, they include transporta-
tion, boiler feed preparation, stack gas cleaning, and waste disposal. Oper-
ating costs are listed in Table 7-8.
A final category is fuel costs, taken as the "economic rent" on the fuel.
By this we mean the price commanded by the original owner of the fuel in
view of its demand and its scarcity or abundance of supply. These are given
in Table 7-9.
Finally, Table 7-10 presents in qualitative form our estimates of the
economic position of various energy options. This table is not to be con-
sidered a detailed ranking of the supply systems, especially when referring to
any specific location. But it does indicate the major features of the existing
economic competition. Thus, under "fuels" we find the use of coal near the
mine, or the direct burning of biomass, to be cheap wherever the application
permits. Oil products such as gasoline or jet fuel are moderately expensive
Table 7-9. Fuel costs of electrical generating systems.
Source
Breeder reactor
Wind I
Direct solar
Hydro
Biomass
HWR
LWR
Coal
Natural gas
Oil
Cost
Negative
None
Low
Low
Moderately low
Moderate
Moderately high
High
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Table 7-10. Qualitative costs of energy alternatives.
Source Cost
Fuels
Natural gas
Coal, direct use near mine
Biomass, direct use
Coal, direct use further from mine
Crude oil
Oil products (e.g., gasoline, jet fuel)
Liquids from biOmaSS}
Liquids from coal
Heavy oil products
Electrolytic hydrogen
Electricity
Hydro
Coal, near mine
Wet geothermal (when available)
LWR, HWR
Natural gas (when available)
Coal, further from mine}
Biomass (local)
Wind
Oil
Direct solar }
Breeder reactor
Low
LOW} Restricted in appl ication
Low
Moderate
Moderate
Moderately high
High
Very high
Very low
Low
Low
Moderately low
Moderate
Moderately high
High (can be low in good locations)
Very high
Not currently economic; development could
lead to major cost reductions
and therefore should be used only when the application demands them.
Synthetic liquids and gases are currently uneconomic. Similarly, hydro-
electric power, wet geothermal, and coal near the mine are the cheapest
sources of electricity. When they are not available (i.e., when the demand is
not located near such sources), conventional nuclear power (LWRs and
HWRs) is the next preferred source. Wind energy in favorable locations can
be competitive. Other sources are currently more expensive.
A TRANSITION TO ELECTRICITY AS
THE REFERENCE ENERGY SYSTEM
Oil and natural gas taken together produce most of today's global primary
energy (5.3 TWyr/yr out of a total of 8.8 TWyr/yr in 1975, including 0.6
TWyr/yr of noncommercial energy; see Table 7-1), with oil contributing
the larger part (3.6 TWyr/yr). So dominant is the role of oil that when its
price was multiplied by a large factor in 1973, the prices of coal and natural
gas followed suit, even though neither of these fuels was controlled by a
world cartel. This phenomenon is what defines a reference energy system.
We have seen that the structure of the global energy supply system in the
future is likely to be very much changed from today's. At some point,
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conventional oil must ultimately be replaced by other liquid fuels, elabo-
rately processed (shale oil) or essentially synthesized from carbon (coal-
or biomass-derived liquids). As this transition occurs, liquid fuel production
and use would become more expensive and would therefore be limited to
irreducible application-as transportation fuels and storable energy supplies
for sporadic use in dispersed locations. When this happens, it will no longer
be possible to consider oil or liquid fuels as dominant energy carriers-what
we have called the present reference energy system.
We have also seen that virtually all of the asymptotic energy forms lend
themselves to electricity generation. This includes solar power, nuclear
fission power, and the most quickly deployable renewables-hydroelectric
power, wind, and wet geothermal. Looking ahead to technological possibili-
ties, we again see a variety of systems that generate electricity-fusion,
space solar power, OTEC, dry geothermal. The only alternative to electricity
that appears possible is hydrogen produced thermochemically from sunlight,
but such processes would have to compete with electrolytic hydrogen
production, which could turn out to be cheaper.
From these qualitative observations we can see the outline of the future
reference energy system in which the reference energy carrier is very likely
to be electricity. That is, the price of other forms of energy would be deter-
mined by the price of electricity. It seems that the associated secondary
energy carrier would be hydrogen. This is in contrast to the present system,
in which natural gas and electricity are associated secondary energy carriers.
In discussing electricity from renewable energy sources, we observed
that there would be an oversupply if the potential of these sources were
developed along with the fossil and/or the nuclear power required to com-
plete and stabilize the electrical system. We also observed that we would
have to change our way of thinking about oversupplies of electricity and
view this extra capacity as means for generating hydrogen. In other words,
we would have to develop a new reference energy system. The change in
viewpoint is completely analogous to what Kuhn (1972) has called a new
paradigm in scientific thinking as the result and indicator of a scientific
revolution. Old questions become irrelevant and new ones become important.
In that spirit, we can speculate about the types of new questions that would
replace older ones. We divided these questions into three levels-a global
level, which comprises the broadest problems and concerns; an industrial
level; and a level at which changes in personal attitudes and actions might
develop (see Table 7-11).
At the global level, regions and countries that are now grappling with
problems of procuring fossil fuels from distant places would shift their
attention to questions of whether nuclear or renewable sources of elec-
tricity are more appropriate. Concerns about the distribution of oil resources
would be replaced by concerns about the distribution of hydroelectric, wind,
and usable solar resources and about the possible economies of using the
flexibly sited nuclear resource. The growing concern about the carbon
dioxide problem is almost certain to be replaced by concerns about land
use allocations, and other problems of air pollution would be replaced by
246 ENERGY IN A FINITE WORLD
Table 7-11. Old and new energy supply system problems.
Global
level
Industrial
level
Personal
level
Old Problems
I
Geographical distribution of fossil fuel resources
CO, emission
Environmental pollution from fossil fuel use
Structure and power of international oil
companies
I
Generation of electricity
Gasoline economy of automobiles
Cogeneration of electricity
Natural gas delivery
Metal smelting
{
Operation of gasoline service stations
Building cooling as an added convenience
factor to comfort heating
Cooking with fuels
New Problems (electricity as new
reference energy system)
Geographical distribution of
renewable energy resources
Land use allocation
Radiation health and safety
aspects of nuclear power
Structure of electricity distribu-
tion and transmission insti-
tutions
Manufacture of liquid fuels
Battery and fuel cell efficiencies
for electric vehicles
Industrial uses of incidental heat
Hydrogen pipeline construction
Electrical and/or hydrogen re-
duction processes
Battery charge and repair stations
Building heating and cooling as a
normal result of heat pump
operation
Microwave cooking
concerns about radiation health and safety. Questions about the structure of
the international oil trade would be replaced by questions about the proper
way of operating the electricity grid in the public interest. The new questions
seem to be easier to face than the older ones, but this may be simply because
they are newer questions and can therefore be addressed without having
to consider so many existing institutional factors.
At the industrial level, we again see a substitution of processes and
associated problems. Just one example will serve as an illustration of the
force of new ways of thinking-the "cogeneration-industrial parks" dichot-
omy. Today, cogeneration is a popular concept-popular because it promises
to recover additional electrical energy from heat sources used in industrial
processes. If electricity is the reference energy supply, then we must think
of associated heat as a by-product to be used at maximum efficiency rather
than discarded. Cogeneration is thus turned around, and the electrical
generating station acts doubly as a source of thermal energy for industrial
parks. Rather than making electricity while burning fuel, we reverse the
concept to providing heat while making electricity (with some of the elec-
tricity being used to make fuel).
Only a few examples are cited for the personal level. To stimulate related
ideas, we call attention to a potential change in the nature of automotive
service stations-the transformation of the gasoline pump into a battery-
charging station. Likewise, there would be a fundamental change in the
Ta
bl
e
7-
12
.
R
es
ou
rc
es
,p
ro
du
ct
io
n
po
te
nt
ia
ls
,a
n
d
co
n
st
ra
in
ts
.
N +
.
-
.
.
:J
M
ax
im
um
P
ro
du
ct
io
n
Le
ve
l
En
er
gy
Ty
pe
(T
W
yr
/yr
)
Pr
od
uc
t
B
io
m
as
s
-
5
Pr
im
ar
y
a
n
d
se
c
o
n
da
ry
fu
el
s,
m
o
st
ly
c
ha
rc
oa
l
H
yd
ro
1.
5
E
le
ct
ri
ci
ty
O
th
er
re
n
e
w
a
bl
es
{
2
(b
y
20
30
)
E
le
ct
ri
ci
ty
in
cl
ud
in
g
so
la
r
1.
5
U
se
r-
co
lle
ct
ed
he
at
a
n
d
fu
el
O
il
a
n
d
n
a
tu
ra
l
ga
s
8-
12
L
iq
ui
d
fu
el
C
oa
l
10
-1
4
So
lid
fu
el
N
uc
le
ar
B
ur
ne
rs
4
(b
y
20
30
)
E
le
ct
ri
ci
ty
{
<
17
o
r
H
ea
t
}
B
re
ed
er
s
<
7
(b
y
20
30
)
E
le
ct
ri
ci
ty
Fu
si
on
<
1
(b
y
20
30
)
E
le
ct
ri
ci
ty
Re
so
ur
ce
(T
W
yr
)
10
00
24
00
30
0
30
0,
00
0
30
0,
00
0
C
on
st
ra
in
ts
La
nd
u
se
,
e
c
o
n
o
m
y,
e
n
v
ir
on
m
en
t
L
an
d
u
se
,
e
n
v
ir
on
m
en
t
La
nd
u
se
,
e
n
v
ir
on
m
en
t,
e
c
o
n
o
m
y,
in
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
E
co
no
m
y,
st
ag
e
o
f
in
du
st
ri
al
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t
R
es
ou
rc
es
,e
c
o
n
o
m
y,
e
n
v
ir
on
m
en
t
So
ci
et
y,
e
n
v
ir
on
m
en
t,
e
c
o
n
o
m
y
R
es
ou
rc
es
,
pu
bl
ic
a
c
c
e
pt
an
ce
B
ui
ld
up
ra
te
s,
re
so
u
rc
e
s,
pu
bl
ic
a
c
c
e
pt
an
ce
T
ec
hn
ol
og
y,
bu
il
du
p
ra
te
s
248 ENERGY IN A FINITE WORLD
mechanical nature of automotive maintenance, requmng chemical skills
(for the batteries) and electrical skills (for the motors).
A SUMMARY TABULATION
Our best guesses-which we hope can be called informed ones-as to long-
term energy supply capabilities are shown in Table 7-12. There has been a
great deal of rounding off of numbers that were previously exhibited, which
more correctly reflects the low precision of most of the numbers. As can be
seen from the table, there are many resources that are either vast, or effec-
tively infinite, or truly infinite. What we are not as sure about is whether
these resources can be produced at a rate commensurate with our needs.
Taking into account maximum production levels for 2030, the global rate of
secondary energy supply by the year 2030 seems to be certainly less than 40
TWyr/yr-perhaps much less. Coal, oil, and natural gas burned at a combined
global rate of 18 TWyr/yr would produce carbon dioxide emissions at three
to four times the present rate; the production of energy from biomass and
renewable sources requires resolution of enormously important land use
and environmental problems; and nuclear power production at a thermal
global rating of 17 TWyr/yr requires public support that is not visible now.
About 25 TWyr/yr of secondary energy of high quality (electricity and
liquids), recovered from about 40 TWyr/yr of primary energy, provide the
energy services of a high energy demand world of 2030, It would not take
much shortfall of our expectations to miss this objective by the year 2030.
So if there is a need for energy, failure to have developed diligently all of
the sources could result in severe problems, even fifty years from now.
Ultimately, very large amounts of both nuclear and solar power could be
supplied, but only well after 2030.
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III CONSTRAINTS

8 MARKET PENETRATION
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter we examine a simple method for describing the evolution of
the energy system that gives insight into patterns of future energy use. The
analysis is based on the concept of energy sources as commodities competing
for shares of the market. It is assumed that primary and secondary energy
sources, and energy supply systems, are subject to market demand in the
same broad sense as, say, steel production technologies and household
detergents. In adopting this concept, we modify and apply a number of
mathematical models that have been used to project patterns in which one
technology may arise to substitute for another. The technique offers a new
way of describing the likely evolution of future energy systems in that it
shows the shares of the energy market held by successive fuel systems over
time.
For understanding the evolution of future energy systems, a first and
obvious step is to examine historical trends of energy consumption. We
analyzed primary energy consumption of the world and of individual regions
and countries, starting at the middle of the nineteenth century. Our findings
show that if the contributions of different energy sources are expressed
as fractional shares of total energy consumption, then the evolution of
energy systems can be described as a continuous substitution of new for
old energy technologies.
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In the following sections we discuss models of technological substitution
for two competing technologies and then describe the evolution of energy
systems using a similar approach. We explain our analysis of historical
substitution patterns and takeover times, indicating how these data can be
used for estimating a realistic buildup rate for new technologies. Finally,
we use this approach to provide additional insight into the projections of the
two IIASA energy demand and supply scenarios for the year 2030 (which
are described in Part IV of this book) and present a theoretical discussion of
our method and our conclusions.
A LOGISTIC SUBSTITUTION MODEL
The initial working hypothesis of this study, proposed by Marchetti (1975),
is that primary energies resemble the behavior of different technologies
competing for a market. Consequently, the pioneering analysis of techno-
logical substitution by Mansfield (1961), later extended by many others,
is also applicable to energy systems. Mansfield's work, as well as numerous
other studies of the technological substitution process and market penetra-
tion of the technological innovation, is based on the logistic function. The
logistic function, although not the only S-shaped function, is perhaps the
most suitable one for analyzing growth processes both because of the ease in
interpreting the meaning of its parameters and because of the simplicity in
estimating the parameters from the observed phenomena. Another S-shaped
function, the Gompertz curve, also has been used frequently, particularly to
describe population, plant, and animal growth (see, e.g., Richards 1959).
The widespread empirical applications of the logistic function as a means
for describing growth phenomena also originated in studies of human popula-
tion, biology, and chemistry. The first reference to the logistic function can
be found in Verhulst (1838, 1845, 1847). Pearl (1924, 1925) rediscovered
the function and used it extensively to describe the growth of population,
both human and biological. Since then, numerous studies have been con-
ducted, only to confirm the logistic property of most growth processes.
Robertson (192 3) was the first to use the function to describe the growth
process of a single individual. Later, the function was advanced for use in
bio-assay (see, e.g., Emmens, 1941; Wilson and Worcester, 1942; and Bergson,
1944), in studies of growth of bacterial cultures in a feeding solution, for
autocatalyzed chemical reactions, and so forth.
Griliches (1957), in his study of the diffusion of the hybrid corn seed in
the United States, was one of the first to use the S-shaped curve to describe
technological substitution. He showed that hybrid corn replaced traditional
corn seed in different states in a very similar way, the S-shaped substitution
being only displaced in time by a few years and lasting for longer or shorter
periods in different states.
Following the work of Griliches, Mansfield (1961) developed a model to
explain the rate at which firms follow an innovator. He hypothesized that
the adoption of an innovation is related positively to the profitability of
employing the innovation and negatively to the expected investments
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associated with this introduction. Mansfield substantiated the theoretical
implications of his model by analyzing the diffusion of twelve industrial
innovations in four major industries.
Mansfield's findings were further extended by Fisher and Pry (l970),a
who considered only fractional shares of a market controlled by two com-
peting technologies. They postulated, on the basis of their analysis of many
substitution processes, that the rate of fractional adoption of a new technol-
ogy is proportional to both the fraction of the market penetrated by the new
technology and the fraction of the market held by the old technology
still in use. They assumed that this substitution proceeds to completion once
it has progressed as far as a few percent of the market.
THE FISHER-PRY MODEL
Mathematically, the Fisher and Pry assumptions can be written as
the differential form of the two parameter logistic function:
j'(t) = exf(t) [1 - f(t)]
where f(t) is the fraction of the market that the new technology
has penetrated at time t; [1 - f(t)] the amount of old technology
still in use; and ex the factor of proportionality-or in Mansfield's
language, the rate of adoption. This differential equation shows two
convenient properties of the logistic function. The function has both
the property of exponential growth-that is, the proportionality to the
amount of growth achieved, O:f(t)-and the property of constrained
growth-that is, the proportionality to the amount of growth left to be
achieved, 0:[1 -f(t)]. It is limited by two asymptotes, one from above
and one from below, 0 < f(t) < 1; and the maximal rate of growth
exj' (to) =4 is achieved at the inflection point to where f(t o ) = 112.
This differential equation is solved by rearranging the terms and
integrating both sides of the equation:
Qn [- f(t) -J= ext + (3 or f(t) =[1 + exp(-ext - (3)]-1
1 - f(t)
where Qn is the natural logarithm and (3 is the constant of integration.
aWe deal here with the Fisher-Pry model in somewhat greater detail because it is a standard ref-
erence in the field of technological substitution and because it has properties that we found useful
for describing the substitution of different energy sources. Fisher and Pry did not deal with energy
substitution, but there have been other applications of the logistic function in the energy field. Hubbert
(1962) used the logistic function to estimate the cumulative proved discoveries, cumulative production,
and proved reserves for crude oil and natural gas for the United States. Penner and 1cerman (1974)
extended this approach by considering the cumulative proved discoveries as shares of the ultimate
cumulative proved discoveries.
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The Fisher-Pry formulation implies that, in fractional terms, the substi-
tution path of a new for an old technology over time tends to take the
form of the logistic function, perhaps the simplest of all S-shaped functions.
This type of fractional substitution is characterized by slow initial growth
followed by more rapid growth, which decreases thereafter in a phase of
slow growth and eventually saturates when the final level of adoption of
an innovation is achieved. In the Fisher-Pry model, the substitution saturates
in a complete takeover of the market and not at some lower fraction.
The characteristics of the logistic function describing fractional substitu-
tion are illustrated in Figure 8-1 which shows the seventeen substitution
cases studied by Fisher and Pry and the logistic fit of these data as a smooth
line. The plot on the right-hand of the figure shows the S-shaped form of the
function and the scatter of the observed data around the trend line. The
plot on the left-hand side shows another convenient property of the logistic
function for empirical analysis. When a sample of data points is plotted in
this way, the scatter of these transformed data points has a straight line
trend, provided that these points can be described by the logistic function.
In Figure 8-1 this is the case, the straight line being the logistic fit of the
data. On both curves the time has been normalized at the inflection point
(to) of the curve, where the fractional share equals 0.5 and the slope of the
curve is the steepest.
Such plots illustrate how the logistic function can describe technological
substitution, not only for very different products and technologies, but also
for different types of economies. However, this aggregated representation
makes individual substitution processes indistinguishable from each other.
Figures 8-2 and 8-3 highlight some of the examples analyzed by Fisher and
Pry. The plots show the remarkable regularity of these substitution processes.
ENERGY SYSTEMS AND THE LOGISTIC
SUBSTITUTION MODEL
Over the previous 115 years, global primary energy consumption (including
commercial use of fuelwood) increased exponentially at an average growth
rate of 2.2 percent per year. Yet during this period energy consumption did
not draw equally from all sources, nor did the use of all energy sources
increase equally.
Figure 8-4 gives the global primary energy consumption since 1860,
according to five major primary energy sourcesb -wood, coal, oil, natural
gas, and nuclear. Energy consumption is plotted in terms of absolute shares
in tons of coal equivalent (tce) per year. Figure 8-4A gives consumption
according to these five energy sources on a linear scale; Figure 8-4B gives
bAlthough hydroelectric power is also an important energy source, it has remained a relatively
constant fraction of total supply; for our purposes here (the analysis of the dynamics of energy
substitution) its inclusion would only complicate the analysis unnecessarily-hydroelectric power
never exceeded a market share of a few percent.
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Figure 8-2. Substitution of basic oxygen furnace for open hearth and Bessemer steel
production expressed by fractional market share (f) for Japan, the FRG, the United
States, and the USSR. The triangles and the circles on the middle line respresent, respec-
tively, the FRG and the United States. Source: Pry (1973).
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consumption on a logarithmic scale. It is evident from these two plots that
the initial growth of energy sources is exponential, but that many features
apparently related to economic and political events influence energy con-
sumption. The consumption of coal, especially during the time when coal
held the largest share of the market, is subject to great fluctuations that
coincide with the two world wars and the intervening period of worldwide
economic depression.
Figure 8-5 shows the fractional shares of the market taken by these five
energy sources, again on a linear scale and a logarithmic scale, respectively.
In the logarithmic plot the fractional shares (j) are not plotted directly but
as the straight line fransformation of the logistic curve, as f/(l-f). (The
properties of this transformation are illustrated in Figure 8-1.) Two impor-
tant characteristics of energy systems can be seen from these plots. First,
the enormous fluctuations of the absolute consumption levels of coal
after the turn of the century have in part disappeared from the plot of
fractional shares. Second, the presence of some straight line trends on the
logarithmic plot indicates where the fractional substitution of energy sources
follows a logistic curve. Thus, we can observe that energy substitution is
similar at least in one respect to the technological substitution patterns
observed by Fisher and Pry. This plot lends strong support to our approach
of treating energy sources with the logistic substitution model. Figure 8-5
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Figure 8-3. Technological substitution expressed by fractional market share (f) in
production of steel, turpentine, and paint. to represents the 50 percent substitution mark;
crosses indicate, respectively, 10 percent and 90 percent marks. Source: Fisher and Pry
(1970).
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also shows that in the case of multiple competition, logistic substitution is
not preserved in all phases of the system. This point is well illustrated by
the substitution path of coal, which curves through a maximum from increase
to decline of its market share.
In order to describe this substitution system by a logistic model, Marchetti
and Nakicenovic (1978, 1979) modified the Fisher-Pry assumptions, intro-
ducing the constraint that all market shares sum to one-a constraint that,
for the case of only two competitors, is implicit in the Fisher-Pry model. In
order to satisfy this constraint, they made certain assumptions about the
behavior of a competitor in transition from logistic growth to logistic decline.
The rules determining this competition process are phenomenological.
Basically, it is assumed that the market share of the oldest still-growing
technology-for example, coal-can be defined as a complement to one of
the sums of other fractional shares following logistic substitution paths.
Thus, the oldest still-growing technology takes the residual of the market,
but eventually its share starts to decline and becomes logistic again. Sub-
sequently, the next newer technology-oil in this example-would undergo
this transition from growth to decline.
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THE LOGISTIC SUBSTITUTION MODEL
(MARCHETTI AND NAKICENOVIC 1978, 1979)
Without going into details, the logistic substitution model may be
illustrated by the following simplified analytical treatment:
Let there be n competing technologies expressed in terms of their
historical market shares
!i(t) = [1 + exp(-ex/ - {3i)r 1 , i =1= j, i = 1, ... , n
and assume that they are ordered chronologically in the sequence of
their appearance on the market. After the coefficients exi and (3i have
been estimated over a certain historical interval for the technologies in
the logistic substitution phases, one gets n logistic equations. Now
choose the oldest still-growing technology, j, to enter the residual phase
and let its market share be defined by
!j(t) = 1 - L [l + exp(-ex/ - {3i)r1
i*j
where j is identified by the fact that exj-l < 0 and exj ;;?; O.
One needs only n - 1 sets of coefficients ex and (3., because the esti-
mated coefficients are not required to deter~ine th~ fraction of tech-
nology j.
The transition from growth to decline would be completed for
technology j and would begin for technology j + 1 when the function
J;(t) becomes logistic on its way down. This would be the case when the
straight line transform of J;(t) approaches a constant. This point of con-
stant slope may be approximated by requiring that the relative rate of
change of the slope be minimal on the way down-that is,
y"(t) . I [ !,(t) J--~- ------+ Mm! and Yj (t) < 0, where Yj (t) = Qn ------,-J----=--:---:-
Yj(t) tj < t ~ t E 1 - !j(t)
where tj is the time that the jth technology entered the residual phase
and t E IS the end of the period.
Once this condition is satisfied, say at time tj+ l' tj ~ tj+ 1 < tE , new
coefficients for technology j are determined as follows:
exj =Y; (tj+ 1) and (3j =y/tj+ 1) - Y; (tj+ 1) tj+ 1
Technology j + 1 now enters its residual phase, and the process is re-
peated until the last technology, n, becomes residual or the end of the
time period, tE , is encountered.
Only time t and the estimated coefficients ex and {3 extracted from
historical data, ordered in the sequence of the ~ppear~nce of the tech-
nologies on the market, are treated as independent variables.
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In order to indicate the potential and limits of this energy substitution
approach, Marchetti and Nakicenovic applied their empirical model to
examples from three different levels of energy systems-global primary
energy consumption, primary energy consumption in single countries, and
different energy subsystems (e.g., electric utilities and final consumers).
Altogether they used sixty different data bases to examine 300 examples for
thirty different countries and energy subsystems. These examples cover
most of the representative world regions and countries, and in all but a
few cases, the quality of prediction of the historical energy substitution
process was consistently very good.
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF
ENERGY SUBSTITUTION
Figure 8-6 reproduces the global substitution of the five primary energy
sources plotted on a logarithmic scale as the linear transform of the logistic
function. The smooth lines on the plot are model estimates of the historical
Figure 8-6. Global primary energy substitution. Logarithmic plot of the transformation
f/(l-f) where f is the fractional market share. Smooth lines are model estimates of histori-
cal data; scattered lines are historical data from Figure 8-5; straight lines show the logis-
tic model su bstitu tion paths.
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data j the straight lines show where energy sources follow logistic substitution
paths. This result is encouraging, since it indicates that this kind of model
is capable of reproducing the evolution of fractional shares of energy sub-
stitution with very high accuracy. The scatter of the historical data is in good
agreement with smooth lines generated by the model. Significant deviations
from the trend lines can be observed only during short time periods. Note
that the penetration trends have almost the same slope for all energy sources
except nuclear energy, which controlled slightly more than a 1 percent share
of the market in the early 1970s and is hardly visible on the graph. Note also
that during the initial phases of the market penetration, the market shares do
not immediately stabilize to long-term substitution trends. Oil penetrated
somewhat faster until it reached a 2 percent market share, while natural gas
controlled almost a constant 1 percent of the market for over a decade,
before both sources stabilized to their long-term substitution trends.
These results show that the market penetration of primary energy systems
appears in regular substitution patterns that can be observed from historical
data for long periods of time. One of the problems in analyzing periods of
one hundred or more years lies in the underlying inconsistencies and gaps in
the recorded data. Nevertheless, the logistic substitution model discussed
above is very robust in that it produces stable estimates of historical market
shares on the basis of very limited input of information.
For example, from Figure 8-5 one may take the period from 1900 to
1920 to estimate coefficients of the model. With the data base of only those
twenty years, by means of the model it is possible to draw the global pattern
of primary energy substitution for the entire period 1860-1974, as shown
in Figure 8-7.
The smooth lines in Figure 8-7 give the model's "backward" and "for-
ward" extrapolations of energy use from the data of the twenty-year seg-
ment. One possible disadvantage of selecting those twenty years as a data
base is that at the beginning of this period natural gas had just penetrated
the market with a 2 percent share and consequently its substitution path
then was still conjectural. However, the model's forecast from the limited
base period to the 1970s is remarkable in that it shows extraordinary agree-
ment with the data from the later years.
By means of these plots and stepping backward in time, it can be seen
that even before the First World War, and in spite of the intervening eco-
nomic depression and the Second World War, one could have predicted the
current energy supply situation. Moreover, the oil embargo of 1973-1974
does not appear to affect the long-term substitution trends. The fact that
oil has now reached its maximum market share is, reading from the model, a
manifestation of the trend that was initiated in the 1920s when natural gas
first entered the market as a competitor.
The outline in Figure 8-8 of the primary energy substitution pattern for
the United States also brings order to the welter of statistical data for the
period 1860 to 1974. Here one sees that the substitution process is very
smooth and rather fast until 1920: coal peaks around that date, and oil
about forty years later. In this application as well, if the projection were
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Figure 8-7. Global primary energy substitution, short data base. Logarithmic plot of
the transformation f/{l-f) where f is the fractional market share. Smooth lines are "back-
ward and forward" ex trapolations of energy use from twenty-year historical data seg-
ment, although data for entire historical period are plotted; straight lines show the logistic
model substitution paths.
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based on data covering a few decades around the year 1900, both of these
peaks could have been anticipated much in advance. Thus, the peaks should
not be associated solely with events such as wars, economic depression, or
the recent oil embargo; as in most of the other cases examined, these events
produced only disproportionately small deviations from the long-term
substitution paths.
What is unexplained is the drop, during the Depression years, in the
relative consumption of coal below the long-term substitution path; nor
can we explain the corresponding increase in the use of oil while natural gas
consumption remained essentially unaffected. Interestingly, by the 1940s
these irregularities are "absorbed," and the overall system retains the long-
term substitution patterns established at the beginning of the century in
spite of a perturbation lasting for twenty years. Again, there is an indication
of the strong internal structure of the substitution process and of the rigid
timetable that the system follows, largely independent of outside influences.
The next two examples show the dynamics of substitution in two different
266 ENERGY IN A FINITE WORLD
Figure 8-8. Primary energy substitution, United States. Logarithmic plot of the trans-
formation f/(l-f) where f is the fractional market share. Smooth lines are model estimates
of historical data; scattered lines are historical data; straight lines show the logistic model
substitution paths.
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energy subsystems in the United States. The first example, in Figure 8-9,
shows that the competition of four different forms of energy for market
shares in the household-commercial sector is characterized by the intensive
use of more convenient forms of energy supplied by networks that have
rather long development times. This substitution behavior is in good agree-
ment with the primary energy substitution pattern presented in Figure 8-8,
underscoring the complex substitution interrelationships at the level of the
whole energy system.
The second example, in Figure 8-10, shows the primary energy inputs
to electricity generation in the United States. Here, nuclear energy already
controls more than 10 percent of the market, so one can assume that its
historical penetration rate has stabilized.
Another peculiarity of the system is that natural gas was used more
extensively than oil for electricity generation even during the years after
the Second World War. A possible explanation is that although oil was
cheap and well established as an almost equal partner to coal on the level
of total primary energy consumption, in the electricity submarket the
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Figure 8-10. Primary inputs to electricity, United States. Logarithmic plot of the
transformation fj(l-f) where f is the fractional market share. Smooth lines are model
estimates of historical data; scattered lines are historical data; straight lines show the
logistic model substitution paths.
f (1-f» fRACTlll\I (f I
o·ss
o·so
0·10
0·70
O·SO
0·30
0.01
20001S5O
YEAR
COAL
~
~
- ~
~ ~
NAT. GAS .A~ '"' ~~/I
\J ~
r.l.~ ...... I
OIL r NUClEAR I
I
stringent gas price regulation had a decisive effect. However, by 1970 natural
gas and oil had about equal shares of 30 percent each. Note that the sub-
stitution of energy inputs to electricity generation is consistent with the
primary energy substitution for the United States given in Figure 8-8.
Several other examples for different countries or groups of countries were
also examined, and the model was almost invariably found to fit the histor-
ical data quite well (Marchetti and Nakicenovic 1978, 1979). In general,
the larger systems followed the logistic substitution paths much more closely
than the smaller ones. We have already seen that the data agreement is
extremely good when considering global systems. A plausible explanation is
that local perturbations are averaged out in the larger systems.
TAKEOVER TIMES AND
BUILDUP RATES
The substitution rates that are so evident with the logistic substitution
model can be characterized by the notion of "takeover time"-that is, the
hypothetical time it would take a certain energy form to increase its market
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share from 1 to 50 percent. In fact, the unexpected capacity of this approach
to "organize" historical data and to extract the information from very re-
stricted sets of data is related to these very regular takeover times.
At the global level it was seen that takeover times are about one hundred
years. Similar stable takeover times were observed for all of the other cases
studied. However, it was generally noted that the smaller the region or the
country, the shorter were the takeover times-for example, in the European
member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), takeover times were of the order of thirty years.
Natural gas penetration is a good example: in most European OECD coun-
tries, it took less than ten years before natural gas had 10 percent of the
market.
However, in the electricity submarket in the United States, the takeover
times of natural gas and oil were more than one hundred years before
nuclear energy entered the market, while coal remained unaffected during
this period. The electricity submarket is characterized by decreasing takeover
times and should be contrasted with the opposite trend observed for the
household-commercial sector. In primary energy substitution patterns in the
United States, takeover times have been long and stable, on the order of
seventy to eighty years.
Related to takeover times is the concept of "buildup rates." As already
noted in the discussion of the dynamics of how new technologies replace
old ones, the new technology generally requires a very long time in order
to capture a sizeable part of the total energy supply. It would be worthwhile
to examine the buildup rates of the "new" technologies of the past in order
to obtain a benchmark for orientation on the buildup rates of projected new
technologies.
The buildup rate may be defined as the exponential growth rate of the new
technology in absolute terms as it grows from 1 to 10 percent of the market
it serves. Table 8-1 gives the market penetration rates as well as the build-
Table 8-1. New technology buildup rates.
Penetrationa Buildupb
Rate Rate
Technology (%/yr) (%/yr)
World primary energy supply Oil 4.9 6.8
Natural gas 4.8 6.8
U.S. primary energy supply Oil 5.3 7.7
Natural gas 4.5 7.0
OEeD-Europe primary energy supply Oil 10.0 13.3
Natural gas 15.7 20.7
Nuclear 6.9 10.4
U.S. inputs to electricity supply Nuclear 31.0 36.0
apenetration rate is the annual growth rate of the market shares f(t) expressed as Qn [f(t)/(1 -f(t))J
-i.e., the coefficient a in our model. (See explanation in text on page 260.)
bSui1dup rate is the exponential growth rate of the new technology in absolute terms as it grows
from 1 to 10 percent of the market it serves.
270 ENERGY IN A FINITE WORLD
up rates of the various energy supply technologies from the examples
already discussed. The buildup rates listed in this table have been estimated
from model parameters rather than from historical data, because of the
often erratic behavior of the actual data when new technologies are just
beginning to satisfy a share of supply. It may be seen that these rates are
faster for smaller geographic regions or smaller markets. The buildup rate for
nuclear power in the United States, for example, is especially fast.
A SECULAR RULE OF ENERGY SUBSTITUTION:
LONG-TERM PROJECTIONS OF MARKET SHARES
The preceding discussions have shown that energy substitution is a very
complex process, rich in variation as one ranges from different primary
energy markets to respective submarkets. One invariant is the regularity of
the substitution process within the system, overshadowing all short-term
perturbations and deviations from the long-term trends. The examples taken
from global primary energy consumption have shown that the internal
structure of the logistic substitution model is robust in that it operates
even with limited inputs of information. It thus lends itself to making
projections not only "backward" into the past but also into the future.
In presenting our approach as described here, we have sometimes en-
countered an a priori reservation, if not objection, to it. This reservation
maintains that the model appears to be deterministic and to lack certain
logical links to the generally accepted theories usually applied in forecasting
and modeling and should therefore be rejected even if it is successfully
applied to the past. In this context we observe the following:
• One should not simply disregard a body of evidence even if it does not
fit a certain perception of reality.
• A projection with this substitution model cannot be a complete one.
The starting dates and rates of growth of new technologies successfully
conquering the market are not endogenous to the model. Also, the
model deals with market shares and not with absolute quantities. One
must know the absolute level of energy production before the full
picture can emerge.
We therefore explore the market penetration constraints affecting the
evolution of new technologies (nuclear and solar) in the future energy
system by applying the logistic substitution model in what we now consider
an appropriate way. The results are shown in Figure 8-11, where the time
scale extends to the year 2030. Three observations are in order here.
1. We assume exogenously that nuclear power starts penetrating on a
commercially significant scale-that is, 2 to 3 percent of the market-
by the year 1970 and that the penetration rate for nuclear power is at
the upper end of penetration rates for other forms of energy experienced
so far. Such values are nevertheless still somewhat below the rates
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Figure 8-11. Global primary energy substitution, 1860-2030. Logarithmic plot of the
transformation f/(l-f) where f is the fractional market share. Smooth lines are model
estimates of historical data; scattered lines are historical data; straight lines show the
logistic model substitution paths.
Ao_
... ~ -,~
WOOO'...,~ COAL "'- OIL ~NAT.GAS
~ ........
...,., "' /' ........ /
~ / ~ ~/
~ £7' ~~
I ~
Lf' ,./ ............. / ........ /
/ / ~/ ~
A / NUCLE"~~ /. SOLAR
f/(l-fa
10-2
1850 1900 1950
YEAR
2000
FRACTION (fa
0·99
0·90
0·70
0·50
0·30
0·10
0·01
2050
experienced for nuclear over the previous decade. The resulting share for
nuclear energy in 2030 is 40 percent (see Figure 8-11).
2. We again assume exogenously that solar power starts penetrating on a
commercially significant scale by the year 2000 and that the penetration
rate for solar power is the same as that explained above for nuclear
power. For solar power we thus arrive at 7 percent of the primary
energy market by the year 2030.
3. Natural gas seems to take on an ever-increasing share, at least until
2020, leading to values beyond 50 percent (see Figure 8-11).
The first two observations seem to tell us that the transitions take time.
A 40 percent nuclear share by the year 2030 is significant, but at the same
time, it indicates clearly that an energy supply based mostly on nuclear is
not realistic. And a 7 percent solar share is less than what many people hope
for today. Note that a 7 percent solar contribution to, for instance, 22.4
TWyr/yr (the IIASA Low scenario projection for global primary energy
consumption in 2030) would be the equivalent of 22 million barrels of oil
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per day (mbd) or 1.6 TWyr/yr. This is a large undertaking when seen in
absolute terms.
Regarding the third observation, the potential of natural gas is large, and
many energy strategies have not taken this fully into account yet. In Chapter
2, we examine the potential of natural gas; Chapter 17 describes the con-
tribution of natural gas to the IIASA High and Low scenarios, while in
Chapter 18 we present an alternative case of nuclear moratorium based on
the exploration of the potential of natural gas.
We do not regard these observations as predictions based on ironclad
laws of reality. As noted, only a part of the market penetration phenomenon
is covered by the model endogenously; assumptions that are exogenous to
the model must be made in order to apply it to the future. For instance, we
had to assume (in observation 2 above) that solar power would start pene-
trating on a commercial scale by the year 2000.
Some additional comments on the nature of these observations are in
order here. The logistic substitution model has as its object the energy
system as a whole. This includes not only the development and production
of related hardware and software, but equally, the sociopolitical institutional
framework in which the system operates. Often, it is argued, explicit govern-
ment support could straightforwardly enhance the use of a particular tech-
nology. This is true for the prototype and demonstration stage of such a
technology. But once such a technology has conquered a few percent of the
market, it is the system that controls the further market penetration of that
technology. It is only then that the logistic substitution model becomes
relevant. Again, the larger the system, the greater the applicability of this
model. As illustrated in Figure 8-11, the object is the global energy system.
Regional or local systems might more easily be made to behave differently.
Indeed, the logistic substitution model reveals the "ponderousness" of the
energy system-that is, the stunning regularity of the system evolution. Large
efforts are needed to avoid these regularities. This is not an impossible
task. In fact, the supply effort as defined in the two IIASA scenarios (see
Part IV of this book) is a way of doing just that: the projected buildup of
new energy supplies exceeds the penetrations suggested by the logistic
substitution model (see Figure 17-19).
THE THEORY OF LOGISTIC SUBSTITUTION
Recently, two theoretical developments of the logistic substitution model
were proposed at IIASA. The first approach, by Peterka (see Peterka 1977;
Peterka and Fleck 1978), follows the work of Mansfield (1961) in that it
treats economics as the driving force in the substitution process. In this
approach, a simplified investment policy for competing products is assumed,
and costs are compared with expected profits. This work confirms that the
substitution process can be explained by the application of existing knowl-
edge about the economic incentives affecting producers' decisions.
Basically, Peterka eliminates prices from this initial formulation of the
MACRODYNAMIC SUBSTITUTION
MODEL (PETERKA 1977)
Peterka assumes that an industry has to generate profits in order to
expand, according to
(Xp'(t) = P.(t) [p(t) - c] + Q(t)
t t % t
where (Xi is the capital needed to increase the production of product
i = 1,2, . . . ,n by the differential amount of total production, Pi(t);
p(t) is the price that a unit of each product i brings on the market; ci
is the cost of producing a unit of product i; and Qi(t) is the external
capital extended to the producer of product i. Qi(t), however, can be
neglected in the long run, because it is required only by nonprofitable
technologies, and such technologies are rarely supported for very long
time periods.
Omitting Qi(t), the basic equation can be rewritten as
d
(X - [£nP.(t)] = p(t) - c.
, dt I ,
1 + L e<>ijt+l3ij
i=Fj
J:(t) = !j(t) =__1__
J Lf/t) 1 + L !;<t~
i=Fj fj(t)
or by taking any two technologies, i and j, subtracting the two equa-
tions, and assuming all (Xi to be equal-that is, (Xi = (X for i = 1,2, ... ,n:
d ~ P (t )J c· - Co
_ £n -'- =_1__J i =1= j
dt lj(t) (X'
Because all terms on the right-hand side of this differential equation
are constants, we can rename them (Xij; we can also eliminate the
total production by introducing fractional market shares, !i(t) = Pi(t)/
[~jP/t)l ; finally, by integration we have
!i(t) <>t+I3··
--= e IJ IJ
!;(t)
This solution is also the final form of the Fisher-Pry model when we
assume n = 2. It implies that the fractional substitution of any two
technologies, out of many competing, is logistic.
A general solution of this model can be obtained in a number of
ways; we use here the simplest, starting from an identity
1
Given the n-1 sets of coefficients (Xij and (3ij' which are determined
from historical data, the substitution process of all n technologies is
determined. Peterka also shows that the fluctuations of the parameters
are smoothed over time so that only the mean values are significant.
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model by introducing fractional shares in place of the total production levels.
The competition between any two energy sources can also be described in
this model by logistic functions. Following this approach, Peterka was able
to obtain a general formulation of the model, incorporating all possible
pairwise substitutions. In general, this formulation of multiple substitution
produces estimates of historical substitution encountered in energy systems
that are indistinguishable from those obtained by the phenomenological
model illustrated in Figure 8-6.
A positive feature of this approach is that market price and absolute
production levels-both of which are subject to great variation over time-
are eliminated. Remaining, then, are only fractional shares, relative costs of
production, and investments embedded in the model coefficients.
As a result, if specific investments for different energy sources (Qi) are
all equal, then the substitution process follows the logistic model. Peterka
also showed that this simplifying assumption can be relaxed and that long-
term substitution paths do not change much when the specific investments
are slightly different. While it is true that different specific investments lead
to nonlogistic substitution rates, it can be seen from Figure 8-12 that
substitution processes can still be approximated by logistic functions for a
large range of ratios of different specific investments (Q I /Q2 )-in this case
for only two competitors (n=2). This confirms the empirical observation that,
in practical cases, the logistic model adequately describes the substitution
process even when the specific investments are different. More importantly,
this result supports the assumption that historical penetration trends can be
used to estimate the long-term substitution path of a new technology once
it controls a few percent of the market.
The second model, proposed by Fleck (see Peterka and Fleck 1978),
uses basic assumptions about the adoption of an innovation by a single
individual. Fleck considers only those innovations that proved successful, so
that the old established product is fully replaced eventually by the innova-
tion. The individual's decision whether to adopt an innovation once it is
proved successful depends on his imitation behavior. In the model, the rate
of imitation of all individuals lumped together is proportional to the market
share achieved by the innovation. This expresses, in Fleck's terms, the
learning aspect of the imitation-the higher the level of adoption, the larger
is the flow of information about the innovation, which generates additional
stimuli to adopt.
This formulation led Fleck to use the nonstationary, absorbing Markovian
chain for describing the substitution process of two competitors, where the
transition probabilities can be interpreted as the rate of limitation. In this
way, the individual decisions to adopt are aggregated, assuming homogeneity
and causal independence of individual decisions. The model takes on a
stochastic character. When aggregated, the individual decisions-although
linked to complex social and psychological processes-result in an envelope
of individual decisions representing the rate of penetration of an innovation.
The causality of individual decisions disappears on the level of a whole
market; th us, the process is described stochastically.
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Not surprisingly, two theoretical explanations, differing radically in nature,
can be given. In the preceding section we explained that the object of the
model is the global energy system as a whole, which includes hardware and
software and sociopolitical institutional frameworks. Given this complexity,
the two theoretical explanations represent two approaches to this com-
plexity, and it is not unlikely that even more explanations could be found.
They then mutually shed light on each other. Indeed, for instance, prices and
costs in the Peterka model have something to do with the individual's
behavior when faced with innovations in the system under consideration
and vice versa.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Our initial objective was to provide a self-consistent, objective, and yet
simple method for describing the past behavior of energy systems. The
approach adopted showed that regular patterns can be distilled from his-
torical data, that the internal structure of the substitution process is robust,
and that it can also be related to traditional economic theory. The logistic
substitution model based on this approach reproduces the historical evolution
of a large number of energy systems and subsystems (about 300 examples
were investigated) so well that its applications to the future should provide
useful guidelines to systems analysts.
The substitution process is remarkably regular. This has important im-
plications. When we consider the takeover time as the measure of the time it
takes the substitution process to go from 1 to 50 percent of the market
share, it turns out that these times are of the order of one hundred years
for the global system as a whole and somewhat shorter-of the order of
about thirty years-for smaller systems. The takeover time extends over
several decades and is fairly constant for any given system, so that we must
also consider time as a constraint similar to natural resource and environment
constraints. Because of both the long lead times for introducing innovations
and the long response time of the energy system, decisions taken today
would have their full effect only in the decades to come.
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9 THE WELMM APPROACH TO ENERGYAND NATURAL RESOURCES
INTRODUCTION
Natural resources, and especially energy resources, are not generally used in
the primary state: they must be processed in order to be available to the
final consumer. A resource processing system is schematically shown in
Figure 9-1.
Most of the activities within this system are becoming more costly for
several reasons. First, there is a need to exploit less easily obtainable re-
sources-for example, offshore oil and mineral ores located in remote areas.
Up to now, generally, natural resources at hand have been utilized; hereafter,
both extraction and transportation costs will probably increase, although
this may be counterbalanced in part by technological progress. Second,
because lower grade resources are being used, there are more processing
requirements-for example, upgrading lower grade mineral ores, water
treatment, and possibly sea water desalination for some uses. Third, increased
ecological constraints (e.g., reclamation of land disturbed by open mines;
construction of wet and later dry cooling towers for large power plants)
are also contributing to these increased processing costs. In general, such
costs are expressed as increases in the consumption of economic resources
(processed resources, manpower, land, capital) and eventually also of natural
resources. Thus, if the objective of the resource-processing system is to
convert natural resources into processed resources, then the primary resource
279
280 ENERGY IN A FINITE WORLD
Figure 9-1. Resource processing system.
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efficiency or the net primary resource balance of the system would decrease,
since it would consume larger amounts of natural resources for its own
operation.
Although most natural resources seem to be in relatively large abundance
globally, the situation appears different when one considers their availability
at specific locations, in specific forms, or in economic terms. For example,
globally there are about 7500 m 3 of clean water available per capita (ex-
cluding sea water). Nevertheless, the availability of clean water is a problem
in many large cities and in some regions-for example, in Colorado for
meeting the requirements of oil shale processing and in Wyoming for coal
conversion plants. Similarly, globally there are about 37,000 m2 of land
per capita, of which 10 percent is arable. But it is becoming increasingly
difficult in industrialized countries to open new surface mines or to find
suitable and acceptable sites for new energy facilities such as power plants or
refineries.
Global energy resources are also enormous if considered in their own right.
However, periodically there are fears of resource scarcity-the current
"energy crisis" being one example.
The problem of resource scarcity cannot be solved by considering each
resource separately. In fact, proper resource management calls for a global
analysis that considers all the qualitative and quantitative interrelations of
the natural resources. These interrelations lie largely in the technologies
used both to extract primary resources and to convert them into useful
resources, each process defining a certain combination of resources and
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manpower. These interrelationships are summarized in Table 9-1 for mineral
fuels.
The mining of coal, for example, can interfere with surface or underground
water resources. For example, at Garsdorf, in the FRG, it is necessary to
handle on the average more than twelve tons of water for each ton of coal
that is extracted. Water is also required, at a later stage, for reclaiming the
land that has been disturbed. The mining of coal also requires energy (e.g.,
electricity, motor fuel) for such operations as blasting and removing the
overburden and/or the coal and transporting the coal. Whether coal ex-
traction is underground or, still more so, open cast, a severe burden is
imposed on the land used and on the landscape, although such disturbances
are becoming more temporary. Materials handling is another problem that is
encountered in coal mining for the handling of not only the coal (or mineral)
being gained but also the overburden, the sterile rocks, and so forth. The
deeper the deposits exploited by surface mining, the greater the amount of
materials to be handled (in addition to the water already mentioned).
For Garsdorf, the overburden material to be handled varies from a few tons
to about fifteen to twenty tons per ton of lignite extracted. And, of course,
all such operations-coal extraction and moving, overburden and water
handling, land reclamation-call for skilled manpower.
What has been briefly shown here for one operation-mining-and for
one energy resource-coal-is applicable, at different levels, to other oper-
ations of all energy chains (transportation, conversion, distribution, utili-
zation) or to other energy resources, be they nonrenewable resources such as
oil, gas, or uranium or renewable resources such as solar, tides, and wind.
Thus, to be able to use a processed energy resource (i.e., final energy),
man has to interfere with and use other natural (and human) resources.
A systems analytic method called WELMM has been developed at IIASA
and applied to the problem of determining energy strategies. WELMM
stands for an assessment of the requirements and the availability of Water,
Energy, Land, Materials, and Manpower resources. The basic tools of the
WELMM approach are described in the appendix to this chapter.
APPLICATIONS OF THE WELMM APPROACH
The WELMM data can be combined either statically or dynamically, in
order to compare various energy strategies on a local, national, regional,
or global basis. The studies carried out so far include WELMM comparisons
of several electricity supply chains (Grubler and Cellerier 1979), and of
different production processes for synthetic liquid fuels (Grenon, Merzeau,
and Gru bIer 1979), as well as assessments of WELMM requirements/impacts
of different energy supply strategies at a national/local level (Groupe
Ressources de I'HASA, 1979; Grenon and Gourmelon, 1980). The first two
studies are of interest globally and are therefore discussed below in more
detail.
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The WELMM Comparison of
Electricity-Generating Chains
One of the first applications chosen was a study of electricity-generating
chains, each chain being defined as a set of energy facilities needed to extract,
upgrade, transport, and convert the primary energy so as to obtain electricity
(see Figure 9-2). Nine chains were compared for producing the same amount
of electricity-6.1 TWh-each with a thirty year life span: four chains pro-
duce electricity from coal, three from nuclear power, and two from solar
power. The major characteristics of these chains are given in Table 9-2
and are summarized below.
Coal 1 and Coal 3 reflect the present status of the technology, whereas
Coal 2 and Coal 4 represent an advanced technology and meet the environ-
mental constraints. Coal 1 and Coal 2 have an underground coal mine,
and Coal 3 and Coal 4 have a surface mine with a stripping ratio of 2 : 1.
The power plant in each case is a 1000 MW(e) unit.
The nuclear chains comprise 1000 MW(e) power plants. The light water
reactor (LWR) chain is an extreme case because of the low uranium ore
content (0.007 percent U3 0 8 ), but it can be considered the maximum
limit for the amount of uranium to be extracted (which is bigger than the
amount of coal to be mined for the same electricity production). As far as
the fast breeder reactor (FBR) is concerned, it was assumed that only a
small amount of uranium would be extracted, while most of the fuel supply
would come from 238 U (depleted uranium in enrichment plants) and from
Figure 9-2. Three types of electricity-generating chains.
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the plutonium produced in other LWRs. The transportation of uranium has
been omitted.
The solar chains comprise 100 MW(e) solar thermal electric conversion
(STEC) plants. The two chains differ in terms of solar radiation (the South-
ern France type or the Californian type).
Examples of results obtained by a WELMM analysis are shown in Table
9-3 and Figure 9-3, the latter presenting the cumulative land and materials
(nonenergy plus energy) required to build and operate these nine chains
for thirty years. These cumulative requirements were obtained by aggregating
the data collected and studied for each facility of each chain. They offer
insight into possible constraints for developing future electricity supply
strategies.
The largest land-consuming chains by far are the solar chains, especially
Solar 1, with a southern European direct solar radiation of 1500 kWh per
m2 per year. The smallest land consumer is the LMFBR chain. The land
requirements for the solar chains are large mainly because of the heliostat
fields of the STEC modules. The land impacts are also considerable in the
LWR 2 chain and in the four coal chains.
If one compares the various chains with respect to the requirements for
construction materials, the two solar chains have requirements about one
order of magnitude higher than any of the other chains. These requirements
correspond to the high quantities of steel, concrete, sand and rocks, and
other materials required for constructing the heliostat fields and towers. On
the other hand, the solar chains require practically no materials for their
operation. The light metal fast breeder reactor (LMFBR) and the LWR 1
chains show the best results if one compares the total material requirements
(for construction plus thirty years of operation) for various chains. But,
Table 9-3. Material requirements for construction and operation of elec-
tricity chains (103 tons).
Nonenergy Energy
Materials Materials
Operation Operation
Metals for Other Materials (cumulative (cumulative
Construction for Construction 30 years) 30 years) Total
Coal 1 43 151 8287 79,000 87,480
Coal 2 65 140 23,566 84,000 107,770
Coal 3 44 142 4000+ 79,000 83,186
Coal 4 67 130 23,230 84,000 107,430
LWR 1 41.8-56.6 192.7 132 2700 3066-3080
LWR 2 43.4-58.2 192.7' 132 119,300 119,668-119,683
LMFBR 33 276.3 NA 800 1103
Solar 1 844.3-1930.4 3298-6778 NA 0 4142-8708
Solar 2 666.4-965.7 2005-3390 NA 0 2671-4355
NA-Not available.
+ = more than or additional.
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Figure 9-3. Cumulative land requirements (km 2 ) for energy chains producing 6.1
TWh electricity. The importance of the seam thickness of open cast mining is indicated
as an example for Coal 3 and 4. For explanation see Table 9-2.
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the LWR 1 chain should be approached with care, because of the high
grade uranium ore considered (0.203 percent U3 0 8 ), which reflects the
current situation of uranium ores. These high grade ores could be fully
extracted over the next decades, and one would have to examine preferably
the LWR 2 chain or an intermediate chain in order to reflect the long-
term perspectives of a LWR chain. Therefore, only the LMFBR seems to
be practically independent of such resource constraints, because of the need
for very small quantities of natural uranium (about two tons per year) from
low grade ores in addition to that of the UF6 tails recovered from LWR
chains.
From the above comparison, it is obvious that the LMFBR would be the
least demanding in terms of land and materials requirements. This would be
followed closely by the LWR, provided that its fuel requirements could
be met by high grade ores. The land and materials handling requirements for
the operation of LWRs with poor quality ore (e.g., with 0.007 percent
U3 0 8 ) may even surpass those of equivalent coal-based systems. The STEC
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system would be the most demanding in terms of its requirements of land
construction materials but not for its operation. These general features
would not change significantly with changes in the location of various
facilities. Nevertheless, for a more detailed and complete assessment, precise
geographical location would have to be taken into account.
The WELMM Constraints on
New Synthetic Liquid Fuels
Liquid fuels are, and will remain for a long time, essential for both developed
and developing economies. Nevertheless, it is now becoming quite clear that
the supply of conventional oil is finite, including the largest deposits and
those still untapped. Thus, in the not so distant future, there will have to
be a shift to the use of synthetic liquid fuels and/or of unconventional oil
resources-probably progressively in a few decades at the global level, perhaps
sooner (in the 1990s) in some countries for political and/or other reasons.
(See Chapter 2 for a discussion of resource supply.)
Among the various possibilities are syncrudes from tar sands or from oil
shales and liquid fuels obtained through coal liquefaction. (The production
of liquid fuels from coal is discussed in Chapter 3). Economic comparisons
of these three alternatives are difficult because of the different technologies
and stages of development.
Nevertheless, there are some common characteristics of the sources of
synthetic liquid fuels. First, they rely on a large resource, as discussed in
Chapter 2. One of the most remarkable characteristics of these uncon-
ventional resources-as they are presently known-is the predominance
of supergiant accumulations. For example, the Athabasca tar sand deposit,
which has an area of 23,300 km2 with 90 billion tons of bitumen in place, is
at least once or twice the size of the largest of all conventional fields, Ghawar
in Saudi Arabia. The Piceance Creak Basin in Colorado contains about 80
billion tons of shale oil in high grade oil shale beds. One of many examples
of huge coal deposits of similar size is the Kuznesk Basin in the USSR,
with total hard coal resources of 850 X 109 tons spread over an area of
33,000 km 2 .
Another common characteristic of these unconventional resources is that,
to date, the available technologies seem to be economically viable only on
a very large scale, which implies a much greater environmental impact than
has been experienced for most other natural energy resource exploitation.
Thus the problem of their development cannot be analyzed by looking only
at the resource. In fact, environmental and WELMM constraints for large-
scale extraction processes (e.g., shortage of water, possible restriction on
disturbing land, manpower and material shortage) will probably influence
the rate of development more than the ultimate recovery of the resource.
For this reason, an evaluation of the WELMM requirements of different
approaches to synthetic liquid fuels would be helpful in revealing the possible
constraints or bottlenecks that a new technology may have to overcome to
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be considered viable. However, in making such an evaluation, one encounters
the difficulty of the lack of data: as yet, there are only two industrial
plants operating for tar sands and only one for coal liquefaction, while the
commercial exploitation of oil shales still remains at the project level. Using
whatever data are currently available in a published form on the operating
of industrial plants, pilot-scale plants, and project and study estimates, a
preliminary comparison has been made of the WELMM requirements asso-
ciated with different synthetic fuel technologies. This provides some useful
insights, as discussed below.
Water. Figure 9-4 shows estimates of water requirements for different
technologies. In order to compare their relative impact on water resources,
the production of 1 cubic meter of synthetic fuel has been chosen as a
reference.
It appears that coal liquefaction would require the largest amount of
water, especially with the current method-the Fischer-Tropsch synthesis
process. The reason is that for this process water is considered a chemical
feedstock. For tar sand, the major part of the water consumption occurs at
the conversion stage because of the current "hot extraction method." One
disadvantage of this process is that most of the water discharged with the
tailings in the tailing pond cannot be recycled (because it contains some
solid particles), nor can it be discharged into a river because of the presence
of bitumen. For oil shale, the critical steps are the waste disposal and oil
shale upgrading, during which 60 percent of the water is consumed.
It is important to know whether the water resources in the affected
regions are sufficient to support such a development. Water supply does
not seem to be a likely problem to inhibit the tar sand industry in Athabasca;
on the other hand, in Colorado, the shortage of water will be a serious
problem for a large-scale exploitation of its oil shales.
Energy. In order to build and operate a plant, to harvest the primary
energy, and to upgrade and transport it, a great deal of additional energy is
needed, particularly if the "quality" of the resource is low. For each process,
one may give the ratio of energy consumed in resource recovery to energy
produced for the market (see Figure 9-5).
Table 9-4 represents some values for the ratio of energy consumed in
different processes. The values of the ratio for all synthetic fuel processes,
as well as for the enhanced recovery of oil, are very low, especially when
compared with those for the production of conventional oil, even in the
difficult conditions of the North Sea.
On the basis of the data in Table 9-4, we consider it too early to conclude
that there is a real difference between the energy efficiencies of the different
processes studied here. The relatively low values for the actual coallique-
faction process (apart from significant energy requirements for steam pro-
duction) also reflect the fact that the plant is producing a wide variety of
products (energy and nonenergy). Second generation coal liquefaction
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Figure 9-4. Water requirements for different synthetic liquid fuel processes compared
to enhanced recovery of conven tional oil. Sources: (a) Bechtel Corporation (1975, 1976,
1977); (b) and (c) Crawford et al. (1977); (d) Resources Management Consultants Ltd.
(1978); (e) Syncrude Canada Ltd. (1971, 1973); (f) Bechtel Corporation (1975,1976,
1977); Hittman Associates Incorporated (1974,1975); (g) Synfuels Interagency Task
Force (1975).
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Table 9-4. Ratio of energy consumed in resource recovery to energy pro-
duced for the market.
Tar Sand Tar Sand
GCOS Imperial Coal Liquefaction Enhanced
45,000 747,000 Oil Shale In situ Oil,
bbljcfl bbljdb ProjectsC Actuald Advance~ Combustion f North Secfl
3.5-4 1.9-2.2 2.2-10 0.8-1.6 2.2-3 2-8 > 100
Sources: (a) Heming (1976); (b) Resources Management Consultants Ltd. (1978); (c) Marland
(1977); (d) Muir (1977); (e) Bechtel Corporation (1976); Oil and Gas Journal (1974); (f) Burger
(1979); and (g) Klitz (1980).
processes (more optimized in the synfuel output) achieve higher efficiencies,
but values are based on laboratory or pilot plants.
On the other hand, if one considers the rate of recovery of the energy in
place, it is higher for tar sand exploitation or enhanced recovery than for
conventional oil wells-about 65 percent for the Syncrude (1978) and the
Great Canadian Oil Sand (GCOS) plants and 30 to 60 percent for the dif-
ferent methods of enhanced recovery, compared with an average of 25
percent for conventional oil. The recovery rate for coal mining is very
dependent on the local geological conditions and usually is of the order of
80 percent. However, in very big opencast exploitations, as are needed for
commercial coal liquefaction plants, the recovery rate would decrease to 50
percent (as was experienced, for example, for lignite mines in the FRG
[Fettweis 1976]).
Figure 9-5. The ratio of energy consumed in resource recovery to energy produced for
the market.
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Land. The processes used for exploiting tar sands, oil shale, and coal
are all very extensive users of land. They require land for mining develop-
ment, overburden and waste disposal, construction of facilities, and off
site requirements (e.g., roads). The open pit mining method is certainly the
most economically attractive for large deposits of low grade, because it
permits a high rate of recovery of the resource and allows the use of large
and efficient equipment. However, in some instances, because of large over-
burden thickness, it may be more economical to proceed with underground
mining rather than with surface mining operations. Table 9-5 compares
the land requirements for different processes based on open pit mining, only.
The fixed land requirements for the different synthetic fuel complexes
(capacity 25,000 to 125,000 barrels per day) are in the range of 1 to 11
km2 , as against 0.17 km2 for the Alaska conventional oil fields of capacity
180,000 barrels per day. The land requirements for mining (in m 2 per barrel
produced) are similar for the different processes (0.026 to 0.05 m2 per
barrel) if one considers the same favorable geological conditions for coal
mines as for oil shale or tar sand (stripping ratio of 0.35). However, the
mining conditions most likely to be available for coal projects would mean
land requirements of up to ten times those required by equivalent oil shale
and tar sand projects.
The figures for the total mined area for different projects, when considered
over their lifetimes, are gigantic, as shown in Table 9-5. Such land distur-
bances may result in considerable local impacts, such as increases in erosion
and sedimentation, changes in soil quality, destruction of vegetation. How-
ever, owing to the progress in reclamation and rehabilitation or restoration
techniques, temporary land disturbance could also be an advantage and,
in some cases, the land may be of better quality after the operation than
it was before.
Materia/s. Table 9-6 shows certain characteristics of different raw materials.
Because they contain rather low percentages of organic matter, it is necessary
Table 9-5. Land requirements for synthetic fuels (based on open pit mining).
Tar Sand Oil Shale Coal (actual) Coal (advanced)
725,000 50,000 50,000 25,000
bbl/~ bbl/db bbl/dc bbl/dd
Fixed land for surface
installations (km 2 ) ,, 1.5-4 4 1.3
Area affected by mining
per year (m 2 /bbl
output) 0.028 0.026-0.029 0.05-0.2 0.04-0.3
Total mined area for
project (km 2) 31.5 , 2.9-14.3 25-100 10-75
Sources: (a) Syncrude Canada Ltd (1978); (b) Project Independence (1974); (c) Synfuels Inter-
agency Task Force (1975); Grubler and Grenon (1979); and (d) Bechtel Corporation (1976); Grubler
and Grenon (1979).
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Table 9-6. Properties of tar sand, oil shale, and coal.
Tar Sand Oil Shale Coal
(Wt%) (Wt%) (Wt%)
Organic matter 9-13.5 14-20 50-80
Inorganic matter 80-90 78-85 5-25
Moisture 2-10 1-2 1-40
Organic Composition
Carbon 83.1 79-81 73-83
Hydrogen 10.3 10.2-10.5 5-6
Oxygen 1.4 4.8-6.7 10-20
Nitrogen 0.3 2.1-2.6 1-2
Sulphur 4.9 0.9-1.2 0.5-5
Source: Cameron (1969).
to handle relatively large quantltIes of these raw materials. All have in
common a deficiency of hydrogen and significant quantities of impurities.
If one considers the physical state of the organic matter of each material,
then tar sand seems to have some advantage because it contains oil as such.
The stripping ratio and the ore grade affect the production considerably.
Table 9-7 shows, for example, that for tar sand, in one of the most favorable
zones, about one ton of overburden must be removed and two tons of tar
sand must be mined in order to produce one barrel of synthetic fuel. Table
9-8 gives information on the problem of waste production. For example,
the mining of oil shale results in a volume of processed shale that is about
1.2 times that of the raw shale. Because of the expanded volume, a complete
return into the excavated area is impossible. One possible solution is to
deposit the spent shale in deep natural canyons, which involves an additional
cost for transportation and considerable impact on the scenic quality of the
landscape. For tar sands, even if the nature of the waste is different, the
Table 9-7. Materials mined to produce one barrel of synthetic fuel.
Tar Sand Mininga
Coal Mining
Open Pit Oil Shale Miningb
Under-
Open Pitd
Over- Tar Under- Open groundc Over-
burden {t} Sand (t) ground (t) Pit (t) Coal (t) burden (tl Coal (t)
2-2.2 1.5 2 1.7-5.8 0.3-0.4
aValues for tar sand correspond to the conditions of the current GCOS and Syncrude complexes-
the'b are among the most favorable.
Values correspond to very high grade oil shale (35 gist) and to classical retorting and upgrading
processes.
cValues correspond to an underground mine (long wall, 1 seam about 4 m thick) and to the Fischer-
Tropsch process.
dValues correspond to surface mining with relatively low oxygen-carbon ratio and to the hydrogen-
coal process.
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Table 9-8. Waste produced in the production of one barrel of synthetic fuel.
Tar Sand Minin/
Oil Shale Miningb Coal Mining Waste
Sand (t) Water (t) Bitumen (t) Spent Shale (t) from Processing (t)
1.8 1.9 0.03 1.2 0.25-0.3 c 0.03-0.11 d
aValues for tar sand correspond to the conditions of the current CGOS and SYNCRUDE com-
plexes-they are among the most favorable.
bValues correspond to very high grade oil shale (35 gist) and to classical retorting and upgrading
processes.
cValues correspond to an underground mine (long wall, 1 seam about 4 m thick) and to the Fischer-
T ropsch process.
dValues correspond to surface mining with relatively low oxygen-carbon ratio and to the hydrogen-
coal process.
question is also serious, and the problem of storage area for tailings is be-
coming more acute. A similar, though less critical picture is shown for coal
liquefaction; huge quantities of ash (about OJ tons per barrel of fuel pro-
duced through the Fischer-Tropsch process) must be disposed of.
Manpower. For all these processes, manpower requirements for construc-
tion and operation are very important. Table 9-9 gives some figures relating
to the Syncrude plant (1978), to the Imperial Project (Resources Manage-
Table 9-9. Manpower requirements for different synthetic liquid fuel
processes.
Design and Total Workforce for
Construction Workforce Operation and
Manpower at Peak Maintenance
Requirements Construction (number of
Projects (man-hours) (number of persons) persons)
Tar sand, SYNCRUDE, open pit
mining (125,000 bbl/d)a 43 X 10· 7500 2500
Tar sand, in situ process (141,000
bbl/d), Imperial Projectb 55 X 10· 9930 2036
Oil shale, open pit mining
(100,000 bbl/d)c 8.7 X 10· 2200 1800
Oil shale, underground mining
(100,000 bbl/d)c 8.7 X 10· 2200 2362
Coal liquefaction, underground
mining, FischerlTropsch process
(40 ,000 bbl/d)d NA 11,000-15,000 7400
Coal liquefaction, open pit mining,
hydrogen-coal process (25,000 bbl/d)e 7.0 X 10· a 820-1000
NA-Not available.
Sources: (a) Syncrude Canada Ltd. (1978); (b) Resources Management Consultants Ltd. (1978);
(c) Project Independence (1974); (d) Hoogendoorn (1975, 1978); (e) Bechtel Corporation (1976);
Synfuels Interagency Task Force (1975).
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ment Consultants Ltd. 1978), and to some oil shale and coal liquefaction
projects.
Manpower problems are a serious potential bottleneck in view of the
heavy development in exploitation of this kind of resource. There are two
major reasons for this. First, the design and construction of tar sand or oil
shale plants require the services of a very wide range of qualified workers
(boilermakers, carpenters, cement finishers, electricians, insulators, iron
workers, millwrights, plumbers and pipefitters, operating engineers and
pressure welders) as well as experience in widely different areas, such as
solid handling, mining, and upgrading. Very few of the design and engineering
companies can cope with this demand. Second, there are high peaks in the
workforce requirement. Unless a very tight schedule is established for the
different projects, there could be a wide fluctuation in the employment
market. One of the main constraints of fast expansion would therefore be
the relative scarcity of engineers and skilled workers.
Even in the operational phase, the oil companies will have to face a new
situation. Manpower requirements for the production of conventional oil
(especially since the discovery of giant fields) have been low. For example,
a field in North Alaska, with an output of 180,000 barrels per day requires
only twenty three man-years for operation and maintenance (Bechtel Cor-
poration 1975,1976).
For the coal liquefaction process, the high number of coal miners would
be the most crucial point. For example, for the new SASOL project in
South Africa (Hoogendoorn 1975, 1978), about 3700 people are required
for the newly developed Bosfesspruit colliery that will produce the coal for
the synfuel plant.
The influx of large numbers of workers into relatively remote or scarcely
populated areas (Colorado, for example) could have a significant social
impact on the area and require the construction of new schools, roads,
hospitals, and the like. This would also mean the consumption of water,
land, energy, and materials for domestic use, and it is therefore also necessary
to take into account all these indirect WELMM requirements.
The above assessment of the WELMM requirements of different synthetic
fuel processes clearly shows that the magrIitude of means used will not be
of the same order as for the recovery of conventional oil. From these pre-
liminary results, coal liquefaction seems to be the least favorable process
with respect to water, land, and manpower requirements. Possible devel-
opments would still take place only in countries with abundant coal resources
in favorable geological conditions. On the other hand, the WELMM compar-
ison between tar sand and oil shale does not show a big disadvantage to oil
shale, although this would have been true if one had considered only their
capital costs.
Again, the current techniques of exploitation of these resources are not
utilizable for small deposits that could make useful contributions to the
energy supply. It is therefore necessary to develop new methods, better
adapted to the smaller size deposits and to the human and material resources
available.
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CONCLUSION
The solution to one resource crisis should not create a shortage of another
resource. For example, one should not opt for an energy option that places
too high a constraint on land or water. Once the resources have been con-
sidered in specific locations, in specific forms, or in economic terms, their
relative scarcity becomes apparent.
From the above study on energy chains for producing electricity, it can be
seen that the large-scale use of STEC technology would be possible only in
remote areas (implying the choice of energy vectors that can be transported
and distributed easily and efficiently), mainly because this technology is a
very intensive land consumer. On the other hand, the material requirements
for the construction of heliostat fields are enormous and may be a problem
if remote areas have to be reached. The study also has shown that the
logical continuation of a long-term nuclear strategy lies in the use of the
FBR technology, because of the tremendous amount of materials to be
handled and of the mining impacts that would result from the use of low
grade ores.
As regards the production of synthetic liquid fuels, a prerequisite to the
large-scale use of unconventional oil is the mastering of in situ technologies,
principally because present technologies require huge amounts of land.
Similarly, the discovery of less water-intensive processes-especially for
coal liquefaction and oil shales-will be necessary for any large-scale ex-
ploitation project.
The type of information that is obtained from a WELMM analysis may
provide decisionmakers with additional knowledge of the natural resource
aspects correlated to energy strategies. This is especially true since physical
data are not likely to fluctuate as widely as monetary data. In fact, when
prices or financial data are either lacking or uncertain (which is often the
case for long-term strategies and new technologies), it is useful to express
the natural (and human) resources in physical terms or, as we say, in
"WELMMite" requirements and to emphasize their systems implications and
interrelations. This new systems approach to energy-or more broadly
speaking to development strategies-supplements classical economic analysis
and is a possible building block of multiattribute, multicriteria decision-
making analysis.
APPENDIX 9A: THE BASIC TOOLS
OF THE WELMM APPROACH
In order to assess the WELMM requirements for different energy supply
options and the availability of such resources at the national, regional,
and global levels, the first step is to collect, analyze, and list all relevant
information in a suitable format so as to allow its easy handling and manip-
ulation for desired applications. Two types of data bases have been devel-
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oped-the facility data base and the resource data base. The composition and
development of these bases are discussed below.
The Facility Data Base
The facility data base contains the WELMM resource requirements for con-
structing and operating various typical energy facilities-namely, coal mines,
oil fields, coal unit trains, pipelines, tankers, conversion plants, or power
plants. In fact, these "facilities" are industrial units considered at one of
the stages of valorization of an energy resource. Each stage can be charac-
terized by a process-for example, gaseous diffusion, centrifugation, and
laser for uranium enrichment; or pipeline and tanker for crude oil trans-
portation. An energy facility can be associated with each process. Fortu-
nately, there is a tendency toward size standardization that makes WELMM
resource-accounting easier-gaseous diffusion plants of ten million separative
work units; crude oil tankers of 250,000 to 300,000 dead weight tons;
nuclear reactors of 1000 and 1300 MW(e). Ultimately, it might be possible
to have standards for similar facilities, for a given technology, and for a
certain industrial development of a given geographical region.
To date, approximately one hundred facilities have been studied at IIASA,
of which aboutfifty have been computerized. Table 9-Allists these facilities
by primary energy form. For well-known, conventional energy sources, the
number of facilities included is of course higher than that for the so-called
"new energy sources" or for those that are not much in use worldwide.
Additionally, sixty five coal mines have been studied (the target is to
represent one hundred basins), and their data have been entered and managed
in the facility data base somewhat differently because of the specificity of
the extraction processes by comparison with other facilities. This forms the
coal mines data base, as discussed in this chapter.
For each energy facility, the facility data base contains both quantitative
and qualitative data as well as descriptions of the construction and operation
of that facility. Specifically, the facility construction file contains infor-
mation on general characteristics-for example, identification, technology
Table 9-A1. Number of facilities included in the facility data base per
energy source
Energy Source
Hyd rocarbons
Conventional (oil, gas)
Unconventional (tar sands, oil shale, heavy oil)
Sol id fossil fuels
Nuclear (fission)
Solar and biomass
Hydroelectric power, geothermal
Number of Typical
Facilities Studied
20
5
20
30
10
10
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employed, size of the facility, economic data-and on natural and human re-
source requirements for constructing the facility-that is, the direct WELMM
requirements. The facility operation file contains information on general
characteristics-identification, energy in- and outflows and other by-products,
description of the operation, lifetime, energy efficiency, availability, eco-
nomic data, environmental impacts (pollution, waste)-and on natural and
human resource requirements for operating the facility for one year-the
WELMM requirements.
An explanatory footnote and a reference to the data source are given
with each of the data. Some detailed explanations are also given, such as
data variations depending on the geographical, technical, and time context
being considered. Storage of the data at various aggregation levels is possible.
For example, manpower requirements are given as a total of man-hours or
man-years, but there is also a breakdown of that total into four categories of
manpower-manual technical (technicians, qualified workers); manual
nontechnical (nonqualified manpower); nonmanual technical (engineers);
and nonmanual nontechnical (lawyers, doctors, etc.). A quality judgment
associated with each of the values increases the value of the facility data
base.
The quality appreciation is, of course, subjective and aims to take into
account the reliability of the data source, its viability, its homogeneity with
other sources, and the range of uncertainty. Following Hittman's (1974)
classification, the quality is described by means of marks within a range of
1 to 5: 1 is very good (± 10 percent), 2 is good (± 25 percent), 3 is fair
(± 50 percent), 4 is poor (± 100 percent), and 5 is expressed as an unknown
validity. Table 9-A2 gives an example of a coal gasification facility, illus-
trating the type of data contained in the facility data base.
The value of a data base is dependent upon the value (i.e., the accuracy)
of the data collected. Thus, four methods have been used for obtaining
accurate information. First, there has been close cooperation with a number
of industrial companies or organizations concerned with the energy sector
in various countries. Second, existing data bases have been used, although
they are generally more restricted in their scope and content. Third, ques-
tionnaires have been distributed to companies, research institutions, and
public organizations, and the responses have been studied. Finally, an
extensive literature search has been conducted. Once the data have been
collected, they are analyzed and synthesized either at IIASA or within
collaborating organizations.
The management system used for the facility data base is called INGRES
and was developed at the University of California at Berkeley and adapted at
IIASA. Supplementing INGRES is a system called ENERTREE that was
developed at IIASA; ENERTREE links the data base and the application
programs, thereby permitting a hierarchical access and simplifying the task
of the end user.
A Substructure of the Facility Data Base: The Coal Mines Data Base: It is
relatively easy to define standard types of facilities at the top end of the coal
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Table 9-A2.
Facility code:
Facility name:
Country:
Prim ary capacity:
Secondary capacity:
Direct efficiency:
Planning duration:
Construct du ration
Load factor:
Life time:
Example of a printout for a coal gasification facility.
COALGAS1
EI Paso coal gasification complex
United States
SNG 0.2703 x 10'0 m3
Not applicable 0.0000
0.572000
NA
3.00000 years
0.910000
30 years
Primary Inputs
ip Low sulfur < 1% bituminous coal
ipe Clean coal
Primary Outputs
op SNG
ope SNG
Secondary Outputs
osl Tar
os2 Tar oil
os3 Naphta
os4 Crude phenols
os5 Ammonia
os6 Sulfur
0.851 X 10 7 t
0.585 X 10 7 tce 7000 kcal/kg
0.2703 X 10'0 m 3
0.334 X 107 tce 7000 kcal/kg
300814. m 3
197865. m3
63350.4 t
40825.2 m 3
78327.6 t
56412.0t
WELMM Requirements for Construction
Resource Quantity Unit Quality
Aluminum 4535.000 t 3
Copper 363.000 t 3
Electricity 100.000 10· kWh 4
Land temporary exclusive 3.885 km' 1
Land temporary total 3.885 km' 1
Manpower total 6118.400 man-years 1
Motor fuel total NA 10· kcal NA
Process heat fuel total 0.000 10· kcal 2
Steel pipes and tubes 10884.000 t 3
Steel plates 21770.000 t 3
Steel reinforcing bar 2177.000 t 3
Steel structural 6530.000 t 3
Total steel (sum of all kinds) 41359.000 t 3
Water intake total 0.227 10· m 3 3
WELMM Requirements for Operation
Chemical and allied products NA t NA
Electricity 0.000 10· kWh 1
Land temporary excl usive 3.885 km' 1
Land temporary total 3.885 km' 1
Manpower total 985.000 man-years 1
Materials NA t NA
Motor fuel total 0.000 10· kcal 2
Process heat fuel total 0.000 10· kcal 1
Water consumption cooling 5.078 10. m 3 1
Footnote
CG0105
CG0105
CG0102
CG0103
CG0103
CG0104
CG0102
CG0102
CG010S
CG010S
CG010S
CG0105
CG010S
CG0101
CG0111
CG0108
CG0109
CG0109
CG0110
CG0111
CG0108
CG0108
CG0107
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Table 9-A2 continued.
WE LMM Requirements for Operation
Resource Quantity Unit Quality Footnote
Water consumption process 5.131 10· m' CG0107
Water consumption total 10.209 10· m' CG0107
Water discharge total 2.805 10· m' CG0107
Water intake cooling 5.965 10· m' CG0107
Water intake process 6.720 10· m' CG0107
Water intake total 12.775 1D· m' CG0107
NA-Not available.
chain (conversion and transportation)-for example, coal unit trains of
10,000 tons, gasification complexes of 2300 million m 3 per year-especially
when one considers the increasing trend of standardization of the size of
energy installations. On the other hand, it is practically impossible to reduce
the large number of coal mines, opencast or underground, to a few represen-
tative examples.
Many factors influence coal-mining activities-for example, the geology
of the deposit, the degree of mechanization, manpower costs, the extraction
technology used. We are presently conducting a study of some one hundred
representative large-scale coal mines, with the aim of collecting and analyzing
the WELMM data. In particualr, we are focusing on those basins that can
contribute significantly to a potential global coal market. For each basin,
representative mines from the point of view of technology and geology
(depth, number and thickness of seams, coal quality, etc.) are being studied,
in order to obtain a sufficient number of mines so as to be able to classify
them according to size, technology used, WELMM requirements, and the
conditions of each basin. Mines in the following countries are being studied-
Australia, Austria, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the
German Democratic Republic, Hungary, India, Poland, the Republic of
South Africa, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Data are obtained from the review of the literature (environmental impact
statements are of particular interest) and from responses to a questionnaire
developed at IIASA in cooperation with coal experts. The status of the coal
mines data base as of mid-1979 is as follows: some 162 questions were
asked about general characteristics of the mines and the WELMM con-
struction and operation requirements. On the average, 60 percent of the
questions have been answered to date. Table 9-A3 shows an example of the
data for general characteristics of coal mines and geological conditions of a
mine in Austria.
Our present approach, based on a few representative mines per basin,
represents considerable progress over the methodology developed in the
u.s. For example, in the energy supply planning model of the Bechtel
Corporation (1975; 1976) the modeling effort for the coal mining activities
is based on only four U.S. mines. Nevertheless, even with our approach it
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Table 9-A3. Example of data printout for a coal mine in Austria.
General Characteristics of the Mine
Process
Type of technology
Data origin
Reference year of data
Total number of coal seams
Including seams to be mined out
Seams supposed to be mined out in reference year
Lower thickness of coal seams
Average upper ash content of seams mined out
Average thickness of coal seams in reference year
Total mining seams thickness
Overburden to coal ratio
Dip of coal seams in degrees
Maximum depth of mining in reference year
Marginal depth of mining
Methane emanation
Tectonic distortion description
Coal density in situ
Rock (overburden) density
Necessity of rock explosion (only surface)
Necessity of coal explosion (only surface)
Surface landscape
Average January temperature
Average July temperature
Range of annual precipitation, minimum
Range of annual precipitation, maximum
Range of ground freezing, minimum
Range of ground freezing, maximum
Average depth of ground freezing
Degree of industrial development of the region
Long distance transportation possibilities
Total remaining geological resources in reference
year
Economic and technical recoverable reserves in
reference year
Recove ry rate
Grade of coal
Range of moisture content of coal, minimum
Range of moisture content of coal, maximum
Average moisture content of coal
Range of ash content of coal, minimum
Range of ash content of coal, maximum
Average ash content of dry coal
Minimum caloric content of coal
Maximum caloric content of coal
Average caloric content of coal
Annual capacity
Construction duration
Period of initial increasing mine output
Total lifetime of the mine
m+p
surf
projkf
1984
2
2
1
2.000
30.000
7.000
25.000
4.450
flat
60
180
0.000
regbedd
1.275
1.950
no
no
hmfoga
NA
15
NA
NA
0.000
0.000
0.000
devdp
exloc
33.000
30.000
0.900
brown
26.000
38.000
32.245
20.000
47.000
33.430
1985
2985
2505
1.250
6.000
3.000
27
Mining and preparation
Surface
Projected for a certain field
Year
Number of seams
Number of seams
Number of seams
Meters
Percent
Meters
Meters
m 3 per metric ton
Flat coal seams
Meters
Meters
m 3 per metric ton daily output
Regular bedding
Metric tons per m 3
Metric tons per m3
No
No
Hilly mountain forest grazing
agriculture
Degree celsius
Degree celsius
Millimeters
Millimeters
Meters
Meters
Meters
Developed industry great popu-
lation density
Existing transportation facilities
106 metric tons
106 metric tons
Ratio resources in ground/re-
serves
Brown coal
Percent
Percent
Percent
Percent
Percent
Percent
kcal per kg
kcal per kg
kcal per kg
106 metric tons
Years
Years
Years
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Table 9-A3 continued.
Year of beginning of exploitation
Coal output in reference year
Number of operating faces
Average output from a face
Number of working days per year: coal winning
Number of working days per year: overburden
moving
Number of working shifts per day: coal winning
Number of working shifts per day for overburden
System of seam opening (underground mining)
Position of main shafts
Number of main shafts
Method of mining
NA-Not available.
1988
1.250
2.000
2500
250
250
3
3
o
o
o
stripb w
Year
10' metric tons
Number of operating faces
Metric tons per day
Number of days per year
Number of days per year
Number per day
Number per day
This is a surface mine
This is a surface mine
Number of main shafts
Stripping with bicket wheel
excavator
is not yet possible to obtain highly accurate information on all aspects
of coal exploitation in a particular coal basin since this depends on how
many representative mines there are for the basin in the data base and how
much conditions vary within the basin. A study of the relations between
geological parameters and the consumption of natural resources is therefore
being made.
The Resource Data Bases
In addition to the accounting of WELMM requirements as discussed above,
another type of accounting is needed and has to be done in parallel. Here
the focus is on determining a region's potential to contribute, through its
resources, to national or even international economy. These "regional
accounting" schemes form what we call resource data bases. Two types of
resource data bases are currently being set up, depending on the type of
regional accounting desired. Indeed, for WELMM applications there are two
different ways of defining a region; two different accounting methods and
two types of data have been used. A summary of these methods is given
below.
For the first method, we start with a given natural deposit and draw
around it the region that would be affected by possible exploitation. This
requirement is served by the global resource data base, which collects in-
formation on WELMM resources associated with giant or supergiant deposits
of fossil and mineral fuels. Data are gathered, as summarized in Figure 9-A1,
on the geographical and geometrical parameters of the deposit and its
possible status in the McKelvey classification (identified, hypothetical,
speculative, subeconomical, etc.) and on the geological parameters of the
deposit and its geological environment, as well as on the possible simul-
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taneous occurrences of other minerals and/or fuels; on potential, present,
or past exploitation; and on historical production. In addition, data on land
and water resources associated regionally with the deposit are gathered and
filed, especially for the various factors that would be of importance should
the exploitation of the resource be planned on a large scale.
An example of highly aggregate data is given in Figure 9-A2 for the oil
shale resource of the Piceance Creek Basin in Colorado. The identified
resource (60 to 70 billion tons of oil in rocks with an oil content of between
60 and 250 liters per ton; 200 billion tons including rocks of lower oil
content) is very large and worth consideration, but land conditions (semi-
aridity with noticeable wind erosion) and water resources (irregularity
of the Colorado River, large ground water resources, but little annual reload)
raise difficult problems and threaten to have large impacts on the environ-
ment.
This data base has so far been developed only for unconventional oil
resources, which seem to be of particualr importance for future energy
strategies. The source of data is, apart from the literature, the replies to
detailed questionnaires on tar sands, heavy crude oils, and oil shales that was
distributed to many private and public institutions in about twenty countries.
The second method for defining a region is to take into account the
social, geographical, political, or administrative determinants. One is then
able to estimate all the potentials of that particular area-energy and mineral
deposits, solar resources, biomass, availability of territory and water, and so
forth. The main concern of this data base is then no longer a giant resource
(an energy deposit in a certain area), but a collection of "small potentials"
that are of particular importance for selecting an optimum local regional
energy strategy. This data base is called the regional resource data base
and includes information from different fields, dividing the WELMM para-
meters as follows: water-permanent water, underground water, rain gauge;
resources-fossil and fissile resources, geothermal resources, wind, solar;
land-land use and land cover, topography, geology, geophysics; and popula-
tion-density of habitation. The regional resource data base is being devel-
oped and tested over an area of 10,000 km2 in Southern France.
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10 ENERGY AND CLIMATE
II\lTRODUCTION
This chapter considers interactions between energy and climate. The relation-
ship is two way. On the one hand, the by-products of energy conversion-
such as waste heat and carbon dioxide-can influence climate. In the other
direction, climate influences the demand for energy-for example, changes in
temperature affect requirements for heating and cooling. Also, climate can
influence the supply of energy, especially with respect to solar and wind
energy conversion and to hydroelectric power.
The impact of energy systems on climate has received increasing attention
recently as awareness of man's potential to alter the earth's climate has devel-
oped, as knowledge of the complexity and sensitivity of the climate system
has increased, and as local and regional changes have been observed because
of pollution. Currently no observed global climatic changes can be attributed
to man's energy use, but possible future changes on this scale, perhaps of an
undesirable and irreversible nature, are of concern.
As noted in Part I, in 1975 global commercial primary energy consump-
tion was some 8.2 TWyr/yr,a 90 percent of this from fossil fuels. Over the
aThroughout the book we have distinguished between installed power capacity (TW) and annual
production of energy (TWyr/yr). However, in this chapter we refer to TW throughout because of
the physical properties of the climate system; here, it is more accurate to consider the power unit
Wand TW.
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next fifty years, global energy consumption could increase by a factor of
three to six. Although the resulting waste heat release to the environment
would be three orders of magnitude lower than the solar energy absorbed at
the earth's surface, it could have an impact on global climate because of its
uneven distribution and high concentration at certain places.
There could also be a climate problem associated with increased levels of
carbon dioxide concentration in the atmosphere if fossil fuels continue to
playa dominant role in future energy systems. It has been observed that the
amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is increasing and that through
the so-called greenhouse effect,b carbon dioxide may affect the climate sys-
tem. These potential effects have been discussed in the literature for more
than one hundred years, but recent studies (e.g., Flohn 1979; Kellogg 1978)
suggest that the buildup of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere because of
fossil fuel combustion could, by the year 2000, cause climatic changes larger
than the natural climatic variability. Others (e.g., NAS 1977) suggest that
the global mean temperature could increase by more then 6 K by 2150-2200
because of carbon dioxide increases in the atmosphere, indicating that the
climatic effects of this gas may be a major factor limiting future energy pro-
duction from fossil fuels.
The resources, the production potentials, and the physical and technolog-
ical constraints of various energy sources are discussed in detail in Part II of
this book. Here, we observe that only three primary sources have the poten-
tial for meeting a large fraction of the global primary energy demand over
the long run-namely, fossil fuels (mainly coal), nuclear power, and hard
solar energy. Thus, future energy supply systems will rely heavily on the use
of one or more of these supply sources. An understanding of the possible
climatic implications of the large-scale deployment of each of these energy
sources is therefore important because of the built-in inertia of energy sys-
tems. The reason for this inertia is that typical energy installations (e.g.,
mines, refineries, power plants) are expensive, require from five to ten years
for their development or construction, and have working lives of from fif-
teen to fifty years. We therefore examined the global climatic implications
of the large-scale use of these three energy sources. Specifically, we consider
the potential climatic impacts of the following:
• Large-scale waste heat release, particularly when concentrated in certain
areas;
• Substantial increases in the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide
and of other gases and particles; and
• Major changes in the earth's surface characteristics.
bCarbon dioxide is virtually transparent to incoming solar radiation but absorbs longwave radiation
coming from the earth surface and reradiates some of it back to the surface. This is referred to as the
greenhouse effect, although the analogy is not perfect-it is more like a "blanket effect." An increase
in the concentration of the gas in the atmosphere would give an increased earth surface temperature
with all other factors remaining constant.
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The first of these issues is more or less independent of the energy supply
mix and may be considered common to all supply strategies. The remaining
two problems are specific in nature and relate mostly to the effects of using
fossil fuels and hard solar systems, respectively. In the following paragraphs
we survey the state of knowledge about these interactions and describe the
methods and results of IIASA's studies of possible climatic impacts of future
energy strategies.
CLIMATIC IMPACTS OF EI'JERGY SYSTEMS
In order to describe the interactions between energy and climate, we define
"the climate system" and indicate why it appears to be sensitive to changes
introduced by human activities. As can be seen in Figure 10-1, the climate
system consists of not only the atmosphere but also four subsystems-the
ocean, the cryosphere (ice and snow), land, and the biosphere. The arrows
in the figure indicate how these components interact through a wide variety
of processes (e.g., evaporation from land and ocean surfaces into the atmo-
sphere; wind stress on the oceans). Thus the climate system is highly complex
and nonlinear. Historical data indicate that climate has varied and continues
to vary on time scales ranging from short periods (season to season, year to
year) to geologic time (millions of years).
Figure 10-1. The climate system. Source: National Academy of Sciences (1975).
SPACE
N2, 02' CO2, °3, etc.
dust particles
ATMOSPHERE
Precipitation,
Changes of
Atmospheric Composition
Air-ice Coupling
Heat Exchange
Evaporation
Changes of Land Features,
Orography, Vegetation,
Albedo, etc. Changes of Ocean Basin
Shape, Salinity, etc.
EARTH
310 ENERGY IN A FINITE WORLD
Energy conversion systems can influence the climate system in three ways.
First, all energy, after passing through various conversion processes, is ulti-
mately released to the environment as waste heat. Second, the burning of
fossil fuels adds certain gases and particles to the atmosphere: either these
can alter the amount of solar radiation absorbed, scattered, or emitted by
the atmosphere or by the earth's surface, or they can alter the amount of
other gases in the atmosphere. Third, large-scale changes in the characteristics
of the earth's surface, such as its reflectivity, roughness, moistness, or the
temperature of the ocean surface, could cause climatic changes.
The extent to which the climate system can be influenced varies. Locally,
energy systems can be seen to influence climate: the fact that urban areas
are often warmer than the surrounding countryside has often been noted
(see, e.g., Landsberg 1975). Regionally-say over a distance of tens to thou-
sands of kilometers-man's activities are seen to influence climate. For
instance, increases of precipitation in areas up to 1000 km downstream of
several U.S. cities have been traced to the effects of urban industrial pollu-
tion on the airflow (Hosler and Landsberg 1977). The potential impact of
energy systems on this scale is large.
Globally, there is no evidence that man's activities are influencing climate
presently. But such an influence is possible in two ways. First, global climate
could be affected by a change in the amount of a gas (e.g., carbon dioxide)
in the atmosphere. Even though this gas might be added at scattered loca-
tions, the atmosphere distributes gases very quickly and evenly, so that the
increase would occur globally. This does not mean that the resulting climatic
variations would be the same over all global regions: a doubling of the
amounts of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere would not, for example, lead
to the same surface temperature change or rainfall change in all regions. Sec-
ond, global climatic variations could be caused by a large anthropogenic
change in just one area, resulting in a change in the atmospheric (or oceanic)
circulation such that other changes occur upstream and downstream of the
perturbed area. It is not the possibility of a globally averaged climatic change
that is the central issue here, but rather, the inevitable regional climatic shifts
that could result from man's disturbances of the climate system.
Present understanding of the climate system is not sufficient to be able to
predict reliably the potential climatic changes due to different energy strate-
gies. However, it is possible to make some preliminary estimates of the
impacts of energy conversion. First, one can look at how the climate system
has responded to natural anomalies and "predict" the impact of manmade
perturbations by analogy. For example, the response of the climate system
to large-scale anomalies in sea surface temperature could be taken as an anal-
ogy for the response to a widespread area of waste heat release. Or on a
smaller scale, the local meteorological effects of an ocean island heated by
the sun could be taken as an analogy for the local effects of a power station.
A second approach is to use information on climate history. For example,
climatic eras in the past when the world was warmer than at present could
provide the basis for scenarios of future climates due to manmade warming.
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Unfortunately, both of these approaches suffer from lack of data and from
questions about interpretation.
A third approach is to use models of the climate system to examine the
sensitivity to manmade perturbations. A hierarchy of climate models exists,
ranging from very simplified models that essentially describe the energy bal-
ance of the system to very complicated models that numerically describe the
three dimensional atmospheric circulation. Since our understanding of the
climate system is incomplete and the existing models contain many simplifi-
cations and do not describe all components and interactions of the entire
climate system, the interpretation of the results of model studies must be
made with care. The most common kind of climate model study, examples
of which are given later in this chapter, are model sensitivity studies, in
which the model is used first to simulate present climate and then to simu-
late climate with an imposed perturbation such as an addition of waste heat.
The difference between the two simulation experiments represents the sensi-
tivity of the simulated climate to a perturbation. Whether the real climate
system would respond the same way as shown by the simulation experiments
is not known. Thus, the results of such model studies should be interpreted
as indicating the direction or the order of magnitude of response of the
climate system.
CLIMATIC IMPACTS OF WASTE HEAT RELEASE
Although the problem of regional climatic shifts deserves emphasis, the use
of global averages can be taken as a starting point for discussing the impact
of waste heat. On a global basis, the total amount of heat released by man's
present activities is only about one-ten-thousandth of the amount of solar
energy absorbed by the earth's surface. (For a discussion of energy flows
through the environment see Chapter 6.) An extreme global projection of
20 billion (109 ) people with an average per capita energy demand of 20
kWyr/yr would lead to a total heat release of 400 TW, which is about one-
two-hundredth of the solar energy absorbed. This could give rise to a surface
temperature increase of 1 K if one considers the energy balance of the global
system (Kellogg 1978). However, by considering the average global system,
we are ignoring the fact that energy consumption is not and will not be dis-
tributed evenly over the earth's surface. Already man's release of heat over
1 to 100 km 2 areas is sometimes found to be of about the same magnitude
as, or greater than, the absorption of solar energy over the same area. It is
this uneven distribution of waste heat with concentration of release in cer-
tain areas that has a much greater potential to alter global climate patterns.
This potential could be realized with a total waste heat release of less than
that in the extreme projection above. Flohn (1975) estimates that the
amount of energy involved in natural climatic changes is of the order of 100
to 300 TW, suggesting that manmade perturbations of this magnitude could
also produce global-scale climatic changes.
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The maximum amount of electric power generated currently at a single
thermal power station is about 3000 MW(e), and the atmospheric effects of
related heat dissipation rates are not considered serious problems (Hanna and
Gifford 1975). However, proposals to build power parks to generate 10,000
to 50,000 MW(e) on a land area of 5 to 100 km2 in the United States stimu-
lated investigation of the meteorological effects of such large heat releases.
These effects must be estimated on the basis of comparable sources of heat
and moisture, such as islands heated by solar radiation, urban-industrial com-
plexes, forest fires, and volcanic eruptions. It has been suggested that waste
heat release from such power parks would increase cloudiness and precipita-
tion in the area and possibly act as a trigger for severe weather (see e.g.,
Hanna and Gifford 1975).
The impact of waste heat on global climate has been studied using numeri-
cal models ofthe atmospheric circulation. General circulation models (GCMs)
are recognized as the best tools currently available for investigating the global
impacts of perturbations such as waste heat. However, as noted earlier, the
GCMs do have shortcomings that must be taken into account in interpreting
the results of experiments. In particular, the absence of a coupled ocean cir-
culation, the poor treatment of clouds, and hydrological and subgrid scale
processes are seen as shortcomings (Williams 1978a). There are also method-
ological problems in determining the significance of results of experiments.
Washington (1971) used the GCM developed at the (U.S.) National Center
for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) to investigate the response of the model
atmosphere to an addition of 24 W1m 2 over all continental and ice regions.
Results showed a 1 to 2 K increase in global average surface temperature
with an 8 K increase over Siberia and northern Canada. A more realistic
input of heat was used in further studies (Washington 1972) that assumed a
per capita energy usage of 15 kWyrlyr and a population of twenty billion,
with the energy released according to present population density distribu-
tion. It was concluded that the thermal pollution effects were no greater
than the inherent variability (noise level) of the model, illustrating the meth-
odological problems of distinguishing "signal" from "noise" in model
experiments.
In a further experiment with the NCAR GCM, waste heat was added to an
area extending from the Atlantic seaboard of the United States to the Great
Lakes and to Florida (Llewellyn and Washington 1977), assuming that energy
consumption in that area was equal to that presently consumed in Manhattan
Island (90 W/m 2 ). In this case, temperature differences of as much as 12 K
were observed in the vicinity of the anomalous heating, but the authors con-
cluded that the heating had little effect above the surface layer and down-
wind from the source region.
Within the IIASA Energy Systems Program and in cooperation with the
Meteorological Office, United Kingdom, a series of simulations was made
(with the GCM developed by the Meteorological Office) to investigate the
sensitivity of the atmospheric circulation to 150 to 300 TW of waste heat
release from small areas (4.4 X lOS km 2 ) located in the ocean in the north-
ern hemisphere. The principal reason for considering such effectively point
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sources was that with a waste heat input of 150 to 300 TW, a significant re-
sponse of the simulated atmospheric circulation was considered likely if the
input was concentrated in a small area. Earlier model experiments (Washing-
ton 1972) indicated that when 300 TW were equally distributed over all con-
tinental and ice areas, no significant effects could be detected. In addition,
one might give some technological meaning to such point sources, with refer-
ence to the energy island concept, as discussed by Marchetti (1976). Figure
10-2 shows the locations of the heat input and Table 10-1 lists the combina-
tions of point sources and heat inputs used in five simulations.
In four of the GeM simulations, only sensible heat was added to the low-
est layer of the atmosphere. In the fifth simulation, the heat was added to a
10 m deep ocean box modeled beneath each area of waste heat input; when
equilibrium was reached, some of this heat had caused an increase in the
ocean temperature, and both sensible and latent heat were released to the
atmosphere.
Figure 10-3 shows the differences of sea level pressure between the first
simulation and the average of three model control runs that had no waste
heat input. The areas where the signal-to-noise ratio is greater than 5 have
been shaded. There are large coherent areas of sea level pressure change not
only over the areas of heat input but elsewhere in the hemisphere. Other sim-
ulations showed a similar response in the vicinity of the Atlantic heat input,
as can be seen in Figure 10-3 for the first simulation; this gives confidence in
interpreting this response as a significant one.
The details of the various simulation runs and their results are described
by Murphy et al. (1976) and by Williams, Kromer, and Gilchrist (1977a,
1977b, 1979). In short, the results of the five waste heat model runs indicate
that the response of the simulated atmospheric circulation to the input of
waste heat at point sources is not just in the area of input. Moreover, the re-
sponse varies according to the location, amount, and method of heat input.
Another waste heat scenario, the so-called Megalopolis Scenario, was ana-
lyzed at IIASA with the same atmospheric model to study further the re-
sponse of the atmosphere to variations in the method of heat input (Kromer,
\
Table 10-1. Areas and amounts of heat input in five GeM sensitivity
experiments.
Experi-
ment
01
02
03
04
05
Area
A&C
B&C
A only
A&C
A&C
Heat Input (W)
1.5 X 10" at each
1.5 X 10" at each
1.5 X 10 14 at each
0.75 X 10" at each
1.5 X 10 14 at each
Remarks: Total heat input (W)
3 X 10"
3 X 10"
1.5 X 10 14
1.5 X 10 14
3 X 1014 ; heat was added to ocean
box beneath each area rather than
directly to atmosphere
Sources: Experiments 01 to 05 are discussed in detail by Murphy et al. (1976) and by Williams,
Kromer, and Gilchrist (1977a, 1977b).
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Williams, and Gilchrist 1979). In this scenario the heat was released from six
different regions in the northern hemisphere. The selected areas represent
locations where large population and/or large energy consumption densities
could be expected in the future. The assumption that the waste heat release
areas are distributed in a more realistic way over continental areas, rather
than over the oceans as in the earlier simulations, makes the Megalopolis
Scenario results more open to interpretation with respect to the two IIASA
energy demand and supply scenarios discussed in Part IV of this book.
Figure 10-4 shows the geographical distribution of the chosen energy con-
sumption areas in the Megalopolis Scenario. The selected areas were in the
range 4-14 X 105 km 2 , and their heat in puts were chosen in such a way that
the heat released per square meter was the same for each area. Three simula-
tion runs were made for this scenario with total heat inputs of 300 TW (60
W/m 2 ), 50 TW (10 W/m 2 ), and 30 TW (6 W/m 2 ), respectively. This is indi-
cated in Table 10-2.
It was found that when the heat input of 300 TW is spread over six areas,
the hemispheric response is comparable to that when the heat input is con-
centrated at only two energy parks. There is still a large number of areas over
which the signal-to-noise ratio is greater than 5, suggesting that there is a sig-
nificant model response to the megalopolis heat input. A further result is
the strong regional-scale response of some of the megalopolis areas. As in the
earlier model experiments, there are large coherent areas of change in the
meteorological fields such as sea level pressure, not only over the area of heat
in put but elsewhere in the hemisphere.
If the heat input is reduced to 50 TW, the impact decreases only to a small
extent, emphasizing again the strong nonlinear behavior of the model atmo-
sphere. There are also strong similarities in the responses to 50 TW and to
300 TW. A further reduction of the waste heat release to 30 TW seems to
bring the response of the model atmosphere closer to the model variability
or noise level as described by the average of three control simulations.
The results of various NCAR and IIASA atmospheric model studies sug-
Table 10-2. Area size and heat releases in three simulations with mega-
lopolis scenario.
Area Size
Heat Released (TW)
Area (km 2 ) MXOI MX02 MX03
M1 (U.S.) 12 X 10' 72 12 7.2
M2 (Europe) 14 X 10' 84 14 8.4
M3 (USSR) 6 X 10' 36 6 3.6
M4 (India) 4 X 10' 24 4 2.4
M5 (China) 8 X 10' 48 8 4.8
M6 (Japan) 6 X 10' 36 6 3.6
Total 50 X 10' 300 50 30
Source: Based on data from Kromer, Williams, and Gilchrist (1979).
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gest that waste heat is not a problem on the global scale, in that it is unlikely
to perturb the global average climate state in the foreseeable future. We have
seen that only when extremely large amounts of heat (on the order of several
hundred terawatts) were released in small areas could any significant changes
in the model atmospheric circulation be determined. With an energy con-
sumption level of 30 to 50 TW, there appears to be little or no ground for
global concerns regarding the climatic impact of waste heat release.
CLIMATIC IMPACTS OF GASEOUS AND
PARTICULATE RELEASE INTO THE
ATMOSPHERE
Whereas the impact of waste heat release on climate is common to the use
of fossil fuels, nuclear energy, and hard solar energy, there are two other sig-
nificant climatic effects associated with the large-scale use of specific energy
sources. These are the impacts likely to result from a large release of carbon
dioxide and other gases and particles in the atmosphere and from major
changes in the surface characteristics of the earth. The first of these impacts
is dealt with in the next two sections, while the second impact is considered
in the section thereafter.
In addition to waste heat, fossil fuel usage produces certain gaseous and
particulate substances that could interact significantly with the climate sys-
tem. The release of carbon dioxide by fossil fuel consumption has received
special attention recently in view of the physical properties of the gas and
its observed buildup in the atmosphere. Figure 10-5 shows the trend in the
concentration of atmospheric carbon dioxide at Mauna Loa Observatory,
Hawaii, for the period 1958-1974. Since this gas is mixed rapidly through
the atmosphere, this can be taken to represent the global trend. Superim-
posed upon a seasonal oscillation of about 6 parts per million by volume
(ppmv), there is a secular increase in the concentration from about 315
ppmv at the beginning of the period to about 332 ppmv at the end. It is
accepted that part of the observed increase is due to the addition of carbon
dioxide to the atmosphere by the combustion of fossil fuels j it is also argued
that some of the increase is due to the destruction of forest (in particular
tropical) vegetation. Estimates suggest that the preindustrial atmospheric
carbon dioxide concentration was about 290 ppmv. The ultimate sink for
the carbon dioxide added by man's activities is the ocean, but the transfer to
the deep ocean occurs much more slowly than the present rate of addition
to the atmosphere. A continuation of increasing fossil fuel usage and tropical
deforestation would, as far as our knowledge of the complex carbon cycle
(sources and sinks of carbon and transfers between them) is concerned, lead
to a further increase in the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide.
A doubling of the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide, accord-
ing to state of the art climate models, would lead to an increase of the global
average surface temperature of 1.5 to 3K. These numbers could be high or
low because of feedbacks being either not accounted for or incorrectly in-
ENERGY AND CLIMATE 319
Figure 10-5. Atmospheric CO 2 concentration at Mauna Loa Observatory. Sources:
1958-1971 data from Keeling et al. (1976); 1972-1974 from Baes et al. (1976).
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corporated in present models. In any case, regional changes in climate, in
particular those related to precipitation, are of much more significance than
global average surface temperature changes. Both model and observational
studies suggest that polar areas could be more sensitive to a global tempera-
ture increase than areas at other latitudes.
Although the climatic impacts of increasing levels of carbon dioxide have
received considerable attention, Flohn (1978a, 1979) emphasizes that other
gases released by man's activities also have a significant greenhouse effect. In
particular, the impacts of N2 0, CH4 , NH 3 , and freons should not be ne-
glected. The model study of Wang et aI. (1976) has shown that a doubling of
the atmospheric concentrations of N2 0, CH4 , and NH 3 would give surface
temperature increases of 0.7 K, 0.3 K, and 0.1 K, respectively.
Flohn has considered the possible time scale of a global warming due to
the combined greenhouse effects of carbon dioxide and other manmade
trace gases. Starting with an initial carbon dioxide content of 320 ppmv in
the atmosphere, Table 10-3 shows the temperature increase corresponding
to different values of a so-called virtual carbon dioxide content, which is
the actual carbon dioxide content plus an equivalent due to the other trace
gases. Using some recent projections of growth of carbon dioxide (Zimen,
Offermann, and Hartmann 1977), Flohn (l978b) derived the curves illus-
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Table 10-3. Combined greenhouse effect (CGE) and CO2 increase.
Virtual CO 2
Real CO 2 Content (ppmvl
Temperature Content Contribution of Real CO 2 to CGE
Increase (K) (ppmvl 33% 50% 67%
0.5 400 (346) 360 374
1.0 490 (376) 405 432
1.5 580 (406) 450 492
2.0 670 (435) 495 555
2.5 760 (465) 540 615
4.0 1150 (560) 740 878
aparts per million by volume.
Note: Temperature increase was computed using the fixed cloud top attitude version of the
model proposed by Augustsson and Ramanathan (1977). The values in parenthesis refer to a case
where trace gases contribute twice as much to the greenhouse effect as does carbon dioxide, which
is considered unrealistic.
Source: Based on data from Flohn (1978b).
trated in Figure 10-6, which give a time scale for expected temperature
levels at different carbon dioxide growth rates. With a carbon dioxide growth
rate of 3.5 to 4 percent per year, and assuming that carbon dioxide contrib-
utes 67 percent to the greenhouse effect, a warming of 0.5 K due to the
combined greenhouse effect would occur between 1990 and 2000. Even
when the carbon dioxide growth rate is reduced to 2 percent per year, this
temperature level is reached around the year 2010.
Since there are many uncertainties in the results of model studies of the
impact of increasing atmospheric carbon dioxide (and other trace gases)
concentration, and since it is of interest to "predict" the regional climatic
changes, particularly the precipitation changes that could result from such a
potential increase, approaches other than modeling have also been taken
recently. Kellogg (1978) suggests that one way to find out what a warmer
earth might be like is to study a time when the earth itself was warmer than
it is now. As Kellogg points out, such a time existed 4000 to 8000 years ago,
a period referred to as the Altithermal. Evidence for climatic conditions at
that time can be derived, among other things, from data on the distribu-
tion of fossil organisms in ocean sediments and pollens in lake sediments,
from historical data of lake levels, and from data on the extent of mountain
glaciers.
An extension of this approach is made by Flohn (1978b), who suggests
that the "level of perception" for a quasi-global warming would correspond
to a global average surface temperature increase of about 0.5 K. A warming
of 1 K would be equivalent to the early Middle Age period warming (~900
to 1100 A.D.). A warming of 1.5 K would be equivalent to the postglacial
warm period (the Altithermal), which Flohn dates as 5500 to 6500 years
before the present. A warming of 2 to 2.5 K would be equivalent to the last
interglacial period, about 125,000 years before the present. And finally, a
warming of 4 K could lead to a situation in which the Arctic Ocean would be
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Figure 10-6. Temperature thresholds plotted as a function of time and initial CO2
growth rate for two values of the combined greenhouse effect. Temperature thresholds
are derived from a fixed cloud top altitude version of the model proposed by Augustsson
and Ramanathan (1977). Source: Flohn (1978b).
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free of ice; an analogous situation is not known to have occurred during the
previous two million years.
Flohn made a detailed analysis of the climatic conditions during each of
these periods, considering them as scenarios for possible future climates due
to manmade warming. He asks, Can climatic history repeat itself? This is
important because of many recent manmade changes in boundary condi-
tions-e.g., in vegetation, albedo, soil moisture, and atmospheric composi-
tion. These changes might make it impossible to reestablish climate patterns
experienced during earlier warmer periods.
The release of particulate material has also been considered with some
interest, focusing on the release of sulfur and nitrogen compounds that
would probably not have as large a climatic impact as would the above sub-
stances. Particulates are produced both directly as smoke or soot and in-
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directly from gases and sulfates and hydrocarbons. Observational evidence
for changes in particle loading of the atmosphere shows an increase in load-
ing over the previous century, but it is not clear whether this increase is a
regional- or a global-scale phenomenon. The interaction of particles with
radiation and thus their impact on climate depends on complicated absorp-
tion and backscatter characteristics of the particles and on surface and cloud
conditions. It seems that most anthropogenic particles exist over land where
they are formed and are sufficiently absorbing to cause a warming of the
earth/atmosphere system (Kellogg 1978). However, there is no quantitative
evaluation of the role of particles at the present time, owing to a lack of ob-
served data on the nature and distribution of the particles and of appropriate
models. Particles can have further impacts on the condensation/precipitation
process and on the albedo of clouds (Kellogg 1978), but the climatic conse-
quences of these have not been considered in detail.
THE CARBON DIOXIDE PROBLEM AND
FUTURE ENERGY STRATEGIES
Models and input information are required in order to assess the future
atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations resulting from different energy
strategies and their climatic implications. Estimates of the rates of future
use of fossil fuels can be used to describe the input of carbon dioxide into
the atmosphere as a function of time. In order to predict the proportion of
fossil fuel carbon dioxide remaining in the atmosphere, a model of the car-
bon cycle must be used, in which the reservoirs of carbon (atmosphere,
ocean, biosphere) and the transfers between them are considered. The effects
of the increased atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration can then be
assessed using a climate model.
Currently, uncertainties must be attached to the results of each of these
models. For example, in the use of carbon models, much uncertainty has
arisen regarding the role of the biosphere. While it is accepted that part of
the observed increase of atmospheric carbon dioxide content is due to the
combustion of fossil fuels, it has been argued recently that the destruction
of the biosphere has also been adding carbon dioxide to the atmosphere
(e.g., Bolin 1977; Woodwell 1978). Whether the biosphere has indeed been
a source of carbon dioxide and, if so, to what extent is not presently known.
Previously, it had always been assumed that the biosphere was a sink for
atmospheric carbon dioxide, as are the oceans. If it were proved that the bio-
sphere has, at least within the last century, been a source of carbon dioxide,
then revision of the estimates of future atmospheric carbon dioxide concen-
trations based on fossil fuel combustion rates would be required. Similarly,
in the case of climate models, the roles of feedback mechanisms, such as the
cloudiness-temperature interaction, are still uncertain. Because of these un-
certainties, we are unable to predict accurately the future buildup of carbon
dioxide resulting from a given energy strategy and its likely climatic conse-
quences. Nevertheless, the models do give us an idea of the magnitude of
the problem.
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An example involving the use of a carbon cycle model and the results
of a climate model is given by the study of Niehaus and Williams (1979).
The model of the carbon cycle (Niehaus 1976) used in this study simulates
the exchange of carbon and radiocarbon among eight reservoirs. The global
average surface temperature response to the increasing atmospheric carbon
dioxide concentration was assumed from the study of Manabe and Wether-
aid (1967).
Figures 10-7 and 10-8 show two of the several hypothetical energy strate-
gies for the period up to the year 2050, analyzed by Niehaus and Williams
(1979). In Figure 10-7, the energy consumption reaches a level of 30 TW by
the year 2050, the use of fossil fuels peaks around the year 2000, and energy
is supplied after that date largely by solar and nuclear sources. In the second
strategy (Figure 10-8), the energy consumption reaches 50 TW, with the en-
tire demand being satisfied by fossil fuels. Figures 10-9 and 10-10 illustrate
the atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations given by the carbon model
for these strategies, together with carbon dioxide emissions resulting from
the strategies and estimates of the resulting global average surface tempera-
ture change. For the hypothetical 30 TW solar and nuclear strategy of Figure
10-7, the emissions of carbon dioxide peak around the year 2000, as shown
in Figure 10-9. In this case, the atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration
reaches a maximum of 400 ppmv in about the year 2020, and the resulting
Figure 10-7. Hypothetical 30 TW solar and nuclear strategy. Source: Based on data
from Niehaus and Williams (1979).
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Figure 10-8. Hypothetical 50 TW fossil fuel strategy. Source: Based on data from
Niehaus and Willidms (1979).
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Figure 10-9. CO2 emissions, atmospheric CO 2 concentration, and temperature change
for 30 TW solar and nuclear strategy. Source: Niehaus and Williams (1979).
450
Temperature
change (OC)
1.0
C02 Emission
(l09 tC/yr)
10.0
CO2 Emission
>
E 400a.
a.
c:
.2
...
co
...
C 350
(1)
(.,)
c:
o
U
N
o
u 300
E
:i
250
.75 t----t----t--f---+---,f..,.,.........--j7.5
Atm. C02 Concentration
.50 t------1---+-+---;-::......,:..-"\+---I5.0
" ,, \
, ,
, ,
" , ....
I •••••~
.-....,........ ,
~\=-,r---t--~.--++------+-"t----j 2.5
\ .
\ ,
'.'
O '"- ""- ....._......l0
1900 1940 1980 2020 2050
Year
ENERGY AND CLIMATE 325
Figure 10-10. CO2 emissions, atmospheric CO2 concentration, and temperature change
for 50 TW fossil fuel strategy. Source: Niehaus and Will iams (1979).
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change in mean surface temperature is less than 1 K. On the other hand, if
energy consumption reaches 50 TW by the year 2050 and only fossil fuels
are used to supply this energy, then the emissions of carbon dioxide would
keep increasing all along, giving an atmospheric carbon dioxide concentra-
tion of 800 ppmv in 2050 and a mean surface temperature increase of about
4 K (Figure 10-10).
Although the results of the above model studies are subject to many un-
certainties and cannot be taken as reliable predictions, still they illustrate the
magnitude of the carbon dioxide problem. Within the limitations of our
present knowledge, it is seen that depending on the energy strategy followed,
the climate impact due to carbon dioxide buildup over the period of the
next fifty to seventy years could remain small-that is, much less than 1 K-
or it could become as large as 4 K.
POSSIBLE CLIMATIC IMPACTS OF LARGE-
SCALE SOLAR ENERGY DEPLOYMENT
If solar energy is called upon at some time in the future to meet a large frac-
tion of man's energy needs, it would be able to do so mostly through the
deployment of hard solar systems such as those based on solar thermal elec-
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tric conversion (STEC), photovoltaic (PV), and solar satellite power (SSP)
applications. Of these, the SSP systems are considered a remote possibility,
and their climatic impacts have not yet been evaluated. Other solar energy
conversion systems (e.g., wind, wave power, hydroelectric power, biomass,
OTEC) can be used locally in favorable situations, but are not expected to
contribute greatly to the global energy requirement and therefore cannot be
expected to have a global climate impact. (See Chapter 5 for a discussion of
the hard solar option for meeting future global energy requirements.)
The possible climatic impact of the large-5cale deployment of solar energy
systems has received little attention in the literature. A IIASA workshop
held in 1976 examined the physical characteristics of the conversion sys-
tems, assessed their impact on boundary conditions of the climate system,
and discussed the climatic implications of such impacts. The workshop find-
ings are described by Williams, Kromer, and Weingart (1977).
STEC and PY Systems
Large-scale deployment of STEC and PV systems would lead to regional
changes in the surface heat balance, surface roughness, and hydrological
characteristics. The climatic impacts of such changes in the earth's surface
characteristics have not been investigated in detail, but a few relevant studies
are available that at least indicate the kinds of impacts that could be ex-
pected. For example, in a series of model simulations, Charney, Stone, and
Quirk (1975) used the GCM developed at the Goddard Institute for Space
Studies to compare the simulated atmospheric circulation occurring with
albedo values of 0.14 and 0.35 in the Sahel area of West Africa. They noted
a decrease in precipitation and convective cloud cover as a response to an
increase in albedo. Similar experiments made by Ellsaesser et al. (1976) with
a zonally averaged model further supported Charney's hypothesis. In their
later, more refined experiments with the GCM, Charney et al. (1977) ob-
served that in an area where appreciable evaporation from the surface occurs,
an increase of albedo reduces the absorption of solar radiation by the ground
and, consequently, the transfer of sensible and latent heat to the atmo-
sphere. The resulting reduction in convective cloud cover tends to compen-
sate for the increase of albedo by allowing more solar radiation to reach the
ground, but it reduces the downward flux of longwave radiation even more,
so that the net absorption of radiation by the ground is decreased. Without
evaporation, the increase of albedo causes a decrease of radiative flux to the
ground and thus a decrease of convective cloud and precipitation. Two fur-
ther results of the work of Charney et al. (1977) are of significance. First,
changes in evaporation rate are as important as albedo changes. Second, ob-
servable effects can be expected when the characteristic time for a change in
the surface flux of moist static energy to penetrate to cloud base is smaller
than the time required for new properties to be advected into the region.
This suggests a minimum dimension of the albedo change area of 40 to 80
km for observable effects.
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A local atmospheric circulation mode developed by Berkofsky (1976)
also showed that the vertical circulation and thus cloudiness and precipi-
tation responded to surface albedo changes in desert areas. In particular,
this model showed that a lowering of the surface albedo in a desert region
could lead to increased vertical velocity and possibly to increased rainfall.
Jager, Chebotarev, and Williams (1978) have discussed the surface energy
balance changes due to STEC systems. Their analysis shows that STEC sys-
tems do not really change the magnitude of the net heat flow from the
surface to the atmosphere, but the mechanism of transfer is changed; the sig-
nificantly lower heat release from the surface is compensated by a release of
waste heat from cooling towers upon energy conversion. In this context
some impacts of STEC systems on climate can be evaluated in the same way
as the potential impact of waste heat from fossil fuel combustion or nuclear
power plants.
One preliminary experiment to evaluate the impact on global climate of
STEC systems was made by Potter and MacCracken (1977). The model used
is a zonally averaged model-that is, it considers a two dimensional (latitude-
height) climate system. A scenario for albedo modification due to intensive
solar energy production, derived by Grether, Davidson, and Weingart (1977),
was used as input to the model. This scenario considered a world population
of ten billion with a per capita energy requirement of 10 kWyrIyr and as-
sumed that the generation of 100 MW(e) would require a reflector area of
3 km 2 (this is an overestimate in order to account for the effects of access
roads, population increases, etc., in the collector region) and a total land area
of 9 km 2 . It was suggested that a rough estimate of the albedo change due to
STEC facilities could be obtained by assuming that an area equal to the total
reflector area has become completely black. Thus the new albedo is approxi-
mately two-thirds of the natural albedo in a region of intensive solar energy
conversion. Figure 10-11 shows the land area assumed by Grether, Davidson,
and Weingart (1977) to be devoted to STEC facilities.
Using this scenario, Potter and MacCracken (1977) modified the zonally
averaged albedo in the model within the zone 50° N to 40° S correspond-
ingly. No other surface boundary conditions were altered (e.g., runoff, evap-
oration, and surface roughness), even though these could also be influenced
by the large-scale deployment of STEC systems. Figure 10-12 shows the
latitude-height distribution of change in atmospheric temperature between
the case with STEC-related albedo changes and the control case of the
model. As might be expected, the troposphere warmed because of the in-
creased absorption of solar radiation. The maximum warming occurred over
the latitudes of largest coverage of solar facilities in the given scenario. Potter
and MacCracken also analyzed the latitudinal distribution of precipitation
change for the land area in each zone and found that the maximum increase
in precipitation occurred in the subtropics of the Northern Hemisphere.
The results of the above experiment should be considered preliminary be-
cause of the rather simple assumption made in the scenario of Grether,
Davidson, and Weingart (1977) regarding the effective change in boundary
conditions. As was pointed out by Jager, Chebotarev, and Williams (1978)
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Figure 10-11. Land area assumed by Grether, Davidson, and Weingart (1977) to be
devoted to STEC facilities in a 100 TW solar scenario.
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and discussed earlier in this section, the large-scale deployment of STEC
facilities is likely to change the local energy balance rather than the albedo,
in particular because of the release of waste heat. Also, the effects of a
zonally averaged albedo change were investigated within a zonally averaged
model; it is difficult to extrapolate the results in order to evaluate the im-
pacts of regional energy balance changes on the general atmospheric circu-
lation. Nevertheless, the results show that impacts are possible on the scale
of the scenario illustrated in Figure 10-11.
Very little is known about the potential impact of changes in surface
roughness over large areas. In atmospheric GCMs a drag coefficient, which
takes into account surface roughness, is used for computing horizontal stress
components and the vertical fluxes of sensible heat and water vapor in the
surface boundary. A limited number of experiments have been made with
GCMs to investigate the impact of changes in the drag coefficient. The re-
sults of these experiments were briefly reviewed by Williams (1977) and
suggest that the changes can have an impact on climate patterns. Similarly,
the potential impact of large-scale changes in surface hydrological charac-
teristics also deserves attention, as the results of model studies (e.g., Walker
and Rowntree 1977; Barry and Williams 1975) have recently confirmed the
importance of large anomalies in surface wetness in influencing the atmo-
spheric circulation. However, as yet no scenarios of changes in surface rough-
ness and surface hydrological characteristics relevant to large-scale deploy-
ment of STEC facilities have been studied.
A series of simulations has been made jointly by the Stanford Research
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Figure 10-12. Latitude-height distribution of difference in temperature (degrees K)
between model case considering 100 TW solar energy conversion and control case.
Source: Potter and MacCracken (1977).
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Institute of IIASA, using a "mesoscale" model of the atmosphere devel-
oped by Bhumralkar (1977) to investigate the regional impact of a STEC
facility (~30 GW(e» on the meteorological conditions in southern Spain.
The model is two dimensional and considers a horizontal plane 400 km long
and a vertical plane 8 km high. The model solves equations for the atmo-
spheric processes within this domain and predicts the changes in such meteo-
rological variables as cloudiness, precipitation, and atmospheric temperatures
due to a change in the surface energy balance.
For this project, the changes in surface energy balance were assumed to
be due to the installation of a STEC facility. The changes are attributed to
optical losses and absorption of solar radiation by mirrors, energy losses at
the central receiver, piping and storage losses within the STEC facility and,
finally, to waste heat release at cooling towers during energy conversion.
Figure 10-13 shows the location of the hypothetical STEC facility that
has been considered in the experiments. As indicated in the inset to this
figure, the STEC plant is assumed to have a horizontal dimension of 32 km,
which implies an area of 1024 km2 . In order to investigate the changes up-
stream and downstream of the STEC plant, a grid 400 km long is considered
with the STEC plant in the center. As also indicated in the figure, it is as-
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sumed that the STEC plant is aligned SW-NE, which is the direction of the
prevailing wind. The temperature, humidity, and wind data required for ini-
tial conditions of the model run were compiled from a number of meteoro-
logical observing stations whose locations are also indicated.
Two sets of model runs were investigated. In the first set, a perturbed run
(with STEC) and a control run were started with initial conditions for a July
day, while in the second similar set, the two runs were started with initial
conditions for a January day. After several hours of simulation time for each
run, the regional climatic conditions in the perturbed and control runs be-
longing to the same set were compared. It was concluded from the results of
these simulation experiments that the installation of the STEC plant caused
in the summer case an earlier and more persistent cloud formation than in
the unperturbed case. The unperturbed control case indicated a sea breeze
situation in which clouds form later in the day and move quickly oceanward
rather than remaining over one area. A small increase in humidity resulting
from the installation of the STEC plant was also observed in the winter case,
although the prevailing wind in this case was strong enough to prevent any
development of cloud cover over the land.
Although these experiments have been of a preliminary nature and con-
fined to one region only, they do suggest the possibility of regional-scale
meteorological impacts of STEC installations of a few tens of gigawatts. (The
potential impact of PV systems is generally considered to be similar to that
of STEC systems.) Such investigations need to be expanded considerably to
cover different regions with different climatic conditions and a range of
STEC capacities. The global-scale climatic impact of STEC (and of other
solar systems) is of concern for a more distant future since, as discussed in
Chapter 5, the hard solar systems will probably not reach a high level of
deployment (tens of terawatt level) until sometime in the later half of the
next century in view of various economic, technological, and market pene-
tration constraints.
IMPLICATIONS FOR ENERGY POLICY OF
THE CLIMATE CONSTRAINT
Currently, there are many uncertainties about the specific climatic impacts
of the large-scale deployment of any of the major energy supply sources. It
seems likely, however, that the global impacts of waste heat and changes in
surface conditions will be felt in the more distant future than those from
changes in concentration of carbon dioxide and certain other infrared-
absorbing gases. In recent years, most concern has centered on the carbon
dioxide question. The question is whether present knowledge of the carbon
cycle and the climate system justifies changes of existing energy policies.
The IIASA Workshop on Carbon Dioxide, Climate and Society (Williams
1978b) concluded that mankind needs-and can afford-a period of between
five and ten years for vigorous research and planning to narrow uncertainties
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sufficiently to be able to decide whether a major shift away from fossil fuels
is called for because of the climatic implications.
Participants at the IIASA workshop formulated a number of policy state-
ments that can, to a large extent, be taken as a general statement on the
interaction between energy policy and climate research at the present. The
main points of these policy statements are as follows:
• Quantitative estimates on the rates of increase of carbon dioxide (and
other infrared-radiation-absorbing molecules) in the atmosphere, and
resulting global and regional climate changes are uncertain and are likely
to remain so for most of the next decade. Thus, it is premature to imple-
ment at this time policy measures requiring the reduction of the use of
coal and other fossil fuels. Present knowledge justifies comprehensive
study of many alternative energy supply systems, but does not yet war-
rant a policy of curtailment offossil fuel use.
• Policies emphasizing the use of coal (because of its great abundance) in
preference to nonfossil (non-carbon-dioxide-producing) energy supply
systems are at present equally unjustified. Since such policy decisions
can become difficult and very costly to reverse, it is most important to
maintain flexibility in energy supply policies at this time.
• Climatological impact assessments of escalating energy use must be per-
formed in greater depth than in the past.
• Systems that allow ready environmental amelioration must be consid-
ered. Such systems would have to be either nonpolluting (or very nearly
so) or lead to environmental effects that can be easily mitigated. There
are several possible systems that can satisfy these conditions, including a
solar-hydrogen or a hydroelectric-hydrogen system, an energy supply
fueled largely by synthetic methanol manufactured at energy islands
using nuclear (breeder) or hard solar energy supply, or very highly decen-
tralized solar energy supply systems.
• Systems employing a short-time recycling of carbon through the atmo-
sphere can also be considered. For example, the use of biomass as a fuel
is a possibility. Stripping carbon dioxide from exhaust stack systems and
even from the atmosphere itself is in principle feasible, and the manufac-
ture of methane or methanol from the carbon thus obtained would be an
effective "recycling" system. The carbon could also be stored in the
living biomass or in the deep ocean.
THE IMPACT OF CLIMATE ON ENERGY
SUPPLY AND DEMAND
In terms of the impact of climate on energy supply, climate can influence
the research and/or the exploration for energy sources. For example, explor-
atory drilling for oil in the Gulf of Mexico entails climatic problems quite
different from those on the North Slope of Alaska (Critchfield 1978). Selec-
tion of sites for power stations also requires climatic considerations. The
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roles of different climatic variables are of particular significance for solar,
wind, and hydroelectric power sources. For this reason, programs such as the
U.S. National Insolation Resource Assessment Program have been established
in order to collect, record, and archive climate data useful to the forecaster
and researcher. Local climate also influences the method, materials, timing,
and costs of both constructing energy supply facilities and transporting en-
ergy (e.g., routing of colliers and tankers; highway and railway maintenance).
The impact of climate variation on supply is mainly through the impact
on such renewable resources as wind, biomass, and solar systems, although
transport of other energy sources can be affected by anomalous climate con-
ditions. Droughts have been noted to influence hydroelectric power supply.
For example, the drought in the northeast United States during the period
1961-1966 reduced flow rates of rivers and reservoir levels; New York City
reservoir levels were reduced to 40 percent of their capacity in 1965 (Critch-
field 1978).
As far as the impact of climate variability on energy demand is concerned,
it has been shown, for the United States at least, that the increasing use of
air conditioning and electric heating in homes has increased the sensitivity of
energy demand to temperature changes. Mitchell et al. (1973) computed the
seasonal total heating degree-days for each state of the United States and for
each of the forty-two heating seasons from 1931-32 to 1972-73. The study
allowed an estimate of climate influences on heating fuel demand. Results
showed that in one year out of one-hundred years one should expect a
national total demand for heating fuel to exceed the long-term average de-
mand (for constant economy) by as much as 10 percent. Similarly, the
demand can be expected to exceed its average demand by at least 3.6 per-
cent on an average of one heating season in five. Of course, when one part of
the continent is colder than average, it is not unusual for other sections to be
warmer than average. The probable extreme deviations are larger when re-
gions are considered, especially in the southern and Pacific states. For
example, for the South Atlantic states, in one year out of one-hundred years
one should expect a total demand for heating fuel to exceed its long-term
average demand by 20.4 percent. To the extent that fuels are not readily dis-
tributed from one part of the country to another, the study was significant.
An examination of the record of winter accumulations of heating degree-
days revealed that the greatest accumulation occurred over the northern
United States and Canada during the winter of 1935-36 (Beltzner et al.
1976). It was estimated that large areas of the northern United States and
Canada would have had an increased fuel consumption of 50 percent or
more in February 1936.
One further interaction between climate and energy demand and supply is
in the field of forecasting. Here it is difficult to draw the line between
weather and climate. In a discussion of the sensitivity of energy demand to
weather influences, the value of a forecast of an extreme event, based on
climatological data, was pointed out (see Critchfield 1978). Similarly, it was
shown that small temperature forecast errors cause extra millions of cubic
feet of natural gas to be required by moderate-sized cities to protect against
334 ENERGY IN A FINITE WORLD
optimistic but false forecasts during cold weather. The above two examples
serve to illustrate the need for the use of climatological data for developing
statistics to aid in forecasting energy demand.
There are a large number of interactions between climate and energy sys-
tems. Many correlations between the two systems have been observed, but
much work is still required. In particular, an adequate theory of existing
climate and the ability to predict future climatic variability are required.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In order to supply energy to satisfy a medium- to long-term demand of
several tens of terawatts, three primary energy sources are available-fossil
fuels, nuclear, and solar. Each of these sources can influence the climate
system-by the emission of waste heat, by changing concentrations of atmo-
spheric constitutents, or by changing surface conditions.
Model experiments suggest that waste heat releases would have to be ex-
tremely large-of the order of 100 TW-in order to perturb global average
climatic state. This is not to say, however, that regional changes would not
occur with waste heat emissions from an energy supply of 20 to 50 TW.
Likewise, changes in surface characteristics, such as albedo, roughness, or
wetness, would have to be on a large scale in order to affect climate on the
global scale, but could have impacts on local or regional climate even when
such changes are relatively small.
As for the carbon dioxide problem, because of the large uncertainties in
the present knowledge of the carbon cycle, it is not possible to quantify with
a high degree of certainty the possible buildup of carbon dioxide in the
atmosphere due to continued large-scale reliance on fossil fuels over the next
fifty years. If the generally held "views" on the magnitudes of sources and
sinks and transfer rates of carbon dioxide are accepted, it appears that the
atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide may increase by 20 to 100 per-
cent over the next fifty years, depending on the global level of energy con-
sumption and the extent of reliance on fossil fuels.
The corresponding increase in global average surface temperature would
be in the range 0.5 to 2 K. However, one should not expect the same tem-
perature changes in all parts of the globe-some areas would experience
greater and some smaller changes. Additionally, there would be regional
changes in other climatic variables-of particular significance is rainfall.
Nevertheless, in view of the present uncertainties in quantifying the ef-
fects of carbon dioxide, it seems premature to recommend only those energy
strategies that actively discourage the use of fossil fuels. At the same time, in
view of the probable climatic implications of increased concentration of car-
bon dioxide in the atmosphere, it would be unwise to build future energy
strategies that continue to rely greatly on the use of fossil fuels. A prudent
policy, in our opinion, would be to have sufficient nonfossil options incorpo-
rated in the energy supply system over the next few decades so as to allow
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expansion from that base, if necessary, as the effects of carbon dioxide be-
come better quantifiable through further research.
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11 RISKS AND STANDARDSIN ENERGY SYSTEMS
INTRODUCTION
All known energy options, and thus any energy supply mix, have associated
with them risks to human health and safety and to the environment. Such
risks arise both because of the possibility of accidents in the energy facilities
(e.g., dam failures, sinking of underground mines, explosions in various
plants) and because of the gradual environmental degradation that goes along
with even the normal operation of such facilities (e.g., emission of carbon
dioxide, sulphur dioxide, and other hazardous gases into the atmosphere;
increase in radiation level; spillage of oil either at sea or on land).
The assessment of such health and environmental risks is an extremely
important part of formulating future energy strategies. Therefore, this chap-
ter discusses a variety of techniques for, first, understanding more precisely
the nature of such risks and, second, understanding how, in formulating
energy strategies, the scientific analysis of risks might be incorporated along
with economic analyses, analyses of public preference, and other relevant
analyses.
In 1974, a Risk Assessment Project was established jointly by the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and IIASA to increase understanding
of the risks of energy systems. A risk assessment framework was developed
that distinguished three elements of the assessment process-risk estimation,
risk evaluation, and risk management-as shown in Figure 11-1.
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Figure 11-1. Risk assessment framework.
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The estimation process deals with the identification and the quantification
of the risks that might be associated with operating a technological system.
The main outputs of the risk estimation studies are quantified consequences
(e.g., increase in illness and deaths) and their probability distributions as
applicable to different groups of the affected population.
Risk estimation is by far the most studied aspect of risk assessment. As
such, the IIASA effort did not concentrate on research in this particular
field.
Once the risks associated with different energy options have been esti-
mated, the problem becomes one of comparing the risks, first, with each
other and, second, with other important energy system attributes (e.g., capi-
tal and operating costs; reliability of supply). Such comparisons are complex
because the risks and attributes of concern differ in so many ways. They
may be fundamentally different in nature (e.g., nuclear proliferation risks
versus the risk of more frequent power blackouts); they may have very dif-
ferent probability distributions (e.g., the relatively low probability associ-
ated with a serious nuclear accident verus certain carbon dioxide increase
associated with burning fossil fuels); or they may affect different populations
(e.g., occupational risks versus public risks, risks to current generations
versus those to future generations, or the global risks of carbon dioxide in-
crease versus the local risks near liquified natural gas [LNG] terminals). In
order to decide whether one particular energy mix is preferable to another,
a process for comparing such a varied collection of risks and attributes is
needed. It is this process that we refer to as risk evaluation.
Ultimately, how one evaluates different risks, how one compares cancer
incidence to the incidence of black lung disease or a near-term increase in
power blackouts to a long-term increase in global carbon dioxide, will
depend on one's personal values or preferences. Thus, there can be no single,
objectively correct procedure for evaluating risks. However, there exist a
variety of techniques that can aid in understanding, first, how to systemati-
RISKS AND STANDARDS IN ENERGY SYSTEMS 341
cally apply one's own values to a complex, multidimensional choice among
energy systems and, second, how to better analyze the values held by others
and possibly incorporate such values in energy policy decisions. It is these
techniques that are addressed in this chapter. They include risk-benefit
analysis, cost-effectiveness analysis, a procedure for measuring and analyzing
public attitudes toward energy systems, and an examination of preference-
based evaluation procedures known variously as decision analysis, risk-benefit
analysis, and multiattribute utility measurement.
Risk management refers to the organizational and political aspects of the
environmental management of energy systems. It involves the pragmatic
problems that arise when competing groups, which most likely disagree on
both the estimation and the evaluation of risks, actually try to negotiate and
implement an energy strategy. Note that since risk evaluation techniques
often also involve the political decisionmaking process, the line between risk
evaluation and risk management is not always as sharp as suggested by
Figure 11-1. At IIASA, standard setting was studied as one important part
of risk management. This research focused on the dynamics of regulatory
agencies setting standards for energy systems. In the following sections we
discuss separately the three components of the risk assessment process as
related to energy systems.
RISK ESTIMATION: IDENTIFICATION
AND QUANTIFICATION
Four categories of information are needed to describe the risks from the use
of a technology, both for planned operations and for unplanned occurrences
-events (e.g., emissions, accident sequences, wind direction) and the proba-
bility of their occurrence; the consequences of these events (e.g., health
effects, property damage); the distribution of consequences within the popu-
lation affected; and the uncertainties in these estimates. The data base for
these four categories establishes the objective portion of any risk assessment
study, although there is often a certain degree of subjectivity introduced by
the judgments of technical experts. Also, since there is no natural law spec-
ifying how these data are to be aggregated, there can be no really objective
unified measure of risk. This problem of aggregation will be dealt with more
fully in the risk evaluation section. Here we concentrate on approaches to
estimating risks.
There are two types of methods for obtaining data in each of the four
categories. In the first of these one examines frequent events of well-
established technologies, using statistical means to analyze historical data. An
example of such an event is the continuous release of pollutants from a
normal technological operation: here the reliability of the data source is a
crucial issue. Problems may arise in the definition of test population versus
control population, the sampling procedure, background noise, correlation
versus causal relation, and competing risks. Nevertheless, statistical methods,
based on actual data, are often judged to lead to the most reliable results. In
reality, however, many of these problems are often insurmountable.
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As will be discussed later in the chapter, the greatest uncertainties in esti-
mating energy systems risks arise in the case of coal, which has the longest
documented history of all commercial primary energy carriers.
However, when the events of concern are very infrequent or have associ-
ated with them major consequences, it is neither possible nor desirable to
estimate risks by just waiting for sufficient historical data to accumulate. Put
another way, we can no longer base the development of a technology on trial
and error, which is equivalent to hypothesis and experiment in science. With
the implementation of technical systems on a global scale, man has entered
the domain of "hypotheticality" (Hafele 1975) where it is no longer accepta-
ble, at the level of the complete system, to correct a hypothesis by the out-
come of an experiment. This applies both to accidents in large, modern
technical installations such as LNG terminals or nuclear power plants and to
routine emissions from well-established technologies such as carbon dioxide
emissions from fossil-fueled power plants.
For these sorts of risks a second approach to risk estimation is needed.
The second type of method estimates low frequency risks (see e.g., Gumbel
1938)-risks thl'lt, in principle, can be predicted usually on the basis of an
extrapolation from statistical data. Examples of such methods are fault- and
event-free analyses as well as computer simulation models for determining
failure rates of various facility components (e.g., pumps, automatic control
systems, pipes, valves, vessels). Information on the reliability of the system
elements is usually available, and from this one can estimate the performance
rate of special equipment composed of such elements. The behavior of the
total system is then synthesized. Since so many different event paths are
possible, those paths contributing significantly to the risk are identified, and
both their probability of occurrence and consequence distribution are
estimated. Generally, such results follow smooth curves with decreasing
probabilities of occurrence for increasing serious consequences. As sug-
gested in studies by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (1975a) and
by Farmer (1967), the total density function is important for a complete
estimation of risks.
However, methods falling in this second category have certain shortcom-
ings. First, only those failures and event sequences that can be envisaged by
experts can be included. In this context, common-mode failures pose par-
ticularly severe problems. Another limitation is that human failures, especially
under stress, are difficult to quantify (USNRC 1975a). Most studies of this
sort are therefore based essentially on extrapolation techniques requiring
expert judgment. Since the probability of many event sequences is as low
as 10-6 per year, there are no historical data with which to verify the
analytical results.
RISK EVALUATION
The risks associated with energy systems include direct and indirect effects
on human health; damage to property; impacts on social institutions and
social relations; and environmental impacts on the biosphere, the atmosphere,
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the oceans, and the land. Moreover, different risks will vary in terms of their
probability distributions (e.g., high frequency versus low frequency), their
geographic distributions (e.g., global versus regional), and their demographic
distributions (e.g., occupational versus public). Comparing alternative energy
systems therefore requires some set of procedures for comparing different
risks in all their different dimensions. It is these procedures that we address
here under the heading of risk evaluation.
In Chapter 10, the research that has been done on large-scale risks associ-
ated with climatic change was discussed. However, past research has more
often focused on human health risks, particularly fatality risks, and it is
principally these risk categories that are discussed here.
Average Fatality Risks of Various Human Activities
Starr, Greenfield, and Hausknecht (1972) suggest the average risk of acquir-
ing a fatal disease as a yardstick for determining acceptable risk levels, since
it has been demonstrated that the risks of many accepted technologies have
been gradually reduced to this level (Starr, 1969). This risk Starr found to
be 10-6/person per hour. Pochin (1977) has compared the individual risks of
various human activities by normalizing them to a fatal risk value of 10-6 .
For example, three weeks of factory work in the clothing industry or only
three hours of work in the mining industry each result in the probability of
one fatality in one million; likewise, traveling either by automobile for 100
km or by airplane for 500 km has an associated fatal risk of 10-6 .
Of course, average expected values will vary greatly among people and cir-
cumstances. Also, such averages may mask important differences in the
probability distributions of the accidents from which they were derived.
Quantified Health Risks of Energy Systems
We now consider the human health risks associated with energy systems. The
order of magnitude of these risks may be seen from estimates of the human
health impacts due to electricity production in the United States in 1975. In
that year, for the total population there were between 2000 and 19,000
deaths and between 29,000 and 48,000 diseases (Hamilton and Manne
1977).
In Table 11-1 we give quantitative estimates of human health risks associ-
ated with 1 GWyr of electricity production for five primary energy sources-
coal, oil, natural gas, nuclear (light water reactor), and solar thermal. These
estimates are based largely on statistics published by the U.S. Department of
Labor and on various assessments reported in the literature.
However, in some cases (e.g., the public health effects of sulphur dioxide,
particulates, and radiation exposure) the data are based on a linear, non-
threshold extrapolation from high level, acute exposures. For each energy
system, estimates are also made of the relative impacts of the various stages
in the fuel cycle. Because of a lack of quantitative or even good qualitative
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One of the references cited for Table 11-1 is the Canadian Atomic Energy
Control Board's report by Inhaber (1978), a report that has attracted
strong criticism. While the only Inhaber results that are incorporated in
Table 11-1 are those having to do with occupational health effects
during construction, we feel that we should include here some supple-
mentary data to Table 11-1. Presented below are the results from the
Atomic Energy Control Board report along with the results of J.P.
Holdren's critique (Holdren et al., 1979) of that report. The numbers
attributed below to Holdren are the results of his trying to reproduce
Inhaber's numbers using Inhaber's methodology. As is evident, there are
some important inconsistencies between Holdren's results and Inhaber's.
Unfortunately, we received the Holdren report too late in the editing
process to incorporate into this chapter a proper treatment of his work.
Still, we feel that the unresolved disagreements are important and
that the reader should be aware of them, even if only in the rough form
that we have been able to present them here.
Person-days Lost/GWyr(e)a
Energy Cycle Occupational Public
Solar Thermal
Inhaber 62,000-100,000 9400-520,000
Holdren 7400-15,000 1000-2700
Nuclear (LWR)
Inhaber 1700-8700 300-1500
Holdren 3100-12,000 300-70,000
Coal Electric
Inhaber 18,000-73,000 20,000-2,000,000
Holdren 19,000-43,000 20,000-1,500,000
Oil
Inhaber 2000-18,000 9000-1,900,000
Holdren 3000-19,000 9000-1,000,000
aOne fatality was assumed equivalent to 6000 person-days lost except for coal workers, in
which case a fatality was assumed equivalent to 1000 person-days lost.
data, estimates could not be made for certain power plant emissions. For
example, it is known that mercury, nickel, arsenic, and vanadium (or some
of their compounds) are toxic to humans and animals, but the impact from
the release of 7 tons per year of each of the first three elements from coal-
fired plants or of 2000 tons per year of vanadium from oil-fired plants are
not included in Table 11-1. Similarly, the table does not include the impacts
of radioactive emissions from fossil fuels, the emission of methane and other
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hydrocarbons from oil- and gas-fired power plants, and oil lost in spillage
(USAEC 1974).
The data in Table 11-1 were normalized to estimate the effects of supply-
ing 1 GW(e)yr, and they can thus be readily scaled to various levels of
energy demand. These data can be used to illustrate how the choice of elec-
tricity supply systems influences economic costs and health. The following
illustration is for the United States. In 1977,28.5 GW(e)yr was supplied by
nuclear power plants (Nuclear News 1978). If the same amount of electricity
had been supplied by coal-fired plants, mean estimates from Table 11-1 sug-
gest that accidents would have caused 114,000 more man-days lost for
workers, 47,000 more man-days lost for the public, about sixty more occu-
pational deaths, and ninety more public deaths, as well as some two hundred
more deaths from coal-workers' pneumoconiosis and ninety to six hundred
more public sector deaths from sulphur dioxide and particulates emissions.
Further, the additional economic costs of using coal would have amounted
to nearly $1.4 X 109 because of the necessarily higher fuel and environmen-
tal control expenditures. Similarly, using either oil or gas instead of coal to
supply this amount of electricity would have more than doubled the direct
economic cost increases (given for coal) and would have also cost more than
nuclear in terms of occupational and public sector injuries and deaths.
Using the data from Table 11-1, we illustrate in Figure 11-2 the health
effects, in both the occupational and the public sectors, resulting from both
accidents and fatal diseases. In plotting this figure we have assumed that one
fatality is equivalent to 6000 man-days lost for workers (or 1000 man-days
lost for coal workers because of pneumoconiosis) in order to be able to
sum fatalities and injuries. It can be seen that, numerically, coal and oil
would have the largest impacts on the health of the public sector, while coal
and solar thermal systems pose the greatest health risk to the worker.
We recognize the large uncertainties in these estimates. Nevertheless, the
uncertainties shown in Figure 11-2 would not prevent a definite ranking of
systems. The ranges given in Figure 11-2 for public health effects are based
on two S02 models cited in Hamilton and Manne (1977). The largest uncer-
tainties occur for public health effects from the use of coal and oil, and the
range of uncertainty is about six times the lower estimate (see box on page
346). Also, the recent Ford Mitre study concluded: "Despite these large
uncertainties, the general conclusion is that on the average new coal-fueled
power plants meeting new source standards will probably exact a consider-
ably higher cost in life and health than new nuclear plants" (Ford 1977:
196).
Such comparisons are weak, and more research is needed to improve the
data base so as to narrow down the uncertainties and perhaps to incorporate
those uncertainties that cannot be incorporated in a single parameter for
measuring risks.
Low Probability, High Consequence Events. The numbers shown in Table
11-1 and Figure 11-2 are expected values. Thus, within each of the cate-
gories in Table 11-1, no distinction can be made between contributions due
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to low probability, high consequence events and those due to high probabil-
ity, low consequence events. However, much concern has been expressed
specifically about events that fall into the former category-low probability
and high consequence. We therefore examined some of the possible risks of
some natural and man-made events, plotting frequency versus magnitude
of distribution as shown in Figure 11-3.
As can be seen from Figure 11-3, an accident that would kill ten or more
people at the Canvey Island petrochemical plants is about two orders of mag-
nitude less probable than other types of accidents that also result in ten or
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Figure 11-3. Frequency of events causing more than N early fatalities for some man-
made and natural events and estimates for similar events from five petrochemical plants
on Canvey Island and from five and one hundred nuclear power plants (NPP) located at
current sites in the United States. Source: Curves for petrochemical plants and for nuclear
plants based on Canvey Island Study (1978) and USN RC (1975a), respectively. Data for
natural hazards and manmade events are derived from statistical analyses of past events.
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more fatalities (excluding nuclear power plant accidents), For larger acci-
dents, the risks from the Canvey Island plants are in the range of other large
accident risks. The risks from one hundred nuclear power plants located in
the United States at current sites are estimated to be two to four orders of
magnitude lower than the risks posed by the plants on Canvey Island.
For the nuclear power plants, the analysis was based on data for system
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components from approximately 200 commercial reactors that together have
some 1400 reactor years of operation. Of course, this is not a sufficient data
base since one accident resulting in ten or more early deaths in the public
sector is expected to occur only once in about three million reactor years
(see Figure 11-3). Nevertheless, the data are adequate for analyzing the
failure rates of the system components, which occur at a much higher rate.
Some additional comments on the Rasmussen Report are in order here.
Since its publication in 1975, the report has been considered by a number of
reviewers, including the Lewis Committee (Risk Assessment Review Group
1978). According to the committee, the uncertainties in the estimates are
understated, but the committee was not able to decide whether the median
values given were too high or too low. Leverenz and Erdman (1975) also
judged the uncertainties in this way, but concluded that the median values
would be lower than those given in Figure 11-3. Although both reviews gave
different quantitative statements in a number of instances, in general they
supported the overall findings of the Rasmussen Report.
A major difficulty in making direct comparisons among data of this type
is that in order to make an accurate comparison of such risks, one needs a
common reference point. One possible solution would be to normalize the
risk of different activities to a common level of social benefits. Such a risk-
benefit evaluation seems desirable for social decisionmaking, and therefore
in the next section we treat this subject in more detail.
Comparisons of Energy System Risks and Benefits
Once it has been established that a specific risk is not out of proportion with
other risks, technologies can be compared by normalizing their risks to a
common measure of social benefits. We refer again to our estimates of health
risks from different electricity supply systems as given in Table 11-1. There,
the benefit of supplying 1 GWyr of electricity was taken as a common basis
for comparing the health risks of the five energy sources. Additional benefits
may be assigned to different systems, based on the different costs of elec-
tricity production and some additional difficult to quantify attributes such
as supply reliability and diversification. In this section, however, we consider
only the production costs.
The cost directly accounted for by the utility operating, say, a power
plant is known as the internal costa and reflects the production cost for gen-
erating one unit of electricity. Since the data on internal costs and health
effects of various electricity supply systems, even when normalized to the
common benefit of supplying one unit of electricity, cannot be compared
directly, their costs and risks need to be expressed in common units. This
poses the difficult task of assigning a monetary value to a human life. Lin-
nerooth (1975) has considered the following approaches to determining such
values:
aData on internal costs of various power plants are given in Table 17-4.
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• Human capital-life is evaluated as the discounted future earnings of
those at risk.
• Insurance-life is evaluated on the basis of individual life insurance
decisions.
• Court awards-awards made by courts to compensate for loss of life are
used as the basis for life value figures.
• Implicit value-life is valued according to the values implied by past
policy decisions to reduce mortality risks.
• Willingness to pay-values risk reduction by the public's willingness to
pay for it.
Applying some of the above approaches to the present situation in the
United States, the monetary value assigned to one human life comes out to
be about $300,000.b This value reflects a trade-off between the objectives
of maximizing GNP and of reducing risks and is therefore only meaningful in
the context of risk-benefit analysis. Linnerooth (1977) has suggested that for
different applications this value be weighted in order to reflect the character-
istics of the specific risk situation.
For illustration, the following calculations are made assuming a monetary
value of $300,000 per human life. At an average expected work loss of 6000
man-days per fatality, this is equivalent to $50 per man-day. In the case of
injury or illness, society loses the productive work and also incurs expendi-
tures; therefore, a total value of $100 per man-day is used (Sagan 1976).
With these values, the health effects can be expressed in monetary equiva-
len ts-namely, external costs. Table 11-2 compares the total (internal plus
external) costs of supplying electricity from different types of plants. A
definite ranking of the alternative electrical supply systems can be made on
the basis of total costs listed in the table. Since the external costs are all
much smaller than the differences between the indicated internal costs, the
ranking based on total costs turns out to be the same as that determined by
the internal costs alone. The last line of Table 11-2 shows external costs as a
percentage of the total costs.
The external costs in Table 11-2 indicate that nuclear power would cost
$420,000 (equivalent to about one fatality) per GW(e)yr less than any other
fuel system. The ordering by external cost would change if different mone-
tary values for a human life were assigned for each fuel system to account
for the differing natures of various risks. For example, this value would have
to be increased to $700,000 per human life for a nuclear system in order to
make its external cost equivalent to that of a gas system and to $57 X 106
million per human life to make it equivalent to that of a coal system.
It is appropriate at this stage to say a few words about the external costs
of energy systems that are associated with low probability, high consequence
accidents-a source of much public concern. In the preceding section we dis-
bSimilar considerations if applied to different countries and regions would lead to different
monetary value assignments for human lives. Appropriate values should therefore be selected on
national bases for use in cost-benefit analysis.
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Table 11-2. Costs of electricity generation (106 $/GWyr(e)).
Type of Cost Coal Oil Natural Gas LWR Solar/STEC
Internal 154 256 216 136 297
External 3.5-10.1 1.0-2.8 0.65 0.21-0.23 1.4-1.8
Occupational health 1.6-2.2 0.69 0.37 0.16-0.17 1.3-1.6
Public health 1.9-7.9 0.31-2.1 0.28 0.01-0.02 0.06-0.20
Major accidents 0.04a
Total 158-164 258 217 136 298
External (as %of total) 2.2-6.2 0.4-1.1 0.3 0.15-0.17 0.5-0.6
aThe expected values for costs of health effects due to major LWR accidents contribute insig-
nificantly to their external costs:
12
13
8400
1400
8400
27,000
Societal costs ($/GWyr(e))
"Acute" deaths
"Acute" illnesses
Latent cancers
Thyroid nodules
Genetic effects
Property damage
"Acute" as used here means either death within thirty days or illness occurring within thirty days.
Health costs are based on $300,000 per human life and $100 per lost working day. Societal costs
of major LWR accidents are based on data from USNRC (1975a), assuming fifty man-days lost per
illness and fifty man-days lost per case of thyroid nodules.
cussed the probabilities of such events occurring in nuclear power plants and
petrochemical facilities and then plotted these probabilities together with
those associated with several different man-caused and natural events. It
turns out that such low probability, high consequence accidents have an
insignificant effect on a cost-benefit analysis of the kind presented above. As
can be seen from the footnote to Table 11-2, the expected value of acute
deaths due to a large nuclear accident would contribute only about $12 per
GW(e)yr, whereas both the external and the internal costs in the table are
given in millions of dollars. Clearly, then, using a multiplicative combination
of low probabilities and high consequences to derive expected values does
not reflect public opinion.
On the other hand, the public appears to take little interest in the carbon
dioxide problem (see Chapter 10 for a discussion of this subject). Yet simu-
lation studies have shown that an increase in the average global temperature
of up to 1 K might be caused by the release of carbon dioxide from a fossil
fuel consumption of about 700 TWyr over the next fifty years. An elec-
tricity production level of 1 GWyr based on fossil fuel plants would make a
fractional contribution of about 4 X 10-6 to this temperature increase. The
effects of such an increase in global average temperature are difficult to
quantify, as they would differ regionally, and resulting climatic trends in
one area might be exactly the reverse of trends in another area.
RISKS AND STANDARDS IN ENERGY SYSTEMS 353
An important effect would be climatic changes affecting agricultural pro-
duction. Bach (1978) estimated that an average temperature increase of 1 K
might lead to a reduction in global food production of 1 to 3 percent. Al-
though there are large uncertainties involved in these estimates, they could
still be helpful for a rough risk-benefit analysis of fossil fuel consumption.
By means of a stepwise probability function, and with only changes greater
than 0.2 percent being considered significant, the expected loss of food pro-
duction is estimated at about 0.3 percent.
In order to compare this reduction to the low probability nuclear acci-
dents just discussed, let us assign to it a monetary value as follows. The
expected loss of food production is estimated as about 0.3 percent. For a
risk-benefit analysis, this reduction must be evaluated in terms of its mone-
tary value. Assuming an average annual global food production equivalent to
$1 X 1012 (about 15 percent of the gross world product in 1975), the ex-
pected agricultural loss from 700 TWyr of fossil fuel consumption would
amount to $3 X 109 per year. If this reduction were to last for a period of
thirty years, the total expected food production loss caused by fossil fuel
consumption equivalent to 1 GW(e)yr (or 3 GW(th)yr) would be about
$43.5 X 105, a number much higher than the risk value calculated for major
nuclear accidents given in Table 11-2. Again, the message is that compari-
sons of risks based on expected values and the sorts of monetary values
assigned here do not necessarily reflect public opinion.
Cost Effectiveness of Risk Reduction
By comparing risks and benefits as described above, it is possible to compare
technical options in terms of their aggregated effects on society. But since
any technology can always be made safer at higher economic cost, one must
address the question of how safe is safe enough? (Starr 1969). Recognizing
the limited resources that society has to allocate to safety, it seems reason-
able to distribute efforts for risk reduction among the most cost-effective
alternatives. Such a procedure does not lead to an absolute limit for an
acceptable risk, but to standard values for the marginal cost of risk reduc-
tion. In the nuclear field, for example, a monetary value of $1000 is tenta-
tively assigned to the reduction of one man-rem of radiation exposure risk
(USNRC 1975b). Table 11-3 gives a comparison of marginal risk reduction
costs, ranging from $30,000 to more than $1 billion per life saved. It appears
that the low probability, high consequence accidents are associated with
higher marginal costs per life saved. The quoted value of $1000 per man-rem
reduction implies marginal costs of $10 million per life saved.
It is generally assumed that the economic law of diminishing returns is
applicable to risk reduction-that is, the marginal cost of risk reduction
would increase with the level of safety achieved (USEPA 1976, Niehaus and
Otway 1977). This implies that any limit on safety represc:nts an arbitrary
trade-off between the objectives of achieving highest safetyl and of minimiz-
ing economic costs, since the risk could be reduced below any given value
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Table 11-3. Marginal costs of risk reduction.
Cost per Life
Saved ($ 70·)
Food poisoning control
Automobile seat belts
Fire control in high rise flats
50% flue-gas desulphurization applied to
coal-fired power plant with
30 m stack
120 m stack
Nuclear plants with
Recombiners
6 charcoal beds
12 charcoal bedsb
Iodine treatmentb
Remote siting
0.03
0.3
40
0.2
2.5
17a
43 a
300a
1000a
10,000a
aBased on one fatal effect per 10' man-rem.
bproposed but not implemented.
Source: Based on data from Niehaus and Otway (1977); Sagan (1976); and USEPA (1976).
with sufficient expenditures. However, this law is applicable only if one
considers just the partial system (e.g., the power plant alone) and neglects
the fact that a power plant is part of the total economic system. In fact, the
components of the safety equipment have to be produced in various
branches of industry, implying an occupational and public risk associated
with their production. Using accident statistics of industry and economic
input-output tables, it is possible to calculate the total risks to workers in-
volved in the production of goods and services with regard to a specific eco-
nomic structure. This method is similar to that used for energy accounting
(Niehaus 1975). The same methodology could be applied, in principle, to
public risk calculations. Representative data are not available, but such risks
would most likely be in the same range as the occupational risk. Calculations
for the FRG (Black, Niehaus, and Simpson 1979) show that for each $109
worth of machine tool products and electrical equipment, there result 8.2
deaths due to occupational accidents and to accidents while commuting and
52,000 lost working days.
If safety equipment consists principally of these products, then by using
the equivalence of one fatality and 6000 man-days, this may be aggregated
to either roughly seventeen deaths or 105 lost man-days per $109 worth of
safety systems. By including the risk to the public, the production of $3 X
107 worth of safety equipment would be associated with one fatality.
Marginal expenditures for safety at rates greater than $3 X 107 per life
saved would therefore lead to increased rather than decreased risks. Conse-
quently, for determining the minimum risk to be associated with a given
technology, one should consider the maximum expenditure for safety that is
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to be involved. The value of $3 X 107 per life saved is obviously exceeded
in certain cases in Table 11-3.
Before moving on to the next section, some comments are in order about,
first, the cost effectiveness calculations just described and, second, the gen-
eral risk-benefit approach discussed in this and the previous section.
First, the cost effectiveness calculation fails to incorporate at least two
factors of importance. It makes no distinction between a death caused now
in producing safety equipment and the expectation of saving one life during
operation of the facility. Furthermore, we estimate that $3 X 107 worth of
safety equipment costs society not only one life but also 600 man-years of
work. Thus, the figure of $3 X 107 per life saved could use some refine-
ment. But for the moment it serves, on the one hand, to illustrate the use of
cost effectiveness calculations and, on the other, to give a perspective on the
order of magnitude of a reasonable maximum limit for safety expenditures.
More generally, the risk-benefit calculations of these last two sections have
several generic weaknesses, some of which we have already alluded to. For
example, expressing risks in terms of expected values does not allow a dis-
tinction to be made between a low probability, high magnitude risk and a
high probability, low magnitude risk with an identical expected value. Yet
such a distinction may be critical if one wants to accurately reflect the social
costs that we, as a society, seem to attach to different risks. Another
observation that was made earlier is that monetary values derived for a par-
ticular situation in a particular country are not necessarily transferable to
other situations or countries. These and other limitations are discussed more
fully in the reference literature. In our presentation here we have attempted
mainly to illustrate the methods and to show the order of magnitude of the
results that they produce.
Publ ic Preferences
As noted, there seems to be a large discrepancy between the results of risk-
benefit calculations as described above and the public perception of these
risks. The question therefore arises of how one might examine more directly
the preferences of various public groups. There are essentially two methods:
revealed preferences-that is, the retrospective examination of the manifest
choices made by society in similar situations in the past-and currently ex-
pressed preferences obtained directly through interviews or questionnaires.
Revealed preferences are often derived from national level statistics (see
Pochin 1977). Otway and Cohen (1975) point to the difficulty of extracting
from these statistics the underlying reasons for past risk behavior. Further-
more, the method assumes that those at risk had good information about the
risk (for which the statistics were obtained at a later period). And finally,
using past behavior as an indicator for future behavior does not seem justi-
fied in rapidly changing industrial societies, especially since the sometimes
militant rejection of technologies is, to some extent, also a rejection of the
decisions and the decisionmaking process of the past.
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In order to gain insight into public perception of risks from different
energy supply systems, the Joint IAEA/IIASA Risk Assessment Project
concentrated on measuring and analyzing expressed preferences. The atti-
tude concept was used because, within the repertoire of established social
science methodologies, "risk perception" seemed best defined as an attitude
toward a particular risk situation. Also, attitude is a well-defined concept.
The attitude-behavior relationship has been clarified (attitude predisposes
a person to behave consistently to form a characteristic behavioral pattern),
and attitude can be measured as a function of the beliefs held about the
object of the attitude (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975). Thus risk perception may
be defined as an attitude and the determinants of risk perception as the
beliefs held about the attitude object, where beliefs are the "learned" associ-
ations between the attitude object and some set of characteristics or
attributes. It is the total number of "salient" beliefs-that is, beliefs within a
person's attention span at any given time-that determines his or her atti-
tude. The number of salient beliefs is usually judged to be between five
and nine.
The model that we used was developed by Fishbein and his associates
(Fishbein 1963; Fishbein and Ajzen 1975). It assumes that the strength of
belief, weighted by the evaluation of the attribute (i.e., the goodness or
badness of the attribute), can be summed to form a measure of attitude.
These variables can be measured using questionnaires. By aggregating the
responses of individuals, it is possible to determine the beliefs and values of
different social groups.
In order to explore the underlying determinants of attitudes toward the
use of five alternative energy systems (nuclear energy, coal, oil, solar, and
hydroelectric power), we applied this attitude measurement technique to a
stratified, heterogeneous sample (n = 224) of the general Austrian public
(Thomas et al. 1980a). The beliefs examined in the questionnaire were based
upon an earlier pilot study by Otway and Fishbein (1976); a total of thirty-
nine determinants (attributes) were used, and emphasis was given to the
perceptions of the subgroups (n = 50) most PRO and most CON nuclear en-
ergy. Detailed analyses of results specific to nuclear energy have been re-
ported by Otway and Fishbein (1977) and by Otway, Maurer, and Thomas
(1978).
Table 11-4 shows the mean attitudes of the PRO and CON nuclear groups
toward each of the five energy supply systems. The groups essentially were in
agreement with respect to hydroelectric and solar power, but there were
statistically significant differences for the other sources. The largest disagree-
ment concerned the use of nuclear energy. Figure 11-4 shows the smoothed
frequency distributions over attitudes for the whole sample, and some dis-
tinct differences among attitudes about the five energy sources may be seen.
Solar and hydroelectric power have almost identical distributions, with
mostly positive attitudes. Coal and oil also have identical distributions, but
with more negative attitudes than for solar and hydroelectric power. The
shape of the nuclear distribution, in contrast, is almost trimodal, with clus-
ters in the area of neutral attitudes and at the extremes.
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Table 11-4. Mean values of attitude of those PRO and CON nuclear energy
toward five energy sources (possible attitude scores range from -15 to 15).
Nuclear Solar Hydro
PRO (N = 50) (10.2) 12.2 12.3
CON (N = 50) (-10.1) 11.1 11.2
Significance of differ- Not Not
ence among groups significant significant
Coal Oil Alia
8.3 9.7 10.6
6.2 3.1 7.9
Significant Significant Significant
at 5% level at 1% level at 1% level
a All energy sources except nuclear.
Source: Based on Thomas et al. (1 980a).
Beliefs held by the public with respect to the use of nuclear energy were
then subjected to a factor analysis in order to identify the determinants of
differing perceptions. Factor analysis identifies the minimum number of
independent dimensions needed to account for the variance of the larger set
of intercorrelated variables. In this case, the set of intercorrelated variables
consisted of the thirty-nine beliefs about the use of nuclear energy that com-
prised the questionnaire.
The thinking of the respondents toward nuclear energy was characterized
by four belief dimensions-psychological aspects (anxiety inducing); eco-
nomic and technical benefits; sociopolitical implications; and environmental
and physical risks. Table 11-5 lists those of the thirty-nine beliefs that
characterize these four dimensions. Table 11-6 shows how these dimensions
contributed to the PRO and CON attitudes of the groups concerned. The
attitudes of the PRO group were largely determined by the positive contribu-
tion made by beliefs about economic benefits and the perceived absence of
Figure 11-4. Smoothed frequency distribution of attitudes toward energy sources.
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Table 11-5. Belief dimensions and most characteristic belief items about the
use of nuclear energy.
Psychological Aspects
Exposure to risk without my consent
Accidents that affect large numbers of people
Exposure to risk that I cannot control
Threat to mankind
Risky
Economic and Technical Benefits
Increased living standard
Increasing Austrian economic development
Good economic value
Increased national prestige
New forms of industrial development
Sociopolitical Implications
Rigorous physical security measures
Production of noxious waste
Diffusion of knowledge for construction of weapons
Dependency on small groups of experts
Transport of dangerous substances
Environmental and Physical Risks
Exhausting our natural resources
Increasing occupational accidents
Water pollution
Air pollution
Making Austria dependent on other countries
Source: Based on Thomas et al. (1 980a).
environmental risks; the negative attitudes of the CON group were deter-
mined mostly by their concern about psychological aspects and sociopoliti-
cal implications.
Problems of policymaking often arise because of different perceptions of
risks by experts, policymakers, and the general public. In many instances, it
can be assumed that the policymakers rely more or less on the experts'
opinions, with some modifications dictated by political considerations.
Table 11-6. Contributiona of belief dimensions to PRO and CON attitudes
about nuclear energy.
Belief Dimensions
Psychological aspects
Economic benefits
Sociopolitical implications
Environmental and physical risks
PRO Nuclear Groupb
-1.6
3.4
-1.2
1.8
CON Nuclear Groupb
-6.4
0.2
-3.2
- 1.4
aContributions can range from +9 to -9.
bAli differences between PRO and CON groups significant at 1 percent level.
Source: Based on Thomas et al. (1 980a).
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However, the public has become increasingly suspicious of both experts and
policymakers. Therefore, we attempted, first, to compare the perceptions
of policymakers and the general public to risks from nuclear energy and,
second, to test the accuracy of the policymakers' perceptions of public
positions on this controversial topic.
The respondents of this study (Thomas et al. 1980b) were a group of
senior civil servants (n = 40) who were in a position to influence policy in a
ministry responsible for energy matters. The measuring instrument was the
same used earlier to measure the attitudes and underlying beliefs of the
Austrian public sample. The "policymakers" completed the questionnaire
twice-once with respect to their own positions and, on the second occa-
sion, in the role of a typical member of the Austrian public who was either
PRO or CON the use of nuclear energy.
The policymakers' own attitudes toward the use of nuclear energy were
found to be significantly more favorable than those of the total public
sample. In terms of the four factor structure described earlier, this was
primarily because the policymakers' beliefs about the psychological (anxiety-
inducing) aspects made a significantly smaller negative contribution to
attitude and their beliefs about environmental risks made a significantly
larger positive contribution. The policymakers were able to shift their own
(personal) responses in the directions indicated by their role-playing assign-
ments to accurately reproduce the overall attitudes of the PRO and the CON
groups, although there was a tendency to overestimate the positive attitudes
of the pronuclear group. In terms of the underlying belief dimensions, there
was a significant failure to recognize the extent to which issues of psycho-
logical significance contributed negatively to the attitudes of both PRO and
CON public groups. The policymakers underestimated the negative values
that both groups assigned to these risks as well as the extent to which the
public believed that nuclear energy would lead to such risks. In summary,
anxiety-inducing psychological aspects made a smaller negative contribution
to the personal attitudes of the policymakers; likewise, the policymakers
seriously underestimated the anxiety-inducing potential that nuclear energy
had for both PRO- and CON-nuclear groups.
Multiattribute Utility Measurement. There is no simple way of combining
the "hard" numbers of the formal risk-benefit studies previously mentioned
with the relatively "soft" numbers reflecting public attitudes and preferences
as discussed in the preceding section. Nevertheless, it would be useful for
decisionmakers to have some quantitative evaluation reflecting varying
emphases on the above two types of risk analysis. Such evaluations can be
carried out using multiattribute utility theory (Keeney and Raiffa 1977)-a
decision-theoretic methodology for evaluating alternatives on the basis of
a set of different attributes, some of which may have natural numerical
measures and others of which may be rather "soft" variables. In multi-
attribute utility measurement, the value-relevant objectives are listed, and a
measurable attribute is then associated with each objective. Value functions
are constructed, reflecting the decision maker's relative preferences, and
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weights are assessed characterizing the relative importance the decisionmaker
gives to each attribute. Finally, values and weights are aggregated (usually by
a multiplicative or additive model) to come up with an overall evaluation.
Our research on the possible use of multiattribute utility measurement
in risk evaluation was largely exploratory. For example, in one experiment
we applied this method to the problem of evaluating nuclear waste disposal
sites (Otway and Edwards 1977). Public attitudes were treated as one
attribute of the many aspects that decisionmakers intended to consider. The
results showed, first, that the procedure is feasible to the extent that
decisionmakers can make orderly judgments of the sort required for utility
measurement and, second, that there was reasonable agreement among
various judgments as to the importance of weights.
Methodologies such as multiattribute utility measurement are generaliza-
tions of the rather restrictive risk-benefit approaches discussed earlier.
Cost-benefit analysis is, in a sense, a special case of multiattribute utility
measurement in which all attributes are expressed directly in monetary
terms. As has been noted, such conversions (e.g., the value of human life) are
hardly straightforward and are very much open to criticism.
RISK MANAGEMENT: STUDIES ON
STANDARD SETTING
The identification, quantification, and evaluation of the potential risks of
energy systems are prerequisite to the difficult task of risk management-
namely, the translation of analytic results into policy and regulatory deci-
sions. The policy tools available include market approaches (e.g., emission
taxes, incentives), regulations (e.g., safety and emission standards), and more
severe direct intervention such as the banning of certain activities (Majone
1978).
Of the available tools for reducing environmental risks and hazards, stan-
dard setting has emerged as the most practical and commonly used. Since the
late 1960s, environmental and regulatory agencies worldwide have issued
numerous standards-for example, for sulphur dioxide emissions from coal-
fired plants and for radiation from nuclear plants. And what has emerged
as a powerful tool for risk management has also become a major constraint
for industrial operations and a driving force for technical development. Espe-
cially for the energy sector, standards have started to shape long- and short-
term decisions ranging from operational decisions about single plants to
long-term planning of optimal energy mixes.
The interest of the IIASA Energy Systems Program in standards as a major
risk management tool was triggered by a series of modeling efforts to analyze
present and future supply-demand structures. (See the discussion of these
supply-demand considerations in Part IV of this book.) The nuclear option
was studied in detail (see Chapter 4), including analyses of all (normal opera-
tion and accidental) risks and hazards involved in the large-scale use of
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nuclear energy (Avenhaus, Hafele, and McGrath 1975, 1977). The question
was asked, Which environmental burden(s) of nuclear energy systems could
be tolerated and what should be the criteria for limiting them at both the
individual and the societal level?
Mixed energy strategies were also analyzed, taking into account environ-
mental constraints. Nordhaus (1977) developed a two sector model with a
constraint for the upper limit of the global carbon dioxide content. Agnew,
Schrattenholzer, and Voss (1979) analyzed the effects of different standards
for sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and other pollutants on the cost of
alternative energy systems. At this stage nothing was said about the appro-
priate-that is, socially acceptable-numerical inputs in the form of standards
and the like. They were simply treated as parameters of the problem, as had
been done by other modeling groups (e.g., Hoffman 1972).
At the next stage, we proceeded to determine equilibrium states and cost-
optimal strategies for parametrically fixed constraints. The question was how
to reach such equilibrium states under given social conditions, considering
the institutional and political realities of environmental decisionmaking and
regulations, and in particular, the realities of standards and standard-setting
procedures.
It was clear from the beginning that an investigation of the political and
social nature of standard setting required appropriate analytical tools. A
study was made of public policymaking under uncertainty and with con-
flicting interest groups and objectives, with risks and impacts of a large scale,
and with only limited possibilities for traditional experimental and incre-
mental approaches. The initial literature survey on analytical approaches and
procedures for standard setting led to research in legal studies (e.g., NAS
1975); environmental economics (e.g., Baumol and Oates 1975); policy
analysis (e.g., Holden 1966; Majone 1976). The tools considered were cost-
benefit analysis (e.g., Karam and Morgan 1975); simulation and simulation
gaming (e.g., Birr et al. 1976); decision theory (e.g., Raiffa 1968; Howard
1968); and game theory (e.g., Luce and Raiffa 1957).
Based on the expertise of the researchers and on their judgments of the
limits and possibilities of these different analytical approaches, several deci-
sions were made. First, the study of standard-setting procedures should use
actual cases and involve interaction with real decisionmakers. Second, two
main lines of case-oriented research should be pursued-policy analyses of
continuing or past standard-setting processes with a largely descriptive and
problem-oriented focus and development of decision and game theoretical
models with a descriptive and normative focus, the latter for aiding regula-
tory decisionmakers in standard-setting tasks.
Three cases of past standard setting were studied-radiation standards,
chronic oil discharge standards, and noise standards. Folllowing the analysis
of decisionmaking processes in these examples, two decision-theoretic
models were developed. The salient features of these models and their appli-
cation to two specific cases of relevance to energy systems will be described
later in this chapter. However, we will begin our presentation by first trac-
ing the historical evolution of radiation standards.
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A Brief History of Radiation Protection and
Nuclear Safety Standards
A look at the historical development of radiation protection standards, as
documented by the International Committee on Radiation Protection
(ICRP), points to the complexity of setting environmental protection stan-
dards. It demonstrates the need for procedural and organizational efforts in
standard setting and also how paratechnical "political" issues interact with
the standard-setting process.
The harmful effects of radiation became known in 1896 when skin burns
were correctly traced to the newly discovered X-rays. Initial attempts to
establish radiation tolerance limits by measuring exposure with photographic
emulsions-a procedure still widely used-data back to 1902 (Taylor 1971 j
Serwer 1976). Efforts to provide radiation protection were made by the
British Roentgen Society in 1915, and the first sets of radiation protection
recommendations were developed from 1920 to 1922 by a committee of the
American Ray Society. In 1925, Mutscheller first quantified a "tolerance
dose" as 1 percent of the threshold erythema dose, amounting to about 6 R
per month or 70 R per year.
In 1928, the Second International Congress of Radiology formed an
International Committee on X-ray and Radium Protection, which later
became the ICRP. Because of difficulties in developing an international
consensus of opinion, national committees were formed with more than one
individual per country allowed to become members of the ICRP. The maxi-
mum recommended dose levels in the 1930s were about 0.1 to 0.2 R per
day or about 25 to 55 R per year. Until then, all biological evidence had
shown this level to be safe for an individual. By 1940, however, the genetic
studies of Hermann Muller indicated that doses of about 50 R to large parts
of the population might produce harmful genetic effects (Muller 1940).
In 1948, the U.S. National Commission for Radiation Protection (NCRP)
approved a more sophisticated concept, lowering the permissible limit for
the blood-forming organs of radiation workers to 0.3 R per week (or about
12 to 15 R per year), but allowing higher limits for older persons and, in
extreme cases, single doses of 25 R. Internal exposure arising from incorpo-
rated radionuclides was also taken into account in the 1940s, when maxi-
mum permissible body burden was set as 0.1 fJ. Ci Ra.c Also, the concept of
risk-benefit was introduced in the field.
In general, until the mid-1950s the goal of radiation protection was
mainly to eliminate the risk of those radiation effects showing a threshold
in their dose response relationship (nonstochastic effects). Protection would
be guaranteed when the total dose in any organ or tissue, from all sources,
was kept below the threshold. The common exposure limit at that time-0.3
R per week-was judged sufficient to prevent nonstochastic effects.
In 1955, the ICRP introduced the remd as the dose equivalent unit (ICRP
cll Ci Ra is a microcurie of radium.
dThe dose in rem is the product of the dose in rad (R) and a factor called the relative biological
effectiveness (RBE) of the radiation used. The rem is taken to be that dose for any radiation that pro-
duces biological effects in man equivalent to 1 R of X-rays.
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1977). Obviously, 0.3 rem per week could lead to an accumulation of 750
rem over a working lifetime of fifty years. This dose, distributed over a long
time, was not expected to be harmful, but there was concern expressed that
there may be additional stochastic effects (e.g., cancer and genetic harm)
for which recovery might playa less important role at continued exposure at
low dose levels. In 1956, the ICRP recommended a weekly dose equivalent
of 0.1 rem to be used for planning, corresponding to an annual dose of 5
rem. All these limits referred to occupational exposure, but in 1956,
ICRP recommended that there also be a dose limit for the public of 0.5
rem per year. These limits are still valid today, although their meaning has
undergone subtle modifications. Figure 11-5 shows the gradual decrease in
radiation limits over the years. No further decreases are expected in the fore-
seeable future.
The related topic of safety standards for nuclear power plants was again
publicly debated in the 1960s. While previously the safety-standard-setting
process was largely determined by the exchange of expert opinion in com-
mittees, now increasingly public pressures and political considerations
entered the process. What once appeared as a purely technical and scientific
issue now became a procedural and methodological one. This led to consid-
Figure 11-5. Evolution of radiation standards with time. ICRP is the International
Committee on Radiation Protection. NCRP is the U.s. National Commission for Radia-
tion Protection.
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erable redundancy in the area of nuclear standards (including safety stan-
dards, equipment performance standards, engineering design standards). A
catalogue by Fichtner, Becker, and Bashir (1977), for example, lists about
2700 nuclear safety standards, rules, and regulations, which by the end of
1976 had been developed in thirty-one countries by 145 different organiza-
tions and institu tions.
Obviously, the implementation of such standards, or the licensing delays
caused by a lack of standards, can substantially increase the costs of con-
structing and operating nuclear facilities. The precise costs are difficult to
quantify, but expenses for a large nuclear power plant not in operation can
run as high as $0.5 to $1 X 106 per day. With capital costs for a 1200
MW (e) LWR block of the Biblis type approaching (and in some cases exceed-
ing) the $1 X 109 mark, licensing costs at 5 percent amount to about $5 X
107 per unit. Much larger (estimated at 20 to 30 percent of total costs) are
the costs due to backfitting changes during construction, which could be
substantially reduced with proper standards. These costs far exceed the
expenses for standard development. Other factors that affect the cost of
meeting standards and that therefore have to be considered by the standard-
setting governmental or nongovernmental organizations include the consis-
tency of national standards and their agreement with international standards,
dissemination, transparency, and accessibility, as well as degrees of legal
relevance (Winterfeldt et al. 1978).
Policy Analysis of Some Past
Standard-Setting Processes
Most standards are set by national or international committees of experts
from industry, science, and governmental organizations. However, the grow-
ing public concern about risks and hazards from energy systems necessitates
that this voice be more clearly heard. In order to clarify involvement of
various parties in the standard-setting process, several environmental
standard-setting cases were studied, and interviews were conducted with
experts, governmental and industrial representatives, and members of public
interest groups.
Two cases of past standard-setting processes were studied in detail-
chronic oil discharge standards for offshore oil production platforms in the
United Kingdom (Fischer and Winterfeldt 1978) and noise standards for
trains (the Shinkansen system in Japan) (Winterfeldt 1978a). Chronic oil dis-
charge standards were set on the basis of equipment availability, costs, and
performance. The reason for this technical orientation in standard setting
was that biological information on the effects of low level hydrocarbon con-
centration in the seas is still sparse. Noise standards for trains, on the other
hand, were set almost exclusively on the basis of noise complaint relation-
ships, with the goal of setting a standard at a noise level that would limit the
number of complaints. Available technical and cost data were more or less
ignored.
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The two cases differed greatly in national definitions of standards and the
legal basis on which standards are issued. While chronic oil discharge stan-
dards in the United Kingdom were set on the basis of the "best practical
means" principle, noise standards in Japan were set as environmental quality
standards-that is, targets or desirable goals for the future without direct
binding force.
The case of radiation protection standards provides a further example of
how definitions of standards can differ. In 1955, the ICRP recommended
that "every effort be made to reduce exposure to all types of ionizing
radiations to the lowest possible level." This wording was changed in 1958
to a recommendation that all doses be kept as low as practicable; and, in
1965, that all doses be kept as low as is readily achievable, economic and
social considerations taken into account. In 1973, it was suggested that the
word "readily" should be replaced by "reasonably". Such differences in
definitions, together with the different institutional setups and organiza-
tional constraints, appear to shape the outcome of standard-setting pro-
cedures substan tially .
There are, however, some important similarities among the different cases
that were studied. In every case there are three main groups of "actors" in-
volved in standard setting:
• The regulator-members of environmental agencies or other institutions
with the task of setting and enforcing standards.
• The developer-industrial organizations and construction firms whose
activities are regulated by standards.
• The "impactees"-those groups of people or public interest groups who
would benefit from standards.
Besides these core actors, there are usually international organizations in-
volved in standard setting, as well as scientific experts from outside the gov-
ernmental or industrial sphere (i.e., from universities or independent research
institutes).
All these groups have different, often conflicting, objectives and interests.
The regulator usually has important political objectives (e.g., consistency
with international and national environmental policies), and the developer
typically focuses on cost considerations, while the impactee's interests are to
reduce potential impacts and risks from the construction and operation of
the systems involved.
Decision Models for Standard Setting
After examining past standard-setting processes, we used what we had learned
to develop two decision-theoretic models for aiding regulatory agencies in
standard setting. We assumed that only three actors/decisionmakers-the
regulator, the developer, and the impactees-were needed to describe the
standard-setting process. However, since the process generally involves inter-
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action among the actors, with possibilities of learning and adaptation at
various stages, its description requires a multistage game theory approach. A
game theory decision model was developed at IIASA by Hopfinger and
Avenhaus (1978) (see Appendix llA for the model description). The model
treats multiple stages in which the transitions from one stage to another are
probabilistic either because of probabilistic changes in the environment or
because of probabilistic responses of the players. This model was applied to
standard-setting problems of carbon dioxide concentrations in the environ-
ment (Hopfinger 1978) and to noise levels from Shinkansen trains (Hop-
finger and Winterfeldt 1978). Here, we will discuss only its application to
setting carbon dioxide standards.
In addition to the multistage model mentioned above, a simplified one
stage decision-theoretic model was developed at IIASA by Winterfeldt
(1978a). The model was applied to the problem of chronic oil discharges in
the North Sea (Winterfeldt 1978b), since a multistage model would not have
been suitable. The use of both models is discussed in the following sections.
Dynamic Standard Setting for Carbon Dioxide. As discussed in Chapter 10,
carbon dioxide emissions in the atmosphere because of fossil fuel com-
bustion are increasing at an alarming rate, and concern has been expressed
about possible global climate impacts. However, neither the physical
processes associated with the carbon cycle in the atmosphere nor the natural
variations of the average atmospheric temperature are sufficiently under-
stood to allow accurate predictions of climatic effects.
Given these substantial uncertainties about the climate, decisions about
energy supply systems are of particular importance. In the research described
here, this problem was viewed as a conflict situation among the following
three groups-governments, producers emitting carbon dioxide, and popula-
tions. The problem was analyzed by Hopfinger (1978), who adapted the
multistage decision model that had been developed by Hopfinger and Aven-
haus (1978).
In order to reflect the global aspects of the problem, the three parties to
the game were taken as (1) the regulator, an international agency; (2) the
producer, an organization of all producers; and (3) the impactees, everyone
who would suffer from a climatic catastrophe. Internal conflicts among
different governments, different producers, or different population groups,
such as possible conflicts between groups from developed and developing
countries, were neglected. It was further assumed that a continuous increase
of atmospheric carbon dioxide beyond a critical value would lead to
irreversible catastrophic climate changes.
The states of the game are characterized as follows:
{(C,L,k) I Cp ~ C ~ 0, L ~ 0, k ~ o}
where C is the amount of atmospheric carbon dioxide, L is the upper bound
of carbon dioxide emissions during a period, Cp is the maximal amount of
carbon dioxide if all fossil fuel were to be burnt, and k is the critical value
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for the catastrophe. We considered k a parameter since its precise value is not
known.
Let (C I , L I ) denote the first state. C I can be assigned the value of the
current amount of atmospheric carbon dioxide, and L1 that of the current
maximal emission of carbon dioxide. At each of the following stages, a
component game of perfect information is played that is completely speci-
fied by a state. The player's choices control not only the payoffs but also
the transition probabilities governing the game to be played at the next
stage. Each player has his or her own subjective estimate of the transition
probability, and this is related to his subjective probability distribution for
the true value of k, the critical amount of carbon dioxide.
To simplify the model, the assumption is made that the subjective proba-
bilities associated with k concentrate at points denoted by CR' CP" and CT
for the regulator, producer, and impactee, respectively. The model assumes
CR <'(; CPr and CT <'(; Cpr, thus allowing the producer to neglect a possible
catastrophe. By making a series of assumptions about the form of the transi-
tion probabilities and the utility functions of the three players, and by
assuming that the total utility accruing to each player is the undiscounted
sum of the component state utilities, several solutions for the game can be
derived.
The game has a large number of equilibrium points (solutions), two of
which are illustrated in Figures 11-6 and 11-7 in the regulator-impactee pay-
off plane. Final choices of the regulator thus may depend on the relationship
between CT and CR or, respectively, on the relative distance of the equilib-
rium points from the point of maximal payoffs (which itself cannot be
Figure 11-6. Payoff diagram for regulator and impactee (CR < C/), Source: Hopfinger
(1978).
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Figure 11-7. Payoff diagram for regulator and impactee (CR > C,). Source: Hopfinger
(1978).
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achieved). For example, in Figure 11-6 the regulator may wish to choose
a strategy leading to equilibrium point 1, while in the case of Figure 11-7 he
or she may choose equilibrium point 2. In contrast, the hierarchical solution
would always lead to the first equilibrium point, which is based on the esti-
mate eRaS the critical value.
What can be learned from an analysis of this multistage decision model? If
one assumes that the set of equilibrium points represents a set of solutions
in any sense, then one can clearly see how far any solution is from being the
"ideal" solution (represented by the point of maximal payoffs)-one gets
insight into the structure of the conflict between the three game players.
Furthermore, because there are many equilibrium points, it is important that
the purpose of such an analysis be defined precisely-be it descriptive (e.g.,
to evaluate value functions using case studies), be it normative (to give deci-
sion aids for regulators), or be it predictive (e.g., to see whether or not
actions are necessary).
It remains open at this stage of development whether models of this kind
can be refined in such a way that they can be applied in practice in the sense
described above.
Standards for Chronic Oil Discharges in the North Sea. Two major sources
of oil pollution in the seas are oil blowouts from production platforms and
the continual chronic or operational oily water discharges of these platforms.
Although accidental spills are dramatic and have large visible impacts on fish,
birds, and beaches, continuous discharges may be equally dangerous, since
they involve the possibilities of mortality or toxicity of marine organisms,
long-term effects on spawning behavior, and ecological imbalances. Environ-
mental agencies therefore seek to limit these chronic oil discharges through
appropriate regulations.
Fischer and Winterfeldt (1978), in their analysis of the decision process
for setting chronic oil discharge standards for North Sea production plat-
forms, focused on the actors, their conflicting objectives, the decision
alternatives, and the information-processing and evaluation strategies. A one
stage decision-theoretic model was developed by Winterfeldt (1978a), who
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also applied it to gain some insights into the problem of setting standards to
control chronic oil discharges (Winterfeldt 1978b). The structure of this
model is shown schematically in Figure 11-8. In the model, after the regu-
lator announces the standard r, an expected utility model determines the
optimal response of the developer, d(r). The impactees, in turn, are assumed
to respond to the developer's decision d(r) with an optimal response, a [d(r)].
This set of decision, together with the associated utilities UR' UD' and UA
accruing to the three decision units, permits exploration, before actual deci-
sions are made, of the relative benefits of different standards from the point
of view of all parties affected.
Table 11-7 presents the model's major inputs: The regulator's alternatives
are formalized by a set of possible standard levels of oil concentration in
the effluent (four national standards were considered), by a set of monitor-
ing and inspection procedures (four procedures were considered), and by a
Figure 11-8. Schematic representation of the single stage decision model.
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Table 11-7. Qualitative inputs for one stage decision model for chronic oil
discharge standards in the North Sea.
R
e
g
u
a
o
D
e
v
e
o
p
e
m
p
a
c
e
e
Decision Unit
Petroleum pro-
duction
division,
United
Kingdom
Offshore oil
operators
Fishermen,
ecologists,
public
Alternatives
Standard level
Sanctions
Sample size, exemp-
tions, inspection
procedure
No treatment
Simple gravity tank
Corrugated plate inter-
ceptor (CPI)
CPI and gas flotation (GF)
CPI, GF, and filters (F)
CPI, GF, F, and biological
treatment
Reinjection of oily water
into empty reservoir
No actions considered,
viewed as "sufferers"
Objectives
Agree with other na-
tional standards
Satisfy international
demands for a clean
North Sea
Agree with national
energy policy
Agree with national en-
vironment policy
Minimize investment
cost for treatment
Minimize operation cost
for treatment
Minimize penalties of
regulation violation
Minimize mortality of com-
mercial marine orga-
nisms
Minimize tainting and
chronic toxicity of fish
and other marine
organisms
Minimize ecological dis-
turbances
External Events
None considered
Detection versus
nondetection
of standards
violation
Random pollu-
tion levels
Source: Fischer and Winterfeldt (1978).
set of sanctions. The regulator's utility function was defined as an aggregate
of four utility functions, expressing the degree to which the four regulator's
objectives (as given in Table 11-7) were met. The developer's alternatives are
given in Table 11-7. Total costs of these alternatives were calculated on the
basis of a fifteen-year lifetime of the production platform and undiscounted
operations costs. The developer's decision depends crucially on whether his
or her treatment leads to a detection of a violation or not. In the event of no
detection, the developer pays only the cost of treatment; in the event of
detection, he or she pays the cost of treatment plus a penalty plus an incre-
mental cost to improve treatment to the next best level. The probability of
detection depends on the choice of treatment, the standard level, and the
inspection and monitoring procedure. The impactees are assumed to have no
action alternatives. As the random emission level is assumed to be a "proxy"
measure for the degree to which the impactees' objectives are met, their
utility function was defined as the negative emission level.
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This is a one stage decision model. As there are only a limited number of
alternatives, it was sufficient to perform a dominance analysis-that is, to
look for those alternatives that are not worse for all three parties than any
other alternatives. Since there were no real assessments by the actors, the
quantifications in the model were hypothetical, reflecting the author's per-
ceptions of the actors' values and options. Nevertheless, some interesting
results were obtained. Examples of these and their implications are given
below.
• The nondominant standards tended to cluster around "cutoff points"-
points at which the cost of the next best treatment is equal to the
expected cost of detection-thus stressing the need for the regulator to
focus attention on the location of such cutoff points.
• The location of these cutoff points is controlled largely by the uncer-
tainty about equipment performance and the definition of the monitor-
ing and inspection procedures (sample size, exemptions from detection,
etc.).
• Penalty variations and nonlinear utility functions do not strongly affect
cutoff points.
CONCLUSIONS
Risk assessment as a field involving both the evaluation of risks in all their
manifestations and the incorporation of these into the decisionmaking
process is relatively new. Obviously, our study can be only a beginning to a
more rigorous consideration of risk in decisionmaking. Here, we have begun
to explore the relationship between what are often called the "hard"
sciences and those political, societal, legal, and public aspects sometimes
labeled "soft." We have established categories and defined concepts in order
to provide a framework for more formal research in this field.
More specifically, we looked into human health risks associated with
the fuel cycles of various electricity supply systems. Based on the conversion
factors and estimates cited in the text, our illustrative risk-benefit exercise
came up with the following results.
• For both normal operation and unplanned events, nuclear power has the
lowest potential human health impact per unit electricity supplied.
• Human health risks from normal operation of nuclear power are relat-
tively well understood. The largest uncertainties in estimating risks are
for coal, although it has the longest documented history as a prime
energy carner.
• The external costs associated with the human health impacts of elec-
tricity production are only a small percentage of the total production
costs and are much below the range of internal cost estimates. This is
especially true for the expected values of accident consequences.
• Safety expenditures in energy systems and especially in the nuclear field
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are approaching the point where the risk reduction achieved is balanced
by the risk of producing this safety equipment.
However, a study of attitudes toward energy-related risks revealed large
discrepancies between the sorts of results just described and the correspond-
ing public perceptions of these risks. For nuclear power, our analysis
revealed, first, a limited number of belief dimensions and, second, that the
PRO-nuclear group perceived the problems in very different dimensions than
did the CON group. This suggests that in their interactions these groups are
often talking past one another.
For example, the PRO-nuclear group rated environmental and physical
safety aspects very positively, while the CON group assessed these aspects
negatively. Also, our comparative analysis of public attitudes toward the
risks of five alternative energy systems revealed that the CON-nuclear group
is significantly less favorable than the PRO-nuclear group toward coal and
oil, whereas there were no significant differences between the groups with
regard to solar and hydroelectric power.
In a related study, decisionmakers were able to reproduce public attitudes
of PRO-nuclear and CON-nuclear groups quite accurately. These are en-
couraging results and indicate that the discrepancy between formal evalua-
tions of risks and corresponding public perceptions may perhaps be bridged
by developing appropriate methodologies.
Finally, we have provided some initial conclusions on how to tackle the
difficult task of risk management. Two quantitative models for risk manage-
ment by standard setting (for chronic oil discharges in the North Sea and for
the atmospheric carbon dioxide content) were developed at IIASA, provid-
ing insight into managing the conflicting interests of the parties involved.
The model applications have demonstrated how one might take into account
both actual data and subjective values when formalizing risk management
processes.
APPENDIX 11A: THE MULTISTAGE GAME
THEORETIC DECISION MODEL FOR STANDARD
SETTING (Hopfinger and Avenhaus 1978)
Assuming that only three actors are needed to describe the standard-setting
process, a general game theoretic model can be developed as follows. Assume
that only time periods or stages have to be considered rather than a time
continuum. A game is played at each stage, and the player's strategies
control not only the payoff but also the transition probabilities governing
the game to be played at the next stage. Each component game is deter-
mined by the states of the play, which contain the relevant physical states of
the world (e.g., amount of oil in water or sulphur dioxide in the air and their
distribution) and the relevant economic state. Perfect information is assumed
for the component game by the following structure: at each stage the regula-
tor makes his or her choice first; then the producer is informed about the
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regulator's choice and makes his or her choice; finally, the impactee learns
about the other choices and makes his or her choice. The play proceeds from
component to component game with the transition probabilities jointly con-
trolled by the players. Since the transition probabilities are often not known
exactly, subjective transition probabilities are admitted for the players; these
may differ from each other.
Let S denote the set of possible states. For each element of s of S (s f S)
the set of the regulator's choices or measures is denoted by ·MR (s). Let
Mp(s,m R ) denote the set of producer's measures or choices in the case of
state s and the regulator's choice m R . If the producer chooses mpfMp(s,mR ),
then MT(Si,m R ,mp ) denotes the set of choices or measures possible for the
impactee. Furthermore, Pj(o Is,m R ,mp,m/) (j = R,P,l) denotes the subjec-
tive probability for the next state, given state s and choices m R' m p, m T .
For each component game, a utility function U/s,m R ,mp,m/)-that is,
a generalized payoff-is given for the jth player. As one play is given by a
( I 1 1 12 2 2 2 ) f dd ..sequence s ,mR ,mp,m/; s ,m R ,mp,m/; . . . 0 states an eClSIOns, one
possibility for the payoff function is
j = R,P,I
where 0 < qj ",;;; 1 is a discount factor for the jth player.
The sets of strategies and the payoff functions describe the game theoretic
model. In contrast with a two person zero sum game, generally in a three
person game there is no simple solution concept-a fact that highlights the
problems of such game theoretic models. Here, for brevity, we consider only
two concepts.
• Equilibrium poin ts are stable, since no player can improve his or her pay-
off if the other players persist in their equilibrium strategy. Since there is
no statement on how to arrive at an equilibrium point, there are no
guidelines for action by any of the players; thus the concept may be
viewed as appropriate for an impartial descriptive analysis of a past event,
since it can give insight into whether or not the players arrived at an
equilibrium point.
• Under the assumption that the regulator has to announce his or her
strategy first and then the producer, one can determine a hierarchical
solution that represents optimal responses on the part of the impactee
and the producer. This concept, in fact, is appropriate for a normative
analysis-that is, an analysis for the purpose of advising the players.
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12 CONSTRAINTS ON ENERGYSUPPLY: THE SUMMARY
INTRODUCTION
In the preceding four chapters, we examined four types of constraints on
society's capabilities for supplying energy: market penetration, WELMM
(water, energy, land, material, and manpower), climate, and risk. In this
chapter, we bring together the findings, emphasizing how these constraints
affect different energy strategies.
One important constraint has been omitted here-that imposed by eco-
nomics. The cost of energy supplies according to various criteria is, of
course, important for determining which option to adopt and to what ex-
tent. However, cost is highly variable, both as a function of geography and of
detailed and local value systems; generalizations on the global basis are there-
fore difficult. Here, we can make only some qualitative observations on how
other constraints might affect economics. Quantitative comments, which re-
quire more complete development, are done as a function of the supply sys-
tem described in Chapter 7 and specifically for both system type and world
region as described in Part IV of this book where economic parameters are
a major criterion of supply allocation.
Social behavior has many unknowns, and we have looked for phenomeno-
logical descriptions of this behavior as it applies to the energy system. The
analysis of the market penetration process is a particularly fortunate descrip-
tion for our purposes, for it reveals a very great regularity in the displace-
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ment of old energy forms by newer ones, even though the causes of that
regularity are unknown or only qualitatively known. The social system,
through forces that are intrinsically economic, psychological, or behavioral,
seems to impose a limit on the rate of replacement of one energy form by
another. Large-scale changes in global consumption patterns do not occur
overnight, and time thereby becomes a significant constraint on any new
type of energy system that is to be deployed.
Likewise, environmental factors affect decisions about whether to install
energy systems of various kinds. Many factors come to mind, including water
consumption, land disturbance and preemption, and destruction of species
habitats. The evaluation of these would require detailed attention to specific
proposals, which was beyond the scope of our work as described here. Yet
we must, if only in a very generalized way, take them into account. The
WELMM approach permits us to do just this. By comparing the requirements
of energy systems for water, land, and materials, we derive insights into the
total environmental disturbance of these systems. This affects policy in sev-
eral ways, not the least of which being the physical requirements that are
revealed. By introducing energy and manpower into the WELMM system, we
also obtain insights into what capital costs are likely to be needed for various
energy systems and in that sense develop a quantitative understanding of the
basic economic factors. Thus WELMM requirements are not in themselves
constraints on energy supply systems; rather, they are input for evaluating
environmental and (to a limited extent) economic constraints. They are
more appropriate for estimating rank of desirability among options than for
setting limits on anyone of them; this in itself is a powerful constraint on
low rank systems.
The climatic effects of energy supply are potentially far reaching, but
their progress is slow. Thus, in considering these effects, we are talking of
global phenomena of great importance. There is hope, however, that eventu-
ally we may be able to master the problems of fully understanding the me-
chanics of climate and then to reliably estimate the consequences in time
to affect policy. Of course, if policy does not act on knowledge, the impacts
of climatic changes could be severe. We therefore characterize this constraint
as a crucial one, but one with a possibility of being eventually scientifically
definable.
Risk is a different matter. We have used the term in a restricted sense to
characterize direct risks to individuals, by way of impacts of energy systems
on human health and mortality. This brings us out of the area of physical
objectivity, for human beings take a highly subjective view of such matters:
they not only ask what is the average long-term effect on people as a whole
but also what can it do to me. We can, within definable bounds of precision,
give only probabilistic answers to such questions. Yet this is unsatisfactory
to many people, both because people vary in their willingness to accept
personal risks and because health effects and mortality are essentially sto-
chastic: no matter how great the odds are, it could happen to "me." Thus
risk definition alone is not enough, although it is all that a physical approach
can achieve. In addition, there must be an understanding of risk perception
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(what people rightly or wrongly believe to be the risk) and of risk manage-
ment, defined as the reconciling of risk and its perception into a beneficial
policy. Clearly, these concepts can be manipulated by social forces, which
are constantly changing. The result is that risk management and perception
translate into a political problem, thus adding uncertainty to the prospects
of realizing fully the benefits of technologies perceived to be "risky."
CONSIDERATIONS ON MARKET PENETRATION
OF I'JEW ENERGY SOURCES
Since the supply of cheap and easily exploitable fossil resources will soon be
depleted, we will have to make the transition, first, to the use of more ex-
pensive and difficult to exploit categories of fossil fuels and, ultimately, to
the use of nonfossil energy sources. How much time is needed for a given
supply system to incorporate a new energy form?
We developed a simple, self-consistent method for describing the historical
evolution of energy systems. A phenomenological model was designed and
applied that treats energy sources as commodities competing for their re-
spective shares in a market. The fractional shares of new energy sources in
each energy supply system follow logistic growth paths of the same sort as
competing products and technologies of other types. A logistic curve decline
follows as even newer technologies penetrate the market in their turn. The
model was validated by fitting data from about 300 cases with data for some
cases, covering a span of more than one-hundred years. The historical evolu-
tion of various energy systems was fitted extremely well.
The model deals with the fractional shares of energy sources only and not
with their absolute magnitudes. By working with fractional shares, we were
able to nearly filter out all fluctuations in total growth from economic, polit-
ical, and other events. The model applies to an energy source, primary or
secondary, only after this source has acquired a significant share (2 to 3 per-
cent) of the energy market. It was also found that the larger a system, the
closer the fit of the model to the observed data.
So far as the past is concerned, there seems to be a characteristic time for
the share of any new technology to grow from 1 to 50 percent of the energy
market, depending only on the scale at which one views the energy system.
This time is one-hundred years globally, thirty years for the continental sys-
tem of Europe, and possibly even less for a single small country.
Clearly, certain insights can be gained from this analysis. First, the logistic
evolution of the shares of new energy sources is a typical characteristic of
all energy systems, irrespective of their size and the type of energy market
covered, primary or secondary. Second, alteration of the structure of an
energy system takes time, but smaller systems can be more easily manipu-
lated than larger systems.
Although the logistic substitution model discussed above was developed
phenomenologically, its structure is supported by two theoretical formula-
tions recently attempted at IIASA to explain the technological substitution
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process. These two approaches differ in that one derives the final regu-
larity of the substitution process from a set of stochastic-that is, "free"-
decisions, while the other explains the same phenomenon through a more
classical route that treats economics as the driving force in the substitution
process. Nevertheless, the end results are the same as those given by the
phenomenological model, thus giving further credence to the insights ob-
tained from our analysis.
Some additional clarification is in order here. Throughout the book we
have used the results of the market penetration technique for orientations
and not as an iron clad rule for determining future developments. It would
indeed be comforting if future energy strategies, such as the ones described
in Part IV of this book, would be consistent with the qrientations taken
from the past and applied to the future. But even our own two scenarios,
which we consider realistic and in the middle of the road, are not consistent
in that sense. Such inconsistency we interpret as a quantitative indication of
the seriousness of the situation.
Considerations on Physical Input Requirements
For assessing the environmental and physical aspects of future energy sys-
tems, it is important to consider the requirements of different technologies
for such inputs as land, water, various materials, and manpower. Examining
these inputs for typical systems may also help to identify potential bottle-
necks that could limit the application or the exploitation of a particular
technology or a resource. We developed the WELMM approach, which identi-
fies, on one hand, the requirements of water, energy, land, materials, and
manpower for different technologies and energy resource exploitation
efforts and, on the other, the availability of these resources in different
parts of the globe. Two types of data bases were used-a facility data base
containing detailed WELMM requirements for constructing and operating
typical energy facilities (e.g., coal mines, oil fields, refineries, power plants,
transportation facilities) and two resource data bases containing information
on potential availability of WELMM categories of resources in different geo-
graphical areas.
A comparison was made of the WELMM requirements for the construc-
tion and the thirty-year operation of different, equivalent electricity supply
chains (plants and their auxiliary facilities), based on STEe, LWR, LMFBR,
and coal-fired plants. The supply chains took into account activities related
to mining, transportation, and processing of fuel; plant operation; reprocess-
ing; waste disposal, and so forth. Of the cases examined, the lowest land-
and material-handling requirements would be associated with a LMFBR
chain, followed by a LWR chain, which, as currently used, is based on 2000
ppm U3 0 8 ores. If the LWR chain were to be operated using very low grade
ore, say with 70 ppm U3 0 8 ore, then its land- and material-handling require-
ments would exceed those of typical coal-based chains. In spite of the zero
mining operations of the solar chains, the requirements of land for these
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chains would be several times higher than those chains using coal-fired
plants. Solar chains would also use more construction materials than either
coal-fired or nuclear plants, but would recover their advantage relative to
the coal chains when the materials needed for their operation were also
taken into account.
A preliminary assessment was made of the WELMM constraints that may
be associated with the supply of liquid fuels through coal liquefaction or
through the exploitation of oil shales and of tar sands. It turns out that each
of these approaches applied to known giant and supergiant deposits of the
corresponding fossil fuels would put considerable strain on the available
water and land resources, would pose severe material-handling and waste
disposal problems, and would have relatively higher requirements of tech-
nical manpower than have been experienced with conventional oil fields.
The consumption of energy (including autoconsumption of the resource)
for different projects is estimated to be about 0.1 to 1.3 times the energy
output in the form of oil. This is one to two orders of magnitude higher
than that required even for the difficult conditions of North Sea oil.
If one were to compare the above processes only with respect to the
three parameters-water, land, and manpower requirements-then coal liq-
uefaction would appear to be the least favorable process. However, the
relative differences are not very large, and local conditions also need to be
taken into account. For example, the water requirements for the exploi-
tation of oil shales (per unit of oil produced) are estimated to be lower than
those for tar sands; but, for example, the water scarcity in the state of
Colorado where major oil shale resources exist may turn out 0 be a serious
problem for exploiting its shale beds. By contrast, water does not now seem
to offer any problem in the region of the Athabasca tar sands.
The various WELMM rankings suggest that LMFBR nuclear systems offer
many advantages related to environmental values as compared with other
ways of generating electricity. For the production of synthetic oil from
shale, tar sands, or coal, WELMM rankings seem to favor shale oil. However,
the differences depend strongly on local conditions and are not easily
generalized.
Considerations on Climate
Three types of climatic perturbation were examined-from the release of
waste heat from energy conversion and use; from local interference with the
earth's radiation balance because of changes in surface characteristics; and
from interference with the earth's radiation balance because of carbon
dioxide buildup in the atmosphere. (The potential climatic effects of deploy-
ing renewable energy sources such as wind, ocean current, ocean thermal, or
tidal power are discussed in Chapter 6, where estimates of specific con-
straints are made for the various technologies.)
To investigate the first of these effects, a general circulation model was
used that simulated the impact of heat inputs on atmospheric circulation and
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thereby climate patterns. The model explored incremental annual energy
releases globally, ranging from 30 to 300 TW. In order to pronounce the per-
turbation of the global climatic system, the energy was released in limited
geographical areas, while previous studies using a general circulation model
investigated the response of the model atmosphere to homogeneous addi-
tions of waste heat amounting to 300 TW over all continental and ice re-
gions. It was concluded that the thermal pollution effects were not greater
than the inherent noise level of the model. A concentrated addition of 150
to 300 TW to the model atmosphere leads to a response of the simulated
atmospheric circulation not just in the area of the input. The response
varied significantly according to the location, amount, and method of heat
input. At the level of a waste heat release of some 30 TW, the results of the
global circulation model experiments suggest that waste heat is a "nonprob-
lem" on a global scale, since it is unlikely to perturb the global average cli-
mate state in the foreseeable future. This is not to say that there could not
be serious impacts of large waste heat releases in the multigigawatt to the
terawatt range in the vicinity of such operations.
The climatic effects due to changes in surface characteristics were exam-
ined with a mesoscale model of the atmosphere by simulating conditions for
a STEC facility. The surface heat balance was altered in a limited region be-
cause of changes in the albedo and the release of waste heat from the cooling
towers of the STEC facility. The changes were, in this case, restricted to a
limited geographical area in southern Spain. Mesoscale effects of some con-
sequence are observable when changes in the surface heat balance reach the
range of tens of gigawatts. This result is considered not to differ in degree
from the direct effects of heat addition.
The third effect, that of changes in atmospheric radiation characteristics
because of the buildup of carbon dioxide and other gases in the atmosphere,
is the well-known greenhouse effect. Although there are uncertainties about
the rates of exchange of carbon dioxide between the atmosphere and the
various sources and sinks of this gas, still, it is possible to assess the increase
in global temperature due to different energy strategies on the basis of our
present understanding of these interactions. We used a carbon cycle model
and a climate model, assuming several different hypothetical energy strate-
gies. For one of these strategies leading to a global energy consumption of
50 TWyr/yr by 2050, with all energy being supplied by fossil fuels, the
average global temperature was found to increase by about 2 K in 2030 and
by about 4 K by the end of 2050. For another strategy it was assumed that
the global energy consumption would increase to 30 TWyr/yr by 2050, but
that the use of fossil fuels would peak at around 2000 and would decline
thereafter, down to the 3 TWyr/yr level by 2030. Most of the energy after
2010 was assumed to be supplied by nonfossil sources-solar and/or nuclear;
for this strategy, the global temperature was found to increase only until
2030, when it would be about 0.5 K higher than its 1975 value.
Even on the average global level, these are rather large changes, compa-
rable to those of historical and prehistorical significance. For example, some
two million years ago the average global temperature was about 4 K higher
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than the current temperature and was associated with an ice-free Arctic. An
increase in average global temperature by 4 K might therefore lead to a simi-
lar situation with a consequent increase in sea level that would flood most
coasts of the world. Changes at regional levels will be much larger in certain
areas, with resulting impacts on precipitation and rainfall and on regional
agricultural practices as probably the most significant. Although the results
could be welcomed in certain areas, they are likely to be negative in many
more places.
At the present time there are many uncertainties about the specific cli-
matic impacts of large-scale deployment of any of the major energy sources.
It seems likely, however, that the global impacts of waste heat and changes
in surface conditions will be felt at a more distant time than those from
changes in concentrations of carbon dioxide. A period of five to ten years
is needed and can pro bably be afforded for vigorous research in order to
narrow down uncertainties, in particular for the carbon dioxide issue. Be-
cause of the present uncertainties about the climatic implications of raising
the carbon dioxide level, it is premature to implement policy measures re-
quiring the reduction of the use of fossil resources. Nevertheless, it is most
important to maintain flexibility in energy supply policies at this time.
Considerations on Risk
The considerations on risks associated with different energy supply systems
have received little attention except with respect to nuclear power. In assess-
ing the risks of energy systems, one therefore runs into the difficulties of
the lack of data, the inadequacy of evaluation techniques, and a complete
absence of decisionmaking formalisms for setting standards.
On the bases of available information and experience, a comparison was
made of the human health risks associated with one unit generation of elec-
tricity, using different types of plants-coal-, oil- and gas-fired plants; LWRs;
and STEC plants. Such a comparison, including the effects of accidents and
diseases on occupational staff as well as on the public, showed that the coal-
fired plants present the largest risks. The risks associated with LWRs amount
to only a small fraction (less than 6 percent) of those relating to coal-fired
plants.
These results may appear surprising. Many people view nuclear power
plants as being associated with much greater risks than other facilities. In
a survey conducted on a heterogeneous sample of the Austrian public, risks
were perceived as lowest for solar and hydroelectric power systems and
slightly higher but still small for fossil fuel energy sources, while opinion was
divided with respect to nuclear energy. An analysis of the beliefs underlying
the attitudes of the PRO- and CON-nuclear energy groups revealed that psy-
chological (anxiety-inducing) aspects and sociopolitical implications of
nuclear power contributed negatively to the attitudes of both groups. How-
ever, for the PRO group, this contribution was sufficiently low to be over-
ridden by positive contributions from their beliefs on other aspects.
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Thus, the risk evaluation process faces a dilemma: public opinion does not
reflect the risks evaluated on purely technical considerations. Psychological
factors and attitudes toward matters related only slightly to risk affect
people's perception of risk. It appears that the general public is very con-
cerned about the possibility of large accidents, even though the probabil-
ity of their occurrence is quite small. Yet, low frequency, high consequence
events generally make only minor contributions to the aggregated risk.
It also appears that positive and negative belief systems color individual
attitudes toward resolution of well-publicized conflicts. For example, a
general faith in the benevolence of "progress" will predispose a person to
accept the technical judgment that the probability of, say, a catastrophic
nuclear accident is comfortably small, while a person's suspicion of "the
system" would predispose her or him to believe that such a judgment is
likely to be corrupt.
Thus more than one measure of risk is needed to correlate public percep-
tion of risk with technical evaluations. Multiattribute utility measurement is
making progress in this direction, but it is still an imperfect tool. Yet even if
a calculus existed for estimating the relative acceptability of not merely
different average risks but also different risk distributions, other considera-
tions would still color perceptions. The development of energy systems must
resolve conflicts between the best technical judgments and the expressed
wishes of the public. Neither of these factors can, ethically, be overridden.
What is needed is described as risk management.
One possible way to resolve this conflict is to reduce any type of risk
below a desirable level by incurring additional effort and investment. How-
ever, the economy has limited resources that need to be directed toward the
most cost-effective alternatives. For identifying such alternatives, the risks
are expressed in monetary terms as loss of production to the economy. With
this approach, the marginal costs of risk reduction are found to be much
higher for low frequency, high consequence events than for high frequency,
low consequence events. Furthermore, the energy system is just one part of
the overall economic system. Thus it is not useful to reduce a certain amount
of risk in any energy installation, since this calls for an effort that would
incur the same amount of risk through some other channel.
Intimately connected with the issues of proper risk evaluation (including
the aspects of public perception) and the cost effectiveness of risk reduction
is the problem of setting standards for energy systems. A policy analysis of
several standard-setting procedures on environmental issues revealed the
problem of often conflicting interests and objectives of the three main par-
ties-the regulator, the developer, and the impactee. The regulator generally
has political objectives, and the developer concentrates on cost considera-
tions, while the impactee is interested in having potential risks reduced. In
order to formalize the interactions, two theoretic game-decision models were
developed and applied to considerations of standards on various issues, in-
cluding the environmental pollution from carbon dioxide emissions. How-
ever, in their present state of development, these models can be used only to
gain insights and not for operational applications.
CONSTRAINTS ON ENERGY SUPPLY: THE SUMMARY 387
The results of our risk analyses indicate the discrepancy between the best
technical evaluations of risk and the public's perception of risks. The tech-
nology that currently carries the highest steady risk is coal, yet it has wide
public acceptance. The technology that poses the greatest threat of catas-
trophe is hydroelectricity, which is also broadly accepted. Using these tech-
nologies as yardsticks, one could argue that, within reasonable limits of
exploitation, no technology is too risky. Still, a large segment of the popu-
lation believes that, specifically, nuclear power is too risky to use. We face
a dilemma that has not been resolved by multiattribute utility measure-
ment, risk reduction, or standard setting. Risk management, which can be
defined as the process of resolving the dilemma, obviously must be further
developed.
SOME FINAL WORDS ON CONSTRAINTS
Our elaboration on constraints, as reported in Part III of this book, functions
essentially as a sensitizer for our study of the global energy system. But to a
large extent, it is a qualitative procedure. There is a considerable drive to be
quantitative, but we found it difficult and not scientifically defendable to
operationally introduce quantitative conclusions from Part III into Part IV.
On the contrary, the findings of Part III enter extensively into the implica-
tions and assessments of the study presented in Part VI.

IV BALANCING SUPPLYAND DEMAND:
THE QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS
The eight chapters of Part IVa represent a synthesis of many separate studies.
They take much of what has been reported in Parts II and III as inputs. They
make use of mathematical models (Chapter 13) to perform a quantitative,
long-term, global and region-by-region analysis of the two scenarios (defined
in Chapter 14). Energy demand (Chapter 16) and energy supply (Chapter
17) are analyzed, and their interpretations in economic terms are offered
(Chapter 15). Alternative cases also are examined (Chapter 18), and their
impacts on the economy are compared with those of the two scenarios
(Chapter 19). The entire effort is summarized (Chapter 20).
The quantitative analysis reported here combines an array of real world
constraints in order to build up, in a "bottom up" way (starting with details),
a range of plausible energy futures. This is done regionally, starting with 1975
data, and has as a goal the balancing of energy supply and demand in a least
cost way within the assumed constraints.
By contrast, much of the other work of the Energy Systems Program
reported elsewhere in this book is "top down" (starting with broad, general
considerations), done globally and not regionally. This other work has a
"vision"-a vision portrayed in the discussions of the chapters in Parts II
and III in particular. The vision sees a truly sustainable global energy system
aThroughout Part IV, except where noted, primary energy excludes the noncommercial use of
fuels (e.g., fuel wood, animal and farm waste).
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over the very long term (say, one hundred years from now), with a secondary
energy carrier based on the eternally available heat from breeder reactors and
solar facilities. The sustaining "endowments" of plutonium or of the sun
would be tapped by technologies whose development may, the vision sug-
gests, be a matter of priority.
The vision and the two scenarios are complementary. The vision seeks to
explore the bounds of the possible; the scenarios seek to balance constraining
factors in order to identify the plausible. The vision defines a long-term
goal; the scenarios chart a path with no explicit goal. But the implications of
the scenarios may lead toward a more rapid development of the energy
systems of the vision.
A number of specific studies that contribute to the vision also playa role
in shaping inputs to the scenario analysis. The fossil fuel resource estimates
of Chapter 2 are essential inputs to the scenarios; the estimates from that
chapter are modified somewhat here in Part IV to match the format of the
analytical tools used for scenario projections. The scenarios use such resource
estimates to generate maximum production rates of each fossil fuel type.
These production rates distinguish the constrained scenario analysis from
the potential-seeking studies of Part II.
Similarly, the uranium resource estimates of Chapter 4 and, to a certain
extent, the solar and other renewable sources estimates of Chapters 5 and 6
also provide bases for more constraining inputs to the scenario analysis.
The full potentials of coal and nuclear energy (Chapters 3 and 4) are not
reached in the scenario projections. But the scenarios could not be generated
without the maximum constraints provided by these studies. And the
scenarios, in any case, do not attempt to elaborate on these important topics
but simply to weigh and balance them. The elaboration is in Part II.
Constraints on the scenarios also come from the studies reported in Part
III. While potential climate impacts or risks of alternative energy strategies
are not fully implemented in these scenarios, they are not completely
ignored. Specific scenario numbers affected by these considerations are cited
where appropriate in the following eight chapters. The carbon dioxide
accumulation resulting from the scenarios is discussed in Chapter 17.
Time is a major constraint on energy system evolution. The so-called
"market penetration" considerations of Chapter 8 enter the scenario analysis
by providing historically based estimates of the maximum buildup rates of
new energy technologies. These system lead times are very important; in a
sense, they incorporate comprehensively the pragmatic difficulties of shifting
the world from its present energy systems to those of the vision or of any
other radically different possibility.
The scenarios and alternative cases discussed here in Part IV are, then,
the pragmatist's integrated guide to a range of plausible, global long-term
energy futures. They will disappoint those searching for revelation or an
elaboration on a special theme; they (hopefully) will satisfy those searching
for a balanced perspective on difficult and often conflicting choices.
The work on Part IV has been a team effort. The acknowledgments in the
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Preface to this book name the principal contributors. The work is also not
the result of a moment-it took more than two years of intensive effort.
Part IV is offered as a learning tool-an experimental foray into an uncertain,
but critically important, global energy future. It should also be noted that
this book was written in the fall of 1979 and that, as observed in Part I,
political events were not applied explicitly to the work reported therein.

13 THE ANALYTICAL APPROACH
It becomes increasingly tiresome to say-or to hear-that the energy problem
is complex and multidimensional. Still, repetition does not diminish the
truth of the statement, and the seemingly endless stream of advocates of
easy answers evidences a certain lingering disbelief of it. When designing
analytical approaches to energy studies, one should keep in mind the so-
bering dimensions of the problem. The preceding chapters of this book
convey some of the broad range of energy-related considerations taken up
during five years of energy research at I1ASA-the complexity of the problem
and the lack of simple solutions. In particular, Part I presents the logic
and arguments underlying the many distinct research topics summarized in
the chapters of this final report of the I1ASA Energy Systems Program.
In spite of the breadth of topics treated in this research, clearly one
cannot hope to deal with all of the important components of "the energy
problem." But one can hope to select a set of vital issues, based on a per-
ception of key components of the problem and on perceived needs of
decisionmakers, and design an analytical approach for understanding and
eventually acting intelligently on those issues. In Part IV, the quantitative
analysis of a selected set of issues is reported. This includes a description of
the analytical approach-the steps carried out, the assumptions made, the
results. The description of the approach takes up the arguments of Part I,
restating them here for the reader of the scenario analyses.
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THE PROBLEM AND THE NEED
FOR QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
Can the globe meet its energy needs in the future? At present, the world
depends heavily on oil and gas. But there is a finite supply of these resources.
More to the point, the cheaply accessible portions of these resources are
already nearing depletion; a transition to something other than inexpensive
and nonrenewable oil and gas is inevitable. Will the transition be prolonged
and painful, difficult and divisive, or can it be well managed, a smooth and
cooperative era? Will it lead the world over the long run to sustainable
energy supply or to a reliance on some different (perhaps more expensive)
depletable resource?
Clearly, energy demand and supply will always balance. The issue is
whether the balance will occur at a level that will satisfy "reasonable human
requirements," dependent to a large extent on population growth and
economic development. No theory exists that permits precise predictions of
the energy needed to support a given population and size of economy,
although historical experience provides some evidence. Thus, assumptions
must be made about future energy demands.
Consequently, the problem translates to: For an assumed projection of
energy demand, can the globe carry out a smooth transition from cheap oil
and gas? An understanding of the character of, and constraints binding on,
the energy transition is a primary objective of the quantitative analysis to
be described. This understanding necessitates a degree of quantification
for several reasons. Quantification lends a certain specificity and thus unam-
biguousness to complex considerations. In such a data- and statistics-heavy
field as energy, numbers are the inescapable common language.
Quantification also facilitates desirable generalization or detailing-
aggregation or disaggregation. Here, analyses are performed for the world as
a whole, by world regions, by economic sector within regions, and by
energy type within sectors. Results are plotted over time and integrated
over time. Numbers allow microscopic inspection of details and telescopic
views of aggregates. Finally, quantification aids attempts to reach the requi-
site measure of consistency in demand and supply, in intra- and interregional
energy balancing. Numbers cannot guarantee consistency, but they can help
significantly.
So, a quantitative analysis was done. Yet, perhaps ironically, but not
contradictorily, the quantification is seen here as only providing insights.
The numbers themselves (especially the numbers describing future energy
prospects) cannot be taken too literally. The aim of quantification is to help
in the intellectual challenge of understanding the dominant characteristics,
trends, possibilities, and constraints in global and regional energy consid-
erations.
Consistent with this is the recognition that the scenarios deal with an
unknown (and to a large extent unknowable) future. But future looking has
value; prudence in actions today follows, at least in part, from the ability
to recognize what can, and what cannot, be foreseen for tomorrow.
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As noted in Part I, the analytic approach adopted for energy studies at
IIASA assumes an essentially surprise-free world-no global-scale disasters,
no sweeping scientific discoveries. A major war could put an end to the
rather stable energy projections of these chapters; an unlikely early break-
through in, say, photovoltaic technology could offset the figures by several
years and alter the results. These things could happen and should not be
forgotten. The fact that these are not included in the scenarios reflects the
belief that such events are not likely to occur and that even if they were,
they could not be rigorously treated.
One would be hard pressed to identify any historical fifty-year period
without either major disasters or life-altering technological advances (or
both). Yet one observes the astounding smoothness-in the aggregate-of
energy growth over the past decades. And one observes the same smoothness
blurring the impacts of the automobile, the telephone, the transistor-all
of which have transformed society in irreversible ways.
All of this leads to a belief (or hope) that the scenarios here are robust,
that they can stand up against events whose impacts, in human terms, may
be large. Should some occurrence or occurrences in the next fifty years make
erroneous this belief, so be it. But such things cannot be planned for, cannot
be foreseen. Still, it seems prudent to at least attempt to look responsibly
toward the future, to postulate some scenarios, to calculate some indicative
numbers, and to gain some insights.
THE BASICS OF THE ANALYTICAL APPROACH
The quantitative, analytical approach developed within the IIASA Energy
Systems Program to conceptualize the energy problem integrates other
aspects of the program's studies; it is broadly outlined and explained in Part
I of this book. (The reader familiar with Part I can safely skip to the dis-
cussion of the IIASA set of energy models in this chapter.) To deal with the
possibly very long transition, a fifty-year perspective is taken (1980-2030).
To cover both global comprehensiveness and local specialness, mutually
exclusive and exhaustive world regions are studied.
The choice of regionalization is neither haphazard nor easy. In one sense,
energy problems are global ones, but wide differences among peoples,
economies, and geographic locations are masked by global aggregates. In
another sense, energy problems are national ones, but the broad perspective
of true long-term possibilities and the prospective balance or imbalance in
world trade are lost in narrow national views. And the IIASA energy study is
not able to consider 140 separate national cases.
The regions are selected more for their economic and energy similarities
than for their geographic similarities. That is, there are developed market
economies with significant energy resources and without significant energy
resources; there are centrally planned economy regions; there are developing
regions with and without energy resources. The regionalization seeks to
396 ENERGY IN A FINITE WORLD
preserve broad national similarities within each region and to allow for
treatment of major energy trade patterns among regions. Seven such regions
are defined in Figure 1-3 and used throughout the quantitative analysis. A
complete listing of the countries of each of the regions is given in Appendix
1A.
The analysis begins with postulates of basic development variables for
each of the seven world regions to the year 2030. The two basic development
variables are population growth and economic development (as measured by
growth in gross domestic product-GDP). Two sets of estimates are made,
in order to bound from above and below the set of likely developments
over the next fifty years. These estimates may be (and are, in practice)
modified as further energy-related insights are gained. Chapter 14 describes
the iterative process of making these projections-a process of selection,
definition, characterization, and evaluation of scenarios. It offers some
criteria for the ultimate acceptability of the scenarios.
Given the initial scenario-defining estimates of population growth and
economic development, consequent energy consumption patterns are cal-
culated for each of the regions. While the objective here is aggregate energy
demand consistent with the postulated economic development over fifty
years, each region's energy consumption is examined in considerable detail.
Key assumptions about technology, lifestyle, and penetration of specialized
energy sources (e.g., solar, district heat, heat pumps) for each region and for
each time interval drive the estimation procedure. The details enable a more
careful examination of the linkages of energy and the economy and help to
keep straight the many and complex end uses of energy. In this way, some
notion can be gained of the requirements for reducing energy consumption
growth. Chapter 16 records both the steps and the key assumptions in this
analysis and its results.
These aggregate energy consumption projections provide one kind of input
to energy supply system analysis. Adding constraints that act upon the
total energy supply system-estimates of the amount, rate, cost, and time of
availability of each prospective energy source-enables calculation of alter-
native energy supply mixes for the future. The chapters of Part II of this
book provide the substantive basis for the more detailed estimates used
here. Water availability, hostile local environment, difficult and costly
transportation requirements, skilled labor limitations, and other local or
regional conditions also must be incorporated in some way. In Chapter 17
these various inputs and constraints are detailed; in many cases it is necessary
to select some quantitative constraints (e.g., and upper limit on annual coal
production within a region) to represent, generally, the aggregate of a
number of restrictive factors-water supply, suitable transportation, and so
forth.
These constraints are based generally on the in-depth analyses of the
chapters of Parts II and III of this book. The aim of the scenario analysis in
Part IV is to integrate and sum these constraints so as to evaluate the impli-
cations for the total energy supply system.
Yet not every conceivable constraint on energy supply systems received
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full treatment here. For example, potential risks to life and health, environ-
mental constraints, and potential climate impacts are not incorporated
explicitly in these quantitative analyses. They may still affect subjective
assumptions about alternative energy sources (see Chapter 17).
The general approach is to consider the energy system from resource
extraction through end use with sufficient detail so as to reflect the most
important constraints and to produce the "best" energy supply mix within
such constraints. This must be done in order to ensure overall global consis-
tency, while not unduly sacrificing regional specialness, for a plausible scenario
range (High and Low). The specific approach is to use an optimization pro-
gram to find the combination of energy sources that satisfies the specific
temporal sequence of regional final energy demands, subject to (often very
dominant) given constraints, while minimizing the discounted total cost.
This procedure is iterated from demand estimation to supply optimization
until the demand and supply projections are judged to be "reasonable"
and consistent. An important part of the iteration and global consistency is
the treatment of energy trade (see Chapter 17); the goal is to produce
balanced, consistent world scenarios without energy "gaps." An example of
the overall iterative procedure for scenario analysis is given at the end of
this chapter.
Once two globally consistent energy scenarios are produced in this way,
the results can be evaluated in terms of their consequences for cumulative
resource consumption (see Chapter 17), the direct and indirect investments
(see Chapter 19), and other criteria of interest. It is important, in this highly
iterative analytical approach, to evaluate the complete scenario specification
and results in as many ways as are useful for determining reasonableness
and identifying misfits (see Chapter 15). Then one can iterate wherever
necessary and/or appropriate in order to alter unacceptable results. Once
acceptable scenarios are generated in this way, variations can be examined.
Ultimately, the identification of at least one strategy that meets the
assumed demand projections, subject to the resource and technology avail-
abilities and constraints, establishes the technical feasibility of the global
transition from oil and gas. The evaluation in terms of the various criteria
of prospective concern will indicate whether the technically feasible path
is likely to be acceptable in other ways as well. If not, the optimization
program can be adjusted in order to constrain values of the sensitive criteria
to acceptable levels. The result should be one or more technically feasible
and acceptable strategies for the transition.
Alternative strategies are considered in Chapter 18, with necessarily less
detail and sophistication than the two main scenarios. With sufficient repeti-
tive analysis, judgments about the sensitivity of results to changes in certain
assumptions provide a further measure of technical feasibility.
The analytical approach just outlined relies on considerable iteration
among its components. This point is an important one, reflecting a recog-
nition of the interdependence of the many aspects of the energy problem;
each of the chapters in Part IV illustrates different dimensions of a sequen-
tial, yet highly interactive, quantitative analysis.
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AI'JALYTICAL TOOLS: A SET OF
ENERGY MODELS
In order to carry out the analytical approach just described, a set of tools
was developed at IIASA or, in some instances, brought to IIASA and adapted
for specific purposes. These computer models are described, as a coherent
set, in this chapter.
The remainder of this chapter is, then, largely methodological-setting
down for the interested reader or researcher the logic and structure of the
formal tools supporting the analysis. Those interested primarily in results
can safely skip to the next and subsequent chapters of Part IV.
In November 1976, Academician M. Styrikovich of the Academy of
Sciences of the USSR suggested making the studies within the IIASA Energy
Systems Program more comprehensive by building a set of computer models
to reflect the high interdependence among world regions, in view of the
many interrelated issues surrounding future energy prospects. With this
impetus came the full realization of a set of energy models at lIASA-by
adapting existing models where possible and building new ones where
necessary. The starting point was the existing linear programming model of
Wolf Hafele and Alan Manne (1974), built as one of the first stages in the
energy research at IIASA. At the first IIASA Conference in May 1976, the
motivation and logic behind the then fledgling modeling effort were pre-
sented (Hafele 1976).
During the course of designing and building the models, IIASA benefited
greatly from cooperation with Dr. Kenneth Hoffman, then head of the
National Center for the Analysis of Energy Systems at Brookhaven National
Laboratory in the United States, and with Professor Makarov and others at
the Siberian Power Institute (SPI) of the Siberian branch of the Academy of
Sciences of the USSR. At SPI, a similar set of energy models was under
design at the same time that the IIASA models were being developed.
Continuous and active interactions with SPI have greatly aided these efforts.
The set of computer models now in use in the IIASA Energy Systems
Program provides a means of synthesizing the many elements of the specific
energy studies reported in this book (in Parts II and III). The models for-
malize certain perceptions and assumptions, yet they do not rigidly drive or
force the logic and findings of the analyses. The essential judgments, logic,
and interpretation of results rest with the researchers themselves.
Purpose and Goals of Energy Modeling
Given a subject as complex, confused, and polarized as is the current thinking
about the world's future energy prospects, one might well ask why computer
models should be thought to offer much help. It is a fair question. Perhaps a
clarification of the general purposes of computer modeling will help to place
the possibilities of such models in an appropriate context and thereby aid in
identifying the real utility and benefits of these models.
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Computer modeling has one central and specific purpose: to aid in under-
standing the complex interconnections with systems-economic, technical,
social, or, in this case, energy systems. There are perhaps three characteristics,
or at least desirable attributes, of properly applied computer models that
enable them to be worthy of such a purpose.
First, models provide insights, by integrating system parameters too
numerous for the individual analyst to assimilate. Models should be designed
for gaining insight and understanding, not (necessarily) for mathematical
sophistication.
A second characteristic of computer modeling is that models provide
results that should be reproducible from basic logic; model results, once
seen, should be obvious.
Finally, computer models provide consistency of calculation. For highly
complex and quantitative subjects, modeling provides an essential accounting
framework-a necessary classification scheme-to aid in the otherwise
laborious if not impossible task of simultaneous calculations with hundreds
or thousands of variables.
Computer modeling has at least one other distinct advantage. With a great
many interdependent variables to consider in typical systems problems, it
is difficult to know which ones are critical, which ones deserve close atten-
tion by planners and decisionmakers. Models can aid in identifying such
parameters through, for example, sensitivity tests and consideration of
alternative scenarios.
Recognizing these characteristics, the particular set of energy models at
IIASA was conceived, with perhaps four general objectives in mind:
1. To study the long-term, dynamic (transitional), and strategic dimensions
of regional and global energy systems;
2. To evaluate alternative strategies-to compare options-of a physical and
technological kind, including their economic impacts;
3. To develop a global framework to enable the assessment of the global
implications of long-term regional or national energy policies; and
4. To explore the embedding of future energy systems and strategies
into the economy, the environment, and society.
In some way, point 4 is the ultimate objective of the model system, as a
set. Is there enough time to manage the transition from today's energy
system to asymptotically satisfactory systems? The aim also in this regard
is to identify the capital requirements of the transition and to study their
acceptability to the world's economies in view of constraints such as conser-
vation of the environment and competing social needs. The fulfillment of
this objective involves the coupling of capital requirements for strategic
energy investments to other elements in the economy, in order to make
trade-offs and to ensure consistency. It also involves the consideration of
capital and financial flows among countries, balance of payments limitations,
and financial aid. Much work remains to be done, even in designing the
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approach for meeting this objective. The IIASA set of energy models was
developed with the aim of extending the debate on the impacts of future
energy alternatives-of evaluating plausible energy strategies in a full systems
context with a truly global perspective.
The Structure of the Set of Energy Models
Large monolithic computer models often suffer from overcomplexity and
rigidity. Small and simple models offer relative clarity and understandability,
while sacrificing (in many instances) methodological sophistication. Un-
certain functional relationships in the first model type are replaced by un-
certain human judgments in the second.
IIASA's energy-modeling work has generally adopted the latter approach-
the linking of several relatively simple models into a coherent whole. In
Figure 13-1 the model set is illustrated and the most important (of many)
linkages are shown. Here, only the general scheme and structure of the set as
a whole is described. In the next section, attention is given to each of the
models. A description of several of the models, including general meth-
odologies used, status, and certain central formulations of relationships, is
appended to this chapter.
The approach, as is apparent in Figure 13-1 and has been repeatedly
stressed (here and in Part I), is a highly iterative one. The initiation of
assumptions and judgments leads to calculations and results that feed back
and modify those assumptions and judgments. Most of the feedbacks are
manual. An original assumption about the relative rate of penetration of
liquid fuels into (or out of) residential energy use markets (for example) is
decreased (or increased) as relative fuel prices (stemming from supplies)
show a disadvantage for liquid fuels. While the flow of information is me-
chanized, the impacts of changes in one set of inputs on another are not. An
example of the operation of the modeling loop and its several interactions
is given in the last section of this chapter.
The energy-modeling activity begins with scenario definitions (top of
Figure 13-1). A scenario is a plausible future-a reasonable outcome of a
set of reasonable assumptions. It is neither a forecast nor a prediction. It
is closer to a hypothesis.
In the IIASA energy research, two such scenarios are selected-two
plausible futures believed to span a reasonable to expect range. (Chapter 14
presents the definition of these scenarios in some detail.) They are defined
by "high" and "low" economic growth within regions and consequent
high and low energy demand growth. Population growth is also a scenario-
defining variable, although at present just one projection of population
is used in the IIASA energy studies. Other factors vary from scenario to
scenario according to judgments about internal consistency.
The scenarios, once defined in this way, do not remain inviolate. At least
in principle, the procedure is more than a partial equilibrium one. Feedbacks
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Figure 13-1. II ASA's set of energy models: a simplified representation.
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from the resulting energy calculations can, and do, modify original economic
growth assumptions. For the analyses reported in these chapters, this has
been done judgmentally. Formalization of the procedure depends on the
availability and suitability of modeling tools.
The scenario projections of economic and population growth for each of
the seven world regions provide the basic inputs for detailed calculations of
future final energy consumption consistent with the scenarios. Disaggregation
of these overall economic and demographic projections enables consideration
of economic and energy-consuming activities in three macrosectors-trans-
portation, household-service, and industry (agriculture, construction, mining,
and manufacturing). An array of judgments about lifestyle developments,
improvements in efficiencies of energy-using devices, and the rate of penetra-
tion of new and/or improved energy-using equipment augment the disaggre-
gated economic and demographic assumptions for each region. All of these
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details are meant to be consistent with the general scenario parameters and
are recorded in a model called MEDEE-2a , where calculations lead to esti-
mates of useful and final energy consumption in the macrosectors. Following
considerations of the penetrations of certain energy sources such as solar and
district heating and electricity, final energy consumption (as nonsubstitutable
and substitutable fuels) of each of the scenarios is calculated.
A further step divides the fossil fuels used for heating among liquid,
gaseous, and solid fuels. This step completes the secondary energy demand
calculations required as input to the energy supply and conversion model
MESSAGE,b as shown in Figure 13-1. All of these energy demand calcu-
lations-from disaggregation of the scenario economic growth assumptions
through secondary energy demands by fuel type-are presented in Chapter
16.
MESSAGE calculates the required supplies of primary fuels to meet the
secondary energy demands at lowest cost and within often quite tight
constraints on resources availabilities, energy production limits, and the rates
of buildup of new energy facilities. Resource constraints are specified as
maximum pools of oil, natural gas, coal, and uranium available at specified
costs. As prices rise, several high cost alternatives can compete. Limits on the
maximum rate of buildup of new energy facilities reflect the inherent lead
times as well as limitations of manpower, materials, and the like in a region.
The assumptions and results-which represent, in some ways, the core of the
energy studies reported in this book-are presented in full in Chapter 17.
Interregional energy trade considerations (also reported in Chapter 17)
provide time profiles of imports and exports of fuels for each regional
MESSAGE run. Relatively simple allocation rules distribute available exports
of fuels (e.g., oil) from exporting regions (e.g., the Middle East) to competing
importing regions (e.g., Western Europe and Japan or Africa and Southeast
Asia).c Allocations are done iteratively with MESSAGE runs (Figure 13-1)
so that a globally consistent balance is achieved.
MESSAGE gives fuels production over time and the path of different
primary fuels through conversion processes to a fixed set of secondary
demands. In addition, MESSAGE provides the marginal production costs
of primary fuels, leading to estimates of time trajectories of fuel and elec-
tricity prices. These prices are fed back (Figure 13-1) to several points in
the loop, in order to iteratively modify initiating assumptions and judgments.
aMEDEE stands for Modele d'Evolution de la Demande d'Energie. It was developed initially at the
Institut des Etudes Juridiques et Economiques at the University of Grenoble by B. Lapillonne and B.
Chateau and adapted for use at IIASA by B. Lapillonne and M. Muller (see Lapillonne 1978). A
version called MEDEE-2 was operated for the scenarios reported here by Khan and Holzl (1980).
bMESSAGE stands for Model for Energy Supply Systems Alternatives and Their General Environ-
mental Impact. It was developed by A. Voss, L. Schrattenholzer, and M. Agnew (see Agnew, Schratten-
holzer, and Voss 1979) following extensions of the Hafele-Manne (1974) model. MESSAGE was
operated for the scenario reported here by L. Schrattenholzer, M. Agnew, and J. Eddington.
cThis procedure, whose calculations are now carried out by A. Papin, will be formalized through
the use of a gaming model. This model originates with A. Makarov at the Siberian Power Institute.
A. Papin is currently adapting it for use at IIASA.
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To be specific, prices in this procedure affect three calculations. First,
price changes alter macroeconomic growth patterns-increased prices can
constrain overall growth and/or can shift activities from more to less energy-
intensive sectors. These changes are made judgmentally at present, based
on estimates of experts inside and outside of IIASA.
Second, price changes alter lifestyles and technological efficiencies of
energy-using devices. Such alterations can be at best informed guesses; as
prices increase, efficiencies tend more toward the technical potentials, and
lifestyles adapt to lowered energy use. Assumptions are made clear and open,
and the potential of energy savings from both categories are assessed at the
maximum levels judged feasible. The specific measures that may be required
to induce the lifestyle or the efficiency changes are not the emphasis here;
the aim is rather to indicate the energy demand results if such lifestyle or
efficiency projections were to occur.
Finally, relative price changes among different fuels and electricity can
cause a change in the mix of secondary energy demand; relative increases in
prices of liquid fuels induce shifts toward gaseous fuels, for example. No
formal or precise elasticities of substitution are used here; again, best in-
formed judgments describe the approach. After the analysis is completed,
demand elasticities can be (and are) calculated (see Chapter 15).
The energy facilities required to meet the energy supply scenarios of
MESSAGE have direct costs-capital, manpower, and materials costs. An
IMPACTd model (Figure 13-1) calculates the required direct and indirect
(energy-related) costs of new energy facilities and thus provides the basic
information for assessing whether or not an economy can afford a given
energy scenario. Exogenous assumptions about facility-specific size, material,
and manpower requirements are made for IMPACT in order to calculate the
direct and indirect requirements of a given energy strategy. In addition, a
separate, detailed WELMM analysis (see Chapter 9) can be done following
the IMPACT run. The assumptions and results from IMPACT are reported in
Chapter 19.
With IMPACT-calculated costs, one can begin to ask whether energy will
absorb unacceptably high shares of economic product. What forms of capital
and financial aid will be required by developing countries? What level of
nonenergy exports are necessary to pay for large energy imports?
Finally, a MACROeconomic modele could accept exogenous assumptions
about demographics and institutional parameters such as productivity,
taxes, and trade and could calculate investment and consumption rates
consistent with the costs from IMPACT. This could allow assessment of the
magnitude of change in, for example, the capital-output ratio if and when
energy becomes increasingly capital intensive. This in turn could enable both
dlMPACT was developed at the Siberian Power Institute by Y. Kononov and V. Tkchachenko
and was adapted for use at IlASA by Y. Kononov, with the help of T. Balabanov (see Kononov and
Por 1979).
eMACRO was developed (in its initial form) by M. Norman and has been extended significantly
by H.-H. Rogner. It is not yet implemented as parr of the modeling loop (see Norman 1977).
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a recheck of the original estimates of GDP for each region and a reentering
of the iterative process. MACRO is being revised and adapted for these
purposes; it was not used in obtaining the results presented in this book.
The sectoral direct energy requirements as calculated in IMPACT provide
(in theory at least) important inputs to the energy demand model (MEDEE-2)
for calculation of energy consumption by industrial sectors. For this purpose,
implementation of an input-output INTERLINKf model is underway.
INTERLINK would enable detailed industrial sectoral consistency between
IMPACT results and the components of GDP for use in demand calculations
in MEDEE-2.
In addition, other models (and modelers) have contributed to the concepts
and insights behind the scheme described in this chapter. For instance, ].
Parikh adapted a simulation model of India, SIMA, for some case study
analyses, and developed a cross-country regression model called SIMCRED
that was useful in first attempts at gauging energy use in developing regions
(see Parikh and Parikh 1979).
The model set, it must be recognized, deals with only a finite set of issues.
In Table 13-1, the scope of activities of the models is summarized-the
things the set does, and the things it cannot do.
This description has focused on the IIASA energy models as a set. Yet
each model is different, and each performs functions that have value inde-
pendent of the set.
AN EXAMPLE OF THE ITERATIVE PROCESS:
THE CASE OF REGION III (WE/JAI\JZ)
Much has been made in this chapter of the iterative process of analysis
inherent in the modeling loop of Figure 13-1. Here, an attempt is made to
shed some light on this process through the use of an example (region III
[WEI] ANZ]). Attention is given here to two possible alterations of initial
assumptions (there are others)-changes in the secondary energy shares and
changes in relative rates of penetration of alternative final energy types.
Table 13-2 shows the changes in the secondary energy shares (of "substi-
tutable fossil" uses) based on the energy price trajectories from MESSAGE
runs. Initially (for example), the gaseous fuels share of fossil sources of heat
in residences and commercial buildings was assumed (in the High scenario)
to reach 60 percent by 2030. Because of the relative price rise of oil and the
somewhat surprisingly flat price trajectory for natural gas, the gas share
has been increased for the residential and commercial sector to 70 percent
by 2030. Similar increases have been made for the industrial sector, partic-
ularly by the year 2000. This clearly is highly judgmental and mostly
arbitrary. It reflects the belief of the possible rate of growth of different
markets, pushed to feasible limits in this instance in the direction of more
fi. Zimin has extended an input-output model (INTERLINK) of a national economy for potential
use within the modeling loop (see Propoi and Zimin 1980).
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Table 13-1 . Scope of the II ASA set of energy models.
The model set does not:
• Take into account most institutional, societal, and political issues
• Predict energy pricing policies, market fluctuations, interest
rates, or multisectoral dynamics
• Focus on great, multisectoral detail of useful energy demand
• Treat tech nological details of small scale
• Simulate carefully the full nuclear fuel cycle or questions of
safety or arms control
• Evaluate the effects of specific tax, quota, regulatory, and finan-
cial incentive policies in detail
The model set does:
• Describe the potential of a reasonable evolution of global and
regional energy systems
• Capture the long-term, slowly changing macroeconomic charac-
teristics of developed and developing economies
• Forecast aggregate final energy demand (fuels)
• Model the evolution of the energy supply, conversion, and dis-
tribution systems and, in so doing, incorporate resources, capital
cost, environmental, and some political constraints
• Calculate the economic impact (capital, manpower, materials,
etc.) of alternative strategies
• Produce consistent scenarios on a global and world-regional level
Table 13-2. The iterative process, Example 1: assumed secondary energy
shares, changes in region III (WE/J ANZ) (%).
Base Year
7975
A. First Estimates
High Scenario
2000 2030
Industry "Substitutable Fossil"
Oil
Gas
Coal
Household/Service "Substitutable Fossil"
Oil
Gas
Coal
53.0
35.1
11.9
65.2
22.9
11.6
50
35
15
65
30
5
40
40
20
38
60
2
65.2
22.9
11.6
53.0
35.1
11.9
B. Final Estimates (after iterations based on relative price movements)
Ind ustry "Substitutable Fossil"
Oil
Gas
Coal
Household/Service "Substitutable Fossil"
Oil
Gas
Coal
35
50
15
55
40
5
20
60
20
28
70
2
406 ENERGY IN A FINITE WORLD
gas use. This one change would result in 188 GWyr/yr less oil, and more gas,
used in 2030 in this region, for the High scenario.
A second iteration, based on relative energy price movements, was a change
in the assumed rate of penetration of electricity into heat markets in region
III. This change, one of many exogenous inputs to the MEDEE-2 model,
was reduced after successive iterations had revealed the tight supply situa-
tion for electricity and, in particular, the pressure on coal as a source of
both electricity and essential liquid fuels. Clearly, if electric uses in WEI
]ANZ could, in general, be substituted by gas, aggregate prices would be
lower, domestic coal would be able to meet a higher share of liquid fuel
needs, and total energy imports would be lower. Since several items are
generally changed during anyone iteration, it is not possible to quantify
precisely the impacts of any single change; still, Table 13-3 summarizes the
changes in electrification assumptions in the iterative process and the result-
ing (approximate) change in total electricity consumption.
The character of such changes can be quite different in different regions.
For example, in region II (SU/EE), estimates of future electricity shares
could actually increase as prices for fuels rise faster than prices for electricity,
as is expected by many analysts in this region.
Table 13-3. The iterative process, Example 2: assumed rate of electricity
penetration, changes in region III (WE/JANZ).
7975 A High Scenario
Normalized
Base 2000 2030
A. First Estimates
Industrial Process Heat (GWyr/yr) 268 524 751
Electric, resistive (%) 0 7 15
Electric, heat pump (COP'" 2) (%) 0 0 0
Household/Service Space Heat (GWyr/yr) 204 390 490
Electric, resistive (%) 4 11 18
Electric, heat pump (COP'" 2) (%) 0 1 2
Electricity Used for Heat (GWyr/yr) 8 81 207
B. Final Estimates (after iterations based on relative price movements)
Industrial Process Heat (GWyr/yr) 268 513 743
Electric, resistive (%) 0 3 4
Electric, heat pump (COP'" 2) (%) 0 0 1
Household/Service Space Heat (GWyr/yr) 204 319 374
Electric, resistive (%) 4 5 5
Electric, heat pump (COP'" 2) (%) 0 3 5
Electricity Used for Heat (GWyr/yr) 8 36 61
Notes: 1 GWyr/yr '" 10· Watt-yr/yr; see energy units table in Appendix B to Chapter 1. COP
'" coefficient of performance.
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MESSAGE results serve, iteratively, to modify other assumptions and
judgments. As oil prices rise more rapidly than originally expected, for
example, domestic crude oil production increases, and imports or perhaps
the use of other expensive liquid fuel sources decline. The aim of the process
is to reach a consistent picture of future energy prospects for the two
global scenarios presented in the chapters of this part.
APPENDIX 13A: FORMULATION AND
LOGIC OF INDIVIDUAL MODELS
MEDEE-2
MEDEE-2 is a simulation model for evaluating the energy demand impli-
cations of economic and lifestyle scenarios for the long-term evolution of
countries or regions. It is a simplified version of a more general approach
developed by B. Chateau and B. Lapillonne (1977) at the Institut des Etudes
Juridiques et Economiques (IEJE), University of Grenoble, France. MEDEE-2
is based on a disaggregation of total energy demand into a multitude of end
use categories such as heating or cooling of dwellings, urban-intercity passen-
ger transportation by mode, and steam generation. When the useful energy
demand of a given end use category can be provided by various energy sources
(e.g., fossil fuels, district heat, electricity, or solar systems), energy demand is
first calculated in terms of useful energy and then converted into final
energy terms based on assumptions about the penetration of various energy
sources into their potential end use markets and about their end use effi-
clency.
For nonsubstitutable uses (e.g., motor fuel for automobiles or electricity
for electrolysis, lighting, and appliances such as washing machines and
refrigerators), energy demand is calculated directly in final energy terms.
Table 13-A1 gives an overview of the end use categories considered in
MEDEE-2. For each end use category, energy demand (useful or final) is
related to a set of determining factors, which can be macroeconomic aggre-
gates, physical quantities, or technological coefficients. The energy demand
projections result from the evolution assumed for these factors. Because of
this high level of disaggregation and relatively few structural assumptions
built into the model, it can be viewed as an accounting framework of the
energy uses in a country or a region.
Figure 13-A1 shows the scheme for projecting useful and/or final energy
demand used in MEDEE-2. The starting point is a scenario that defines an
environment of population growth, economic development, and energy
availability and prices envisaged for the future (see Chapters 14 and 15).
These general scenario parameters must be disaggregated in terms of eco-
nomic structure (GDP expenditure and formation and production of certain
very energy-intensive basic industry products), demographic structure (labor
force participation, urban-rural split, household size; type and size of dwell-
ings and their energy-using equipment; travel distances, automobile owner-
ship, preferences for certain modes of travel), and technological structure
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Figure 13-A1. Schematic description of MEDEE-2.
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(energy intensiveness of industrial sectors, dwelling insulation, fuel economy
of vehicles, and the like). Once this disaggregation is done, calculation of
energy demand for each end use category is straightforward.
For certain thermal uses (space and water heating, steam generation,
and so forth), energy demand is calculated in useful terms. Several energy
sources (fossil fuels, electricity, district heat, solar systems, heat pumps)
can be used to meet this demand. While the potential markets for each source
are defined in the model, the user must specify the penetration of the various
energy sources into their potential markets and their efficiency.
Transportation. Three types of transportation are distinguished in MEDEE-
2-passenger, freight, and international and military transportation. Passenger
transportation is broken down into an urban and an intercity category.
For international and military transportation (a category for which data
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are often difficult to find), only the use of liquid fuels is considered feasible.
The motor fuel demand for this type of transportation is treated as a func-
tion of GDP.
The demand for domestic freight transportation (measured in net ton-
kilometer) is calculated as a function of the GDP contribution by the agricul-
tural, mining, manufacturing, and energy sectors. The modal split-that is,
the allocation to the various modes (rail, truck, inland waterways or coastal
shipping, pipeline)-must be specified exogenously, as well as the energy
intensity (per ton-kilometer) of each mode. Except for rail, where electricity
and coal can also be used as an energy source, only liquid fuels are assumed
to be used.
Passenger transportation is treated in more detail, because it accounts in
most countries for a major share of energy consumption.
Total demand for intercity passenger transportation (measured in pas-
senger kilometers) is calculated in MEDEE-2 from data on population and
average distance traveled per person per year. Automobile travel is calculated
from data on population, automobile ownership, average distance traveled
per automobile per year, and an average load factor (passenger kilometer per
vehicle kilometer). The remainder is allocated to public transportation modes
(rail, bus, airplane) according to exogenously specified shares. The corre-
sponding vehicle kilometers are calculated from average load factors for each
mode. The energy intensities (per vehicle kilometer) also have to be specified.
As for transportation, only liquid fuels are assumed to be used, except for
railways.
The demand for urban transportation is related to the population in large
cities (those with more than 50,000 inhabitants) where mass transportation
is feasible. From data on the average distance traveled per day per person
in urban areas and on the total population in these areas, the demand for
transportation is calculated and allocated to two modes-private automobile
and mass transportation systems. Using average load factors, the passenger
kilometers are converted to vehicle kilometers. Liquid fuels or electricity
can be used as energy sources. The allocation has to be specified by separate
parameters, as well as the energy intensity for each mode (per vehicle kilo-
meter). All energy demand calculations for the transport sector are made
only in terms of final energy.
Industry. All economic activities except those of the service sector are
included under this label in MEDEE-2. Specifically, these are agriculture,
construction, mining, three manufacturing subsectors, and energy (elec-
tricity, gas, water). The energy consumption of the energy sector (and
other energy-related activities, if they can be isolated) is neglected, because
the energy consumption of conversion activities is calculated at a later stage
by the MESSAGE model. Three types of end use categories are considered-
specific uses of electricity (for lighting, motive power, electrolysis, and so
forth), thermal uses (space and water heating, low and high temperature
st~am generation, furnace operation), and motor fuel use (mainly for motive
power in nonstationary uses such as in agriculture, construction, and mining).
Because it is in most cases impossible to obtain energy balances in this
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detail, all present uses of electricity in industry are considered "specific,"
and all fossil fuels, except motor fuel, are assumed to be consumed for
thermal uses. This implies that electricity penetration into thermal uses
must be interpreted as incremental penetration above the levels reached
today. The activity level (value added) and the energy intensities (per unit
value added) for each sector are required for the energy demand calculations.
The energy intensities must be specified in terms of final energy for motor
fuel and electricity and in terms of "electricity equivalent" for thermal
uses. The breakdown of thermal uses (space and water heating, low and high
temperature steam generation, furnace operation) is assumed to be constant.
If the breakdown is not known for each subsector, an average split must be
specified.
The change in energy intensities should reflect a change in the specific
energy demand per unit of output due to changes of the product mix or to
process integration and other operational improvements.
For thermal uses, the penetration of electricity, district heat, cogeneration,
heat pump, and soft solar technologies must be estimated. The remaining
energy demand is assumed to be met by fossil fuels and is converted to final
energy demand using exogenously specified end use efficiencies for heating
systems, boilers, and furnaces (these must be given relative to electricity).
Electricity can penetrate into virtually all thermal uses; the potential market
of the other alternatives is restricted to steam and low temperature uses.
The demand for coke and for petrochemical feedstocks is calculated
separately in MEDEE-2, since they account for a major share of total
industrial energy consumption. Coke demand is related to pig iron produc-
tion, which in turn is related to steel production, and petrochemical feed-
stock demand is directly related to the value added of basic materials
industries.
Household-Service Sectors. It is well known that in the presently developed
countries space heating accounts for the major share of energy consumption
in this sector and that with improved insulation this energy demand could be
reduced considerably. Thus, buildings constructed after the world's awak-
ening to the energy crisis in 1973 have or will have better insulation. To
capture this difference, pre-1975 and post-1975 buildings are treated separate-
ly in MEDEE-2. In addition, three types of dwellings are considered-single
family housing units with central heating, apartments with central heating,
and dwellings with room heating only. This is done in order to capture the
large difference in the average heat loss of these dwelling types.
The change in the housing stock of the residential sector is determined
from data on average family size and population, on demolition of existing
dwellings by type, and on construction of new dwellings by type. Allowance
is made for the reduction of heat loss in old dwellings through retrofitting;
the heat loss of post-1975 dwellings is calculated from data on the average
size and the specific heat loss (in W1m2 ) for each type of dwelling. Energy
demand for water heating, cooking, air conditioning, and the electricity
consumption of secondary appliances (such as washing machine, refrigerator,
freezer, dish washer, clothes dryer, vacuum cleaner) is calculated from
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exogenously specified ownership fractions and/or average annual consump-
tion rates.
The change in the building stock of the commercial-service sector is
calculated from data on the average floor area per worker and labor force
and on the demolition of existing floor area. Allowance is made for improving
the insulation of old buildings. Besides thermal uses (space and water
heating), two other end use categories are distinguished-namely, air con-
ditioning and specific electricity uses, for which penetration and/or average
consumption rates must be given.
The energy demand calculations for this sector are generally made in
terms of "electricity equivalent." For air conditioning, electricity is con-
sidered the only energy source; this is also true for heat pumps. In all other
instances, the penetration of alternative sources such as electricity, district
heating, heat pumps, or soft solar technology must be estimated j the remain-
ing energy demand is assumed to be met by fossil fuels and converted to
final energy demand using exogenously specified end use efficiencies. The
potential market for district heat is restricted to urban areas, and the po-
tential market for solar is restricted to post-197 5 single family housing units
in the case of space heating. Penetration of solar technology for thermal uses
in the commercial-service sector is also assumed to be feasible only in low
rise buildings.
A complete description of MEDEE-2 is given in Lapillonne (1978).
Message
The fundamental features of the MESSAGE model are summarized in Figure
13-A2. A number of primary energy sources and their associated conversion
technologies are considered. These include resources and technologies that
could permit an essentially unlimited supply of energy-the fundamental
point of the whole exercise being to explore possible transitions to energy
systems states based on more or less unlimited resources such as 232 Th,
238 U, and solar energy.
Each primary energy source (except solar and hydroelectric power) is
subdivided into an optional number of classes in MESSAGE, taking account
of the cost of extraction, quality of resources, and location of deposit.
These primary sources are then converted directly (e.g., by crude oil refining)
or indirectly (e.g., electrolytic hydrogen) into secondary energy. Secondary
energy is exogenous to MESSAGE and is provided by the MEDEE-2 model
as time series data for electricity and for soft solar, solid, liquid, and gaseous
fuels. The variables of the model are expressed in period averages of annual
quantities.
The objective function is the sum of discounted costs for fuels (primary
energy)-operating, maintenance, and capital costs for providing the energy
demand over the planning horizon (1975-2030).
In the equations of the models-given roughly below-indexes are some-
times omitted if it seems to facilitate understanding.
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Figure 13-A2. Schematic description of MESSAGE.
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A comprehensive description of the MESSAGE model-its logic, mathe-
matics, and scope-is available in Agnew, Schrattenholzer, and Voss (1979).
The Objective Function. The objective function of the MESSAGE model is
the sum of discounted costs of capital, operating and maintenance, and fuels
(primary energy):
nL (3(t)5{b T r(t)+cT x(t)+d T y(t)}
t = 1
where
t is current index of time period,
n is number of time periods,
(3(t) is discount factor,
5 is number of years per period,
b is vector of energy resources costs,
r is vector of resource activities (linear programming variables),
c is vector of operating and maintenance costs,
x is vector of energy conversion activities (linear programming van-
abIes),
d is vector of capital (investment) costs, and
y is vector of capacity increments (linear programming variables).
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The discount factor is calculated from an annual discount rate of 6 per-
cent, applied to a constant dollar investment stream. As MESSAGE is in-
tended to minimize societal costs, this discount rate is to be understood as a
pretax one. a
The cost of increments to capacity still operating at the end of the plan-
ning horizon is corrected by a "terminal valuation factor," tv:
tv(t) = (1 - {35 (n + I-I)
for example, the terminal valuation factor for the last time period is
tv(n) = 1 - (35
Resource Constraints. The following resource constraint is defined for each
resource and for each category:
nI Sr(t)<.Av
t ~ I
where r(t) is annual extraction in period t, and .A v is availability of resource.
Resource Requirements. The following equation is specified for each time
period and for each resource:
JI r/t)~ I VlXI(t)+SWIYI(t)-SWIYI(t-6)
J~ I I
where
J is index of resource category,
J is number of resource categories,
v I is specific consumption by production activity x I , and
w I is inventory requirement for capacity increment Y I .
Capacity Equations. The following equation is specified for each technol-
ogy and for each load region supplied by this technology:
x < Cap X h. X pf,
J J
where
J is index of load region,
Cap is capacity,
hj is load duration of load region j, andpi is plant factor.
al n these analyses, taxes are taken as part of the difference between prices and costs and so are
not included in these cost minimization calculations. Because of this fact, the discount factor here
may be thought of as a "social" discount factor, applied equally to all world regions.
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Demand Constraint. The following equation is specified for each time
period, for each demand sector, and for each load region:
L 77.x. ~ DM.
I) I )
where j is index of demand sector, 77i] is conversion efficiency (or equal to 0
if xi does not supply demand sector j), and DM] is annual secondary energy
demand.
Buildup Constraints. The following equation is specified for some (pri-
marily new) technologies and for each time period:
y(t) ~ 'Yy(t - 1) + g
where'Y is growth parameter, and g is constant, allowing for startup.
Emission Constraints. b The following equation is specified for each type of
pollutant and for each time period:
b = " em.x.L.. I I
where b is total emissions (LP variables), and emi is specific emissions of tech-
nology i.
Pollutant Concentration Constraints. b The following is a nonbinding con-
straint that is defined for each time period and for those pollutants whose
concentrations are to be calculated (e.g., krypton, carbon dioxide):
2 25 (T-t)lt2 X b
T = 1
where 5 is the number of years for each time period, and t2 is the half-life of
pollutant.
Impact
Once an optimal energy strategy is identified, it is necessary to understand
the requirements for corresponding direct and indirect energy investments.
The first version of the IMPACT model was built at the Siberian Power
Institute by Yuri Kononov and Victor Tkchachenko. At IIASA the model
was developed further and adjusted to the purposes of identification and
comparison of long-range regional strategies of the transition to new energy
sources.
bThese constraints, although available, were not directly used in the MESSAGE runs reported in
Chapter 17.
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Modeling Techniques. IMPACT belongs to the set of energy-oriented
dynamic input-output models, explicitly accounting for lags between the
start of investment and the putting into operation of production capacities.
It consists of linear and nonlinear equations that describe the following
for each year of the period concerned-the balance of production of indi-
vidual products and services and their consumption in operating and building
the energy systems and related branches; the conditions for introducing
extra capacities in energy-related branches; and investment and WELMM
requirements.
Model Capability. For each given energy strategy, the model determines:
• Investment in energy system development;
• The required putting into operation of CapaCItieS in energy-related
branches of industry and corresponding (indirect) capital investment;
• The required output of different types of materials, equipment, and
services to provide operational and construction requirements of the
energy system and related branches; and
• Direct and indirect WELMM requirements.
All these indicators are evaluated for each year of the period considered.
The model describes the building up of production capacities as a direct
part of the energy supply system (ESS) and its related branches. In this way,
lead times of construction and related consumption of equipment and
material are taken into account. This is done by identifying input-output
relations between the following sectors of the economy important for the
energy supply systems:
iron ore mining
primary iron and steel manufacturing
fabricated metal products
nonferrous metal ore mining
nonferrous metals manufacturing
chemical products
plastic and synthetic materials
petroleum products
stone, clay, and glass products
lumber and wood products
miscellaneous materials
engines and turbines
electrical equipment
mining equipment
oil field equipment
construction equipment and machineries
material handling equipment
metalworking equipment
instrument and control equipment
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transportation equipment
special industry equipment
general industry equipment
fabricated plate products
miscellaneous equipment
export goods I
export goods II
construction in energy sectors
construction (nonenergy)
transport (nonenergy)
maintenance and repair construction
The Equation System of Impact. c The direct requirements of the ESS for
products of energy-related sectors are expressed as
where
t+ r
Ye(t)=AIXe(t)= L
r=t
F(r-t) Z (7)
1 e
Ye (t) is the vector of direct investment and operational requirements of
the ESS for products of energy-related sectors in the year t;
is the vector of annual energy production in the year t j
is the vector of required additional capacities of the ESS in the
year tj
Al is the matrix of contribution coefficients of energy-related sectors
to the construction and operation of energy production per unit of
activity;
F\r-t) is the matrix of contribution coefficients of energy-related sectors
in the year t to putting into operation the additional capacities of
the ESS in the year t (t ~ 7 ~ t + r); and
7 is the vector of the time lag introduced by construction times.
Total (direct and indirect) material and equipment requirements of the
ESS are expressed as
Xl (t) =A 2 Xl (t) + A 3x~n (t) + Ye(t)
where
A 2 is the matrix of input-output coefficients;
A 3 is the matrix of materials and equipment requirements coefficients
per unit of investment in energy-related sectors;
Xl (t) is the vector of output in energy-related sectors; and
x~n (t) is the vector of indirect capital investments in energy-related
sectors.
CMatrix notation is used throughout the section. The letters t or T in parenthesis denote vector-
valued time functions. A bar denotes an exogenously given input.
F(r-t) F(r-t)
2 ' 3
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Direct capital investment in the ESS is expressed as
t+r
X d (t) = ~ F(r-t) Z (7)
2 L 2 e
r=t
Indirect capital investment in the ESS is expressed as
t+ T
xin(t) = ~ p(r-t) Z (7)
2 L 3 I
r=t
Total (direct and indirect) capital investment in the ESS is expressed as
X(t) = X d (t) + X in (t)
2 2 2
where
are, respectively, the matrixes of capital investment coef-
ficients in the year t to put into operation the additional
capacities of the ESS and energy-related sectors in the
year t;
Z I (t) is the vector of new additional capacities in the energy-
related sectors in the year t; and
X~ (t) is the vector of direct capital investment in the ESS.
Vector Z I (t), with vector components Zi I), ... ,Zik ), must satisfy the fol-
lowing conditionsd :
{
min [XU) (t + 1) - x(i)(7)]
T<t I I
ZU)(t) = "'"
I
o
if this value is positive; otherwise for every i € {I ,2, ... , k}.
Vector notation is used in the model for simplicity reasons. This equation
is therefore written as
7, I(t) = max [~~~ (X I(t + 1) - X1(7») ;OJ
The structure of IMPACT is shown in Figure 13-A3.
The model also includes an equation for calculating the direct and the in-
d
In order to take into account installed capacity requirements, this expression can be replaced by
. [(i) X(i)(r) J
{
min X (t + I) __--'1_----:-
_ (i) r';;'t I (I - p)t-T+I
Z I (t) =
o
if this value is positive; otherwise for every i f {I,2, ... , k} where p is the rate of replacement.
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direct expenses of the WELMM resources. This equation is written as
t+T
X/t) =A 4 Xe (t) +AsX I (t) +A 6 xi2n (t) + L
T~t
where
p( T -t)
4
is the WELMM expenditures in the year t;
is the matrix of direct operational WELMM coefficients;
is the matrix of indirect operational WELMM coefficients of
energy-related sectors;
is the matrix of indirect constructional WELMM coefficients of
energy-related sectors; and
is the matrix of direct constructional WELMM coefficients in the
year t to put into operation new energy capacities in the year t.
Equations for evaluating air and water pollutant emissions of the ESS and
the energy-related sectors can be written an~.10gically._
The drivers for IMPACT's relations are Xe(t) and Ze(t); these exogenous
variables can be obtained from an energy supply model (e.g., the IIASA
MESSAGE model).
An algorithm has been developed for solving equations iteratively. This
algorithm, as well as other details of IMPACT's structure, logic, and scope are
described in Kononov and Por (1979).
The Gaming Model
The gaming model (GM), developed by Professor Makarov at the Siberian
Power Institute, offers the capability to assess interregional oil trade-and oil
balancing, within regions-in a systematic way. Its implementation at IIASA
is still in an early stage.
The gaming model has been designed to allow an aggregate assessment of
the long-term tendencies in world oil trade. By means of sophisticated data
on liquid fuel demand and oil production by groups of countries (regions)
over time, the model yields estimations of oil price dynamics and quantities
of internationally traded oil.
The approach to world oil market modeling assumes that economic factors
are primary ones in affecting conditions of long-term world energy develop-
ment; social and political factors are treated as relatively more temporary.
Thus, economic factors were chosen as the subject for modeling, while politi-
cal and social factors can be introduced as exogenous controls.
In the gaming model, the process of trading in the world oil market is
simulated as a game (developing in time) of some partners or groups of
countries (regions). Each region is characterized by specific conditions of
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energy development-in particular, economic values of oil imports and
exports-and objectives (interests) as a participant in world oil trading.
These characteristics, when incorporated, form regional submodels wi thin
the GM that allow the multiple optimization of regional oil supply systems
during the process of simulation.
Regional results are coordinated with the special "compromise-searching"
procedures of GM. These are based on three different assumptions about the
world oil market-equilibrium (ideal competition among exporters and
importers), dominance of exporters with full unity among members of their
coalition (monopoly), and dominance of exporters with competition among
members of their coalition (cartel).
In its dialog regime, GM allows variations in certain critical regional and
interregional oil trade factors-for example, regional oil demand and supply
elasticities, potentials and costs of regional oil production, exporters' and/or
importers' oil trade quotas, and composition of coalitions of oil traders. In
this way, one can simulate a broad spectrum of evolutionary paths for the
world oil market.
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14 TWO SCENARIOS DEFINED
A scenario, as used here, is a logically consistent statement or characteriza-
tion of a possible future state of the world. Often the scenario statement also
specifies a logical sequence of events that could transform the reference or
base year state into the postulated future state. The postulated future state
can represent the consensus of many experts or be outrageously absurd, pro-
vided that it is internally consistent and follows from the assumptions m~de.
A scenario, therefore, is not a prediction, but simply one of infinitely many
future states that might happen.
Scenario development and analysis can serve many varied purposes. De-
pending on one's purpose, one can be interested in scenarios that are most
unlikely to happen-as, for example, in contingency planning or developing
emergency preparedness. In contrast, for the purpose here, scenarios are used
to provide synthesis for conceptions and projections about a wide variety of
global energy issues in the long term. This is above all a learning process; the
scenarios are an aid to this process. As the primary goal of this quantitative
analysis is to learn about the smooth evolution of energy demand and sup-
ply, discontinuities, abrupt changes, and radically changed lifestyles have
been excluded from the scenario set.
The development of scenarios is necessarily subjective. Certain assump-
tions must be made that cannot be defended rigorously. Choosing what to
make assumptions about is even more subjective. While acknowledging this
subjective input to the scenario definitions of this chapter, we offer no apol-
423
424 ENERGY IN A FINITE WORLD
ogy; it is necessary in order to serve the purpose of synthesis and learning.
It should also be understood that these projections do not necessarily repre-
sent either the most preferred future state of the world or the most probable.
The two scenarios are internally consistent and span a range of economic
and energy supply and demand futures. The real future could certainly be
"higher" than the High scenario or "lower" than the Low scenario, but the
range was selected such that the expected future value is more likely within
the range than outside it.
In this chapter, the criteria for developing scenarios are described, fol-
lowed by several general characteristics of the two scenarios used. The final
section presents in detail the numerical projections of population and gross
domestic product (GDP) for each of the seven world regions defined for the
quantitative analysis within the IIASA Energy Systems Program.
The scenarios here can be seen as a pragmatic, detailed integration of the
various specific studies discussed in the chapters of Parts II and III of this
book. That is, while the latter studies attempt to explore the upper poten-
tials for supply sources and the global bounds of various constraints, the
scenarios aim to produce an integrated, "real world" picture of future energy
prospects.
CRITERIA FOR DEVELOPING SCENARIOS
It was pointed out in the previous chapter that the development of scenarios
is an iterative process. That is, make assumptions about basic input variables,
then develop energy demand and supply estimations in detail, and analyze
them in many different ways. When inconsistent or unreasonable implica-
tions are identified, make appropriate changes to basic input variables. As
part of this process of analyzing implications and feeding back changes for
another iteration, criteria must be used for judging whether changes should
be made and what changes to make. Indeed, without being specific about the
criteria for accepting a scenario, it is difficult to set values for variables to
start the iterative process. Four guiding criteria are outlined below, and spe-
cific characteristics of the two scenarios defined are given in the following
section.
The most important criterion for developing a scenario is consistency.
Consistency was assured among the details through the use of detailed
accounting systems and models. This procedure ensured that the supply of
each fuel and energy type was consistent with the projected demand for
energy of each fuel and type for each region. Consistency evaluations were
made among and across regions with respect to energy availability and sup-
ply costs and utilization of globally traded energy commodities, with respect
to energy use by economic sectors in various stages of development, and
with respect to energy price response and conservation.
A second important criterion is that the scenario projections in their total-
ity must not be unreasonable. Application of this criterion required judg-
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ment-judgment made collectively by accepting and soliciting comments and
reactions from experts. This criterion of reasonableness is the subjective
extension of the first criterion of consistency. Scenario projections were ana-
lyzed first for quantitative consistency; then the same characteristics and
implications were further judged for reasonableness. For example, during an
early iteration, one scenario was judged to be consistent in that each region
had balanced supply and demand within the given allocation of interregional
energy trade, but it was also judged unreasonable that one region had a much
higher energy resource cost than another. A change to the interregional
energy trade flow was made in later iterations. In another case, energy de-
mand was reduced by lowering GDP projections and increasing conservation.
A third criterion is the degree of continuity or smoothness of the scenario
projection. Not only are the values of key parameters and variables expected
to be evolving smoothly during the projection period, they also must be con-
nected to the past. The inertia of accumulated capital cannot be ignored.
Again, a judgment was needed; it was never intended in these analyses that
scenario projections be an extrapolation of historic data ("business as usual"
scenarios), but that assumed changes to historic trends would develop in an
orderly fashion.
The fourth criterion is the degree of variation between scenarios. An
important determinant of the long-term transition in energy use away from
petroleum is the level of energy use. At least two scenarios are required, and
these must span a sufficiently wide range in order to incorporate the un-
avoidable uncertainties. Thus, iterations originally affecting only one scenario
often resulted in related changes to the other scenario so as to preserve the
necessary range between the two.
SCENARIO CHARACTERISTICS
There are two basic development variables that drive the long-term scenario
projections-population growth and macroeconomic development (as mea-
sured by growth in GDP). In making population projections, one usually
considers the many factors influencing both birth rates and death rates.
Assumptions about these factors could be made, leading to a variety of pop-
ulation projections, by linking various scenario values (such as economic con-
ditions or energy usage) to these factors. This was not done. Instead, a single,
fixed projection of population was preferred-one that fell within the range
of numerous recent popUlation projections. This is not to deny the existence
or the importance of economic and environmental factors on population.
This approach was taken in part to reduce the complexity of analysis, but
mainly to focus attention on the implications of the long-term energy
transition.
In making projections of economic activity, a range of values was selected
for examination. A range of economic growth estimates serves two primary
purposes-first, it reflects the large uncertainties associated with making such
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projections and avoids having a single estimate projection mistaken for a pre-
diction; second, it yields a range of energy use projections (this being a crite-
rion for scenarios). This is not to say that energy use and economic activity
must necessarily go hand in hand; in fact, this relationship is examined in
Chapter 15.
Projections of GOP are considered to be within the loop of the iteration
process (see Chapter 13). In some cases, especially for the developing econ-
omy regions, original values of GOP projections were reduced after exam-
ining the implications of the requirements for energy. Because of such
adjustments during the iteration process, it is no longer precisely correct to
characterize the GOP projections as inputs. Final values for the two basic
development variables are given in the last section of this chapter.
In general, the scenario projections exhibit (assumed) ever-decreasing
growth rates of population and economic growth through the time period up
to 2030. This assumption is reinforced for energy consumption-especially
for the developed economy regions-by assuming increasing improvements in
the efficiency of energy use (Chapter 16).
It is assumed here that there will be no major changes in the sociopolitical
environment or in lifestyles except those that accompany economic develop-
ment,a For example, transportation would, in the scenarios, continue to be
a primary factor in determining energy use even with major increases in effi-
ciencies. No breakthroughs in the development of new energy-related tech-
nologies are assumed here, although coal liquefaction, advanced breeder
reactors, and large-scale solar electric technologies are assumed to be com-
mercially available (although not necessarily exploited) on a large scale
around the turn of the century. No major cost changes for energy technolo-
gies are assumed (although it may be that these costs and the resource extrac-
tion costs used are optimistically low).
In the development of the energy supply scenarios (Chapter 17), no
explicit constraints were imposed with respect to environmental problems,
including the buildup of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, or with respect
to problems of risk. These issues are addressed in Chapters 10 and 11, respec-
tively. The quantities of carbon dioxide that would be released from the
burning of fossil fuel at the levels in the supply scenarios are reported in
Chapter 17.
The two scenarios were selected to focus on the transition away from
petroleum resources. Making very low or no growth projections of popula-
tion, economic development, and energy use would not highlight the prob-
lems to be faced during this transition. Thus these two scenarios have
moderate to moderately high projections of these basic variables. As well, by
focusing on the transition, the analyses inevitably become oriented toward
supply considerations. Indeed, it may be that the world will face a two-part
aIn some sense, the two scenarios defined in this chapter could be seen as two versions of one sce-
nario, in that neither touches the possibility of wholly different states of the economic, social, and
political world.
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Table 14-1. Overview of basic scenario projections, aggregate global results.
Base High Scenario Low Scenario
Year
1975 2000 2030 2000 2030
Population (109 ) 4.0 6.1 8.0 6.1 8.0
(Growth rate (%/yr)) (1.7) (0.9) (1.7) (0.9)
GDP per capita ($1975) 1600 2800 5000 2200 2800
(Growth rate (%/yr)) (2.4) ( 1.9) (1.3) (0.9)
Primary energy per
capita (kWyr/yr) 2.1 2.8 4.5 2.2 2.8
(Growth rate (%/yr)) (1.2) (1.6) (0.3) (0.8)
Notes: Rounded data.
All growth rates are average annual growth rates over each time interval. For energy unit conver-
sion factors see Appendix B in Chapter 1. For population, see Table 14.2 for detailed projections.
GDP is in constant (1975) U.S. dollars; see Table 14.5 for detailed projections. For primary energy
per capita, electricity counted at fossil replacement basis, see Table 15.2 and Chapter 17 for detailed
projections.
energy supply transition-first, away from cheap petroleum resources and,
second, away from fossil fuels and toward more renewable energy sources.
Energy supply and demand for all fuels, for all regions, and for the globe
must balance at each given time. Relying on conclusions of supply shortfalls
resulting from other studies and realizing that energy supply costs must still
increase, strong energy conservation trends were built into the scenario
demand projections from the beginning. Energy prices and elasticities were
not, however, assumed at the outset and thus were not used for projection
purposes. Rather, energy prices were inferred from energy costs and then
elasticities were calculated from detailed scenario projections. These results
were then used in the iteration process and in many cases resulted in lower
energy use projections based on even stronger conservation measures.
In summary, these scenarios can be characterized as having declining
growth rates, increasing energy costs and prices and-as reactions to these
increased prices-greatly improved energy use efficiencies and conservation.
Table 14-1 gives an overview of detailed projections and results that are
described later in this book.b As shown in this table, global population is
projected to double by 2030 and average per capita GDP to increase by 3.2
and 1.8 times in the High and the Low scenarios, respectively, by 2030. In
both scenarios, primary energy would increase from 2.1 kWyr/yr per capita
in 1975 to 4.5 kWyr/yr per capita in the High scenario and to 2.8 kWyr/yr
per capita in the Low scenario (on average) by 2030. This means that (com-
mercial) global primary energy use would increase from 8.2 TWyr/yr in 1975
to approximately 36 TWyr/yr in the High scenario and to 22 TWyr/yr in the
Low scenario by 2030.
bEnergy units and conversion factors for the scenario projections are given in Appendix lB.
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SCENARIO PROJECTIONS: POPULATION
AND GDP
As noted earlier, these analyses use a disaggregated, seven region world.
These regions were selected as a minimal disaggregation, accounting for dif-
ferences and similarities with respect to geography, economic system and
energy use, and resources., It is desirable to limit the number of separate
regions in order to minimize the burden of calculations, but also to separate
developed and developing economies, market and centrally planned econo-
mies, and regions with large and small resources. The seven world regions are
defined in Figure 1-3; the countries in each of these regions are listed in
Appendix 1A. Both the roman numeral designators (I through VII) and the
abbreviated letter designators are used throughout the chapters of this part.
Population
World population has already passed four billion. At current growth rates,
the population would double in thirty-five years. No present-day demogra-
pher, however, would project world population for the next thirty-five or
fifty years with today's growth rate.
Examination of world population over the past 225 years shows that
growth rates have varied considerably. The growth rate for the world as a
whole increased from four persons per thousand per year (0.4 percent per
year) in 1750 to nineteen persons per thousand per year in 1975. Yet these
world average growth rates do not indicate the large changes that have taken
place separately in the developed and the developing countries. The presently
developed countries experienced a rapid increase in growth rate up to the
middle of the nineteenth century (from four to ten persons per thousand per
year) and a gradual leveling off. The presently developing countries had very
low and decreasing growth rates in the previous century but have recently
shown very high growth rates (twenty-two per thousand per year) (see Chant
1980).
The population projections used here (Keyfitz 1977) assume the achieve-
ment of a bare replacement level of fertility in developing regions by 2015.
Projections based on achieving this level earlier would be lower. The popula-
tion projections for the seven world regions are presented in Table 14-2.
Examination of the growth rates of these projections shows a gradual de-
crease globally from the current peak of 2 percent per year to less than 1 per-
cent per year by 2030. As shown in Table 14-3, the growth rates for the
developing regions (IV-LA, V-AfiSEA, and VI-ME/NAf), however, are more
than three times the growth rates of the developed regions (I-NA, II-SU/EE,
and III-WE/]ANZ); region VII (C/CPA) is close to the world average.
Three observations are worth noting with respect to these population pro-
jections. First, the world is in a transition during which global popUlation
will double in the next fifty years; after 2030, global population will likely
stabilize with only a further 13 percent increase. Figure 14-1 puts the cur-
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Table 14-2. Population projections by region, High and Low scenarios
(106 people).
Population
Base Projection
Year
Region 7975 2000 2030
I (NA) 237 284 315
II (SU/EE) 363 436 480
III (WE/JANZ) 560 680 767
IV (LA) 319 575 797
V (Af/SEA) 1422 2528 3550
VI (ME/NAf) 133 247 353
VII (C/CPA) 912 1330 1714
World 3946 6080 7976
Notes: 1975 data are midyear estimates from United Nations Monthly Bulletin of Statistics,
January 1978.
Source: Keyfitz (1977).
rent population growth rate and the assumed future decline in growth rate
in perspective with historical data.
The second observation is that as a stable population is approached, a
striking change occurs in the age structure. The fraction of population over
age sixty-five increases substantially, as can be seen by examining the ratio of
population between the ages of fifteen and sixty-four to the population age
sixty-five and over. In simple terms, this ratio indicates the number of people
who must produce, in an economic sense, not only for themselves and for
their children but also for one additional adult who has retired from eco-
nomic production. In region I (NA), this ratio would drop from 6.3 in 1975
to 4 in 2030. Regions II (SU/EE) and III (WE/JANZ) exhibit a similar pat-
tern. In region IV (LA), typical of the developing regions, the rate would
drop from over 14 in 1975 to about 9 in 2030. These declining ratios would
tend to limit the potential for average per capita economic growth in the
next fifty years.
Table 14-3. Population growth rates, High and Low scenarios (%/yr).
A verage Annual Growth Rate
7950- 7975- 7985- 2000- 2075-
Region 7975 7985 2000 2075 2030
I (NA) + II (SU/EE) + III (WE/JANZ) 1.2 0.8 0.7 0.4 0.3
IV (LA) + V (Af/SEA) + VI (ME/NAf) 2.4 2.8 2.1 1.3 1.0
VII (C/CPA) 1.7 1.9 1.3 1.0 0.7
World 1.9 2.0 1.6 1.1 0.8
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Figure 14-1. World population, historical and projected. Source: Keyfitz (1977).
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The third observation of these population projections has vital importance
for projecting energy use-increasing urbanization, particularly in the devel-
oping regions. High power densities are required in cities; this carries large
multiplications for both energy supply and concentrated environmental pol-
lution. In region IV (LA), for example, the relative population in cities of
greater than 100,000 people would increase from 37 percent in 1975 to 69
percent in 2030; and in region V (AfiSEA) from 13 percent in 1975 to 44
percent in 2030. These projected trends are examined further in Chapter 15.
Economic Growth
Global economic production exceeded 6 trillion (10 12 ) U.S. dollars in 1975.
Many caveats and explanatory notes must be added to this statement before
it can be properly interpreted. It is, however, one measure of the "size" of
the global economic system.
The explanatory notes include the following: 1975 U.S. dollars and 1975
official exchange rates and prices (except for centrally planned economiesc )
cFor the centrally planned economies the estimates of GDP given by the World Bank (1977) in the
World Bank Atlas were used. These estimates are based on a comparison of physical indicators of eco-
nomic product among centrally planned and market economies for 1965. (This comparison was done
by the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe.) The data for real growth for both centrally planned
and market economies were used to estimate the GDP of centrally planned economies for 1975.
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are used throughout these analyses, and GDP is measured first by country
and is then aggregated to the seven regions and finally to the globe. The
caveats include the obvious ones involved whenever GDP estimates of differ-
ent countries are compared or aggregated into regions: economic structures
differ considerably from country to country (especially from developing to
developed economies), and so GDP estimates are not really comparable,
and official monetary exchange rates do not necessarily reflect "real"
equivalences.
The aggregate GDP measure of economic activity is not sufficient for mea-
suring the welfare of a country or region. It is not even sufficient for pro-
jecting energy use, as will be seen in Chapter 16. It is, however, the single
most important aggregate measure of economic activity and, to that extent,
it provides a useful yardstick for broad comparisons and for scenario
definition.
For making initial projections of GDP, the projections and results of other
similar recent studies, including those of WAES (1977) and WEC (1978),
proved invaluable. The projections here differ from those of WAES and WEC
in having lower economic growth and consequently lower energy demand-so
that energy supply and demand could balance at a more "reasonable" energy
supply situation. The main criterion used in extending the projections to the
year 2030 and for developing the two scenarios in greater detail was the con-
stant checking for internal consistency and consistency among world regions.
Even though the application of this and other criteria for selecting scenario
variables involved mostly the exercise of judgment, the procedure was very
useful for eliminating potential scenario values that superficially appeared
reasonable. Consistency within a scenario at any level of detail, however, is
clearly only a necessary, and not a sufficient, condition for reasonableness.
As part of the exercise of setting economic projections, therefore, there
were several iterations of making assumptions, analyzing implications, check-
ing for consistency, and refining assumptions. The projections here are the
result of this process.
The two scenario projections for the growth rate of regional GDP are given
in Table 14-4. The general trend in the projections, which is exhibited in all
regions, is the ever-decreasing growth rates in later and later periods. Many
factors are likely to contribute to this trend, including a host of social and
institutional ones, but the two most important factors are decreases in popu-
lation growth rates and the increasing scarcity of basic resources. Decreases
in population growth rates in these projections have already been discussed;
the growth rates of GDP per capita (Table 14-5) also exhibit the general
trend of decreasing growth rates in the projections. This decline in per capita
growth rates is attributed mainly to the depletion of resources and the con-
comitant increase in real cost of these resources. In the IIASA energy study,
this factor is most evident with respect to energy resources, but other basic
resources will most likely follow a similar pattern.
The economic growth rates assumed here do not, surely, reflect the desires
for development in each region. The Low scenario, in particular, may be
unacceptably low in many regions. The point here is not to predict the most
likely rates, but to test a plausible range and to evaluate the implications.
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ECONOMIC GROWTH PROJ ECTIONS:
OTHER STUDIES
For reference purposes, it may be helpful to compare the growth rate
projections of the IIASA Energy Systems Program with those of other
published studies. The WAES (1977) economic growth projections, as
shown below, are somewhat higher for regions I and III, but their
analysis indicated that with these rates there would be a gap between
oil demand and supply.
The Leontief United Nations study presented two economic growth
scenarios: one based on the so-called New International Economic
Order growth targets; and one in which economic growth rates were
determined by constraints on available labor, investment potential,
and balance-of-payments. The New Economic Order (NEO) scenario
calls for much higher economic growth rates in the developing regions
while maintaining a relatively high growth rate in the developed regions.
WAES (7977) Economic Growth Projections (%/yr)
Case C Cases C-7,2 Case 0 Cases 0-7,8
7976- 7985- 7976- 7985-
Region 7985 2000 7985 2000
North America (region I) 4.3 3.7 3.0 2.6
Western Europe, Japan, Australia, New Zealand,
South Africa (region III) 5.4 3.5 3.2 2.4
Developing countries
(regions IV (LA) + V 6.4 5.1 4.4 3.8
(Af/SEA) + VI (NE/NAf)
UN Economic Growth Projections (Leontief et al./ 7977), 7977-2000 (%/yr)
IIASA 7975-2000
High Low
Region NEOa OEOb Scenario Scenario
Developed countries (regions I (NA), II (SU/EE),
and III (WE/JANZ) 3.6 3.9 3.9 2.8
Developing countries (regions IV (LA), V
(Af/SEA), VI (ME/NAf), and VII (C/CPA) 6.9 5.4 5.3 4.0
World 4.5 4.2 4.2 3.1
aNew Economic Order Scenario C (low population growth which is closest to our population
projection) .
bOld Economic Order Scenario A.
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Table 14-4. Historical and projected growth rates of GDP, by region, High
and Low scenarios (%/yr)
Historical Scenario Projection
1950- 1960- 1975- 1985- 2000- 2015-
Region 1960 1975 1985 2000 2015 2030
A. High Scenario
I (NA) 3.3 3.4 4.3 3.3 2.4 2.0
II (SU/EE) 10.4 6.5 5.0 4.0 3.5 3.5
III (WE/JANZ) 5.0 5.2 4.3 3.4 2.5 2.0
IV (LA) 5.0 6.1 6.2 4.9 3.7 3.3
V (Af/SEA) 3.9 5.5 5.8 4.8 3.8 3.4
VI (ME/NAf) 7.0 9.8 7.2 5.9 4.2 3.8
VII (C/CPA) 8.0 6.1 5.0 4.0 3.5 3.0
World 5.0 5.0 4.7 3.8 3.0 2.7
I + Ilia 4.2 4.4 4.3 3.4 2.5 2.0
IV + V + Via 4.7 6.5 6.3 5.1 3.9 3.5
B. Low Scenario
I (NA) 3.3 3.4 3.1 2.0 1.1 1.0
II (SU/EE) 10.4 6.5 4.5 3.5 2.5 2.0
III (WE/]ANZ) 5.0 5.2 3.2 2.1 1.5 1.2
IV (LA) 5.0 6.1 4.7 3.6 3.0 3.0
V (Af/SEA) 3.9 5.5 4.8 3.6 2.8 2.4
VI (ME/NAf) 7.0 9.8 5.6 4.6 2.7 2.1
VII (C/CPA) 8.0 6.1 3.3 3.0 2.5 2.0
World 5.0 5.0 3.6 2.7 1.9 1.7
I + lila 4.2 4.4 3.1 2.1 1.3 1.1
IV + V + Via 4.7 6.5 5.0 3.8 2.9 2.6
apresented for purposes of comparison with data of WAES (1977) and of other global studies
that exclude centrally planned economies.
Note: Historical and projected values of GDP in constant (1975) U.s. dollars are given in Chant
(1980).
The interregional trade implications of these regional economic projections
were not examined. The assumption was made, however, of a continuing
dependency of the deVeloping regions on trade with the developed regions as
a major stimulant for growth. Because of this, the developing economies
would be limited in their growth potential (by assumption) to one or two
percentage points greater than the growth rates of the developed economies.
This interregional linkaged of economic growth rates is not universal and
may prove unfounded for a fifty-five-year projection period; but the projec-
tions are based on this assumption. Some countries, notably those of the
dThis assumption has been used in some World Bank studies, in particular in a contribution to the
WAES (1977) study. See also Hicks et al. (1976).
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Table 14-5. 1975 per capita GDP, historical and projected real growth
rates for two scenarios to 2030.
Historical
Growth Rate Projected Growth Rate of per Capita GOP (%/yr)
of per GOP per High scenario Low scenario
Capita GOP Capita
(%/yr) (dollars) 1975- 2000- 1975- 2000-
Region 1950-1975 1975 2000 2030 2000 2030
I (NA) 1.9 7046 2.9 1.8 1.7 0.7
II (SU/EE) 6.7 2562 3.6 3.2 3.1 1.9
III (WE/JANZ) 4.0 4259 3.0 1.8 1.7 0.9
IV (LA) 2.9 1066 3.0 2.4 1.6 1.9
V (Af/SEA) 2.5 239 2.8 2.4 1.7 1.4
VI (ME/NAf) 5.7 1429 3.8 2.8 2.4 1.2
VII (C/CPA) 5.1 352 2.8 2.4 1.6 1.4
World a 3.1 1565 2.4 1.9 1.3 0.9
aThese global per capita growth rates may appear inconsistent with the values for the regions,
but they are correct. Growth rates of aggregate ratios (e.g., GDP per capita) need not always be
within the range of their component parts when both numerator and denominator grow at different
rates.
Note: All growth rates are average annual growth rates (rounded) over the time period shown;
actual projections have decreasing growth rates. See Chant (1980).
Middle East in region VI, are assumed to be limited not by this linkage but
by their capability to absorb the favorable trade balance due to oil exports.
The GDP aggregate measure of economic activity gives no hint of the
evolving structure of the underlying economy. A dollar of GDP in 2030 is
different from a dollar of GDP in 1975 in many different ways-for example,
in the High scenario it is composed of approximately one-half as much agri-
culture. This is true for all regions: the share of agriculture drops from 6 to
3 percent in region III (WE/jANZ), from 12 to 5 percent in region IV (LA),
and from 36 to 16 percent in region V (AflSEA). The same trend is exhib-
ited in the Low scenario, but to a lesser extent (see Chant 1980).
An important difference between developed regions I, II, and III and
developing regions IV and V is evident in the industry share of GDP. Al-
though the relative shares for the two types of regions are currently all
between 26 and 50 percent, industry's share in the developed regions is pro-
jected to decrease (from 32 to 29 percent for region I, from 50 to 41 percent
for region II, and from 46 to 39 percent for region III in the High scenario);
for the developing regions it is projected to increase from 36 to 47 percent
for region IV and from 26 to 38 percent for region V in the High scenario.
The service sector shares in the developed regions increase as the economies
evolve into the postindustrial phase, while for the developing regions this
share is relatively constant over the study period. Region VI (ME/NAf) is
something of a special case in this regard because of the large role played by
the petroleum sector. In this region, the industry sector is projected to
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decrease from a share of 66 percent (currently) to 47 percent in the High
scenario and to 54 percent in the Low scenario. (Detailed projections were
not made for region VII-C/CPA.)
The fact that economic activity is changing with time is evident from these
changing sectoral shares. There are also tremendous changes within these
sectors over this long time period.
These population and GDP projections are the basic development variables
in the two scenarios. Based on these, detailed projections of energy demand
were made (Chapter 16), and corresponding energy supply scenarios were
developed (Chapter 17). Before proceeding to these detailed energy projec-
tions, the next chapter presents these energy results in summary form and
analyzes the relationships among population, economic development, and
energy use in an aggregate way.
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15 INTERPRETATION OFSCENARIO
PROJECTIONS*
Energy serves two distinct purposes. First, energy is an input to (or factor of)
production; it drives machines and produces heat in industries. Second,
energy is consumed as an end product; it provides comfort and mobility for
people. That is, the economy requires energy as an input, and the economy
provides income that allows people to consume energy as a product. As the
economy expands, the consumption of energy expands. Or does it necessar-
ily? This question is examined in this chapter.
In the past, energy use and economic activity have gone hand in hand.
This fact was used for making numerous business as usual projections of
energy demands. a But energy prices are changing, and that makes a differ-
ence. Faced with higher energy prices, industry looks at options that use less
energy. With higher prices, the householder thinks again about how he or she
spends income. And the relationships between energy use and economic
activity change.
This chapter describes the relationships among energy use, population,
economic activities, and energy prices, examining them in an aggregate way
for the data of the recent past and for the projections. This examination was
"The analyses reported in this chapter are described in full, and the data are presented in more
detail, in Chant (1980).
aThe terms "energy demand," "energy use," and "energy consumption" are used interchangeably
in this chapter; in economics, demand has a broader interpretation.
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performed essentially after the fact of detailed scenario development. But
since these analyses were also done during the iteration process of the sce-
nario development, modifications to the projections were made, based on
this kind of interpretation. Thus, the data presented in this chapter are basi-
cally results-but since similar results calculated during the iteration process
have influenced the projections, the data are also in a very limited sense
inputs.
The purpose of presenting the aggregate analysis at this point is twofold:
first, to introduce the scenario results by means of a few essential variables;
and second, to interpret the detailed scenario projections (presented in Chap-
ters 16 and 17) in a simple and traditional way so as to highlight the differ-
ences and similarities between the projections and history and between the
projections of this study and other similar projections.
The detailed scenario projections of energy supply and demand are pre-
sented in Chapters 16 and 17 and are summarized here in the next section.
With these projections of energy use and the projections of population
growth and gross domestic product (GDP) growth from the previous chapter,
one has the data base for examining the relationships among energy use, pop-
ulation, and energy densities that are presented in the second section of this
chapter. The relationships between energy use and economic activity in the
aggregate are presented in the third section. The fourth section is concerned
with energy as an input to production in the industry sector and examines
the possible substitution between energy and nonenergy inputs (capital and
labor).
ENERGY USE IN THE TWO SCENARIOS
The population and GDP growth projections presented in the preceding
chapter were used as driving variables for determining energy demand. Chap-
ter 16 explains how energy requirements in terms of useful energy (e.g., a
heated room) and of final energy (e.g., furnace oil in the basement) were
linked to these driving variables. These requirements for final energy were
translated into secondaryenergyb (e.g., furnace oil at the refinery) and given
as demands to an energy supply optimization model (as described in detail in
Chapter 17) that provided detailed requirements for primary energy (e.g.,
crude oil). After several iterations ofthis process, two scenarios were selected.
Final energy projections for the years 2000 and 2030 are summarized in
Table 15-1 (A), presented along with values for the base year (1975) and for
1950. As shown in the table, the projections for the world indicate a four-
bOnly so-called commercial final and secondary energy requirements are analyzed by the supply
model. For developing regions (IV, V, VI, and VII), and to a limited extent in region II (SU/EE), part
of the useful energy demand is met by noncommercial energy sources such as wood and animal and
agricultural wastes. Noncommercial energy was accounted for in the determination of energy require-
ments as described in Chapter 16.
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Table 15-1. Summary of scenario energy projections, final energy.
A. Final Energy for 7950 and 7975 and Projections to 2030 (TWyr/yr)
Historical High Scenario Low Scenario
Region 7950 7975 2000 2030 2000 2030
I (NA) 0.96 1.87 2.63 3.67 2.26 2.64
II (SU/EE) 0.36 1.28 2.39 4.11 2.17 2.95
III (WE/JANZ) 0.55 1.59 3.04 4.38 2.39 2.99
IV (LA) 0.05 0.26 1.01 2.64 0.73 1.66
V (At/SEA) 0.05 0.25 1.06 3.17 0.80 1.88
VI (ME/NAt) 0.01 0.11 0.58 1.64 0.43 0.87
VII (C/CPA) 0.03 0.39 1.23 3.20 0.85 1.59
World 2.01 5.74 11.93 22.80 9.64 14.56
B. Final Energy Growth Rates for 7950-7975 and Projections to 2030 (%/yr)
Historical High Scenario Low Scenario
7950- 7975- 2000- 7975- 2000-
Region 7975 2000 2030 2000 2030
I (NA) 2.7 1.4 1.1 0.8 0.5
II (SU/EE) 5.2 2.5 1.8 2.2 1.0
III (WE!JANZ) 4.3 2.6 1.2 1.7 0.7
IV (LA) 6.8 5.6 3.3 4.3 2.8
V (At/SEA) 6.7 5.9 3.7 4.7 2.9
VI (ME/NAt) 10.4 7.0 3.5 5.8 2.3
VII (C/CPA) 10.8 4.7 3.2 3.1 2.1
World 4.3 3.0 2.2 2.1 1.4
Notes: These data for final energy include nonenergy feedstocks but exclude noncommercial
energy such as wood, agriculture and animal waste. See Appendix 1B for the definition and conversion
of energy units. Estimates of historical final energy are taken from Chant (1980). Data and world
totals are rounded; totals may appear to not add exactly. Growth rates were calculated using non·
rounded data and then rounded to one decimal place; these rates may therefore appear to not apply
exactly in part A of the table.
fold increase over the 1975 value in the High scenario and a 2.5 increase for
the Low scenario. These increases over the fifty-five-year projection period
appear modest compared with the 2.85 increase of 1975 over 1950. These
relative increases are shown more clearly in Table 15-1 where average annual
growth rates are presented. The declining growth rates over time are clearly
shown here for the world and for each of the world regions, especially for
regions I (NA) and III (WE/]ANZ).c The corresponding data for primary
energy are given in Table 15-2 and are examined in more detail in the follow-
ing sections.
CSee Figure 1-3 for the definition of the IlASA world regions and Appendix 1A for the list of the
countries in each region.
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Table 15-2. Summary of scenario energy projections, primary energy.
A. Primary Energy for 7950 and 7975 and Projections to 2030 (TWyr/yr)
Historical High Scenario Low Scenario
Region 7950 7975 2000 2030 2000 2030
I (NA) 1.14 2.65 3.89 6.02 3.31 4.37
II (SU/EE) 0.42 1.84 3.69 7.33 3.31 5.00
III (WE/JANZ) 0.67 2.26 4.29 7.14 3.39 4.54
IV (LA) 0.06 0.34 1.34 3.68 0.97 2.31
V (Af/SEA) 0.06 0.33 1.43 4.65 1.07 2.66
VI (ME/NAf) 0.01 0.13 0.77 2.38 0.56 1.23
VII (C/CPA) 0.03 0.46 1.44 4.46 0.98 2.29
World 2.39 8.21 a 16.8 35.7 13.6 22.4
8. Primary Energy Growth Rates for 7950-7975 and Projections to 2030 (%/yr)
Historical High Scenario Low Scenario
7950- 7975- 2000- 7975- 2000-
Region 7975 2000 2030 2000 2030
I (NA) 3.4 1.5 1.5 0.9 0.9
II (SU/EE) 6.1 2.8 2.3 2.4 1.4
III (WE!JANZ) 5.0 2.6 1.7 1.6 1.0
IV (LA) 7.1 5.7 3.4 4.3 2.9
V (Af/SEA) 7.1 6.1 4.0 4.8 3.1
VI (ME/NAf) 10.7 7.5 3.9 6.2 2.6
VII (C/CPA) 11.1 4.7 3.8 3.1 2.9
World 5.1 2.9 2.5 2.0 1.7
aprimary energy for the world for 1975 includes 0.21 TWyr for bunkers.
Note: See notes to Table 15-1.
ENERGY USE, POPULATION, AND DEi'JSITIES
Energy Use Per Capita
As noted above, the world was using (commercial) primary energy at the rate
of 8.2 TWyr/yr in 1975. For a global population of four billion, this is an
average annual rate of 2.1 kWyr/yr per capita. As shown in Figure 16-1,
however, the distribution of per capita energy use worldwide is very skewed.
Even at the aggregate level of seven regions, the 1975 per capita energy use
varies from about 0.2 to 11.2 kWyr/yr per capita.
This distribution changes significantly in the scenario projections to 2030
as illustrated in Figure 15-1. For the High scenario projections, the figure
shows the increase in primary energy per capita for each of the seven regions
and for the world. On an aggregate regional comparison basis, these per cap-
ita figures change from a ratio of almost fifty (region I (NA) relative to
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region V (Af/SEA) ) in 1975 to fifteen in 2030; the ratio is about nineteen
in 2030 in the Low scenario. These changes, although modest, come about
only with substantial economic cost, as will be seen later in this chapter and
in Chapter 19.
The changes in final (commercial) energy use per capita are shown in
Table 15-3 for the historical period 1950-1975 and for the projection period
for both scenarios. The data indicate very low projected increases in energy
use in the developed regions (I, II, and III) and especially in region I (NA)
for the Low scenario.
Energy Densities in Two Scenarios
It is interesting to observe the implications of the scenario projections in
terms of energy use per unit area on average and in urban areas. The data
reported here for 2030 are simply results from the scenario projections; they
were not used as inputs or constraints for developing the scenarios.
Estimates of the inhabitable land area and population densities are given
in Table 15-4 for each of the seven world regions. The high population den-
sity in region VII (C/CPA) stands out especially when compared with the
1975 average urban density for developed regions of approximately 1000
persons/m2 .
This table also shows the average energy use densities for 1975 and for the
High scenario projection for 2030. It is expected that the disparity between
the energy consumption densities in the developed (I, II, and III) and the
developing (IV, V, and VI) regions-a factor of nine difference in 1975-
Table 15-3. Final energy per capita 1975 and growth rates, historical and
two scenarios to 2030.
Growth Rates of Final Energy
Growth Final per Capita (%/yr)
Rate Energy High scenario La w scenario(%/yr) per Capita
1950- (k Wyr/yr, cap) 1975- 2000- 1975- 2000-
Region 1975 1975 2000 2030 2000 2030
I (NA) 1.3 7.89 0.6 0.8 0.03 0.2
II (SU/EE) 3.9 3.52 1.8 1.5 1.4 0.7
III (WE!JANZ) 3.3 2.84 1.8 0.8 0.8 0.3
IV (LA) 4.0 0.80 3.2 2.2 1.9 1.6
V (At/SEA) 4.3 0.18 3.5 2.6 2.3 1.7
VI (ME/NAt) 7.4 0.80 4.4 2.3 3.2 1.1
VII (C/CPA) 9.0 0.43 3.1 2.3 1.6 1.3
World 2.4 1.46 1.2 1.2 0.3 0.5
Notes: Total final energy includes nonenergy feedstocks but excludes noncommercial sources
of energy (e.g., wood, animal waste). These global per capita growth rates are correct although they
may appear inconsistent with the values for the regions. Growth rates of aggregate ratios (e.g., GDP
per capita) need not always be within the range of their component parts when both numerator and
denominator grow at different rates.
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Table 15-4. Land areas, population, and energy densities in world regions.
Population Energy
Inhabitable
Density Density
(caplkm' ) (Wlm')
Land
Region (J06km') 1975 2030 1975 2030
I (NA) 12.5 19 25 0.21 0.48
II (SU/EE) 15.5 23 31 0.12 0.47
III (WE/]ANZ) 9.5 59 81 0.24 0.75
IV (LA) 14.8 22 54 0.02 0.25
V (Af/SEA) } 24.7 63 158 0.02 0.28VI (ME/NAf)
VII (C/CPA) 2.7 246 463 0.12 1.20
World 80.3 49 99 0.10 0.44
Notes: Inhabitable land excludes polar regions, deserts, high mountain areas, and most semiarid
grass lands and low productivity forests in extreme climates. Energy density figures for 2030 are for
the High scenario.
would be narrowed significantly (to a factor of two for both scenarios) if the
developing regions increase dramatically their energy use. Note that region
VII would have the highest energy consumption density, while still having
2.6 kWyr/yr per capita, a factor of seven less than that of region I (NA).
Even the global average energy consumption density of 0.44 W1m2 by 2030
appears high when compared with the global average forest production of
wood at 0.2 W/m 2 (see Chapter 6).
These regional average energy consumption densities mask much of the
variation across countries and specifically between urban and rural areas. Not
only is the energy consumption per capita different between urban and rural
areas, but each region is at a different level of urbanization. The differences
in the urban and rural patterns of energy consumption are discussed in detail
in Chapter 23.
ENERGY USE AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
IN THE AGGREGATE
The relationship between energy use and GDP is now examined for recent
historical values as well as for the projection period. Later in this section,
scenario energy prices will be defined, and the projections will be interpreted
in terms of these price assumptions. Again, the purpose of this analysis is for
interpreting the scenario projections in economic terms after the projections
have been made. The elasticities presented in this chapter result from projec-
tions and were not used for input.
A simple way to examine the linkage between energy use and GDP is to
relate primary energy use per capita to GDP per capita. As an illustrative
example of this relationship over a long historical period, Figure 15-2 pre-
sents a graph of primary energy use per capita versus GDP per capita (in con-
stant dollars) for the United States for the period 1910-1978. Even though
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the annual variations as shown in this figure include both increases and
decreases, the long-term trend is unmistakable. And of course, in the scenario
projections to the year 2030, it is the long-term trends that are of interest
rather than the annual fluctuations.
In Figure 15-3, the projections for the High and the Low scenarios for
region I (NA) are shown in relation to the long-term trend exhibited in Fig-
ure 15-2. What is immediately apparent is the change in slope of this graph
between the historical period and the scenario projections. This analysis
examines the nature of this change in detail for all regions. It is immediately
apparent that the scenario projections include large effects of energy conser-
vation and efficiency improvements over and above what has occurred in the
past.
This trend of conservation and increasing efficiency of energy use is pro-
jected for all regions, but to a lesser extent than for region I (NA), as shown
in Figure 15-4. Also evident in the figure is the general trend of less energy
intensiveness of economies as they change from relatively underdeveloped-
regions V (Af/SEA) and VII (C/CPA) for 1950-1975-to developed.
Primary energy and GOP per capita, region I (NA), 1910-2030.Figure 15-3.
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Figure 15-4. Primary energy and GDP per capita, II ASA regions, 1950-2030.
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Energy-GOP Elasticities
A convenient way of specifying the degree of coupling between aggregate
economic growth and energy demand growth is by means of the energy-GDP
elasticity, E.d A coefficient value of unity would simply imply that economic
growth and energy growth go hand in hand-that is, that a 10 percent growth
dThis elasticity, e, is defined by the following relationship:
E
£(1,) = {GDP(I,)}
£(1,) GDP(I,)
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Table 15-5. Primary energy-GDP elasticities, Ep ' 1950-2030.
Historical High Scenario Low Scenario
7950- 7975- 2000- 7975- 2000-
Region 7975 2000 2030 2000 2030
I (NA) 1.03 0.42 0.67 0.36 0.89 a
II (SU/EE) 0.77 0.65 0.67 0.62 0.62
III (WE/]ANZ) 0.96 0.70 0.77 0.65 0.73
IV (LA) 1.28 1.04 0.98 1.06 0.97
V (At/SEA) 1.52 1.15 1.11 1.18 1.19
VI (ME/NAt) 1.20 1.16 0.96 1.23 1.10
VII (C/CPA) 1.57 1.06 1.17 0.98 1.27a
World 0.99 0.70 0.90 0.67 0.93
aThe primary energy-GOP elasticity is unusually high for regions I and VII in the Low scenario.
In the later time period in these regions, demand for liquids must be met from coal liquefaction, which
has significant conversion losses, thus adding to primary energy use. Since the GOP growth is small in
the Low scenario, the elasticity of primary energy use with GOP is increased. If these losses are sub-
tracted from primary energy consumption in 2030, the resulting elasticities are 0.53 and 0.94 for
regions I and V II, respectively. The same effect is present in the High scenario for regions I, II, III,
and VII, but is less pronounced in the elasticity because GOP growth is higher.
Note: Historical values were computed by linear regression on logarithmic transformation of
equation (see note, p. 446) using five yearly data (see Chant 1980). Values for the projection period
result from the scenario data.
in GOP would be accompanied by a 10 percent increase in energy usage. A
value of zero would imply that energy usage is constant as the economy
grows. A value of 0.5 would imply that a fourfold increase in economic activ-
ity would be accompanied by only a twofold increase in energy; a doubling
of GOP would require about 41 percent more energy, while a 10 percent
increase in GOP would require a 4.9 percent increase in energy.
A wide range of values is possible for the energy-GOP elasticity, even
values greater than unity or less than zero. A value greater than unity would
imply that energy usage increases faster than GOP. This result does not nec-
essarily imply a loss of efficiency but usually refers to a developing economy
where the nature of the economic activity is changing; a shift from agricul-
ture to industrial production, or mechanization of agriculture itself, is usu-
ally accompanied by large increases in energy usage. On the other hand,
negative values of this elasticity during periods of economic growth would
imply that energy usage is decreasing. This can happen during periods of
strong energy conservation or shortage of supply, perhaps associated with
large energy price increases.
The primary energy-GOP elasticities, €fJ' resulting from the scenario pro-
jections are shown in Table 15-5. The elasticities for the historical period
where tl and t2 are two given times, Ie' is energy consumption measured in physical units, and GOP is
gross domestic product measured in real non inflated monetary units. This elasticity can be calculated
with respect to primary energy, Ep' or to final energy, Ef' Numerical differences between Ep and Ef can
be due to changing energy conversion efficiencies or fuel mixes.
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follow the often observed trend of being less than unity for developed econ-
omies (regions I, II, and III) and greater than unity for developing economies
(regions IV, V, VI, and VII). Regions V (AfiSEA) and VII (C/CPA) exhibit
the largest value of Ep for the historical period, but these average values mask
an apparent trend from even higher values at the beginning of the period to
lower values near the end of this period.
The elasticities, as noted, result from scenario projections of energy de-
mand. They are based less on energy resource considerations than on energy
savings potential. Thus, for instance, if region I (NA) has a higher potential
for saving energy than region III (WE/JANZ), then the NA elasticities will be
lower than those of WEI] ANZ, in spite of the fact that energy resources are
abundant in NA and (relatively) scarce in WEI]ANZ.
The elasticities for the early part of the projection period (1975-2000) are
much lower than the historic values, thus indicating the assumed increased
efficiencies and conservation of energy use. This trend does not appear to
continue throughout the projection period, as indicated by these elasticities
for 2000-2030. It is shown below, however, that the trend of improved effi-
ciencies is projected to continue in terms of energy use; but that the in-
creased losses due to coal liquefaction and electrification mask the trend here
in terms of primary energy. (Chapter 17 describes the energy supply scenar-
ios by region, including the extent of coal liquefaction and electrification.)
The energy-GDP elasticities for final energy (Ef) can also be calculated. In
this case, the elasticity indicates the trends of energy use rather than of
energy supply. Table 15-6 presents these elasticities for the historical period
(1950-1975) and for four periods during the projection period (1975-2030).
The trend of decreasing elasticities as economies develop (both developed
and developing economies) is now quite clear. The only significant exception
is region I (NA), which has very low values for the initial years of the projec-
tion period. This results from assumptions that this region has a great conser-
vation potential that it can and will take advantage of as rapidly as possible.
A large part of this conservation before 2000 is due to mandated fuel effi-
ciency improvements in automobiles in the United States and Canada.
The energy-GDP elasticity is the simplest yardstick by which to measure
the energy-economy bond. Its application is useful but limited. It highlights
gross national or regional differences, shifts in energy supply strategies, and
other changes over time but does not explain them. It does not account for
energy price changes explicitly; higher prices that lead to lower energy usage
yield lower values of E, but there is no measure of the price response. This
comes next.
Income and Price Elasticities
There is a multiplicity of factors determining the relationship between energy
consumption and economic growth. One factor is technological development,
which tends to make energy growth smaller than economic growth. Another
factor is the changing texture of economic activity, which for developed
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Table 15-6. Final energy-GDP elasticities, €r, 1950-2030.
A. High Scenario
Historical
---~
1950- 1975- 1985- 2000- 2015-
Region 1975 1985 2000 2015 2030
I (NA) 0.84 0.31 0.43 0.53 0.48
II (SU/EE) 0.68 0.59 0.58 0.52 0.53
III (WE/JANZ) 0.84 0.77 0.65 0.58 0.51
IV (LA) 1.21 1.07 1.01 0.97 0.90
V (M/SEA) 1.42 1.20 1.08 1.05 1.01
VI (ME/NAf) 1.17 1.12 1.07 0.95 0.81
VII (C/CPA) 1.53 1.10 1.02 1.02 0.96
World 0.87 0.69 0.73 0.78 0.77
B. Low Scenario
Historical
1950- 1975- 1985- 2000- 2015-
Region 1975 1985 2000 2015 2030
I (NA) 0.84 0.24 0.38 0.53 0.46
II (SU/EE) 0.68 0.54 0.57 0.50 0.41
III (WE/JANZ) 0.84 0.67 0.64 0.60 0.49
IV (LA) 1.21 1.10 1.03 0.95 0.88
V (M/SEA) 1.42 1.19 1.12 1.14 1.06
VI (ME/NAf) 1.17 1.21 1.11 1.01 0.93
VII (C/CPA) 1.53 1.02 0.98 0.99 0.90
World 0.87 0.64 0.73 0.79 0.74
Note: Historical values were computed by linear regression on logarithmic transformation of
equation (see note, p. 446) using five yearly data (see Chant 1980). Values for the projection period
result from the scenario data.
economies is usually away from energy-intensive industry toward services
and for developing economies is away from low-energy-consuming agricul-
ture toward mechanized agriculture and energy-intensive industry. Energy
consumption is also affected by energy conservation, which may result from
price increases, legislated efficiency improvements, or other public measures.
The relationships among energy use, economic activity, and energy price
are complex. These relationships can be abstracted in different ways to aid in
understanding. One such abstraction is to consider three categories of ways
of reducing energy use-do better, do differently, and do without. The first
category, do better, includes improvements in efficiency or technological
development-the application of "know-how" to do better. The second cate-
gory, do differently, suggests that some alternative method of performing an
activity (which uses less energy) should be found and that since it excludes
the "technical fix" options of the first category, the alternative must involve
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a substitution of other inputs or resources in place of energy-use more cap-
ital and labor and less energy to do it differen tly. The third category, do
without, includes ways of reducing energy use by simply reducing energy-
intensive activities or changing lifestyles to get by with less. This may appear
simple in concept but in practice can have indirect effects; a conscious deci-
sion to forego some activity results in an additional resource (money, time,
etc.) that will likely be redirected toward some other activity that mayor
may not be less energy intensive. The technological development and substi-
tution effects included in categories one and two above are examined in the
final section of this chapter for the industry sector. Here, distinguishing be-
tween the income effect and the price effect provides another way of under-
st~nding the relationships among energy use, economic activity, and energy
pnce.
Changes in energy consumption that are due to changes in GDP when
there is no change in the price of energy are called the income effect. Changes
in energy consumption due to energy price changes when there is no change
in GDP are called the price effect. The separation of energy demand into
these two effects is very useful but, of course, in application can be some-
what arbitrary. For example, the mandated motor vehicle efficiency improve-
ment in region I (NA) is not exactly an income or price effect but is an
important factor affecting projected energy consumption for this region.
The simplest and most common way of defining these effects quantita-
tively is by means of elasticities-the energy-income elasticity, 'Y, and the
energy-price elasticity, ~.e When there are no price changes, the energy-
income elasticity, 'Y, is equivalent to the energy-GDP elasticity, f, presented
earlier. First, energy prices are examined.
Energy Prices. It should be immediately clear that the appropriate energy
price for relating energy use to price changes is not the international price of
crude oil even though this is the price so often quoted when energy price
increases are mentioned. If energy price is to help explain the consumption
of energy then that price must be the price to the user of that energy, and it
must be quoted in real, noninflated terms. In this application, the energy
price used is the price for final (delivered) energy, averaged over all forms of
final energy.
Before specifying the relative price increases that are used for interpreting
eThe income elasticity, 'Y, and price elasticity, (3, are defined as follows:
F(t 2 ) = {GDP(t 2 )}'Y {p(t 2 )}13
£(t,) GDP(t,) P(t,)
where, in addition to those definitions in footnote d, P is the appropriate price of energy that applies
at time t2 relative to the price at time t 1. See text above for interpretation of "appropriate price."
These elasticities may be defined with respect to either primary energy or final energy. In all applica-
tions here, 'Y and {3 are assumed to be constant over the time period. The price elasticity {3 is an all·
energy elasticity. Individual fuel type elasticities and cross· fuel elasticities are often employed for
analyzing energy demand and interfuel substitution. These elasticities are not calculated here. Interfuel
substitution is handled within the model analysis and iteration process as described in Chapters 16 and
17.
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Table 15-7. Real prices for final (delivered) energy (1975 $ per kWyr).
Residential-
Industry Transport Commercial All Sector
Sector Sector Sector Aggregate
Region I (NA)
1972 30 116 83 70
1975 52 144 108 97
1975-1972 1.73 1.24 1.30 1.35
Region III (WE!JANZ)
1972 62 254 135 113
1975 92 338 174 159
1975-1972 1.48 1.33 1.29 1.41
Notes: $100 per kWyr is equivalent to $19.40 per barrel of oil equivalent, $3.34 per million Btu,
and $0.011 per kWh. These prices are calculated from data contained in Hogan (1979). These data
were taken from a data base assembled by Pindyck as described in Pindyck (1978) and updated
from several sources by Hogan. Data on current prices were adjusted for inflation using a GNP de-
flator; currency conversions were based on a purchasing power parity conversion rate. The data
reported here for region III (WE!JANZ) are for the aggregation of data for the four largest energy-
using countries only: France, FRG, the United Kingdom, and Japan.
the scenario projections, it is useful to look at recent energy price changes.
Gathering, reconciling, and aggregating price data for (delivered) final energy
products is a tremendous task even for the data of one country. There is a
multiplicity of energy products at the user level, and even the same product
is sold at vastly different prices to different users.
What can be done is to select important representative energy commodi-
ties and gather price data on these according to aggregate user categories. At
a minimum, petroleum products used for transportation should be separated
because of the large taxes that are usually levied on these products. As well,
the user categories of the industry sector and of the residential and commer-
cial sector should be separated because the typically large energy users in
industry pay a lower unit price for energy. Prices for different years must be
corrected for inflation. Data for different fuel types within these user catego-
ries can be aggregated on a calorific quantity basis, but one must recognize
that this procedure is not ideal because of different end use efficiencies, envi-
ronmental effects, ease of use, and the like. The user categories can also be
aggregated on the calorific quantity basis with the same caveat. Finally, data
for countries within a geographic region can be aggregated on the same basis
after choosing an appropriate measure of the equivalences of different
national currencies.
This procedure was followed to produce the data of Table 15-7. As shown
in the table for region I (NA) in 1972, for example, the delivered energy
prices varied significantly for the three user categories, with the transport
sector pricesf ($1l6/kWyr) being almost four times the industry sector prices
fprices are quoted in constant (1975) U.S. dollars.
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($30/kWyr). For the all sector aggregate price, region IIi (WE/JANZ) prices
were approximately 60 percent higher than region I (NA). Also indicated in
the table is that, on the average, 1975 delivered energy prices were only
about 40 percent greater (in real terms, of course) than 1972 prices in either
region. Clearly, the international price of crude petroleum increased by a
much greater factor during this same three-year period, even in real terms,
but crude petroleum prices are not the only prices of interest in analyzing
the user demand for energy.
The price data of Table 15-7 are simple quantity-weighted averages based
on the calorific content of various fuels. A similar weighting of price data
from other sources (Doblin 1979) indicates an even smaller price increase
between 1972 and 1975 of 27 percent for the United States. Other countries
substantiate this trend-France, 19 percent; the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, 22 percent; and the United Kingdom, 26 percent for 1975 as com-
pared to 1972. Even between 1972 and 1978, these sources indicate that
U.S. prices had increased by only 33 percent.
Hogan (1979) aggregated fuel types within sectors and across sectors using
a Cobb-Douglas function formulation to estimate another average energy
price; his procedure assumed that interfuel substitutions would occur to take
advantage of different relative fuel price increases. His average price index
indicated that 1975 prices would be only 22 percent higher than 1972 prices
for the United States and that price increases in other countries would be as
follows: France, 11 percent; the FRG, 15 percent; the United Kingdom, 33
percent; and Japan, 31 percent.
The conclusion is that real prices to the user for delivered energy had not
increased by more than 40 percent between 1972 and 1975, on average, and
possibly less depending on sources, aggregation methods, and currency
valuations.
Energy Price Projections. Energy price projections are required for inter-
preting the scenario projections in terms of income and price elasticities. The
price projection required is for final energy delivered to the user and for real
price increases relative to 1972 and not relative to the base year 1975, as
explained below.
There is a variable lag between the time a price change is made and the
time when the effect on the economy is noticed. In some situations the time
lag can be practically zero when the activity requiring the energy can be
immediately changed or foregone-as, for example, with pleasure travel. In
most situations, however, the time lag is very long, up to two or three dec-
ades before industrial processes can be redesigned and new equipment can be
economically replaced. Even though the price increases between 1972 and
1975 affected the energy consumption of 1975, it is assumed that only a
negligible part of the ultimate reaction to these price increases had yet
occurred by 1975. Thus, since post-1975 energy use patterns will still be
reacting to these earlier price increases, price increases of 1972 to 1975 must
be included in the definition of the relative price appropriate for interpreting
the scenario projections. The lagged effect of later price increases is ac-
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counted for by specifying that the relative price increases for energy are to
have taken place by approximately 2010, so that their full effect is repre-
sented in the scenario projections for 2030.
The projected energy price increases employed here must be consistent
with the energy production cost increases that result from the analysis of
energy supply presented in Chapter 17. These production costs are not,
however, the sole determinant of user energy prices. Other costs such as
transmission, transportation and distribution costs, trade margins, taxes,
administrative costs, interest payments, and profit must also be accounted
for. The energy production costs examined here include all resource costs,
including imported crude oil at world trade prices and all energy conversion
costs for refineries, electric power plants, and the like. These production
costs estimates are used only as a guideline for projecting final energy price
Increases.
Energy production and conversion costs are based on the supply scenarios
of Chapter 17. For 2030, for example, the total annual cost of supply of all
fuel types and electricity was calculated. This total cost was then allocated
per unit of final energy that would result from this total production. Thus,
for example, the cost of production of electricity was calculated for the
amount of secondary energy (gross power station output) required, but this
cost was divided by the net amount of final energy (electricity delivered to
the user) produced. These production and conversion costs are shown in
Table 15-8, along with 1972 costs estimated using the same procedure. Aver-
age production and conversion costs would be within the range of $101 to
$126 per kWyr of final energy for 2030 for both the High and the Low sce-
narios. These 2030 costs would be between 3.4 and 4.2 times the 1972 costs
for regions I (NA) and IV (LA) and between 2.9 and 3 for region III (WEI
JANZ) in both scenarios. The apparently low costs for region II (SU/EE)
reflect very high shares of relatively inexpensive central sources of heat-dis-
trict heat and cogeneration plants.
A comparison of final energy prices for 1972 from Table 15-7 with pro-
duction and conversion costs of energy shows that in 1972 these costs com-
prised only 43 percent of final energy prices for region I (NA) and 35 percent
Table 15-8. Energy production and conversion costs (1975 US $ per kWyr
offinal energy).
High Scenario Low Scenario
Region 7972 2030 2030
I (NA) 30 126 118
II (SU/EE) ne 108 103
III (WE/JANZ) 40 119 114
IV (LA) 30 104 102
V (Af/SEA) ne 105 101
ne-not estimated.
Source: Energy supply scenarios as determined by the MESSAGE model described in Chapter 17.
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for region III (WE/jANZ). The difference consists of taxes and other costs.
All taxes and other costs are not likely to increase at the same rate as energy
production and conversion costs; some of these other costs should not in-
crease at all, while others will increase to varying degrees, and taxes will vary
from country to country. It is simply an assumption, adopted here, that
these taxes and other costs will little more than double from their 1972
value. Combining these components of costs results in approximately a three-
fold increase in prices for region I (NA) and a 2.4 times increase for region
III (WE/j ANZ). The lower price increase for region III is due to the relatively
high level of prices already in place in this region in 1972. Since these price
levels did not prevail throughout the other regions in 1972, the relative price
increase for all other regions is defined to be threefold.
In summary, the implied price evolutions employed in the interpretation
of scenario projections in this chapter are as follows:
• Energy prices are for final energy (delivered to the user) averaged for all
fuels on a calorific content basis.
• Energy prices are for real increases relative to 1972.
• Energy prices are projected to increase by a factor of 2.4 for region III
(WE/jANZ) and by a factor of 3 for all other regions.
Elasticities. Income and price elasticities were defined in footnote e. For
the historical period (1950-1975), real energy prices did not change signifi-
cantly; they actually dropped slightly in most countries. Without taking
account of these small price changes during this period, the values of the
income elasticity, "I, would be the same as those given in Tables 15-5 and
15-6 for the energy-GDP elasticity, €, for primary energy and for final
energy, respectively.
For the scenario projection period 1975-2030, energy prices do increase,
and therefore both income elasticity, "I, and price elasticity, {3, must be con-
sidered. If the scenario projections for GDP increases and final energy in-
creases are specified, and if energy price increases are also specified, then the
corresponding combinations of "I and {3 (consistent with the scenario projec-
tions) can be calculated. These combinations of "I and {3 are shown in Figure
15-5 for the High scenario and in Figure 15-6 for the Low scenario. These
figures apply to the all sector aggregate of GDP and final energy projections
for the period 1975-2030. (The data for GDP are given in Chapter 14 and
those for final energy in Table 15-1.) The grouping of the developed regions
(I, II, and III) with values of "I less than unity and of the developing regions
(IV, V, VI, and VII) with values of "I greater than unity is as expected. A
comparison of the two figures for the two scenarios indicates that the High
scenario has higher price elasticities or lower income elasticities than the Low
scenario for all regions. This result indicates that the High scenario projec-
tions represent better assumed efficiency improvements and stronger assumed
conservation effects than the Low scenario.
Particular numerical values for "I and {3 may be selected for any region on
the basis of Figures 15-5 and 15-6. For example, if the income elasticity
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Figure 15-5. Income and price elasticities for aggregate final energy, High scenario.
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were unity (that is, energy use increases in step with GDP increases if there
were no price increase), then the price elasticities represented by the scenario
projections are -0.81 and -0.52 for region I (NA) for the High and the Low
scenarios, respectively. For the historical value of the income elasticity for
this region (for final energy it is 0.84), the corresponding price elasticities
would be -0.58 and -0.39 for the two scenarios. Table 15-9 presents typical
values of both 'Y and {3 for all the other regions. As indicated in this table, the
price elasticities for aggregate final energy are lower for the developing
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Figure 15-6. Income and price elasticities for aggregate final energy, Low scenario.
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regions than for the developed regions. This result is not an irrefutable con-
clusion, because the range of income elasticities shown was chosen arbitrarily
and larger price elasticities would result if larger income elasticities were
chosen. Based on the historical values of the income elasticities, however, the
range of values shown seems reasonable. These findings are also in agreement
with many other studies that examine elasticities.
It is useful to perform the same kind of analysis with income and price
elasticities that resulted in Figures 15-5 and 15-6 but for different categories
of energy use. As mentioned in the opening paragraph of this chapter, energy
serves two purposes-as a factor of production (an intermediate input in the
economic system) and as an end product for use by consumers to make their
homes comfortable and to provide mobility-a final demand for the eco-
INTERPRETATION OF SCENARIO PROJECTIONS 457
Table 15-9. Final energy-income and energy-price elasticities.
High Scenario Low Scenario
Income Price Income Price
elasticity elasticity elasticity elasticity
Region I {3 I {3
I (NA) (0.8, 1.0) (-0.52, -0.81) (0.8, 1.0) (-0.35, -0.52)
II (SU/EE) (0.8, 1.0) (-0.46, -0.85) (0.8, 1.0) (-0.42, -0.71)
III (WE/JANZ) (0.8, 1.0) (-0.30, -0.66) (0.8, 1.0) (-0.22, -0.45)
IV (LA) (1.1, 1.2) (-0.23, -0.44) (1.1, 1.2) (-0.18, -0.35)
V (At/SEA) (1.2, 1.3) (-0.24, -0.45) (1.2, 1.3) (-0.11, -0.27)
VI (ME/NAt) (1.1, 1.2) (-0.24, -0.49) (1.1,1.2) (-0.D2, -0.20)
VII (C/CPA) (1.2, 1.3) (-0.32, -0.50) (1.2, 1.3) (-0.30, -0.43)
Note: Final energy price elasticities are all sector aggregates for the period 1975-2030, calculated
according to the equation (see footnote e) to be consistent with GDP and final energy scenario pro-
jections and with the assumed range of values for the income elasticities shown. The historical values
for 1950-1975 for I are given in Tables 15-5 and 15-6 under the assumption that real prices did not
change during that period. These values are, respectively, 0.84,0.68, and 0.84 for regions I, II, and III
and 1.21,1.42,1.17, and 1.53 for regions IV, V, VI, and VII. The high values for the developing
regions would not be particularly appropriate for the projection period; the range shown in this
table would be more appropriate. Note also that the price elasticities of the High scenario are larger
than those for the Low scenario, because it was implied that a higher innovation rate thus favoring
more energy conservation would go along with the higher growth rates of the High scenario.
nomic system. (The two terms final energy and final demand should not be
confused.) Energy used for these two purposes can be identified from the
detailed projections described in Chapter 16. Having done so, the elasticities
of each category of energy use can be examined with the same model as
defined in footnote e.
Two components of the final demand category of energy use can be dis-
tinguished-energy used in households and energy used for passenger trans-
portation. All other final energy is defined as belonging to the category of
intermediate input energy. An examination (Chant 1980) of these three com-
ponents separately shows that, as for the case of the aggregate of all energy
use, the High scenario projections exhibit higher price elasticities ({3) and
lower income elasticities ('Y) than the Low scenario projections. Passenger
transport energy also has higher {3s and lower 'YS than household energy but
only for region I (NA). For all other regions the opposite is true. This result
indicates the very high efficiency improvements and conservation potential
that were realized in these projections for region I. More importantly, per-
haps, is the assumed saturation effect on passenger transportation, which is
most pronounced in this region.
A comparison of the two categories of energy use (household plus passen-
ger transport energy and intermediate input energy) shows that the elastici-
ties for the regions are very different for the final demand category but
reasonably close together for the intermediate input category of energy use.
Also, in the High scenario, the deVeloped regions have higher {3s and lower 'YS
for the final demand category than for the intermediate input category,
458 ENERGY IN A FINITE WORLD
Table 15-10. Comparison of elasticities. The result indicated is for the final
demand energy use category as compared to the intermediate input energy use
category within each region. The final demand energy use category is final
energy used in households and for passenger transportation. The intermediate
input category includes all other final energy use. Combinations of 1 and 13 that
were consistent with scenario projections for GDP, energy use, and price
increase were plotted as in Figures 15-5 and 15-6. The result "higher 13, lower
1" indicates that the straight line representing combinations of 1 and 13 for the
final demand category was higher and to the left of the line for the inter-
mediate input category. These results are described in more detail in Chant
(1980).
Regions High Scenario Low Scenario
Developed Higher {3s Higher {3s
(I,ll and III) Lower ')'s Lower ')'s
(very pronounced) (less pronounced)
Developing Same Lower {3s
(IV, V and VI) Elasticities Higher ')'s
whereas for the developing regions the two categories are almost identical. In
the Low scenario, the effect for the developed regions is less dominant, but
for the developing regions the final demand category has lower ~s and higher
)'S than the intermediate input category. (See Table 15-10 for a summary of
these results.)
An interpretation of these results is that, for the developed regions, GOP
growth would be accompanied by relatively lower growth (more conserva-
tion) in the final demand for energy than in the requirements for intermedi-
ate input energy. Conversely, for the developing regions, and especially in
the Low scenario, GOP growth would be accompanied by relatively higher
growth in the final demand for energy (which is strongly linked to popula-
tion) than for intermediate input energy.
Payments for Energy
Price increases were projected here to be threefold relative to 1972 prices
(2.4 times for region III). Energy consumption would increase substantially
in both scenarios, although the increase is slowed (relative to GOP increases)
because of improved efficiencies and conservation. A simple calculation can
be performed that indicates how much more total energy payments would
increase than would GOP in these projections. Table 15-11 shows the results
of this calculation. For each region, this table gives the relative increase of
GOP and final energy (projected 2030 value relative to 1975 base year value)
and the price increase assumption. For example, the combination of a three-
fold increase in energy price and the projected increase in final energy usage
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Table 15-11. Projected increases in payments for energy as fraction of GDP.
Region GDP
I (NA) 4.75
II (SU/EE) 8.23
III (WE/JANZ) 4.90
IV (LA) 10.50
V (Af/SEA) 10.26
VI (ME/NAf) 15.36
VII (C/CPA) 7.66
Region GDP
I (NA) 2.50
II (SU/EE) 5.07
III (WE/JANZ) 2.79
IV (LA) 6.56
V (Af/SEA) 5.87
VI (ME/NAf) 6.90
VII (C/CPA) 4.20
A. High Scenario
Final Final Energy Payments for
Energy Price Energy-GDpa
1.96 3.0 1.24
3.25 3.0 1.18
2.75 2.4 1.35
10.36 3.0 2.96
12.56 3.0 3.67
15.45 3.0 3.02
8.13 3.0 3.18
B. Low Scenario
Final Final Energy Payments for
Energy Price Energy-GDpG
1.41 3.0 1.69
2.31 3.0 1.37
1.88 2.4 1.62
6.49 3.0 2.97
7.42 3.0 3.79
8.19 3.0 3.56
4.04 3.0 2.89
aprojected energy payments as a fraction of GOP in 2030 relative to energy payments as a fraction
of GOP in 1975 using 1972 energy prices. For example, if energy consumption doubles and price
triples, then energy payments increase sixfold. But if GOP also increases fourfold, then this "pay-
ments for energy-GOP" index would be 6/4 = 1.50.
Notes: Values given are for the year 2030 as a multiple of base year value. GOP and final energy
are given as projected 2030 values relative to 1975 values. Price increase is for final energy (delivered
to the user) relative to 1972 price levels.
by the factor 1.96 in region I (NA) in the High scenario would imply a 5.88
increase in energy payments. During the same period, however, GDP would
increase only by a factor 4.75, so that energy payments as a fraction of GDP
would increase to 1.24 times its base year value-a 24 percent increase. Pay-
ments for energy in the developed regions are a relatively larger fraction of
GDP in the Low than in the High scenario, primarily because of stronger
conservation and efficiency improvements assumed in the High scenario. The
developing regions would have much higher increases in relative payments
for energy in both scenarios.
The calculation just performed was for energy payments by users of final
energy. As noted above, the production and conversion costs of providing
this energy would increase more substantially than the final energy price
(more than fourfold for region I and about threefold for region III). More
importantly from the energy supply and economic impact point of view,
however, is that the energy supply system is projected to become increasingly
capital intensive; therefore, fourfold production cost increases translate into
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even larger increases for investment in the energy sector. The detailed analy-
sis in Chapter 19 shows that these investments would almost double their
base year fraction of GDP for the developed regions and more than triple it
for the developing regions. The relatively small projected increases in total
payments for energy (relative to GDP) for the developed regions should not,
therefore, be taken as comforting. Not only would large increases in invest-
ment be required in the future, but these projected increases would be a
reversal of the trend that pertained for 1950-1975. In the past payments
would have dropped to 0.83-0.85 (for regions I and III) relative to GDP if
prices had been constant in real terms. But they were not-they dropped.
The large increases for the developing regions appear staggering. They point
to the need for studying the world trade prospects and potential balance of
payments problems.
ENERGY USE IN INDUSTRY
Three ways of reducing energy consumption have been defined-do better,
do differently, and do without. In this section, two factors primarily respon-
sible for the effects included in the first two categories are examined-tech-
nological development and substitution. Technological development (or
efficiency improvements) allows processes to "do better" or to "do more
with less." Substitution as used here refers to the substitution of other non-
energy inputs of production in place of energy inputs and not to interfuel
substitutions. If less energy use is achievable either by changing processes or
by changing combinations of labor, capital, and other material inputs, then
it is energy conservation by "doing differently." In this section these effects
are examined in the scenario projections for the industry sector only.
Production Function Approach
A production function approach is used here to analyze the substitution
effect in industry. That is, the options available to industry, when it is
deciding which production process to use and how much labor and other
inputs to use, are described by a smooth curve indicating what combinations
of such inputs produce a given output. This concept is illustrated in Figure
15-7.
The production function approach is useful since certain relationships
concerning prices can be derived. If it is assumed that industry produces at
whatever level it chooses but at minimum cost, then theoretically, the rela-
tive amounts of inputs it uses are determined by the relative prices of these
inputs. The amount of substitution that results from a change in relative
price of inputs is measured in this approach by the elasticity of substitution,
a. This elasticity is defined as the ratio of the percentage change in use of
inputs (measured as a proportion) due to a percentage change in the relative
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Figure 15-7. Idealized factor substitution curves. Each curve defines combinations of
energy and other inputs that produce constant output.
Other
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prices of the inputs.g The shape of the curve in Figure 15-7 determines a.
For small price changes, the relationship between energy use and energy
price using this approach shows that the elasticity of substitution, a, is al-
most equal (in magnitude) to the energy-price elasticity, ~, defined earlier.
Technological Development
Historical analysis indicates that industry has been producing more for less
on the average as technology improved. If this factor is ignored, then energy
requirements for industry in the scenario projections (which are lower per
unit output) will appear to reflect a higher price effect or substitution effect
than is really the case. In fact, it is partly this technological development
"more for less" effect that results in energy-GDP elasticities being less than
unity for developed economies (as has already been seen).
An illustration of historical technological development is given in Figure
1-6, where the energy efficiency of prime movers is shown over a 3DO-year
gMathematically, the elasticity of substitution, G, is defined by the following differential:
d(EIZ) d(PZIP[il
a~-- /-=-------'=--
EIZ PZIPE
where E represents the energy input with price PE and Z represents other (nonenergy) inputs with
price PZ '
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period. The nature of this kind of plot is described in Chapter 8; it describes
an S-shaped curve for efficiency as a function of time. The rate of improve-
ment of efficiency ranges from 0.8 to 1.5 percent per year up to the 50 per-
cent efficiency point, and then the rate of improvement begins to decrease.
Not all technological development trends follow this pattern, nor do they
all improve at the same rate. Examination of data for the United States on
these trends, especially with respect to energy use, indicates that on the aver-
age, technological development has been contributing between 0.5 and 1 per-
cent per year to the decrease in energy use per dollar of value added.
Technological development is represented in the production function anal-
ysis by an exponential growth factor with coefficient, 8.h It is important to
note that this treatment of technological development emphasizes efficiency
improvements only and that other factors are included in addition when
defining labor productivity.
Interpretation of Scenario Data
This analysis of technological development and substitution has been applied
to the industry sector of the scenario projections. The relevant data from the
projections are presented in Table 15-12, where industrial output Y and
energy input E are given for the year 2030 relative to 1975. An indication of
the "more for less" trend that was included in the projections is that indus-
trial output increases up to twice as much as do requirements for energy.
The separation of this trend into technological development and substitution
is accomplished by means of the production function model as shown below.
In this application of this model, the scenario projection data of Table
15-12 and the energy price projections described in an earlier section are
taken as given. The values of the technological development coefficient, 8,
and of the elasticity of substitution, a, both of which are consistent with the
scenario data, are then calculated. The equation relating output, energy use,
energy price, and the two parameters 8 and a is given in footnote h. Since
there is only one equation and two unknown parameters, only combinations
hIn this analysis, the often-used constant elasticity of substitution production function with neu-
tral technological development on energy and nonenergy (prime) inputs is applied. That is, output Y is
produced from energy input E and other inputs Z according to
Y = eot ~E l:a +bZ l:aJ a~l
where a is the elasticity of substitution, fj is the technological development coefficient (indicating
exponential growth with time, t), and a and b are constants. The quantities of Y, E, and Z are mea-
sured relative to their base year (1975) value. The equilibrium price of E, PE' must be equal to its mar-
ginal productivity defined by the derivative of Y, which yields the relationship
E _ a (a-l)ot Y -a
- - a e PE
where the price of output product Y is assumed to be unity. The equilibrium price of energy in the
base year (t=O) is a. Energy price increases are defined relative to this base year price.
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Table 15-12. Projected industry sector output and energy requirements
for six regions.
High Scenario Low Scenario
Industrial Final energy Industrial Final energy
Region output input output input
I (NA) 4.28 2.37 2.57 1.64
II (SU/EE) 6.53 2.88 4.27 2.09
III (WE/JANZ) 4.22 2.71 2.56 1.75
IV (LA) 13.76 9.13 7.80 5.26
V (Af/SEA) 15.58 11.46 8.09 5.70
VI (ME/NAt) 39.78 28.27 17.52 13.27
Notes: Projected values in 2030 relative to 1975 values. Industrial output is value added in mining,
manufacturing, and construction, excluding the energy sector (and excluding mining in region VI),
plus payments for energy. Payments for energy were calculated multiplying final energy use in in-
dustry by the average final energy price for industry (see Table 15-7 for base year (1972) values).
Region I prices were used for all regions except region III; prices for 2030 were taken to be 3 times
for all regions except region III (2.4 times). Final energy data exclude feedstocks. Details are given
in Chant (1980).
of 8 and a that are consistent with the scenario data can be determined.
These combinations are shown graphically in Figure 15-8.
In this figure, regions II (SU/EE) and I (NA) in the High scenario stand
out as having either higher technological development or higher elasticity of
substitution. The industry sectors of the developing regions V (AfiSEA) and
VI (ME/NAf) exhibit almost identical trends in terms of this model and are
projected to be the least likely to benefit from the "more for less" trend.
This kind of production function analysis of the substitution effect be-
tween energy and nonenergy inputs is often performed without including the
technological development factor. The interpretation of the scenario projec-
tion data in this case is very simple; it is the case with 8=0.i As indicated in
Figure 15-8, the elasticities of substitution with 8=0 are very high for region
II (SU/EE) (0.65, 0.75), are between 0.41 and 0.54 for regions I (NA) and
III (WE/JANZ), and are between 0.27 and 0.38 for the developing regions.
These aggregate analyses are useful for comparing broad regions, for inter-
preting scenario projections, and for comparing the scenarios with other sim-
ilar energy studies. It must not be forgotten, however, that these aggregate
effects are the total of many and complex efficiency, technology, lifestyle,
regulatory, and standards changes as well as other factors that are somewhat
misrepresented when lumped together. How these energy projections were
made based on economic and population projections as well as other assump-
tions is the subject of the following chapter.
ilt is interesting to note that this model with 8;0 and the earlier model with 'Y and ~ for 'Y;1 yield
exactly the same values for a and ~ (with opposite sign). Unity income elasticity ('/-1) is, in these
aggregate models, equivalent to no technological development (8;0).
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Figure 15-8. Technological development and substitution in industry in the High
scenario.
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16 ENERGY CONSUMPTICINAND CONSERVATION
Governments and energy policymakers have acknowledged the importance
of understanding the components of energy use and of using energy more
efficiently wherever possible. Clearly, it is beneficial if the same productive
process or service can be accomplished with relatively less energy inputs (all
other things being equal). With continually rising fuel costs and their re-
sultant economic burdens, saving energy is more than important-it is
essential.
Yet energy consumption, present and future, rests midst some fundamen-
tal and strategic questions. Is "use less" a resource-poor country's sole
defense against potential energy shortages and embargos? Or are countries
better served by accelerating their own energy production? How large is the
real potential of reducing energy consumption? During what time span is it
achievable and at what costs (and benefits)?
The answers, unfortunately, are not simple and direct, because energy
demand (as the end use of energy is commonly called) is not a simple and
direct subject. The use of energy by industries, by motorists, by home-
owners, depends on a multitude of factors-not least among which are eco-
nomic development and population growth, as discussed in the previous
chapter. Among the other factors influencing energy consumption are
climate, technological progress, government regulations and taxes, pricing
policies, lifestyle decisions, cultural distinctions and preferences, education
and public perceptions. Energy demand is always complex and is often
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confusing. It is not likely to become less complex, even in the relatively long-
term fu ture.
Much research has already been done by many. Important contributions
have come from a diverse and rapidly increasing number of individuals and
groups-the American Physical Society Conference on Efficient Use of
Energy; the energy demand work done within the United States National
Research Council-sponsored Committee on Nuclear and Alternative Energy
Systems (CONAES) study; the national assessments done as part of the Inter-
national Energy Agency (lEA) activities; the landmark Dutch "Energy Con-
servation: Ways and Means" study; the work of the Workshop on Alternative
Energy Strategies (WAES); and a score of other studies completed and
underway at universities, research institutions, and government agencies
around the world. (A representative list of these and other broad-ranging
energy demand and conservation studies appears at the end of this chapter.)
This chapter is about energy consumption present and future, about
potential improvements in the efficiencies of energy use, and about the rela-
tionship of energy demand and detailed economic activities. It is about using
and saving energy in importantly different parts of the world. Total energy
demand is viewed here on the long term and on a regional basis and in light
of expected energy supplies. Detailed assessments of a range of plausible
energy demand futures-a High and a Low energy scenario-are made for six
of the seven world regions. Through sets of assumptions about lifestyle,
economic activities, and technical efficiencies, considerable energy savings
were incorporated in the scenarios.
These studies are meant to be a conceptualization of energy demand pros-
pects over a fifty-year horizon: they are neither forecasts nor predictions.
While they may accurately be labeled projections, their real value is more in
the concepts illuminated rather than in the numbers themselves.
The analyses reported in this chapter were aided greatly by the use of the
MEDEE-2 model. a This model, one in the set of IIASA energy models
described in Chapter 13, offers a means of collecting and processing large
numbers of assumptions and calculating resultant energy use. MEDEE-2
results are presented in this chapter for regions I through VI. For region VII
(C/CPA), about which very little is known, a simpler model, SIMCREDb was
used.
The approach adopted here for making energy demand projections using
the MEDEE-2 model is a relatively detailed one. Once these detailed projec-
tions are made, they can be aggregated into demand categories such as trans-
portation, household, agriculture, and industry. These broad categories, as
well as the total, can then be analyzed and interpreted in terms of various
elasticities including energy price elasticities (Chapter 15). Any unreasonable
result in terms of elasticities is then a signal for reexamining the related com-
bination of detailed assumptions and projections in the MEDEE-2 frame-
aThe MEDEE-2 model considered here was adapted at IIASA by B. Lapillonne and is described in
Chapter 13 and in Lapillonne (1978).
bSIMCRED (Simulation Model based on Cross Country Regressions for Energy Demand) was de-
veloped by J.K. Parikh, at IIASA. A description of this model can be found in Parikh (J 980).
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work. Thus, the approach here is detailed energy scenario development for
energy-influencing macroeconomic, lifestyle, and technological factors,
followed by aggregate elasticity analysis.
An alternative approach would be to make energy demand projections on
the basis of elasticities alone. In this approach (at whatever level of disaggre-
gation is desired), energy demand is related to economic and energy price
variables by means of elasticities (based on historical data or by assumption);
energy demand estimates then result from projections of these economic and
price variables. This approach is attractive, especially at the most aggregate
level, because reasonable projections can be made with very little effort. The
shortcoming is clear, however: no insight is gained on how and where energy
conservation and improvement of efficiencies may occur. At a more disaggre-
gated level, the elasticity approach offers no escape from detailed data anal-
ysis and from having to make detailed assumptions where data are insuf-
ficient for setting parameter values. Even at the detailed level, no insight is
gained as to physical parameter changes that must occur-changes that are
very helpful for judging whether scenario projections are reasonable.
There is no answer to the question as to which alternative yields more
trustworthy projections-this depends on the frame of reference of the per-
sons making the projections. The approach adopted here makes use of both
alternatives-one primarily for generating projections (the detailed account-
ing framework of this chapter) and the other for interpreting these projec-
tions (the calculations in Chapter 15).
SOME DEFINITIONS
This chapter concentrates on estimating final energy consumption; the usual
accounting schemes deal only with primary energy. The distinction is impor-
tant. The various energy forms and levels have already been defined in Part I
and are illustrated there in Figure 1-1. Here, some additional comments are
in order.
Primary energyc (at the lower left of Figure 1-1) represents the energy
content of extracted raw fuels-for example, crude oil or natural gas at the
wellhead; coal at the mine mouth. Some primary fuels need to be refined or
converted to secondary energy (in oil refineries or power plants) with typi-
cally rather large conversion losses (at least 60 percent losses in the case of
coal converted to electricity), while others can be transported and used
directly as secondary energy. Secondary energy, after transmission and dis-
tribution through major networks (e.g., oil or gas pipelines, delivery trucks,
high and low voltage lines), becomes final energy. Electricity at the output,
or busbar, of a power station is secondary energy; electricity at the home
cPrimary energy also includes fossil fuel equivalents of, for example, nuclear and hydropower con-
version to electricity and the energy obtained from new sources such as solar, geothermal, wind, ocean
thermal gradients, charcoal or wood fuels from forests, planned wood plantations, biogas, and so
forth.
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wallplug is final energy. Final energy is energy delivered to final consumers-
oil delivered to burners in the basement or to industrial boilers.
Final energy is what the consumer buys. What one actually benefits from
is useful energy-the heat that warms living rooms, for example. Produced
photons, heated air, and kinetic energy are useful energy. All of the conver-
sion losses, from primary through to at least final energy (and sometimes, if
possible, through to useful energy), are counted in the analyses here and are
shown in the detailed presentation or results in these pages and in support-
ing documents.
As there is a law of energy conservation, the balance is easy to calculate
for each and every stage shown in Figure 1-1. Ultimately, primary energy
becomes waste heat through one or another channels of energy transfer-
photons become absorbed, heated air dissipates, kinetic energy is used up
in friction. In short, energy is not really "consumed" at all: energy "de-
mand" is an inexact notion. What is demanded instead is energy services.
Energy services are provided when, for example, photons illumine book
pages, warm air heats living rooms, kinetic energy keeps automobiles moving.
The well-lit pages, the comfortable rooms, and the moving vehicles are the
services demanded-services that, not being energy, do not (broadly speak-
ing) obey laws of conservation.
ENERGY SERVICES
To take a trivial but instructive example of energy services, imagine a
potter. He has a potter's wheel, a motor for driving the wheel, spatulas
-and his skill. As he progresses, his daily output of pottery increases,
he produces less scrap, his skill improves. The amount of sustained in-
flux of kinetic energy per output of pottery has decreased j useful
energy has been partly substituted by skill. Encouraged, our potter
buys a more sophisticated potter's wheel. His daily output increases
further and in tum the amount of sustained influx of kinetic energy per
output of pottery has decreased. The potter therefore demonstrates
that energy services can be substituted by services of capital stock and
skill.
A homeowner can do the same. With greater investment in, for exam-
ple, insulation (capital) and careful building design (know-how), he can
reduce his energy services requirements-and his monthly heating bill.
Ultimately, energy conservation is obtaining more energy service from
less energy input-even if more capital, and/or labor, and/or know-how
is being used.
In Chapter 21, on energy, negentropy, and endowments, the funda-
mental reasoning behind these considerations will be elaborated.
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Table 16-1. Global commercial energy use in 1975, base year (GWyr/yr).
District Nu-
Coal Oil Gas Elec tricity Heal Hydroa cleara Total
Transportation 45 1272 0 16 0 0 0 1333
Industryb 729 722 620 359 170 0 0 2600
Household-Service 285 547 382 249 48 0 0 1511
Feedstocksc 0 298 0 0 0 0 0 298
Final energy 1059 2839 1002 624 218 0 0 5742
Transportation and
distribution losses 38 0 97 91 10 0 0 236
Secondary energy 1097 2839 1099 715 228 0 0 5978
Inputs to electricityd
and distributed
heat 1069 534 359 [-734J [-2771 497 119 1567
Other lossese 91 455 49 19 49 0 0 663
Primary energy 2257 3828 1507 0 0 497 119 8208
aHydro- and nuclear-generated electricity are given in terms of fossil primary energy input equiv-
alent.
blndustry includes agriculture, construction, mining, and manufacturing.
cFeedstocks include nonenergy uses of fuels. (Natural gas used to make fertilizers is included in
"ind ustry. ")
dThe inputs to electricity generation are primary equivalents of the sources; these figures include
primary sources used in cogeneration facilities. (The -734 figure under "electricity" represents the
secondary [busbar J electricity generated from the several primary sources.)
e"Other losses" include all primary to secondary losses (e.g., primary transport, oil refining);
they also include bunkers (210 GWyr/yr of oil in 1975)-energy used in international shipments of
fuel.
Sources: Based on data from United Nations (1977a); United Nations (1978); OECD (1976);
World Energy Conference (1978); Economic Commission for Europe (1976); Smil (1976); CIA
(1975); Kambara (1974); Vigdorchik (1976); Beschinsky and Kogan (1976); Petro Studies Co.
(1978).
ENERGY DISTRIBUTION IN 1975 AND A
RATIONALE FOR PROJ ECTIONS
In 1975, the world was consuming (commercial) primary energy at an aver-
age rate of 8.2 TWyr/yr, which is equivalent to some 8.5 billion (109 ) tons
of coal per year or to some 110 million (106 ) barrels of oil per day (mbd).d
In terms of secondary energy, the world in 1975 used about 6 TWyr/yr, as
seen in Table 16-1, while total final energy use was 5.7 TWyr/yr. Although
these global totals tell us something about how much of which kind of
energy was used, they reveal little about where-in which economic sector or
dFor more precise conversion of energy units, see Appendix lB.
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Figure 16-1. Global per capita commercial primary energy consumption, 1975. Values
show fraction of population whose primary commercial energy consumption is smaller
than the corresponding value on the horizontal axis.
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in which country-energy was used. This latter information is exceedingly
important for projecting energy demand.
Present per capita energy use around the world is very unevenly distrib-
uted. In 1975, the global average per capita consumption of commercial
primary energy was 2.1 kWyr/yr-or a total of 8.2 TWyr/yr for a global
population of four billion people. However, about 60 percent of the world's
population exist with less than one-half of that amount, and only about
7 percent of the people in the world consume energy at rates greater than 7
kWyr/yr, cap. Figure 16-1 graphs these inequities; the United States and
Canada (and Luxembourg) provide the data for the right-hand side of the
diagram.e
The maldistribution of energy use has deep implications for future energy
consumption. Responsible technological planning and energy scenario build-
ing should attempt to even this heavily skewed distribution. At what level it
should become even is an open question. One simple possibility, of course, is
for energy use to stabilize at the present global average of 2.1 kWyr/yr, cap.
This is the value today in Greece, Spain, and Singapore, for example.
Developing countries will continue to require energy growth, substantial
eOf course, there are many reasons why some countries (e.g., those that export large quantities of
energy-intensive products) have higher per capita energy consumption than others. It is not the pur-
pose here to cast value judgments on consumption levels. Surely, the distribution of Figure 16-1 gen-
erally illustrates inequities, waste, and inadequate energy provisions in most of the world.
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energy growth, in order to achieve industrialization and human betterment
goals. There seems little doubt about this. One fact supporting this assess-
ment is the high and relatively constant level of energy consumption per unit
of area in cities in both the developed and the developing countries (see
Chapter 23 for a discussion of this subject). This, coupled with projections
for dramatically increasing urbanization in most of the developing countries,
leads to clear indications of substantial and inevitable energy growth in these
countries. The challenge is to provide the requisite energy efficiently and
effectively-to facilitate development in the developing regions while avoid-
ing. transfer of any of the wasteful energy excesses of some developed
regIOns.
These issues have a great bearing on the globe's energy future. Because of
it, one must consider the present position of developing countries with care.
ENERGY CONSUMPTION IN
DEVELOPING REGIONSf
Some Basicsg
The search for effective and speedy means of meeting human needs and
hopes is accentuated in the developing countries by their present plight-the
great distance between practice and potential, realities and aspirations. The
challenges to development in the deVeloping regions are substantial; they
reflect individual and societal distresses that call for fresh thinking and inno-
vative solutions. Distinctive characteristics of economic structure, cultural
patterns, and political goals in the developing regions cannot be ignored. The
implications for energy requirements, particularly over the long term, are
large and serious.
Here, only a few of the distinctive characteristics of the developing regions
are outlined. In economic terms, the regions have (typically) low per capita
income levels, high consumption and low investment rates, relatively large
agriculture sectors, (usually) large and life-giving imports and foreign aid,
and supply-constrained (rather than demand-driven) growth patterns. Most
of the developing countries seem to be heading toward steady industrializa-
tion and rapid urbanization, although there may be some slackening of the
latter trend in some places. In energy terms, national total and per capita
energy consumption levels are very low; the share of oil among commercial
energy uses is often high; and noncommercial energy plays an important
baseline role, particularly in rural areas and, to a certain extent, in house-
holds in urban areas.
These are generalizations, to be sure. But they convey some impressions
and some learning. They imply, almost certainly, the considerable likelihood
f"Developing regions" here refers to regions IV (LA), V (Af!SEA), VI (ME/NAf), and VII (C/CPA).
Occasionally excluded is region VI (when only nonoil-exporting countries are meant) or region VII
(China is often a special case). These occasions will be clear by statement or implication.
gA detailed description of these observations may be found in the work of Parikh (1980).
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of major increases in energy demand in the future. And they may indicate
that the developing regions could have a higher flexibility in choosing among
future energy supply and industrial options than the developing regions.
Some of the specific data that lay behind these observations are reported in
Table 16-2 for two of the developing regions-IV(LA) and V (AflSEA).
Low Energy Consumption. The exceedingly low level of commercial
energy consumption in many developing countries is a difficult fact for
many to grasp. For contrast, North America recently (1975) had 11 kWyr/yr,
cap; the USSR and Eastern Europe, about 5 kWyr/yr,cap; Western Europe
about 4 kWyr/yr,cap. In the developing regions (IV-LA, V-AfiSEA, VI-MEl
NAf, and VII-c/CPA) in 1975 consumption was 1.1, 0.2, 1, and 0.5
kWyrIyr ,cap, respectively. Consider some typical examples: in 1975 Brazil
Table 16-2. Energy in two developing regions, 1965 and 1975.
7975
Total Rural Fraction
Population (10·)
Region IV (LA) 319 0.40
Region V (Af/SEA) 1422 0.78
Share of
Total Agriculture
GDP(109 $)
Region IV (LA) 340 0.12
Region V (Af/SEA) 340 0.36
7965 7975
Total primary energy
(including noncommercial) (TWyr/yr)
Region IV (LA) 0.278 0.447
Region V (Af/SEA) 0.442 0.672
Share of oil
Region IV (LA) 0.46 0.51
Region V (Af/SEA) 0.15 0.24
Share of noncommercial energy a
Region IV (LA), of which 0.35 0.24
Wood 0.28 0.18
Agricultural wastes 0.07 0.06
Region V (Af/SEA), of which 0.61 0.51
Wood 0.41 0.34
Agricultural Wastes 0.20 0.17
aNoncommercial energy is expressed here in terms of its calorific heat content and not as a re-
placement equivalent of fossil fuels. The efficiencies of use of noncommercial and commercial fuels
are quite different (see text).
Sources: For GDP and share of agriculture see United Nations (1977b) and World Bank (1977).
For rural fraction see United Nations (1976b). For commercial energy see United Nations (1976a,
1977a). Estimates of noncommercial energy are based on data from FAa (1976, 1977a); Parikh
(1980).
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had 0.7 kWyr/yr,cap; India, 0.2 kWyr/yr,cap; and about 30 African and
Asian countries-including Bangladesh, Burma, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Uganda-
used primary energy at the rate of less than 0.1 kWyr/yr,cap.
High Oil Share. Current oil prices are high, as the whole world knows. But
they have been low, and oil is easy to transport. Even without expensive high
voltage lines or underground pipelines, oil in tincans can reach even the
remotest of villages. As a result, the oil shares of total primary commercial
energy in 1975 were 67 percent in Latin America and 49 percent in Africa
and South Asia. Many countries-Peru, Thailand, and Kenya among them-
have 80 and 90 percent or more (of commercial primary energy) oil shares.
In regions I (NA) and III (WE/JANZ) the shares were 44 percent and 56 per-
cent, respectively; in the oil-rich Soviet Union it was 39 percent. But oil
must be imported to many developing countries, and this strains hard cur-
rency reserves that are also needed in no small measure for imports of food,
equipment, and spare parts. The oil payments outflow in many developing
countries is serious; in some countries 30 percent and even more of export
earnings go to oil purchases.
Rural Electrification Backlog. Vast rural areas in many developing coun-
tries are without electricity. Only 15 percent of the rural population in Latin
America and Asia have electricity; less than 4 percent of Africa's 80 percent
rural population does. At the same time, the degree of electrification, and in
particular its consumption density in urban areas in these countries, is com-
parable to that in the urban areas in developed countries.
Noncommercial Energy. The role of noncommercial energy in rural areas
in the developing countries is difficult to measure. In 1975, these sources
provided probably about 24 percent of total energy in Latin America (region
IV) and as much as 51 percent in region V (AflSEA). But these shares have
been declining-from 35 percent and 61 percent, respectively, in 1965. Obvi-
ously, this trend is important for estimates of future consumption of com-
cial fuels. h
Wood continues to playa major noncommercial energy role in the develop-
ing regions, and its use has been growing in Africa and Asia at over 4 percent
per year for the past two decades (see Table 16-3). About 70 percent of
noncommercial energy use today is met by fuelwood-village women trudg-
ing several kilometers each day in gathering and carrying. The resulting long-
term deforestation effects have led to recognition of a possibly imminent
"fuelwood crisis." The problems of energy use in the developing regions are
not small; they may not be purely local, either. For example, the harvest of
noncommercial fuels usually works to aggravate environmental problems
hNoncommercial energy's main role is in the household, and its present end use efficiency is typ-
ically 10 to 20 percent of that of fossil fuel. As a result, the current share of noncommercial fuels in
useful energy is much lower-less than 10 percent in region IV (LA) and less than 20 percent in region
V (Af/SEA).
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Table 16-3. Consumption offuelwood, 1951-1975.a
1951 1961 1975 Growth Rate
Region (GWyr/yr) (G Wyr/yr) (GWyr/yr) (%/yr)
IV~Latin America 59 70 84 1.5
V-Africa (except Northern
Africa and South Africa) 35 75 101 4.5
South and Southeast Asia 47 93 128 4.3
a2.7 m' of wood = 1 kWyr
Source: FAO (1977a, 1966, 1962).
such as deforestation and soil erosion, and pollutants and smoke from
these fuels are serious health hazards. The tasks for the future are both large
and complicated. But they are critically important ones for the well-being
of most (if not all) of earth's inhabitants.
Long-term Projections for Developing Regions
These observations and interpretations about present-day developing regions
have led to methodologies and assumptions for projecting energy growth in
these regions. In the results presented here, use has been made of mathemati-
cal computer models and the expertise of scientists at IIASA from develop-
ing countries. The detailed inputs to and results of projections for the
developing regions are reported in this and the next chapter, along with
the inputs and results for other regions. Here, some of the major findings for
the developing regions are summarized.
In 1975, the developing regions-regions IV (LA), V (AflSEA), VI (MEl
NAf), and VII (C/CPA)-accounted for 15.7 percent of total global primary
(commercial) energy. By 2030, under the assumptions of the High and the
Low scenarios, they would represent 38 to 43 percent of this global total.
Clearly, much of the global growth in energy consumption and many of the
new energy markets are in the developing regions. By 2030, per capita levels
of consumption in the developing regions would have grown substantially,
but in most instances they would not have reached 1975 West European (4
kWyr/yr,cap) levels. Only region IV, Latin America, and region VI, the
Middle East and Northern Africa, could be nearing, by 2030 (especially in
the High scenario), a status that could be called "developed."
The important role of noncommercial sources at present in developing
economies cannot be overlooked. Noncommercial energy use in regions
IV and V is estimated to drop from 30 and 58 percent, respectively, of total
final energy demand in 1975 to about 5 and 10-15 percent by 2030 in the
two scenarios.Yet even these numbers are somewhat overstated. If noncom-
mercial energy is counted in useful terms, the same percentages are about 6
and 17 percent for 1975 and would be about 1 and 2-4 percent in 2030,
in spite of an assumed 60 to 100 percent improvement in its end-use effi-
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ciency. The very low conversion efficiencies of noncommercial sources into
useful energy exaggerates their magnitude if counted on a primary or, even
more so, on a final equivalent basis. This is an important distinction. It is
assumed that by the year 2030, regions IV, V, and VI would continue to use
about as much noncommercial energy as they did in 1975, but this would
be a continually diminishing fraction of total energy use. i
These observations on the prospects for the developing regions provide
background for the discussion of energy use worldwide, in region-by-region
comparable detail.
A SUMMARY OF ENERGY DEMAND RESULlSj
The results summarized here are based on the High and Low scenarios de-
fined in Chapter 15. Many exogenous assumptions, judgments, and data are
required to produce the energy demand estimates presented here. These in-
puts will be described in subsequent sections of this chapter.
If the High and Low scenarios span a plausible range of future possibilities,
then (as already noted in Chapter 15) energy demand growth would slow
down overall, especially if compared with recent historical trends. The
scenario assumptions lead to growth rates of global primary energy demand
declining from an average of nearly 4.8 percent per year over the past twenty-
five years to an average of 1.9 to 2.8 percent per year in the next fifty years.
Table 15-2 recorded the totals-primary energy consumption of roughly 36
TWyr/yr in the High scenario and 22 TWyr/yr in the Low scenario by 2030.
Based on the assumptions of the High scenario by 2030, global primary
energy consumption would be about 4.5 kWyr/yr,cap-the present level in
France, Poland, and the United Kingdom. With the Low scenario, the global
2030 average would be about 2.8 kWyr/yr,cap, the present value in Italy and
Ireland.
But the inequities in energy consumption among regions abate only
slightly by 2030 under the conditions of these scenarios. Regions are dis-
tinctly different; for example, both the High and the Low scenarios allow
somewhat higher (although hardly an excess of) per capita energy growth
for the developing regions than for the developed regions, recognizing the
saturation effects and slower growth in the latter. Although the High
scenario offers considerably increased economic development for the
developing regions (see Chapter 14), it could be argued that even this
amount falls short of their worthy goals and aspirations. The shape of the
energy future hinges on the successful development of conventional, uncon-
iThis does not mean that uses of wood or agricultural wastes, for example, should be put to an end.
In addition to continued noncommercial supplies, the supply analyses (Chapter 17) describe the possi-
bilities of using produced and harvested wood or plantation crops, or the conversion of farm wastes
into methane, as commercial energy sources.
jFor a complete description of base year information, assumptions concerning projections, and
results see Khan and H6lzl (1980).
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Table 16-4. Per capita final energy consumption, two scenarios 1975 to
2030 (kWyr/yr, cap).
Base High Scenario Low Scenario
'(ear
Region 1975 2000 2030 2000 2030
I (NA) 7.89 9.25 11.63 7.95 8.37
II (SU/EE) 3.52 5.47 8.57 4.98 6.15
III (WE/JANZ) 2.84 4.46 5.70 3.52 3.90
IV (LA) 0.80 1.75 3.31 1.28 2.08
V (Af/SEA) 0.18 0.42 0.89 0.32 0.53
VI (ME/NAf) 0.80 2.34 4.64 1.76 2.46
VII (C/CPA) 0.43 0.93 1.87 0.64 0.93
World 1.46 1.96 2.86 1.58 1.83
Note: The figures are average rates of final energy use, averaged over the population and the year.
The figures for regions I through VI result from the many assumptions and calculations for each of the
scenarios, using the MEDEE-2 model; the figures for region VII are based on SIMCRED model runs.
ventional, and alternative energy resources at acceptable costs in many parts
of the world. Certainly much of the potential for growth in the centrally
planned economies of region II (SU/EE) depends on the successful develop-
ment of the vast and resource-rich areas of Soviet Asia.
Per capita final energy consumption figures (Table 16-4) show relatively
slow growth in this indicator in the developed regions and the more rapid
growth in the developing regions-moderated by high population growth
rates. Whether these reflect acceptable levels of improvement in developing
regions remains to be seen.
Figure 16-2 summarizes the projections of global final and primary
energy use over the coming decades on the basis of the High and Low
scenarios. Note the relatively rapid growth in electricity use and, attendantly,
in processing and conversion losses. These trends result from assumptions of
increasing electrification (although almost solely for special purposes) and
from declining relative availability of liquid fuels. The assumptions underly-
ing the final energy projections are given in detail in subsequent sections of
this chapter.
ELECTRIFICATION ASSUMPTIONS
The degree of electrification in each of the world regions results from a set
of scenario assumptions affecting the relative use of electricity and other
fuels for various sectoral activities. These scenario assumptions follow the
relative price changes of electricity and competing fuels that result from
successive iterations through the modeling loop of Chapter 13.
Electrification is seen in the analyses here to be demand driven in the near
term, with significant supply limitations imposing constraints over the
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medium and the long term. Over time, the trend of increasing penetration of
electricity into end use markets slows down significantly, especially in
developed regions.
In summary, the electrification assumptions are as follows:
• Electricity use of "essential electric" purposes such as motive power in
industry, aluminium production, lighting in buildings, home appliances,
and computers would grow in the scenarios at a rate comparable to
growth in sectoral activities.
• Electricity would modestly enter the heat market in buildings for space
heating, water heating, and cooling. For example, it is assumed that by
2030 roughly 17 percent of home heating could be provided by elec-
tricity in regions I (NA) plus III (WE/J ANZ) (from 8 percent in 1975)
and about 7 percent in the developing regions (VI-LA plus V-AflSEA
plus VI-ME/NAf) in 2030 from just 1 percent today.
• Electricity would also penetrate the industrial heat market to a certain
extent; to do so, it would compete not only with fossil fuels but, in-
creasingly, with solar and cogenerated heat. By 2030, 10 percent of
industrial process and space heat is assumed to be provided by elec-
tricity in each of regions I, IV, and VI, 4 to 5 percent in regions III and
V, and 5 to 10 percent in region II.
• Electricity use for transportation is assumed to increase in all regions
because of increasing electrification of railways and urban mass transit
systems in metropolitan areas and also because of a likely shift from
gasoline cars to electric cars in urban travel. The share of electricity in
transportation energy would thus increase to 1 to 2 percent of all trans-
portation energy use in 2030 in regions I, IV, V, and VI from virtually
zero today. In regions II and III, the shares may be as high as 9 and 4
percent, respectively, by 2030.
An additional comment on transportation energy is in order here. In
region I (NA), no electrification is assumed for freight trains; for passenger
trains, 20 percent of passenger km are with electric trains, compared to 1
percent in 1975, and 50 percent of mass transit is assumed to be electric.
However, because of the insignificant share of rail and urban mass transit
in this region, electricity used for transportation is and would remain low.
In region III (WE/JANZ), on the other hand, 9 percent of the freight service
(30 percent of rail freight) is performed on electric trains, and this share is
projected to increase to 15 percent by 2030 (50 percent of rail freight).
Similar shares can be observed for intercity passenger transport, and urban
mass transit plays a significant role in this region. Because of the higher
end use efficiencies of electric modes of transportation relative to modes
using motor fuel, the electricity share appears to be low even for this region,
despite the large share in service. Figure 16-3 and Table 16-5 provide some
of the details about electrification in the scenarios.
Electrification rates could substantially exceed the ones assumed here if
heat pumps penetrate appropriate markets surprisingly rapidly or if elec-
Figure 16-3.
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Electricity in two scenarios by region, 1975-2030.
High Scenario
Electrl~
I
I
Other final-;nergy form~
Areas are proportional
to energy use
Low Scenario
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Table 16-5. Household use of electricity, 1975 and scenario assumptions
(103 kWh/household).
Base High Scenario Low Scenario
Year
Region 7975 2000 2030 2000 2030
I (NA) total electricity 9.4 13.0 15.0 11.9 12.9
(% thermal uses)a (59) (52) (47) (56) (52)
II (SU/EE) total electricity 1.2 3.9 6.5 3.0 4.3
(% thermal uses) (25) (26) (23) (29) (30)
III (WE/JANZ) total electricity 3.1 6.0 9.1 5.3 7.1
(% thermal uses) (38) (39) (34) (38) (36)
IV (LA) total electricity 0.7 1.9 4.2 1.4 2.7
(% thermal uses) (3) (11 ) (20) (13) (21)
V (Af/SEA) total electricity 0.05 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.3
(% thermal uses) (1) (4) (8) (3) (11 )
VI (ME/NAf) total electricity 0.2 1.2 4.3 0.9 1.8
(% thermal uses) (9) (22) (23) (19) (33)
aThermal uses include air conditioning.
Notes: Only for region I (NA) were sufficient statistics available; for other regions estimates come
from partial data and/or data for selected countries. Consumption of electricity per household for
specific uses (lighting, electrical appliances) is a direct assumption; consumption for thermal uses
results from separate assumptions on useful energy consumption for space heating, water heating,
cooking, and air conditioning and from assumed penetration of electricity into these markets.
tricity proves to be cheaper than substitute fuels. The latter is not felt to be
likely in many regions in this study, although in region II (5U/EE), a sub-
stantial body of opinion today sees nuclear power costs actually declining
in the future. If this were to occur, electricity penetration would be higher
than indicated in Figure 16-3 and Table 16-5.
Electricity today accounts for between 10 and 13 percent of final energy
in the developed regions (I, II, and III), while only 6.5 percent of final
energy is electricity in the developing regions (IV, V, VI, and VII), ranging
from about 10 percent for region IV to less than 4 percent for region VII.
These assumptions produce an increase in electricity use globally to 2030
of 2.6 to 3.4 percent per year in the Low and High scenarios, respectively-
from 2 to 3 percent per year in regions I and III, to 3 to 4 percent per year
in region II, 4 to 6 percent per year in regions IV and V, and 6 to 8 percent
per year in region VI. These growth rates are about one-half of the current
rates in most of the world. Electricity is saturating in its uses in many de-
veloped countries. Electricity growth is still higher than overall energy
growth-a factor of about 1.4 higher globally, compared to factors typically
2 times higher in recent decades.
"Essential" uses of electricity make up a fairly significant fraction of total
final energy use in all regions. By 2030, the scenarios lead to some 20 to 30
percent (or more) of total final energy in buildings being devoted to elec-
tricity for appliances, lighting, cooling, and air conditioning. In industrial
sectors, the shares of electricity for lighting, motor drive, electrolysis,
and electric furnaces are typically 15 to 20 percent by 2030. The increasing
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shares in the scenarios reflect the relatively greater savings possible for other
energy uses.
Assuming average 70 percent load factors of power plants and 15 percent
losses in transmission and distribution (the 15 percent figure represents the
average of all losses from power station busbar to home wallplug) , the
installed capacity required to generate the electricity of Figure 16-3 be-
comes 3550 to 4390 GW(e) in 2000 and from 6320 to 9845 GW(e) in
2030.k (The 1975 total world installed electric capacity was nearly 1600
GW(e).) Can the world build such capacity? What are the available sources
for such generation? These questions are dealt with in the overall supply
estimates and major supply "alternatives" reported in Chapters 17 and 18.
ENERGY CONSUMPTION IN SECTORS:
ASSUMPTIONS AND RESULTS
The Sectoral Shares: GOP, Demographics, and Energy
The analytical approach embodied in MEOEE-2 calls for a detailed specifica-
tion of the overall economic growth projections-in particular, a sectoral
breakdown of GOP. This detailing is necessary in order to incorporate some
important energy-influencing pieces of information, including anticipated
changes in the investment and consumption rates in GOP and in the mix of
manufacturing activities; expected changes in demographics (urbanization,
family size, labor force participation); likely evolutions of certain socio-
economic activities (transportation systems planning, use of energy-
consuming equipment, etc.); and perceived changes in lifestyles.
The disaggregation of the GOP projections of Chapter 14 into more mean-
ingful sectors is not an easy task. There is no universally accepted method
for projecting the evolution of various socioeconomic activities and related
technological parameters over a period of several decades. There is also an
acute shortage of disaggregated relevant data; sufficiently detailed data on
energy consumption are available only for a few countries (mostly devel-
oped), and even then, such data have been compiled for only a few years.
The scenario assumptions here were developed on the basis of judgments
guided by past trends, interregional and intercountry comparisons (wher-
ever appropriate), estimated relationships reflecting the interdependence
between various economic and social activities, and estimated prospects of
future technological developments.
In short, the process is one of estimating large numbers of detailed param-
eters, all (or most) influenced directly by the total GOP projections. These
scenario assumptions and the resulting sectoral and subsectoral energy
demand projections are not deterministic, but simply guidelines for under-
standing the nature of future energy demand.
kThe installed capacity figures result from the supply analyses described in Chapter 17. The figures
quoted for load factors and losses in transmission and distribution are average on typical figures; more
precise numbers are given in Chapter 17.
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As a first step, GDP in each region is disaggregated into three broad
sectors-agriculture, industry (manufacturing, mining, construction, and
energy), and service. Table 16-6 records the assumptions made for six of the
world regions. These changes in economic structure over the next fifty
years are assumptions. They are based on past data, observed trends, and
national expectations. The changes are generally greatest in the developing
regions, which are, in these terms, developing-shifting GDP more and more
(relatively) from agriculture to industry. In developed regions, the expected
shift is toward more services.
Disaggregation of the demographics projections of Chapter 14 is neces-
sary in order to consider the final consumption of energy demand in a
sufficiently detailed way. The assumptions of Table 16-7 illustrate the ex-
pected trends-increased urbanization throughout the world; slightly increas-
ing economically active population fractions, especially in the developed
regions; and reductions in family sizes in all regions. (Such estimates are
important-for example, changes in average energy use per capita can vary
considerably with changes in average family size.)
With these inputs, final energy consumption is calculated in detail in
MEDEE-2. Aggregating these results into three broad groups (household-
service, industries, and transportation) yields the figures in Table 16-8.
Regional differences in sectoral use of energy are apparent. These differences
seem to persist in spite of the fact that economic and demographic structures
in some of the regions have been assumed to undergo considerable changes
over the next fifty years.
Table 16-8 illustrates that the share of final energy used in buildings is,
throughout, much higher in the developed regions (I, II, and III) than in the
developing regions (IV, V, and VO, as one would expect. In addition to low
space heating requirements in the developing regions, this is also because of
the considerable dependence of these regions on noncommercial fuels for
domestic use. Also, building energy use is low in these projections because
of saturation effects, which can be seen in almost all the world regions.
Transportation activities in the developing regions make up a relatively
high share of final energy in 1975, and the trend, in general, shows a slight
increase in both scenarios. This is because of a considerable increase in
freight transportation, projected to grow with industrial output and because
of expected increase in personal travel and a reduction of average load fac-
tors. Among the developed regions, the relative shares of transportation and
industrial activities are markedly different in regions I (NA) and III (WEI
JANZ) and region II (SU/EE), mirroring the differing emphases on industrial
activity and personal transportation in the two types of economies.
Transportation Energy
Energy used in moving people and goods around is high everywhere-from
about 18 percent of total final energy consumption in 1975 in region II
(SU/EE), to 30 percent in regions I (NA) and V (AflSEA), to about 40 per-
.
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cent in regions IV(LA) and VI (ME/NAf). For the world the figure is 24
percent. Of course the ways in which this energy is used (the mix of trans-
port modes-automobiles, buses, trains, trucks, planes-and the fuels used)
vary considerably from country to country. But the end result is usually a
large share of energy use in transport, and it is growing.
In the United States, for example, transportation consumes directly about
30 percent of total final energy. If one counts all the indirect uses-energy
used to make automobiles, energy used to make steel to make automobiles,
energy used in road construction, and so forth-the figure is well over 40
percent.
The analysis reported here foresees some changes in this picture-relatively
slower growth in personal travel in the developed regions (except for air
travel), moderately increased use of public transportation for urban travel
(a consequence of cities' growing congestion), and greater economies of gaso-
line consumption. These assumed changes are due to relative price increases,
changes in public perceptions about energy availabilities (which mayor may
not be accompanied quickly by price changes), and government mandates.
The results are strikingly different in different parts of the world, as illus-
trated in Figure 16-4. Region I (NA) evidences the smallest relative increase
in transportation energy use, although the high mobility, great distances, and
large (but slowly shrinking) automobiles of the United States and Canada
keep the absolute level of energy use high. In region III (WE/JANZ), mobil-
ity continues to increase steadily in these projections among all modes of
transport.
In region II (SU/EE), transportation energy use is currently low compared
to that in both regions I (NA) and III (WE/JANZ), despite large distances.
The main factors for this contrast are the large share of rail in both freight
and passenger transportation and the emphasis on urban mass transit in
region II. Although a certain increase in automobile ownership and attendant
increase in energy use for personal transportation is envisaged in this region,
the total increase is not so marked because in freight transportation no sig-
nificant shift toward trucks is expected. In developing regions IV (LA),
V (AflSEA), and VI (MEINAf), growth in transport energy demand is sig-
nificantly higher, owing to greater freight transport accompanying growth in
industrial and agricultural output and to the fact that personal travel is far
from the saturation mark.
Consider the relative levels of transport activity around the world in 1975:
total passenger travel (intercity plus urban) in North America was some 4100
billion (09 ) passenger kilometers (population 237 million); in region II it
was 1700 billion passenger kilometers (population 363 million); in region III
over 5000 billion passenger kilometers (population 560 million). The total
activity for developing regions IV, V, and VI together was only 3000 billion
passenger kilometers for 1874 million people. But this seems sure to change.
Passenger travel in the developed regions is expected to be nearing saturation
levels; further increases in personal travel will probably be relatively modest.
(There are limits-of income and time-to how much one can travel.) This
effect is especially pronounced in region I. Regions I and III together show
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only a 1.2 to 1.6 percent per year growth in total passenger travel according
to the MEDEE-2 runs for the two scenarios to 2030, while the developing
regions IV, V, and VI together increase their personal travel amount by from
3.9 to 4.4 percent per year. The region II growth rate is projected at 1.9 to
2.4 percent per year.
The types or modes of travel also matter-as do relative load factors. Table
16-9 summarizes, for the High scenario, the results of an array of assump-
tions for urban and intercity mobility, relative growth of different transport
modes, and expected changes in load factors around the world. It is apparent
in Table 16-9 that passenger travel in NA is assumed to shift away from
automobiles and toward planes in the scenarios. Still, by 2030 the automobile
would account for 73 percent of total passenger kilometers, confined to 50
percent or less in other regions. In general, the developed regions are pro-
jected to continue observed tendencies toward relatively more air and
(except NA) automobile travel, while the developing regions reflect ex-
pected shifts toward automobile (noticeably) and trains (less noticeably)
and away from today's large fraction of bus travel (roughly 60 percent in
the developing regions compared to less than 20 percent in the developed
regions).
Automobiles. Automobiles consume prodigious amounts of energy. More
precisely, they consume prodigious amounts of petroleum-a particularly
important distinction.
In North America, total automobile travel (intercity and urban) is
assumed to grow from 3800 billion passenger kilometers in 1975 (which is
equivalent to four automobile trips coast to coast across the United States
per person per year) to about 6000 billion passenger kilometers by 2030.
This average growth rate of just 0.8 percent per year indicates a leveling off
in the so far continuously increasing automobile use in the North American
region. The region III (WE/JANZ) growth in total automobile travel, by con-
trast, is assumed to be 1.6 to 2.4 percent per year, while in region II (SU/EE)
it is assumed to be 2.1 to 2.7 percent per year. In the developing regions IV
(LA), V (AflSEA), and VI (ME/NAf), the corresponding rates are between
4 and 6 percent per year-even though the assumptions restrict urban auto-
mobile travel, because of city traffic congestion, to 35-50 percent of all
urban passenger travel.
Assumptions for automobile ownership and usage vary widely among
regions, as recorded in Table 16-10. Automobile ownership is thought to be
nearing limits in North America, as is the distance traveled per automobile.
Region IV (LA) is assumed to approach the present statistics of region III
by 2030, whereas the figure for region V in 2030 may be comparable to
region IV today. The relatively high growth in regions IV, V, and VI of auto-
mobile ownership in the scenarios results from assumed higher growth in
GDP per capita and anticipated increases in urbanization.
Region II (SU/EE) has low automobile ownership and high distance
traveled per automobile-figures more common to the developing regions.
The scenario projections for this region maintain that autmobile ownership
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Table 16-10. Assumptions for automobile ownership and usage in six world
regions.
Base
Year
7975
High Scenario
2000 2030
Low Scenario
2000 2030
A. Auto Ownership
(auto/1 000 pop)
Region:
I (NA)
II (SU/EE)
III (WE/JANZ)
IV (LA)
V (Af/SEA)
VI (ME/NAf)
B. Intercity and Urban
Distance Traveled
(10 3 km/auto/yr)
Region:
I (NA)
II (SU/EE)
III (WE/JANZ)
IV (LA)
V (Af/SEA)
VI (ME/NAf)
500 526 526 526 526
25 63 100 50 67
192 305 450 240 313
39 100 230 72 144
4 11 38 9 22
17 59 177 42 79
15.9 16.1 16.5 15.9 15.9
18.5 17.1 17.6 16.2 16.5
9.2 10.2 10.3 10.1 9.9
13.2 13.8 13.1 15.4 15.0
25.2 21.3 19.3 24.4 26.0
16.4 16.6 18.1 19.3 24.4
Sources of data for 1975: United Nations (1977c); International Road Federation (1976); U.S.
Department of Commerce (1976).
would continue to be low, reaching only one-half of the present WE/JANZ
(region III) level by 2030. This reflects the explicit desire in region II to
develop public transport facilities, to minimize the need for private auto-
mobile use, and thus to minimize liquid fuels requirements (see also the
discussion in Chapter 17).
Energy use in vehicles can be reduced significantly by increasing load
factors (average number of passengers per trip or passenger kilometers
divided by vehicle kilometers) and by improving the vehicle's energy-using
efficiency. Load factors for automobiles are assumed to hold about constant
in the scenario cases in the developed regions, but are reduced somewhat in
the developing regions as automobiles become more common and family
sizes shrink. However, the largest factor by far in reducing potential per
kilometer energy use in automobiles is efficiency improvement. The lion's
share of this potential is found, not surprisingly, in North America.
In the United States in 1975 automobiles were, on average, burning about
17 litres per 100 kilometers traveled (about 14 miles per United States
gallon). By the year 2000, average efficiency of all automobiles on the road
in North America is projected to improve by about 55 percent-to 7.811100
km (or 30 miles per gallon). This impressive performance is the result of
legislationl passed in the U.S. Congress mandating an average fuel efficiency
IThc Energy Policy and Conservation Act of December 1975.
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for all new automobiles in 1985 of 27.5 mpg (8.6 £/100 km). By 2000,
virtually no automobiles older than the 1985 model year will be on the road
-thus the figure of 30 mpg assumed here in 2000. This substantial improve-
ment in automobile fuel performance in the early years of the fifty-year time
horizon of this study has no precedent in the United States and could still
be open to reasonable question. By 2030, automobiles traveling in North
America are projected to operate at an average fuel efficiency (about 6.8
11100 km or 35 mpg), substantially exceeding that in region III (WE/j ANZ)
today about 10 11100 km or 24 mpg). This efficiency improvement signals
smaller automobiles (a lifestyle change of a sort for many drivers) and better
design of engine and body (including any mix of new technologies or con-
struction materials that one would like j these numbers are meant to be the
aggregate of such possibilities). Fuel efficiency improvement in other regions
are not projected to be as great as in region Ij a range of 30 to 45 percent
improvement in the next fifty years is expected in region II (SU/EE), 30
to 35 percent in regions III (WE/jANZ) and VI (MEINAf), and about 15 per-
cent in regions IV (LA) and V (AflSEA).
Electric cars offer a potential for reduction of motor fuel use in automo-
biles. Electric cars, assumed to be three times as efficient as internal
combustion engine automobiles, nevertheless would consume about the same
total primary energy as conventional cars-if, of course, the electricity would
come from central station sources. It is assumed here that by 2030 about 20
percent of urban automobile travel in the developed regions (I, II, and III)
and perhaps 5 percent of urban car travel in developing regions (IV and VI)
might be accounted for by electric cars.
As a result of these and other assumptions, automobile energy use declines
sharply in region I and shows a modest decline (as a share of total transpor-
tation energy use) in regions II and III. Regions IV, V, and VI contrast
sharply with these results, increasing in total automobile energy use mark-
edly, largely because of the low level of use today.
Table 16-11 shows these projections for automobile energy use in the
scenarios. The quantities are large, as can be seen. The gasoline consumption
in automobiles in 2030 in regions I through VI would amount to about 0.9
to 1.1 TWyr/yr of oil. One must ask the extent to which alternative trans-
port modes could replace the car and with what energy consequences.
Mass Transit. For intercity trips, North Americans travel relatively less by
automobile in these projections over fifty years than they do today. One
reason is an assumed modest shift away from automobiles and toward mass
transit for intercity travel. In other regions, the shift assumed is actually
toward automobiles for intercity travel, but trains continue to playa very
significant role in regions II (SU/EE), III (WEIjANZ), V (AfiSEA) , and VI
(ME/NAf)-by 2030, 35 to 40 percent in region II, 20 to 35 percent in
region III, 16 percent in region V, and 20 percent in region VI, from 53,42,
26, and 10 percent, respectively, in 1975. In region I (and IV), intercity train
travel is assumed to remain low-l percent (6 percent) of all intercity travel
in 1975 to about 2 percent (3 percent) in 2030.
Travelers take to the air in greatly increasing numbers in both the High
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Table 16-11. Energy use by automobiles in six world regions.
Base High Scenario Low Scenario
Year
Region 7975 2000 2030 2000 2030
I (NA)
Energy used by cars (GWyr/yr) 364 205 194 203 201
As share of total transportation energy (%) (67) (32) (19) (36) (29)
"
(SU/EE)
Energy used by cars (GWyr/yr) 26 45 63 42 50
As share of total transportation energy (%) (11 ) (11) (8) (11) (9)
III (WE/JANZ)
Energy used by cars (GWyr/yr) 111 214 249 168 179
As share of total transportation energy (%) (35) (30) (22) (32) (26)
IV (LA)
Energy used by cars (GWyr/yr) 20 82 238 67 179
As share of total transportation energy (%) (19) (20) (21) (22) (25)
V (Af/SEA)
Energy used by cars (GWyr/yr) 17 67 277 60 216
As share of total transportation energy (%) (22) (25) (30) (27) (36)
VI (ME/NAf)
Energy used by cars (GWyr/yr) 6 27 108 22 67
As share of total transportation energy (%) (13) (13) (18) (16) (21 )
and the Low scenario projections for the developed market economies. The
rate of growth would also be high for developing regions, but from a much
smaller starting amount. In region IV (LA), intercity air travel would grow
from 2.6 percent in 1975 to 6-8 percent by 2030; in regions V (AfiSEA)
and VI (ME/NAf), the increase would be from 1.5 percent in 1975 to 3-7
percent by 2030 in the scenarios. In region I (NA), airplane flights would
account for as much as 30 percent of all intercity travel in 2030 (from 7 per-
cent today), while region III (WE/JANZ) would increase plane travel from
3.5 percent today to as much as 18 percent of all intercity travel by 2030
in the scenarios. In region II (SU/EE), air travel may account for as much as
27 percent of all intercity movements by 2030, from 20 percent today.
Load factors for trains and planes (and buses) are assumed in most cases
to be approximately constant or to increase only marginally in regions I and
III. This is hardly the case for the developing regions. There, overcrowding
on buses and trains is the norm, not the exception. High population growth,
coupled with the high mobility preferences accompanying income increases,
keep the load factors high in regions IV and V-although a gradual relaxation
of the present overcrowding is assumed to occur in parallel with increasing
per capita income and a slowing down of population growth. Load factors
of 20 and 25 passenger kilometers per vehicle kilometer for buses and about
150 for trains are common for regions I and III. In regions IV, V, and VI, the
bus load factors of typically forty to fifty today would drop to twenty to
forty by 2030 in the scenarios, while train load factors would fall from five
hundred to two to four hundred. (Of course, varying "vehicle" size among
and even within regions increases the difficulties of drawing comparisons.)
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The bus and train load factors in region II are also assumed to drop by a fac-
tor of two over the next fifty years and become comparable to those in
regions I and III.
Freight transport is assumed to grow significantly in all world regions
roughly in parallel with the activity levels in the agriculture, mining, and
manufacturing sectors. It is a big business: some 5 trillion (10 12 ) ton-
kilometers of freight in 1975 would reach some 11 trillion ton-kilometers
in the Low scenario and some 19 trillion ton-kilometers in the High scenario
for the developed regions I and III by 2030; energy use increases by a factor
of 2.4 to 3.9 over the fifty-year period. Freight transportation activity is
much lower in regions IV, V, and VI. These regions together had only about
2 trillion ton-kilometers of freight movement in 1975; an increase of six to
ten times that level is projected by 2030. Gradual shifts toward increasing
freight transportation on trains in regions IV and VI and with trucks in
region V are assumed. No significant change is assumed in the present dis-
tribution of freight transportation modes in the developed regions I, II,
and III.
Energy in Buildings
Homes use fuels and electricity for heating, lighting, air conditioning (some-
times), cooking and the like. Commercial and public buildings-the service
sector-use energy for about the same purposes, as well as electricity for
special needs such as medical equipment, office machines, computers, and
elevators. The total amounts of all these building operation energy uses are
not small.
In 1975, in region I (NA) and III (WE/JANZ), there were 266 million
homes, 45 percent of them centrally heated houses and apartments. There
were three persons per household on average. In the scenarios, housing con-
struction is assumed to be tied to population growth (which is low), while
allowing for further reductions in the assumed average number of persons per
household by 2030-to 2.24 in region I and to 2.56 in region III. Almost all
new residential dwellings are assumed to be centrally heated j many of them
are also air conditioned. In these two regions, by 2030, about 90 percent of
dwellings would be centrally heated, from 45 percent today. Air condi-
tioning would be available for 30 to 40 percent of dwellings, from 12 per-
cent in 1975.
In regions IV (LA), V (AflSEA), and VI (ME/NAf) taken together, the
number of residential dwellings reaches about 1130 million by 2030, from
360 million in 1975, with the number of persons per household dropping
from 5.22 to 4.16. Space heating requirements being relatively small in these
mostly warm regions, only about 25 percent of dwellings require space heat.
By 2030, some 17 to 19 percent are assumed to use space heat, from 11 per-
cent in 1975.
Service sector floor area increases fairly briskly in regions I and III, reflect-
ing the high growth of the total service sector in these regions. By 2030,
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from 1.7 to 2.1 times as much building area is in use and to be energy
serviced, as in 1975 in these two regions; in region II (SU/EE), the increase
is even larger, from 3.2- to 4.4-fold. Two main factors-higher population
growth and improvement in the working conditions of service sector em-
ployees-cause the growth in service sector activity in the developing regions
to be even greater than in the developed regions. Service sector floor area in
the developing regions is about 6.0 to 7.5 times (by 2030) that in 1975.
Tables 16-12 and 16-13 report some of the energy consumption figures
associated with the economic activity levels just cited. Readily apparent in
both of these tables is that by far the largest energy-gorging device in build-
ings in the developed regions is the space itself. Space heating (and to a lesser
extent air conditioning) overwhelms other needs in residences j in service sec-
tor buildings, electrical appliance consumption of energy is also very high. In
regions I and III, about 60 percent of useful energy in buildings goes to heat-
ing the inside air; in the scenario projections here this number decreases to
40 to 50 percent as various energy-saving measures are introduced.
Improved insulation in old and new homes can reap substantial reductions
in energy use. The assumptions in the scenarios of insulation improvements
in new buildings plus retrofit of pre-1975 dwellings significantly reduce the
heat losses in dwellings in regions I, II, and III. Retrofitting of the pre-1975
housing stock is assumed to reduce their heat losses by 20 to 30 percent over
the next fifty years. According to the assumptions used here, by 2030 the
average heat losses of all post-1975 dwellings would be only 50 percent of
those in 1975. Further gains are difficult beyond certain initial savings.
Rising prices and an assumed increasing public awareness of energy uncer-
tainties (as well as a fair measure of government-instituted standards) lead to
these results.
Electricity use for appliances has grown by great leaps and bounds in
recent years, usually much faster than rises in real income. Increased dispo-
sable income has to date seemed to go in rather large shares to such "extras"
as dishwashers, color televisions, and clothes dryers. In region I, and to some
extent in regions II and III, some flattening of this growth curve is postu-
lated-appliance ownership saturates, and their energy efficiencies, in
response to rising prices, improve.
Relative increases in electricity consumption for household appliances (see
Table 16-12) are much higher by 2030 in the developing regions-being
three to five times 1975 levels in region IV, five to ten times in region V, and
six to seventeen times in region VI -mainly because the present levels are so
low. Most houses that use electricity at all in these regions today use it only
for lighting and a bare minimum of other activities.
Another factor that is expected to play an important role in the future
energy requirements of buildings in both developed and developing regions is
air conditioning. Until now the extensive use of air conditioning has been
limited to region I j scenario assumptions here project by 2030 considerable
use of air conditioning in several other world regions as well (see Table
16-13).
At present the useful thermal energy requirements in the householdl
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service sector are met essentially by fossil fuels and electricity in the devel-
oped regions and by fossil fuels and noncommercial energy in the developing
regions. The scenario assumptions pertaining to future use of noncommer-
cial fuels, efficiency improvements in the use of all fuels, and penetration of
electricity, soft solar, district heat, and heat pumps lead to the final energy
demand patterns shown in Table 16-14. There, the large reliance on district
heat in region II is apparent (see Chapter 17). Also, the higher fossil, and
lower electric, shares in the developing regions than in the developed regions
reflect the end use patterns typical in buildings in these two kinds of regions.
It has been assumed that by 2030 heat pumps would be used to the extent
of 40 to 50 percent in regions I, II, and III and of 12 percent in regions IV
and VI and that there would be efficiency improvements of 10 to 25 per-
cent in the use of fossil fuels in different world regions.
Energy Use in Industrial Activities
Industrial energy use is currently a major portion of the total consumption
in all world regions; the scenario assumptions do not lead to major depar-
tures from that. Energy as a factor of production, as an "input" to produc-
tive output, is an indispensable commodity-qualitatively different from the
energy used by households or that consumed in transportation activities. Yet
despite its firm footing in virtually all of the world's economies, industrial
energy demand trends and possibilities span an impressively wide range. Be-
fore highlighting some specifics in the industrial energy projections for the
scenarios, it may be helpful to define the particular breakdown of this large
and highly heterogeneous activity as it is specified in the MEDEE-2 model.
By "industry" four broad sectors are meant-agriculture, construction,
Table 16-14. Shares of energy sources in the household-service sector heat
market (percent of total useful thermal energy).
High Scenario
2000 2030
Region NCE FF EL DH 55 NCE FF EL DH 55
I (NA) 0 68 24 0 8 0 56 31 0 13
/I (SU/EE) 4 44 6 43 3 3 22 10 60 5
III (WE/JANZ) 0 73 15 6 6 0 55 21 13
"IV (LA) 18 72 3 1 6 14 57 9 8 12
V (At/SEA) 37 63 0 0 0 26 70 2 0 2
VI (ME/NAt) 3 94 2 0 1 2 86 5 2 5
Notes: NeE = noncommercial energy sources; FF = fossil fuels (for regions IV, V, and VI this
column includes the fossil fuel equivalent of charcoal/wood and biogas to be supplied as commercial
fuel); EL = electricity; DH = district heat; SS = soft solar. In 1975, noncommercial energy share is
estimated to be 7,39,68, and 9 percent in regions II, IV, V, and VI, respectively. The Low scenario
shares are quite similar to these in the High scenario.
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mining, and manufacturing. Energy use in these sectors is projected as the
product of their value added and their energy intensiveness (energy use per
unit of value added). For manufacturing, calculations are done for four
subsectors-basic materials (e.g., primary metals, building materials, basic
chemicals); machinery and equipment; nondurable goods (food, textiles,
clothes); and miscellaneous.
The energy intensiveness is specified for three main types of energy use-
specific uses of motor fuel, specific uses of electricity, and thermal uses for
which the energy can be provided by various energy forms. The first two
coefficients are specified in terms of final energy; the third one is in terms
of useful energy. Specific uses of electricity are, for example, lighting,
motive power, and electrolysis. Thermal uses are steam generation, furnace
firing, and space and water heating. (Ideally, the distribution of useful
energy consumption among these types of thermal uses is specified for each
sector. If these data are not available, an average distribution for all sectors
must be specified.) The distribution among these categories is necessary in
order to estimate the potential industrial markets for district heat, solar
energy, heat pumps, and electricity and to make meaningful assumptions
about the penetration of these energy sources into the useful energy mar-
ket. The fraction of this market that is not covered by electricity, district
heat, solar energy, or heat pumps would be met by conventional fossil fuels.
In order to calculate final energy, one has to specify average end use effi-
ciencies of fossil fuels relative to those of electricity, either for the three
types of thermal uses separately or for an average for all thermal uses. The
overall final energy intensiveness can then be obtained from a consideration
of the following:
1. The distribution of value added among the economic sectors distin-
guished in the model (agriculture, construction, mining, the four manu-
facturing sectors, and the rest);
2. The energy intensiveness coefficients of each sector mentioned above;
3. The penetration of energy sources such as electricity, district heat, heat
pumps, and solar energy into their appropriate useful thermal energy
markets; and
4. The average process efficiencies of the technologies used (e.g., the aver-
age efficiency of fossil-fired furnaces, of fossil-fired boilers).
Of these, the first factor captures differences in economic structures; the last
three factors are meant to reflect technological patterns as they relate to
energy use. The energy intensiveness coefficients are also influenced by the
mix of activities in each sector.
Manufacturing. Manufacturing activities account for a lion's share of the
industrial energy consumption. In 1975, the share of manufacturing activ-
ities, including coke usage in the steel industry and feedstock inputs to
petrochemical industries, out of total industrial energy consumption was 90
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to 97 percent for regions I to V, in spite of considerable differences in the
composition of their economic structure. In region VI (ME/NAf) this share
was relatively smaller-about 62 percent-owing to the exceptionally low
level of manufacturing activity and the dominance of oil and gas production
in the industrial sector of this region. The scenario assumptions of changes in
economic structure, composition of manufacturing activities, and technologi-
cal coefficients result in projections for the years 2000 and 2030 for which
the share of manufacturing in the industrial energy consumption varies
between 76 and 90 percent in all world regions.
In the following paragraphs some salient features of the scenario assump-
tions affecting the energy consumption in the manufacturing sector in
different world regions are outlined. As mentioned earlier these scenario
assumptions are based on judgments, past trends, interregional and inter-
country comparisons, and estimated prospects of technological develop-
ments and conservation measures.
The projected changes in the overall economic structures of region I to
VI embodied in the scenarios were outlined in Table 16-6. Table 16-15
describes the assumed shifts in the composition of manufacturing activities
for the High scenario. The projected changes for the Low scenario are in the
same general direction but occur relatively more slowly.
The requirements of energy for a given mix of manufacturing activities
can be reduced as follows: by incorporating better machinery and processes
(which reduces the energy intensiveness of these activities); by increasing
the share of electricity, district heat, and soft solar energy in meeting the
demand for thermal processes (which reduces conversion losses); by making
increased use of cogeneration and heat pumps (which reduces the require-
ments of final energy); and by improving the efficiency of fossil fuels for
conversion to process heat (which also reduces conversion losses). Tables
16-16 and 16-17 outline assumptions of plausible changes in different
regions of the world over the next fifty years. The data for 1975 (column 1,
Table 16-16) show considerable differences in average useful energy inten-
siveness of manufacturing activities in various world regions. These differ-
ences are due in part to different mixes of component activities and in part
to differences in processes, technologies, and the extent of automation. (For
most of the regions the data are relatively scarce, and estimates used here
have been based on available information for representative countries.
One sees in these projections in general a greater reduction of energy
intensiveness in the developed regions than in the developing regions. These
reductions are particularly large in regions II (SU/EE) and I (NA) but not so
large in region III (WE/JANZ), where manufacturing activities have already
undergone considerable modernization. A part of these reductions is, of
course, because of structural changes in the manufacturing activities. The
largest structural changes in the manufacturing sector are assumed for the
developing regions, where both the most energy-intensive basic material
industries and the least energy-intensive machinery and equipment industries
grow relatively faster than the nondurable goods industries. This has a
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Table 16-16. Projected reduction in average useful energy intensiveness of
manufacturing industries, High scenario.
Useful Energy
Percent Reduction Percen t ofIntensiveness
(kWh/$VA) In 2030 Which Due to
Relative Structural
Region 7975 2030 to 7975 Changea
(NA) 8.66 6.06 30 8
II (SU/EE) 10.86 6.12 44 1
III (WE/JANZ) 4.20 3.21 24 4
IV (LA) 5.81 4.51 22 4
V (At/SEA) 11.06 9.29 16 -3
VI (ME/NAt) 7.68 4.96 35 -8
aStructural changes are the result of assumed changes in manufacturing activities.
Notes: Useful energy is expressed as equivalent electricity requirement. Data are for manufactur-
ing industries, excluding coke and petrochemical feedstock use.
balancing effect on the overall energy intensiveness of manufacturing.
For the projections of the penetration of various more efficient energy
forms, as well as cogeneration and heat pumps in the industrial heat market
(see Table 16-17), regional differences in settlement patterns, past practices,
current technological trends, geographical conditions, and so forth have been
kept in mind. In spite of these technological changes, more than 80 percent
of the industrial process heat requirements in all regions except region II
(SU/EE) would still have to be met by fossil fuels in 2030 in the High
scenario. Improvements of the order of 20 percent in the average efficiency
of fossil fuel use are assumed to be possible over the next fifty years.
Table 16-17. Assumed penetration of electricity, district heat, cogeneration,
heat pump, and soft solar in their potential industrial heat markets in 2030,
High scenario (percent of potential industrial heat markets).a
Soft Solar
Elec- District Cogen- Heat Low High
Region tricity Heat eration Pump temperature temperature
(NA) 0.10 0 0.50 0.50 0.15 0.05
II (SU/EE) 0.10 0.85 b 0 0 0.10 0.03
III (WEIJANZ) 0.05 0.15 0.60b 0.50 0.15 0.05
IV (LA) 0.10 0.12 0.20 0.20 0.30 0.10
V (Af/SEA) 0.04 0.05 0.15 0.10 0.30 0.10
VI (ME/NAf) 0.10 0.12 0.25 0.20 0.30 0.10
apotential industrial heat markets: electricity-all process heat; district heat-steam and hot water;
cogeneration-low temperature steam and hot water; heat pump-steam and hot water demand met by
electricity; and soft solar-steam and hot water.
bin region II district heat and in region Ilion site cogeneration were already supplying 69 and
30 percent of their respective potential markets in 1975.
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The overall effect of these technological developments, better practices,
and structural changes would be to reduce the average final energy intensive-
ness of manufacturing activities (excluding use of coke in steel industry and
feedstocks) by about 35 to 55 percent in different world regions, as shown
in Table 16-18 for the High scenario. The effects of structural changes are
somewhat smaller on final energy than on useful energy as the overall con-
version efficiencies from final to useful energy are assumed to improve by
20 to 30 percent because of technological changes.
At present, the use of coke in the steel industry amounts to 2 to 11 per-
cent of final energy requirements of manufacturing activities in various
world regions. The consumption of coke per ton of pig iron produced varies
considerably from country to country. Estimated regional averages for 1975
are between 500 kg in region III (WE/JANZ) and 1000 kg in region VI (ME/
NAf). The lowest consumption has been achieved by the Japanese steel
industry, where the consumption decreased to about 390 kg per ton of pig
iron in 1972. However, following the oil crisis, the consumption of coke in
Japan increased again as fuel oil use decreased; the consumption in 1975
was 441 kg per ton of pig iron. Despite this short-term reversal in the trend
of the Japanese steel industry, it is assumed here that reductions down to
about 400 kg per ton of pig iron would become feasible in various world
regions because of future technological improvements.
Table 16-19 summarizes the present and projected levels of final energy
consumption in manufacturing and also shows the growth of electricity in
manufacturing energy use in various world regions in the two scenarios. A
large share of total final energy would to to manufacturing for all world
regions in the scenarios. The trends generally show stable or declining
shares (except for regions I-NA and VI-ME/NAf).
Agriculture. Agriculture in the developing regions, based largely on tradi-
tional farming practices, is currently far less energy intensive than that in the
developed regions. According to the economic projections of the scenarios
here (see Table 16-6), the agricultural GDP in regions IV, V, and VI is ex-
Table 16-18. Average final energy intensiveness of manufacturing activities
(excluding feedstocks and coke).
Energy Intensiveness
ReductionHigh Scenario
(kWh/$VA) Due to
Relative Structural
Region 7975 2030 Decrease (% ) Change (%)
I (NA) 12.3 7.0 43 6
II (SU/EE) 13.9 6.4 54 1
III (WE/JANZ) 5.7 3.6 37 4
IV (LA) 8.6 5.5 36 3
V (At/SEA) 19.6 12.6 36 -2
VI (ME/NAt) 12.2 6.1 50 -7
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Table 16-19. Energy consumption in manufacturing.
Base High Scenario Low Scenario
Year
Region 7975 2000 2030 2000 2030
(NA)
Manufacturing energy usea (GWyr/yr) 700 1189 1701 984 1186
Percent of final energyb (37) (45) (46) (44) (45)
Electricit/ (G Wyr/yr) 91 214 362 172 233
II (SU/EE)
Manufacturing energy use (GWyr/yr) 699 1350 2369 1216 1623
Percent of final energy (55) (57) (58) (56) (55)
Electricity (GWyr/yr) 83 237 564 196 336
III (WE/jANZ)
Manufacturing energy use (GWyr/yr) 731 1385 2011 1052 1298
Percent of final energy (46) (46) (46) (44) (43)
Electricity (GWyr/yr) 113 267 477 197 277
IV (LA)
Manufacturing energy use (GWyr/yr) 106 438 11 02 293 628
Percent of final energy (42) (44) (42) (40) (38)
Electricity (GWyr/yr) 15 72 235 49 133
V (Af/SEA)
Manufacturing energy use (GWyr/yr) 144 585 1615 395 774
Percent of final energy (57) (55) (51) (49) (41)
Electricity (GWyr/yr) 16 88 336 59 156
VI (ME/NAf)
Manufacturing energy use (GWyr/yr) 31 262 733 203 346
Percent of final energy (29) (45) (45) (47) (40)
Electricity (G Wy r/yr) 4 53 180 41 85
aManufacturing energy use is final energy of all types (including coke and feedstocks) used in the
manufacturing sector.
bpercent of final energy is manufacturing energy as a percent of commercial final energy.
cElectricity is electricity used in the manufacturing sector.
pected to increase by a factor of 3.7 to 4.5 over the next fifty years; the
expected increase would be 2.2 to 2.5 times in regions I, II, and III. The
implications of these projections in energy terms can be seen in the param-
eters of Table 16-20.
Consider arable land in the developing regions. There is not much poten-
tial for expanding arable land area in regions IV, V, and VI, where the
present per capita availability of arable land is about 0.34 ha compared to
0.62 ha in developed regions I, II, and III. If no significant new area is
brought under cultivation, the per capita arable land availability would
decrease over the next fifty years to 0.14 ha in the developing regions and
to 0.46 ha in the developed regions.
These limits on arable land expansion imply that essential agricultural
productivity improvements must come from increases in the use of
fertilizers, irrigation, and farm mechanization. But surface water is in short
supply, and precipitation is not adequate in most areas. Increasing use would
therefore have to be made of underground water.
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Table 16-20. Agricultural patterns in different world regions in 1975.
Arable Land Irrigation Mechanical Fertilizer
per Capita (% of Appliances Use
Region (ha/cap) arable land) (per 7000 ha) (kg/ha)
I (NA) 1.07 7 22 80
II (SU/EE) 0.77 7 15 96
III (WEfjANZ) 0.34 9 45 117
IV (LA) 0.45 9 7 32
V (Af/SEA) 0.32 14 1 14
VI (ME/NAf) 0.33 25 4 27
VII (C/CPA) 0.15 61 2 50
Note: All data refer to arable land including land under permanent crops. Mechanical appliances
included here are tractors and harvester-threshers. Fertilizer use refers to consumption in terms of
N"P,Os,and K,O.
Sources: FAO (1977b); United Nations (1977c).
Taking these factors into account, the energy intensiveness of agriculture
(including mechanization and irrigation, but not including energy used to
produce fertilizers) in regions IV, V, and VI is assumed to increase by a
factor of ten over the next fifty years. Thus, by 2030 the average energy
intensiveness in these regions would be about the same (2.8 kWh per dollar
value added) as the present average value for the developed regions. The final
energy used in agriculture would increase for the High and the Low scenarios
by about 45 and 37 times the 1975 level in the developing regions and by
just 2.4 and 2 times in the developed regions. The share of agricultural
activities in industrial energy consumption in 2030 is thus found to lie in the
range of 3 to 5 percent in all regions except region V (AflSEA), where it
amounts to 10 percent for the High scenario and 15 percent for the Low
scenario. (The shares in all regions in 1975 were in the range of 1 to 4
percent.)
Energy needed for fertilizer production is counted in these analyses in
the basic materials manufacturing sector and in feedstocks production. For
regions IV and V, those sectors are projected to increase in output by 2030
to about ten to twenty times their 1975 levels. These increases should easily
encompass the energy demand for chemical fertilizer, which may increase by
a factor of five to ten in the same period.
FUELS DEMAND
Careful, intelligent, and selective use of fuels can be a highly effective means
of energy conservation. It is not, after all, energy per se that is in short
supply so much as it is particular types of energy, or fuels, that must be
wisely marshaled.
In 1975, 47 percent of the world's 8.2 TWyr/yr (commercial) primary
energy need was sb.ked by oil and another 18 percent by natural gas. These
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fuels have in recent decades increasingly dominated energy markets. Oil
movements are of staggering proportions: oil moved around in ships that
carry as much as 400,000 tons of oil-ships whose size rivals the world's
largest skyscrapers. Oil is big business. And the picture is not likely to change
dramatically in the foreseeable future.
Uses of Liquid Fuels
Liquid fuel is premium fuel. It is essential as a motor fuel and as a raw
material for certain industrial processes. Its convenience of transport and,
until quite recently, easy availability have expanded its common uses to
include heat raising and electricity generation.
But crude oil resources are not infinite; oil prices are rising in response
to the perceived limitations on expansion of oil production. The supply
analyses of Chapter 17 support this nearly consensus view. The data of Table
16-21 are the result of several iterations of liquid fuel demands and supplies.
Table 16-2l. Final energy demands for liquid fuels, 1975-2030.
Base High Scenario Low Scenario
Year
Region 7975 2000 2030 2000 2030
(NA)
Liquidsa (TWyr/yr) 0.951 1.14 1.67 0.99 1.13
Percent motor fuel + feedstock b (74) (86) (94) (84) (91)
II (SU/EE)
Liquids (TWyr/yr) 0.438 0.70 1.31 0.64 0.89
Percent motor fuel + feedstock (65) (90) (100) (88) (100)
III (WE!JANZ)
Liquids (TWyr/yr) 0.979 1.65 2.06 1.32 1.44
Percent motor fuel + feedstock (52) (69) (86) (64) (76)
IV (LA)
Liquids (TWyr/yr) 0.190 0.68 1.68 0.49 1.05
Percent motor fuel + feedstock (69) (79) (90) (79) (89)
V (Af/SEA)
Liquids (TWyr/yr) 0.138 0.53 1.57 0.42 1.02
Percent motor fuel + feedstock (58) (74) (91 ) (74) (88)
VI (ME/NAf)
Liquids (TWyr/yr) 0.070 0.31 0.88 0.23 0.47
Percent motor fuel + feedstock (74) (85) (94) (85) (91 )
World c
Liquids (TWyr/yr) 2.85 5.46 10.36 4.37 6.69
Percent motor fuel + feedstock (64) (79) (92) (77) (88)
aLiquids means total final energy demand for liquid fuels.
bpercent motor fuel and feedstock means "nonsubstitutable" liquids demand for motor fuel (in
transportation, agriculture, mining, and manufacturing) as well as petrochemical feedstock uses
req uiring Iiq uids.
cWorld includes region VII (C/CPA), assumed here simply to be the average of other developing
regions.
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In the High and Low scenarios, liquid fuels more and more come to be
used primarily-almost exclusively in some regions-for premium uses-as
motor fuel and as feedstocks for petrochemical products. Oil for other pur-
poses, described region by region in the following sections, is increasingly
replaced by other fuels under the conditions of the scenarios. In rough global
average terms (making some gross assumptions for region VII), about 64 per-
cent of liquids and fuels went to premium uses in 1975, increasing to some
88 to 92 percent by 2030 in the scenarios.
The shifts of liquid fuels away from nonessential uses is accomplished
judgmentally in these studies, in response to the relative price rises of liquid
fuels. After each round of the iterative procedure, fuels and electricity prices
are compared, and a redistribution (within limits) of secondary energy de-
mands among fuel types is made. The liquid fuels prices that induce the
shifts are reported in the next chapter: as a benchmark, international oil
prices would be about $21 per barrel (1975 dollars) by 1990 in the High
scenario and about $19 per barrel by 1990 in the Low scenario.
In spite of this shift away from nonessential uses of oil, demands for
liquid fuels continue to grow under the assumptions of the scenarios-from
1.6 to 2.4 percent per year worldwide, 1975 to 2030. And it is the prospect
of continued growth in demand for liquid fuels, coupled with the realiza-
tion of its finite supply, that raises the specter of a future energy famine. It
might be true: Chapter 17 looks squarely at global supply-demand balances
of fuels. Here, we seek only an understanding of the opportunities and con-
straints for altering the mix of fuels demanded in final energy-an under-
standing that can help in managing an uncertain energy future.
Interchangeable Fossil Fuels: Charcoal and Biogas
Some fuels for some purposes are essentially noninterchangeable-electricity
for lighting, liquid hydrocarbons for automobiles, coking coal (to a certain
extent) for steel making. With the detailed "bottom up" demand calculation
procedures followed here, these and other fairly certain (even over fifty
years) uses of specific fuels can be accounted for.
And one can go one step further. One can evaluate the possible growth of
electricity into places (such as home heating) where other fuels could sub-
stitute, and one can evaluate the potential growth of new sources such as
solar energy for heat and hot water. This has been done with an eye to rela-
tive prices, fuel availabilities, and other scenario assumptions that affect
fuel supplies. The growth of electricity and district heat or combined heat
and power generation derived in this way have already been described. The
solar growth description follows in the next section.
What is left (mostly) is interchangeable fossil fuels-or "substitutable"
fossil fuels, as they are frequently called here. These are fuels allocated to
heat (industrial, and household and service sector) requirements that are not
supplied by electricity, district heat, combined cycle, or solar systems. In
addition to coal, oil, and gas, they are assumed to include the commercial
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supply of charcoal and wood from forests and plantations and biogas from
anaerobic fermentation of agricultural and animal wastes. The latter, in the
case of some developing regions, may be able to meet a significant fraction
of the heat demand of industries and the household/service sector if an
aggressive policy is pursued for their exploitation.
Substitutable fossil fuels defined in this way were meeting essentially 82
percent of heat demands in 1975-being 48 percent of total final energy in
regions I (NA), II (SU/EE), and III (WE/JANZ) together and 45 percent of
final commercial energy in developing regions IV (LA), V (Af/SEA), and VI
(ME/NAf). (The remaining 18 percent of 1975 heat demand was met by
electricity and district heat-region II only-and noncommercial fuels-devel-
oping regions primarily.) By 2030, substitutable fuels would be as low as 27
to 29 percent under the conditions of the scenarios. This is largely because
of electricity, solar, district heat, and cogeneration penetrations into the heat
market and because of improvements in insulation levels that further reduce
space heating needs.
The allocation of substitutable fuels among the competing sources-oil, gas,
coal, and renewable energy sources-is an issue worthy of considerably more
attention and rigorous treatment than this study has been able to provide.
But some simplifying assumptions can be made and were made broadly con-
sistent within the scenarios with relative prices of these competing fuels.
The start is with the figures calculated in MEDEE-2 for substitutable fossil
fuels in two sectors-industry and household/service-from 1975 to 2030,
for each of the scenarios and for each of the regions. Then, after observing
the dynamics of relative prices from the supply-demand balance calculations
(Chapter 17), the fuel mix of substitutable fossil fuels over time are adjusted
in these sectors to be consistent with the relative prices. In the developing
regions, the potentials for maximum penetration of local renewable sources
is also considered. Table 16-22 records a selection of these fuel-shifting
assumptions for four regions of the world for the High scenario.
Developed Regions. In region I (NA), coal is sufficiently in abundance so
that its use in industry directly can and should increase. Its abundance is
reflected in its low relative price. Therefore, it is assumed here that the share
of substitutable fossil uses in industry increases from 12 percent in 1975 to
about 25 to 30 percent by 2030. (These assumptions, based on MEDEE-2
outputs, are used to create inputs in appropriate form for the energy supply
system MESSAGE model of Chapter 17.) Oil is assumed to be used less and
less for heat purposes in both the industrial and household/service sectors.
That is liquid fuels, by assumption, are held for essential motor fuel and feed-
stock purposes. (As a result, liquid fuels used as part of substitutable fossil
fuels in household/service and industry would drop from 251 GWyr/yr in
1975 to 99 to 105 GWyr/yr in 2030.) Gas use rises as a replacement forliquid
fuels: its price, reflecting its relative (compared to oil) abundance, grows less
slowly than the oil price.
In region II (SU/EE), a dramatic shift is seen away from reliance on oil
for heat to extensive use of gas (and, to a lesser extent, of coal) and com-
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bined cycle and district heat systems. Oil would simply not be used for
heating in the Soviet Union in the long term and probably very little or not
at all in Eastern Europe as well. As a result, gas is assumed to take the major
share of substitutable fossil uses in both industry and household/service
sectors (about 75 percent by 2030 in the High scenario, from 25 percent in
1975). Coal used for such purposes may actually decline (from current rela-
tively high levels) in the face of this increased gas use and the desire to use
coal for central station electric and combined heat and power plants.
Region III (WE/JANZ) has not been blessed with a bounty of fuel re-
sources. As a result, there are fewer clear signals to use in allocating substi-
tutable fossil demands among fuels. Here, a modest growth in direct coal use
in industry is assumed-to 20 percent of industrial substitutable fossil de-
mands in 2030 in the High scenario, from 12 percent in 1975. Coal is rela-
tively plentiful in this region (at least compared to other fuels) and could
be exploited. The gas share is projected to grow markedly in response to
supply availabilities and the hope of offshore finds and imports from region
II, both at nonexcessive prices. Gas would then contribute 502 to 791
GWyr/yr to final energy demand in 2030, compared to 234 GWyr/yr in 1975.
As in most other regions, liquid fuels in region III are shifted out of sub-
stitutable uses and saved for motor fuel and feedstocks. Thus, oil's share
of total substitutable fossil fuel would drop from 59 percent in 1975 to 23
to 36 percent in 2030.
Deve/oping Regions. It is assumed that, in view of the scarcity of fossil
fuels and their rising production costs and import prices, the developing
regions IV (LA) and V (AfiSEA) would pursue an aggressive policy to save
on fossil fuels by making extensive use of renewable resources. A part of
substitutable fossil demand in each region may be replaced by the organized
commercial supply of charcoal and wood, agricultural wastes, and biogas,
without disrupting the normal evolution of various activities in the industrial
and household/service sectors. The analysis of the maximum renewable
contribution (Table 16-23) takes into account the evolution of settlement
patterns (urbanization, distribution of city sizes) and the likely distribution
of various energy-consuming activities among rural areas (villages), towns
(urban agglomerations with less than 100,000 inhabitants), and large cities
in each region.
Keeping in view the differences of traditional practices and social habits
of people in regions IV and V and also taking into account the potential of
biomass resources in the two regions (see Chapter 17), the extensive use of
biogas plants has been considered as a viable option only for rural areas in
region V, but not for those in region IV. On the basis of the assumptions in
Table 16-23 and the level of use of noncommercial fuels assumed, it is ex-
pected that biogas generation in region V may substitute for as much as 15
GWyr/yr of fossil fuel by 2000 and 35 to 40 GWyr/yr by 2030. The substi-
tutable fossil fuel demand to be met by commercial supplies of charcoal and
wood and biogas would be 100 to 121 GWyr/yr by 2000 and 273 to 424
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Table 16-23. Assumed penetrations of renewable sources of energy, regions
IV (LA) and V (At/SEA).
Projected Penetration of Renewablesa
(fraction of useful heat demands)
Demand
Sector
Households
Cities
Towns b
VillagesC
Service sector
Cities
Towns
Manufacturing
Nature of Demand
Cooking, space and water heating
Cooking, space and water heating
Cooking, space and water heating
Space and water heating
Space and water heating
Low temperature steam/hot water
High temperature steam
Furnace heat
2000 2030
Region I V Region V Regions I V
and V
0.40 0045 0.60
0.60 0.70 0.80
0.75 0.85 0.90
0.20 DAD
0.30 0.60
0.40 0.80
0.30 0.60
0.06 0.12
aprojected penetrations assume aggressive policies and include the use of noncommercial fuels
in households.
bTowns are urban agglomerations with less than 100,000 inhabitants.
CVillages include all rural households.
Source: Khan (1980).
GWyr/yr by 2030 in region V; in region IV it would be 55 to 69 GWyr/yr
by 2000 and 166 to 247 GWyr/yr by 2030.
After allowing for the estimated shares of charcoal/wood and biogas, as
discussed above, the remaining substitutable fossil fuel demands in each of
the developing regions are distributed over time between coal, oil, and gas in
the light of the relative price dynamics of these fuels resulting from the
supply-demand balance calculations of Chapter 17. This is done in various
regions in the following way.
Region IV (LA) does not have abundant coal resources but could be self-
sufficient in oil and gas. Coal supplied a mere 7 percent of substitutable fossil
fuels in 1975 and is projected to drop to 1 to 2 percent (all in industry) by
2030. Oil made up the largest fraction (at 62 percent) in 1975. Its share may
drop, although high total demands would keep oil a major supplier of heat.
Commercial sources of wood (charcoal) may well be able to meet substantial
portions of substitutable fossil needs. It is projected that by 2030 charcoal
may offer as much as 247 GWyr/yr to a total substitutable fossil demand of
up to 578 GWyr/yr (see Chapter 17).
Region V (AfiSEA) resembles region III in that domestic oil is scarce and
expensive, yet region V does have major resources of coal (compared to its
demand level) and, to a lesser extent, gas. With supply pressure on liquid
fuels, the liquids share of total (secondary) substitutable fossil fuels has been
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assumed to drop from some 43 percent in 1975 to just 13 to 19 percent in
2030-although this represents a growth of from 58 to as much as 141
GWyr/yr by 2030. Coal and, more importantly, charcoal expand to cover
nearly 50 percent of substitutable fossil fuel needs by 2030. Gas is suffi-
ciently available to contribute further to industrial heat needs, whereas
biogas may play an important role in meeting the bulk of commercial energy
requirements of rural households.
Table 16-22 records some of these observations for the High scenario. Dif-
ferences for the Low scenario mostly reflect the not so great supply pressure
on liquid fuels in this instance and hence the relatively less pronounced
assumed shifts away from liquid fuels. Still, the similarities in assumptions
for the two scenarios are greater than the differences.
"Soft" Solar
Fifty-year energy projections need to recognize the potentials of new tech-
nologies. Solar technologies have a role to play in the long term-ultimately
perhaps the lead role. Here, attention is given to the possible penetration,
buildup, and use of single-building rooftop solar collectors for producing heat
for rooms and water. (This is so-called "soft" solar, discussed briefly in
Chapter 6.) Other solar technologies for large-scale production of electricity
and fuels, untested and uncertain new technologies, and indirect uses of the
sun are treated in Chapter 5. Their possible role in the primary energy supply
mix of the future will be discussed in Chapter 17.
In regions I and III it is assumed (quite optimistically, it seems fair to say)
that 50 percent of all new (post-1975) single family centrally heated homes
and low rise service sector buildings would install solar heating systems. (The
assumption is 30 percent for region II.) These would be systems that are 50
to 70 percent solar-that is, requiring backup (oil, electric, gas) for 30 to
50 percent of the time. Further, it is assumed that by 2030 nearly 40 per-
cent of all households would be using solar water-heating systems. The result
of these assumptions in region I is that by 2030 some 14 percent of residen-
tial space heating and 28 percent of water heating would be provided by
solar systems; service sector space and water heating would be 6 to 7 per-
cent solar. The same numbers in region III are 7, 28, and 6 percent, respec-
tively. In both regions, solar systems provide 3 percent of total industrial
process heat (5 percent of steam generation) and 10 percent of industrial
space heat by 2030. All of these numbers are, in aggregate, virtually zero
today.
The aggressive buildup rate assumptions for soft solar in the developed
regions are meant to explore a reasonable upper bound for their contribution
to the energy mix. With the additional, hard to measure expected contribu-
tions of passive solar building design, local solar contributions would indeed
be significant fifty years from now. But their ultimate contribution seems
to be constrained by the market size-the demands for space and water
heat in detached or low rise buildings are not excessive. Further, large-
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scale applications of solar technologies for cooling, for industrial process
heat, and for electricity generation are discussed in Chapter 5 and 6, but are
integrated into these scenarios in only a very aggregate way. Chapter 17 sum-
marizes the results.
It is instructive to look at the plausible role that the soft solar space- and
water-heating technologies can play in the developing world, where sunshine
is relatively more abundant. About 82 percent of the useful heat demand in
the household/service sector in regions IV, V, and VI in 1975 is estimated to
be due to cooking needs. The share of space and water heating in the heat
demand of the household/service sector in the three regions increases from
about 18 percent in 1975 to 36 to 41 percent by 2030. As the space- and
water-heating demands per dwelling are much lower in regions IV, V, and VI
than in regions I and III, the soft solar space- and water-heating systems are
expected to penetrate later and relatively more slowly in the developing
countries. Still, in regions IV and V, gradually by 2030 up to 50 percent of
the new construction of single family, centrally heated dwellings and of low
rise service sector buildings needing space heating are assumed to turn to
solar systems, which would require backup by fossil fuel for about 20 per-
cent of the time. Further, it is projected that by 2030 as much as 30 percent
of the total hot water demand in regions IV and V would be met by solar
devices. The penetrations of soft solar in the household/service sector of
region VI are assumed to be only about half of these numbers.
With these assumptions one finds that solar heating would support 14 per-
cent of the household/service sector's space- and water-heating demand in
regions IV, V, and VI by 2030 in the scenarios. The penetration of soft
solar in the industrial demand for process heat in these regions is projected
to increase by 2030 to 30 percent of low temperature steam and hot water
demand and 10 percent of high temperature steam demand-assuming a
20 percent fossil fuel backup of the installed systems. The share of soft
solar in the industrial heat demand of these three regions is thus estimated
to be about 4 percent by 2030. The total contribution of soft solar in the
final energy demand of regions IV, V, and VI comes out to be 78 and 46
GWyr/yr in 2030 for the High and Low scenarios, respectively, which
amounts to just 1 percent of the corresponding final energy.
The Exploitation of Conservation in the
Two Scenarios
The extent of energy efficiency improvement embodied in the two scenarios
can be seen in Figures 16-5 and 16-6, where final energy per unit of GDP is
plotted against GDP per capita for regions I through VI. It is seen that the
ratio of final energy demand to GDP continues to decrease for the developed
regions (I, II, and III) in line with the historical trends. On the other hand,
the ratio continues to increase, at least initially, for all the developing
regions, again in line with the historical trends, but later on it flattens off
and even starts decreasing for regions IV and VI. These different trends in
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Figure 16-5. Energy intensiveness in different world regions, High scenario.
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Figure 16-6. Energy intensiveness in different world regions, Low scenario.
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the developed and the developing regions are characteristic of economies
that have already reached a high level of industrialization but are still in the
process of building up their industrial infrastructure.
Globally speaking, the curves of Figures 16-5 and 16-6 imply a reduction
of final energy per dollar GDP from 0.91 in 1975 to values of 0.53 and
0.62 in 2030 for the High and the Low scenarios, respectively. If only the
developed regions I, II, and III are considered, the improvement is even more
impressive: final energy per dollar GDP decreases from 0.95 in 1975 to 0.45
and 0.55 over a period of fifty-five years. By far the largest improvement is
seen in region II (SU/EE), where the overall conservation resulting from
various scenario assumptions amounts to 61 and 54 percent. The correspond-
ing figures for region I are 59 and 44 percent and for region III, 45 and 33
percent. These improvements, seen in the light of real price increases of 3
and 2.4 times the prices in the recent past (see Chapter 15), appear quite
pronounced-but not unrealistic. Some measures of this trend, in detail, have
been reported in this chapter. Indicators such as automobile efficiency,
average transport load factors, home insulation, structural changes in indus-
try, and others have been cited to illustrate the extent of the energy-using
improvements assumed.
Another measure of the efficiency improvements assumed for the sce-
narios can come from calculating the final energy that would result by 2030
if the historical 1950-1975 final energy-to-GDP elasticity were to be applied
for 1975 to 2030. Table 16-24 shows the differences between final energy
calculated in this way and the final energy projections of the High and Low
scenarios. Savings of roughly 20 to 50 percent occur in each region. The
demand reduction steps behind these figures represent an important "sup-
ply" source of 7.3 to 18.3 TWyr/yr globally by 2030.
These amounts are certainly substantial. They underscore the aggressive
Table 16-24. Final energy in the two scenarios compared to final energy
calculated with historical elasticities (2030).
With With
High Historical Differ- Low Historical
Scenario
€l enceb Scenario €l Differenceb
Region (GWyr/yr) (GWyr/yr) (Percent) (GWyr/yr) (G Wyr/yr) (Percent)
I (NA) 3665 6921 47 2636 4036 35
II (SU/EE) 4114 5355 23 2952 3850 23
III (WE/JANZ) 4375 6037 28 2987 3761 21
IV (LA) 2640 4385 40 1656 2481 33
V (Af/SEA) 3173 6900 54 1876 3121 40
VI (ME/NAt) 1638 2590 37 868 1015 16
VII (C/CPA) 3196 8849 64 1589 3536 55
World 22,801 41,037 44 14,564 21,800 33
aCalculated using historical (1950-1975) final energy-to-GDP elasticity (€f) for each region.
bCalculated as final energy using historical €f minus IIASA scenario projection divided by final
energy using historical cf.
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conservation measures assumed in the scenarios. They reflect the belief that
vigorous actions to increase energy efficiency and to improve energy produc-
tivity are necessities in any energy strategy-short, medium, or long term.
Without such improvements, the supply scenarios in the next chapter would
surely prove to be infeasible.
Energy savings certainly will attractively and economically compete with
many alternative energy supply additions; the detailed assumptions on effi-
ciencies and "lifestyles" here were intended broadly to reflect this. At the
same time, changes in energy use sectors can come along slowly-it takes on
the order of a decade to retool a major industry and on the order of a cen-
tury to replace a nation's housing stock. These several considerations lead,
in these studies, to the estimates as reported in this chapter.
Still, one wonders if an additional potential exists-a potential for cutting
back growth in energy demand to the point that supply difficulties (such as
those revealed in the next chapter) are almost totally mitigated. A number of
voices claim that such potential exists and is realizable. The studies at IIASA
have not been designed to assess the validity of such assertions. But the
approach followed at IIASA can possibly illuminate the implications of
major demand reductions.
Recognizing such possibilities, a very low energy scenario is assessed using
this same MEDEE-2 tool. This scenario is meant to explore the implications
of actions designed to achieve zero, or even negative, overall energy growth
in developed regions. In Chapter 18, the analysis of this very low energy
scenario is described. First, however, the energy supply possibilities for the
High and Low scenarios of this chapter are presented in the next chapter.
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17 ENERGY SUPPLY ANDCONVERSION
How can sufficient energy be supplied over the next five decades to meet
the continuing needs of growing economies? While the answer is by no
means obvious, the issue is sufficiently important to be worthy of careful
analysis. As demonstrated in Chapters 15 and 16, requirements for energy
are high and will become higher, forcing prices to rise. Energy supply and
conversion systems to meet the needs must offer some measure of conve-
nience and acceptably low cost, and they must not jeopardize environmental
security. The aim of this chapter is to explore a feasible range of such sys-
tems in some detail.
Because energy supply and conversion systems are complex and interre-
gionally interdependent, mechanistic approaches to their study do not suf-
fice. The description in Chapter 13 of the quantitative, analytical approach
used here illustrates the iterative, interactive character of the tools and
methods that produced the results summarized in these pages. Interactions
among energy needs, preferences, relative prices, resource availabilities,
production constraints, and costs are treated so that, after some examina-
tion and reexamination, a reasonably consistent energy supply and conver-
sion system should result. The goal is synthesis-the integration of the many
components of demand and supply into a coherent energy system.
An important tool in this process is a dynamic linear programming model
of the energy supply and conversion system, a model called MESSAGE. The
detailed results of applying this model region by region-within assumed con-
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straints-appear throughout this chapter. (The model is described in Chapter
13.)
The system being modeled in these studies is a heterogeneous one in
which energy demand, supplies, and international flows are coordinated via
a complexity of market prices, government regulations and interventions,
and physical constraints. No international central planning bureau exists
(for better or for worse), and none is modeled.
In this context, it is important to remember that, while the computer
models in use provide the important benefits of speed of computation, in-
ternal consistency, and organization of assumptions, they do not drive the
fundamental logic of the analysis nor the interpretation of the results.
Human judgments and assumptions playa large role in these studies; mental
models are, in any case, prerequisites to computer models.
In this chapter, the two scenarios (High and Low) of Chapter 14 are
examined. These scenarios do not postulate the buildup and use of the
endowment-creating technologies as described in Part II of this book. That
is, the possible production of a synthetic liquid fuel, such as methanol,
through the use of heat from nuclear breeders or from centralized solar
collection systems is not considered here. The implementation of these
technologies (thought to be more expensive than the ones used here) seems
sufficiently uncertain and possibly delayed into the very long term so that
they are treated only in the next chapter.
Table 17-1 summarizes some of the central definitional characteristics of
the High and Low scenarios, as well as some summary results of the analysis.
The two scenarios have different economic growth assumptions and thereby
different energy demand requirements. They have different supply profiles
Table 17-1. Two global supply scenarios: definitions of main parameters.
Assuming, by 2030:
Population
factor increase
total (106 )
Gross World producta
factor increase
growth
average growth, (%jyr) 1975-2030
Final energy Demand b
factor increase
2030 annual rate (TWyrjyr)
Results in, by 2030
Primary energy
factor increase
2030 annual rate (TWyrjyr)
average per capita (kWyrjyr)
asee Table 14-4.
bSee Table 15-1.
High Scenario
2
7976
6.4
declining rate
3.4
4.0
22.8
4.3
35.65
4.5
Low Scenario
2
7976
3.6
2.4
2.5
14.6
2.7
22.39
2.8
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(resulting from MESSAGE runs) and thus different energy price assump-
tions. But they both (simplistically, perhaps) carry the same resource availa-
bilities, unit cost estimates, and maximum buildup rate assumptions. These
several assumptions have important bearing on the results summarized here
and are presented in more detail in the pages that follow.
This chapter begins by summarizing the main assumptions and results
of the energy supply system analyses. The next three sections contain what
can, for these supply analyses, be taken as assumptions. Then, the potentials
and limitations on future oil production are examined, because oil turns out
to be the most demanded primary resource, and its supply is constrained.
The next three sections lead to a summary of oil supply results, region by
region. The results for gas and coal supply and demand and for electricity
generation follow. Then, the potentials of local renewable sources in devel-
oping regions are sketched. Calculation of cumulative fossil fuel use leads to
questions of carbon dioxide concentrations and, ultimately, of resource
depletion.
GLOBAL PRIMARY ENERGYa
The bottom line of any traditional energy accounting is the total primary
energy use. Within that total, the various energy sources must be identified.
When these sources are set down beside the demand figures already described
(Chapter 16), the nature of the globe's conceivable energy futures becomes
clearer.
The figures presented here are results of the supply analyses detailed in
this chapter. They are summarized here for introductory purposes, before
a full description of the underlying assumptions is given.
Looking back over the previous twenty-five years with such an analysis
(Figure 17-1), it is easy to see the shift throughout the world to oil and gas
and the decreasing reliance on coal. (Chapter 8, on market penetration,
offers further illumination on the historical trends.)
The High and the Low scenario projections for the next fifty years are
recorded in Figure 17-2, leading to a few observations:
• The oil and gas era is not over. While the share of total primary energy
demand met by both of these fuels would decline, they would still pro-
vide large amounts of energy-two and a half times their 1975 levels in
the High scenario by 2030. (A large fraction of this oil is unconven-
tional, as shall be reported later.)
• Nuclear energy would fill a rapidly expanding wedge. This source of
electricity would meet effectively all new off-peak load electricity de-
mand in the developed regions, in the scenarios.
• Coal production, after growing slowly to the end of this century, must
aThe wealth of data being what it is for analyses of this kind, we present here the important high-
lights of the supply scenario results. All global results presented here are the aggregate of the seven
world regions.
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Figure 17-1. Global primary energy supply for the period 1950-1975 (excluding non-
commercial sources).
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Table 17-2. Two su pply scenarios, global primary energy by source, 1975-
2030 (TWyr(yr).
Base High Scenario Low Scenario
Year
Primary Sourcea 1975 2000 2030 2000 2030
Oil 3.83 5.89 6.83 4.75 5.02
Gas 1.51 3.11 5.97 2.53 3.47
Coal 2.26 4.94 11.98 3.92 6.45
Light water reactor 0.12 1.70 3.21 1.27 1.89
Fast breeder reactor 0 0.04 4.88 0.02 3.28
Hyd roe lectri city 0.50 0.83 1.46 0.83 1.46
Solarb 0 0.10 0.49 0.09 0.30
Otherc 0 0.22 0.81 0.17 0.52
Totald 8.21 16.84 35.65 13.59 22.39
aprimary fuels production or primary fuels as inputs to conversion or refining processes-for
example, coal used to make synthetic liquid fuel is counted in coal figures. (For definition of energy
types, see Figure 1-1.)
b1ncludes mostly "soft" solar-individual rooftop collectors-also small amounts of centralized
solar electricity.
C"Other" includes biogas, geothermal, commercial wood use.
dColumns may not sum to totals because of rounding.
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Figure 17-2. Global primary energy: two supply scenarios, 1975-2030.
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expand rapidly thereafter; this is the result of the demand for synthetic
fuels.
• Solar and other renewable energy sources contribute a noticeable, but
hardly dominating, share to primary energy by the year 2030. (The bases
for their contributions are reported in Chapter 16 and also briefly in a
later section of this chapter.)
In Table 17-2, the primary energy totals are given by source for the High
and Low scenarios for 2000 and 2030. In Table 17-3, the same totals are
given by region. These results are aggregate world totals. They mask impor-
tant regional details and major changes in the forms and uses of energy that
are considered in these analyses. They also mask the role of new technolo-
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Table 17-3. Two supply scenarios, primary energy by region, 1975-2030
(TWyr/yr).
High Scenario Low Scenario
Region 7975 2000 2030 2000 2030
I (NA) 2.65 3.89 6.02 3.31 4.37
II (SU/EE) 1.84 3.69 7.33 3.31 5.00
III (WE/JANZ) 2.26 4.29 7.14 3.39 4.54
IV (LA) 0.34 1.34 3.68 0.97 2.31
V (Af/SEA) 0.33 1.43 4.65 1.07 2.66
VI (ME/NAf) 0.13 0.77 2.38 0.56 1.23
VII (C/CPA) 0.46 1.44 4.45 0.98 2.29
Total b 8.21 a 16.84 35.65 13.59 22.39
alncludes 0.21 TWyr/yr of bunkers--fuel used in international shipments of fuel.
bColumns may not sum to totals because of rounding.
gies and of constraints on the uses of energy resources. Yet they do reveal a
theme that will be repeatedly sounded throughout this chapter: in spite of
considerable shifting of liquid fuels away from nonessential uses and in-
creased efficiency of their use, oil supply will remain the crucial problem in
the coming decades. A very large unconventional crude oil industry and a
large coal synthetics business could well be in the offing.
SECONDARY ENERGY DEMANDS
The supply system analyses of this chapter indicate the consequences of
meeting the secondary energy demands of Chapter 16. These consequences-
relative price dynamics, constraints on fuels supplies, constraints on the
buildup of new facilities-induce judgmental feedback alterations of the orig-
inal demand estimates or of the fuel mix assumptions. The resulting new set
of energy demand estimates enters the supply analyses (as inputs or assump-
tions), and the iteration goes on until a reasonably consistent scenario is
obtained.
Secondary energy demands come from the final energy demand estimates
of Chapter 16 by adding average transmission and distribution losses (see
Figure 16-2). This calculation is done for each fuel and varies somewhat
from region to region. But approximate figures used for these losses, as a per-
cent of total secondary energy by each type, are oil 0 percent (all losses
counted in MESSAGE runs); gas 7 to 10 percent (local pipeline losses); coal
2.5 percent (mostly coal blown off trains); electricity 12 to 18 percent
(counted from power plant busbar to final consumer); soft solar 0 percent
(a convention adopted here).
Figure 17-3 contains seven plots showing secondary energy demands for
the High scenario region by region. The Low scenario is in many respects
quite similar, yet has somewhat higher oil fractions than in the High sce-
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Figure 17-3. Secondary energy demand, High scenario, 1975-2030.
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nario, since oil prices do rise more steeply in the High scenario than in the
Low scenario. The higher energy consumption levels of the High scenario
force oil supply to increasingly expensive sources. (The derivation of the oil
price dynamics appears later, in the section on interregional oil balancing.)
In these scenarios, liquid fuel consumption continues to be large, while
liquids demand, as a fraction of total secondary energy use, drops (from 60
percent in 1975 to 45 percent in 2030 in region III [WE/JANZ] in the High
scenario, for example). Liquid fuel is a premium one, highly preferred for
many uses and virtually irreplaceable for some. Nonetheless, the increasing
relative prices for liquids in these scenarios-stemming from the constraints
on resource and production-dampen the use of liquid fuels in many in-
stances where they are not essential. The potential for further reduction in
the consumption of liquid fuels rests largely on the possibility of substitute
fuels for use in transportation and in petrochemicals production.
526 ENERGY IN A FINITE WORLD
Figure 17-3 continued.
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The share of secondary energy from gaseous fuels increases in some re-
gions in these scenarios; coal increases in all regions. The extent of this sub-
stitution is somewhat problematic; a host of local factors makes individual
regional situations importantly different. By 2010 or 2020, gas and coal
compete for the heating market with solar and, to a limited extent, electric-
ity at the same time that efficiency improvements are shrinking the size of
this market. This limits the potential gas share. This is indeed a significant
observation. In spite of vigorous efforts to substitute gas for oil and generally
to expand gas use wherever possible, gas demands increase only modestly
in these scenarios. Gas is market limited.
These secondary energy demands, then, are inputs to the supply analyses;
the supply and conversion system sees them as assumptions. They are the
results of the assumptions and calculations of Chapter 16.
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CONSTRAINTS ON SUPPLY: COST AND
BUILDUP RATE ASSUMPTIONS
A variety of energy supply and conversion technologies can compete to meet
demands. Here, it is assumed that technologies compete primarily on a cost
basis, with the cheapest technology available being used first. But there are
constraints on the rates at which new resources can be exploited or new
facilities built and on the total amount of any single activity (such as coal
mining) that a society will tolerate. And deliberate planning to maintain
flexibility-for example, to provide diversity of supply in order to cope
better with unexpected changes in energy supply systems-can affect deci-
sions that would otherwise be dominated by cost considerations alone. In a
sense, all of these constraints, taken together, are the singular characteristic
of the scenarios-the aspect of their analysis that sets them apart from con-
siderations elsewhere in this book.
Table 17-4 lists competing technologies for fuels and electricity supply
and assumptions used here for their capital and operating costs. These data,
while arrived at by averaging many sources, are still highly judgmental. And
while they will surely change over time, perhaps dramatically, just one cost
estimate for each technology is used here for the entire planning horizon.
Sensitivity analyses can test alternative cost estimates. Yet the possibility
that the cost figures used here might be greatly understated should not be
overlooked. It can be observed that the real costs of complex energy supply
systems today invariably exceed expectations, and this may not change in
the future. (The 1970 to 1977 costs of power plants in the United States,
for example, rose much faster than the domestic consumer price index.)
This possibility could well heighten interest in the potential economic attrac-
Table 17-4. Cost assumptions for major competing energy supply and
conversion technologies.
Capital
Cost
(l975$lkW)
Variable
Cost
(1975 $Ik Wyr)
Final Product
Cost
(7975$lkWyr)
Electricity Generation
Coal with scrubber 550 23 154
Conventional nuclear reactor (e.g., LWR) 700 50 136
Advanced reactor (e.g., FBR) 920 50 143
Coal, fluidized bed 480 36 152
Hydroelectric 620 8.5 85
Oil fired 350 19 256
Gas fired 325 16 216
Gas tu rbine 170 17 241
Solar central station 1900 28-60 297
Synthetic Fuels
Crude oil refinery 50 3.7 75
Coal gasification ("high Btu") 480 40 125
Coal liquefaction 480 40 125
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Table 17-4 continued.
District Heat Technologies
Electric- Capital Variable Final
Heat Cost Cost Product Cost
Type Ratio (7975$/kWSEa) (7975$/kWyrSEa) (7975$/kWy rSEa) LF'J
Combined Heat and Power (Region II [SU/EE] )
LWR 38/62 320 25 65 0.7
Coal 23/77 220 18 79 0.75
Liquids 23/77 180 15 137 0.75
Gas 23/77 180 15 74 0.75
Heat Production (Region II [SU/EE] )
LWR 0/1 160 13 35 0.7
Coal 0/1 90 9 52 0.85
Liquids 0/1 60 5 100 0.85
Gas 0/1 60 5 46 0.85
aSE "" secondary energy.
b LF "" load factor.
Notes: The figures for electricity generation and synthetic fuels are assumed to apply, mostly,
to both developed and developing regions; differences are noted in the text. The costs are assumed
to apply, as averages, over the fifty-year planning horizon.
Capital cost: Capital costs per kW of capacity. Assumed to represent average capital costs (paid
at once) for standard facilities of thirty-year lifetime; intended to include owner's costs (interest
during construction, land lease, etc.). Escalation is not included. Extraordinary other costs (litigation,
unspecified social costs) are not included.
Variable costs: Operating and maintenance plus fuel cycle costs (not including fuel costs) per
kWyr of product (electricity or synthetic fuel).
Final product cost: Static cost per kWyr of secondary energy (electricity or synthetic fuels)
including fuel costs. Fuel costs are taken to be the cheapest category of the corresponding fuel.
The cost figures in this column are not the dynamic figures in MESSAGE; here they serve only the
purpose of quick comparison. The data on plant life (thirty years; hydro fifty years) and on the load
factor (70 percent hydro and 57 percent solar) enter the calculations, as does the discount rate (6
percent). For a time interval of five years and a plant life of thirty years, the formula for the an-
nual ized capital cost is
cap •
{35 - 1
(I)
where {3 is the one-year discount factor (1/1.06 here) and cap is the total capital cost. In order to
get the levelized capital costs per kWyr of output, equation (1) must be divided by the load factor.
For example, a LF of 0.7 yields a levelizing factor of 0.101.
Hydroelectric: The high, but so far unexploited, potential of hydroelectric in regions IV and V
led to a specification of two capital cost categories for hydro in each of these regions; the second
category, including additional costs, reflects transmission from remote sites.
Solar central station: Including storage costs allowing an annual average load factor of 57 percent.
Variable costs include an estimate for long distance transmission costs and are lower in high insola-
tion developing regions.
Sources: The following sources (often contradictory and/or incomplete) were aggregated to
generate rough average (sometimes consensus) estimates: report of the Modeling Resources Group
of the Synthesis Panel of CONAES; inputs to PI LOT model (G. Dantzig, Stanford University, Cali-
fornia); Brookhaven National Laboratory, Upton, New York; American Gas Association, Arlington,
Virginia; Pacific Gas and Electric Co., San Francisco, California; Bechtel Corporation, San Francisco,
California.
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tiveness of energy efficiency improvements (or energy productivity in-
creases) as an alternative "supply" source. The cost estimates used here are,
for better or for worse, no more than a composite of the presently best
recognized estimates.
The technologies of Table 17-4 are not the only ones that would contrib-
ute to the future supply mix. For example, combined cycle facilities-such as
gas turbine combined cycle plants with on site, "low Btu" coal gasifiers~
might well contribute importantly. While these omissions may not be opti-
mal, the analysis is simplified by having few instead of many technologies;
the results would not change markedly with the introduction of further
technologies.
As pointed out in Chapter 8 on market penetration, there are limitations
on the maximum rate at which a new energy supply source or a new energy
technology can be brought on stream. This fact is reflected here by a con-
straint on annual buildup rates. This constraint is defined in relative terms,
so that an annual buildup rate in one five-year period cannot exceed that of
the previous period by more than a specified percent. In addition, one
parameter is provided that allows for an initial startup. Together these
buildup rates and startup parameters define asymptotically the exponential
growth, with higher growth rates at the beginning. Table 17-5 summarizes
these assumptions. As a general feature, these constraints are more stringent
in developing regions, reflecting typically lower productivity, lack of com-
plete supporting infrastructure, smaller markets, and (frequently) depen-
dence on imports of technology.
The constraints are not only those of technology. For example, in spite
of enormous coal resources, coal production in the United States may be
limited by environmental, social, and transportation considerations and by
lack of water. Developing countries and regions with large resources may
decide to impose production (or export) ceilings to stretch out the lifetime
of their wealth, allowing development to keep pace only with their need for
income. In other words, political and institutional issues may alter strategies
that seem "economically" compelling. Assumptions that reflect these con-
straints were incorporated in the analyses presented below.
ENERGY RESOURCES: INPUTS TO THE
SUPPLY ANALYSESb
It has been the hope of resource economists, energy planners, and/or model-
ers to generate reliable resources versus cost curves or tables. This, of course,
is the very spirit of the McKelvey classification (see Figure 1-8). Unfortu-
nately, the reality is far from the ideal situation.
Nonetheless, modelers must use such curves or tables of available re-
sources as a function of costs and/or prices. Thus, an endeavor has been
made to distribute the various fossil reserve and resource estimates-dis-
bThis section (not including the boxed material) is contributed by M. Grenon, leader of the Re-
sources Assessment Group at IlASA.
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Table 17-5. Startup and buildup constraint assumptions for new energy
technologies.
For Developed Regionsa
Conventional nuclear reactor (e.g., LWR)b
Fast breeder reactorb
Coal, fluidized bed
Coal Iiq uefaction
Coal gasification
For Developing Regionsd
Conventional nuclear reactor (e.g., LWR)b
Fast breeder reactor b
Coal, fluidized bed
Coal liquefaction
Coal gasification
Solar electric
Increment, as
Percent of
Previous Period's
Expansion
150
200
200
200
200
120
120
140
140
140
140
Startup
Capacity
(GW/yr)
2
2
2
6
6
0.4
0.4
0.4
2.0
2.0
0.5
Commercially
Available
After
today
1995c
1990
1990
1990
today
2000
1995
2000
1995
2005
aRegions I (NA), II (SU/EE), and III (WEIJANZ).
b For nuclear technologies, a total (LWR plus FBR) buildup constraint is also imposed; see text
for more details.
cThe year 2000 for region I; 1995 for regions II and III.
dRegions IV (LA), V (At/SEA), VI (ME/NAt) and VII (C/CPA).
Note: The numbers in Table 17-5 are transformed into constraints for the MESSAGE model
as follows: The asymptotic increment and startup parameters refer to /' and g, respectively, in
yt ,;; /,yt-1 + g (1 )
where / is the annual addition to the capacity of the respective technology in time period t (yO
being a boundary condition). Thus, the maximum capacity in the first period in which, say, FBRs
in developed regions are allowed is 5 [yrsl X 2[GW/yr] = 10 GW of installed capacity. This occurs
in the period labeled 2000-i.e., FBRs are "commercially available after" 1995 by the third column
in the table. The maximal increase in the period "2005", according to formula (1) is 30 GW/yr yield-
ing a maximum total of 40 GW/yr for that period. In addition to these buildup constraints, there is
a constraint on the buildup of total nuclear capacity. This constraint is based on the following as-
sumptions:
• An asymptotic value of 30 TW(e) of installed nuclear capacity (reached only well after the
year 2030) is shared among the regions according to their share of global population in 2030 .
• The values of the first three periods are estimated for each region on the basis of present knowl-
edge of plans, commitments, and so forth, making up the start of an S-shaped curve toward
the asymptotic value above.
cussed more fully in Chapter 2-among different cost categories. This has
been made with the single purpose of providing a working tool, and it can be
considered at best a zero order approximation. However, the approach is
tempting, and efforts to improve the first preliminary results are continuing.
In order to achieve this objective, broad use has been made, first, of the
important comments accompanying the studies by the World Energy Con-
ference (l978a, 1978b, 1978c), which provide basic data. Second, many dis-
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cussions were held with numerous experts, especially during the second
IIASA Conference on the Future Supply of Oil and Gas (Meyer 1977).
Finally, one is obliged, although reluctantly, to rely on "guesstimates."
The results are summarized in Tables 17-6 and 17-7. A further examina-
tion of energy resources is reported in the chapters of Part II of this book.
There, the intent was to stretch to the boundaries of the possible, to identify
and analyze the real potentials of various energy sources. Here, in the
scenario analysis, the aim is different. A balancing of various alternatives is
sought, within an array of real world constraints. These constraints, as will
be shown, are the real determinants of the scenario results.
Table 17-6. Summary of estimates of ultimately recoverable resources by
cost category.
Coalb Oil Natural Gas Uranium
Resourcea (TWyr) (TWyr) (TWyr) (TWyr)
Cost Categoryc 2 2 3 2 3 2
Region
I (NA) 174 232 23 26 125 34 40 29 35 27
II (SU/EE) 136 448 37 45 69 66 51 31 ne 75
III (WE/JANZ) 93 151 17 3 21 19 5 14 14 38
IV (LA) 10 11 19 81 110 17 12 14 1 64
V (Af/SEA) 55 52 25 5 33 16 10 14 6 95
VI (ME/NAf) <1 <1 132 27 ne 108 10 14 1 27
VIJ(C/CPA) 92 124 11 13 15 7 13 14 ne 36
World 560 1019 264 200 373 267 141 130 57 362
aFor oil, gas, and coal, see estimates given in the text (translated here into units of TWyr); for
uranium, see estimates given in Chapter 4.
b For coal, only a part of the ultimate resource (-15 percent) has been included because the figures
are already very large for the time horizon of 2030 and because of the many uncertainties about
very long-term coal resources and production technologies.
cCost categories represent estimates of costs either at or below the stated volume of recoverable
resources (in constant 1975$).
For oil and natural gas: Cat. 1: 12$/boe
Cat. 2: 12-20$/boe
Cat. 3: 20-25$/boe
For coal: Cat. 1: 25 $/tce
Cat. 2: 25-50$/tce
For uranium: Cat. 1: 80$/kgU
Cat. 2: 80-130$/kgU
A subcategory of oil, 1A, exists only for regions I (NA) and IV (LA) and includes oil available at
production costs of $12 to $16/boe. Also, a subcategory of gas, 0, exists only for region VI
(ME/NAf), with gas available at $2/boe.
ne-no estimate.
Note: For conversion to other units see Appendix B to Chapter 1.
Sources: Ashley, Rudman, and Whipple (1976); Eckstein (1978); Grenon (1977); Grossling
(1976); Institute of Geological Sciences (1978); Lambertini (1976); Meyer (1977); Oil and Gas Jour-
nal (1978); O'Shaughnessy (1976); Penner and Icerman (1975); Perrine (1978); Uhl (1977).
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Table 17-7. Summary of estimates of ultimately recoverable fossil resources
by cost category (physical units).
Coal Gil Natural Gas
Resourcea (10' tce) (lO'toe) (IO'm'/
Cost Categoryb 2 2 3 2 3
Region
I (NA) 188 250 16.2 18.3 88.2 28,900 34,000 24,650
II (SU/EE) 149 489 26.8 31.8 49.4 52,700 40,800 24,650
III (WE/JANZ) 100 163 12.0 2.1 14.8 16,150 4250 11,900
IV (LA) 11 12 13.4 57.1 77.6 14,450 10,200 11,900
V (Af/SEA) 59 56 17.6 3.5 23.3 13,600 8500 11,900
VI (ME/NAf) 0 1 93.1 19.0 d 91,800 8500 11,900
VII (C/CPA) 99 134 7.8 9.9 10.6 5950 10,200 11,900
World 606 1105 187.0 141.7 263.9 223,550 116,450 108,800
aSee Table 17-6.
bSee Table 17-6.
cSee Table 17-6.
d See Table 17-6.
Note: The natural gas resources of region II (SU/EE) are worthy of special note here. Estimates
for the Soviet Union alone (M. Styrikovich, personal communication, 1979) put natural gas resources
of categories 1, 2, and 3 at 90,000 X 10' m'; 43,000 X 10' m' ; and 17,000 X 10' m' , respectively.
Such resources would allow a greater use of gas and probably less of coal than has been projected
here.
Sources: See Table 17-6.
Coal Reserves and Resources
Two cost categories are proposed for coal-less than $25/tce (category 1)
and between $25 and $50/tce (category 2). It seems that in many regions,
large amounts of coal can be produced at these costs. This includes region
III (WE/JANZ); it is known that some production costs in Europe are al-
ready higher than the upper limit of $50/tce (e.g., in France and the FRG
the minimum cost is $75/tce, and in Belgium it is $100/tce), but this region
includes also South Africa, Australia, and the United Kingdom, with reason-
able to very low production costs.
Generally, the "economically recoverable" coal reserves in each region are
in the first category (except for region III, because of the above comment),
and part of the resources remaining to be identified are in the second cate-
gory. In the case of the USSR, the United States, and China, only 10 percent
of the total resources are considered. However, the figures are already suffi-
ciently high so that including more would not change very much, at least
with our time horizon of 203 O. Moreover, for these countries, and probably
also for others, the possibility that some of the reserves may finally appear
in the higher cost category is not excluded, but some of the resources
remaining to be identified can replace them in the lowest category.
To put these figures in perspective, for the United States, for instance,
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it is perhaps worth mentioning that EPRI (1977) has independently calcu-
lated the cumulative coal production required to reach $25/ton from July 1,
1975 (with a starting cost of less than $10/ton), which amounted to 850
billion tons (50 billion tons for the Appalachian region, 110 billion tons for
the Rocky Mountains, 240 billion tons for the interior plains, and 450 bil-
lion tons for the Great Plains). The figures in Tables 17-6 and 17-7 for re-
gion I (NA), at least, may thus appear conservative in light of some current
analyses.
Oil Reserves and Resources
Three categories of oil resources are used (all costs in 1975 dollars). Category
1 is oil available at production costs of $12 per barrel of crude oil. It
includes the known reserves plus a fraction of the resources remaining to be
discovered. This fraction varies with the regions and is a matter of judgment,
taking into account past history and geological and geographical factors.
(It was the general opinion of the Delphi experts [Desprairies 1977] that
most of the conventional oil remaining to be produced could be produced at
$12 or less per barrel of crude oil.) A subcategory, lA, exists only for re-
gions I and IV; it includes oil available at production costs of $12 to $16 per
barrel of crude oil. Only some oil shales, tar sands, and heavy crude oils are
in this group.
Category 2 has production costs of $12 to $20 per barrel of crude oil and
includes the second part of the resources remaining to be discovered, plus a
small amount of possibly recoverable heavy crude oils, tar sands, or oil
shales.
Category 3 has production costs of $20 to $25 per barrel of crude oil and
includes supplementary heavy crude oils, tar sands, and oil shales plus
"unconventional" oil according to the WEC (1978b) definition (deep off-
shore and polar areas). The total amount of heavy crude oils, tar sands, and
oil shales considered is about 300 billion tons (at less than $25 per barrel of
oil equivalent production cost). This has to be compared with the 300 (plus)
billion tons of heavy crude oil in place in Venezuela alone, 150 billion tons
of tar sands for Canada, and 420 billion tons of oil shales estimated by
Donnell (1977)-totaling more than 800 billion tons.
In the WEC study (1978b), the range for deep offshore and polar area oil
varies from zero to 230 billion tons of oil, with an average value of about 40
billion tons. Based on discussions with many experts, and taking into
account the longer time horizon of the IIASA study (2030 instead of 2000)
and the higher price range ($20 to $25 per barrel instead of less than $20 per
barrel), a value of 60 billion tons has been selected.c These 60 billion tons
were distributed tentatively among the seven IIASA regions according to a
reasoning close to prospective areas as defined by Grossling (1976).
cOnce more, it must be stressed that this was done for the modeling exercise reported in this chap-
ter. Values chosen result in a kind of "sub-Delphi" set of discussions with various experts.
534 ENERGY IN A FINITE WORLD
Note that most of the crude oil produced today In the world still has
production costs of less than $2 per barrel.
Gas Reserves and Resources
The same kind of reasoning was used in estimating gas reserves and resources.
(The experts of the WEe gas study [1978b] thought that probably 75 per-
cent of gas resources remaining to be discovered could be produced at less
than $14/boe [1974 dollars] in the year 2000 and that the total could be
produced at less than $20/boe.)
For unconventional gas resources, information is very poor outside the
United States. Moreover, because of the importance of conventional gas
reserves and resources and the less developed utilization of these resources
compared to oil, conventional gas resources will probably not be used to
any large extent before 2020-2030, with the possible exception of region I.
There is nevertheless no geological reason that this region should be the only
one to own such varied resources as methane in coal fields, gas in tight for-
mations or in Devonian shales, or geopressured gas. Most of these unconven-
tional gases were included in the highest cost category ($20 to $25/boe).
Some experts argue that this is highly speculative; others say that it is proba-
bly conservative.
At the end of this chapter, the total fossil resources consumed in the High
and the Low scenarios are compared with these estimates of resource availa-
bilities. (The accompanying boxed material compares the fossil fuel resource
estimates used here with those of other recognized energy studies.) Still, in
the scenarios throughout this chapter, other constraints are in many cases
binding, while resources remain available, albeit at higher costs. One of these
other constraints-maximum annual production rates for oil-is considered
next.
OIL: FROM RESOURCES TO PRODUCTION
Given the estimates of total energy resource availability, maximum potential
outputs from each source can be estimated. This demands consideration of
the geological potential, the economic trade-offs, and the infrastructure re-
quirements for the energy supply system. One example of this analysis is
presented here-an example that must represent the lion's share of primary
energy for any scenario of the future. This is oil.
Table 17-8 translates the oil resource estimates of Tables 17-6 and 17-7
into conventional and unconventional resourcesd (other than shale), into en-
hanced recovery, oil shale, tar sands, and heavy crude oil resources. Assump-
tions and definitions are given as notes to Table 17-8. The cost categories
dThe terms "conventional" and "unconventional" when applied to oil resources have different
meanings to different users. Throughout this chapter, these terms will take on the definitions in the
notes to Table 17-8.
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COMPARATIVE WORLD RESOURCE ESTIMATES
The estimation of world fossil fuel resources used in the supply sce-
narios of this report do not deviate markedly from the recent estimates
of several recognized groups. This general consistency is no accident.
The estimates used here result from (among other things) careful
study of the experts' views, published and unpublished. Indeed, with
only very minor modifications the estimates of the World Energy
Conference (l978c) were used directly. The figures below summarize
the estimates used here and those of three well-known sources.
Variable (and/or vague) definitions in different studies preclude
precision in these comparisons. Yet the general consensus is clear. One
also can observe some measure of agreement in regional and national
estimates, although differences do appear. For example, this study sees
some 40 billion barrels more oil in Latin America (region IV) than the
Moody and Geyger assessment, and somewhat less coal in North Amer-
ica than does WAES. However, in most regions where comparisons
can be made the convergence is remarkably close.
World Recoverable Resources (rounded figures)
Moody &
Geyger WAES WEe IIASA
Oil a
Conventional 10' bbl( 10" toe) 2000(274 ) 2000(274) 2200(302) 2100(288)
UnconventionaI10"bbl(10"toe) 397 (54)
Gasa
Conventional 10 '2 m 3 (10" toe) 233(186) 210(175) 285(237) 291 (242)
UnconventionaI10 '2 m 3 (10"toe) 42 (35)
Coal b
Category 1 10" tce 598 640 605
Category 1+2 10' tce 2506 1707
a"Conventional" resource estimates include enhanced recovery and offshore to less than
200 m and some heavy crude oil, all at less than $20/boe; "unconventional" oil resource
estimate of IIASA includes deep offshore, polar areas, and tar sands. Oil shales not included
here.
bCategory 1: $25/ton extraction cost; category 2: $25-$50/ton extraction cost. (Varying
fractions of total resource base are assumed to be recoverable in different studies.)
Sources: Moody and Geyger (1975); WEC (1978c); Desprairies (1977).
of Tables 17-6 and 17-7 and the physical resource categories here overlap.
The two types of categories are defined for different purposes, and in any
case, there is no reason why the total amount of any physical type (conven-
tional, unconventional) should be expected to have just a single production
cost.
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Table 17-8. Ultimately recoverable oil resources (TWyr).
Unconventional
Deep
offshore Oil shale
and Enhanced and
Region Conventional polar areas recovery tar sands Total
I (NA) 26 12 10 126 174
II (SU/EE) 43 12 20 76 151
III (WE/JANZ) 15 7 6 13 41
IV (LA) 23 8 178a 210
V (Af/SEA) 23 13 7 20 63
VI (ME/NAf) 139 b 20 c 159
VII (C/CPA) 12 8 5 14 39
Total d 281 52 56 447 837
alncludes 170 TWyr of heavy crude oil.
bRegion VI is not expected, within the next fifty years, to make extensive use of tertiary re-
covery techniques.
clncludes heavy crude oil and some possibly deep offshore oil.
dThe analysis of region VII is necessarily rough, as few published data are available.
Notes: Conventional resources, all (usually) of category 1 and some of category 2, include known
reserves and some remaining to be discovered resources; onshore and offshore resources at depths
of less than 200 m; not including enhanced recovery. Deep offshore and polar areas resources, a
subset of categories 2 and 3 of Tables 17-6 and 17-7, include deep offshore resources (depths greater
than 200 m) and polar areas oil. Enhanced recovery, in category 2 and 3 of Tables 17-6 and 17-7,
includes oil available only with tertiary techniques. Oil shale and tar sands, in category 2 and (usually)
category 3 of Tables 17-6 and 17-7, includes oil shales and tar sands as well as heavy crude oil esti-
mates.
Sources: See Table 17-6.
These are oil resources: but resources must be discovered (added to re-
serves) and produced. Demands are met only from discovered, produced, and
delivered products. There is a large and significant (if apparently imponder-
able) difference between resources and supplies.
Additions to Reserves
It is from future additions to oil reserves that oil production will come.
Additions to oil reserves come from extensions to existing fields; exploration
for and discovery of further conventional oil fields; enhanced recovery from
operating fields; and exploration for, discovery of, and improvements in
recovery techniques for unconventional oils such as in deep offshore and
polar areas.
Future additions to reserves of conventional oil depend largely on the
success of oil exploration ventures and the intensiveness of exploratory drill-
ing. Discoveries of large-giant or supergiant-fields of conventional oil are
not anticipated. Thus, additions to reserves would largely come from discov-
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eries of new small to medium fields, as well as from extensions to old fields
(see Nehring 1978). In general, a correlation exists between oil-finding rates,
new exploratory drilling footage, and cumulative discoveries (as a share of
ultimately recoverable resources). Qualitative analysis of such correlations
for different regions has served as a basis for extrapolation of the past be-
havior of additions to reserves of conventional oil for the next five decades.
Little is known about the future of additions to reserves of unconven-
tional oil around the world. With no better approach available, it is assumed
that the correlation between finding rates, intensiveness of exploratory drill-
ing, and cumulative discoveries is the same for unconventional as for conven-
tional oil. While it may be that high investment costs will inhibit rapid
development of individual unconventional oil fields, it is assumed here that,
in aggregate, the potential unconventional oil resources could be discov-
ered in the future more quickly than conventional oil resources have been
in the past-because of improved exploratory methods and expected price
incentives.
Figure 17-4 summarizes the results of these and other considerations for
regions I (NA), III (WE/JANZ), IV (LA), V (AflSEA), and VI (ME/NAf)
(for conventional oil only). Notice that the assumptions give large additions
to conventional oil reserves in the next few years, with additions dropping
off toward 2030 as the ultimately recoverable resource total is neared.
Enhanced Recovery and Oil Shales
Enhanced recovery of oil can substantially increase maximum production
possibilities. New techniques improved the average rate of recovery of oil in
the United States from 25 to 32 percent between 1950 and 1975. But sev-
eral cautions should be 0 bserved. First, many improved (secondary and ter-
tiary) recovery techniques have not yet been mastered on a large scale. Prog-
ress on the carbon dioxide projects in the United States, for example, has
been slow. Second, a multitude of factors, including viscosity of the oil,
porosity of the rock, and structure of the oil layers, can dramatically in-
fluence the chances for success. Also, tertiary recovery (which we call here
enhanced recovery) from a field occurs only after primary and secondary
techniques have been applied; the timing of enhanced recovery in a given oil
field depends on the rate of development of the reserves of that field.
Enhanced recovery data exist in significant quantities only for oil fields
in the United States. (Recent estimates [Perrine 1978] put the potential
from tertiary recovery in the United States by 1990 at up to 200 GWyr/yr
[2.8 mbd] .) U.S. data are therefore used as a means of establishing estimates
for enhanced recovery in all regions. It is assumed here that enhanced re-
covery applies only to conventional oil fields in the next fifty years and that
such technologies are available today in the developed regions and only after
2000 in the developing regions. Enhanced recovery in the High and the Low
scenarios increases total cumulative recovery from conventional oil in place
to 2030 by a factor of 1.25.
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Total resources of oil shales, tar sands, and heavy crude oils are by most
estimates enormous. Growth rates of known reserves are not expected to
constrain future production rates, but buildup rates of this new industry and
environmental constraints may. As a result, these sources of oil can be
thought of as alternatives to coal liquefaction; the assumption here puts the
maximum buildup rates for oil production from these sources and coal li-
quefaction at the same value. The final choice between the two must be a
matter of national priorities, resource availabilities, environmental consid-
erations, and economic trade-offs.
The total additions to reserves resulting from all of these considerations
of conventional and unconventional oil and enhanced recovery are discussed
in the accompanying boxed materials. There also, these figures are compared
with the WAES assumptions-a comparison meant to indicate the extensive
use in this study of and (with some modified judgments and new informa-
tion) reliance on the WAES analyses and findings.
Maximum Potential Production
A region's oil production is the aggregate of the production of many fields-
large ones and small ones, fully developed ones, and ones just starting to
develop. Each field-even each elementary unit or sector of each field-has
its own dynamics of the buildup to (and maintenance of) peak production
capacity, followed by the gradual decline of production. Small- to medium-
sized new fields require three to five years to reach peak capacity (it was two
to four years from the start of production for many sectors of the North
Sea, for example, and about ten years from first discovery), and many pro-
duce at peak rates for only five to ten years (or less, as is certainly the
case for many North Sea fields) before production rate limits (reserve-to-
production ratio constraints) force a gradual decline of output.
With these considerations in mind, maximum potential oil production
rates over the next fifty years have been calculated for several regions. Maxi-
mum potential oil production rates are those that could be reached poten-
tially under assumed economic, technical, and environmental constraints.
These include constraints on additions to reserves (as described above);
buildup rate constraints (especially for enhanced recovery, oil shales, tar
sands, and heavy crude oils); production ceilings of oil from shales (rep-
resenting environmental constraints); and reserves-to-production ratio
constraints.
With these constraints, the following assumptions are used to calculate
the oil production rates:
• The limiting ratio of reserves to production is taken at a worldwide aver-
age of 15 to 1 for conventional oil and for deep offshore and polar area
oil; 7.5 to 1 for enhanced recovery methods; and 25 to 1 for the portion
of heavy crude oil resources that can be recovered by conventional
methods.
GROSS ADDITIONS TO RESERVES, OIL OF ALL
TYPES, AI'JD COMPARISON WITH WAES
While the amount of ultimately recoverable oil (Table 17.8) is surely of
major importance, it is, in the end, annual oil production that meets
liquid fuel requirements. As WAES observes, "Oil can be produced only
from fields that have been discovered and for which production facili-
ties have been installed. Oil production is based on proven reserves, the
rate at which they are added to and on the rate at which production
facilities are developed. The importance of ultimately recoverable
reserves is that they determine how long a rate of additions to reserves
can be maintained." Here, it is flatly assumed that all the ultimately
recoverable resources of Table 17.8 (except shale oil and tar sands)
are discovered and added to reserves by the year 2030.
Assumptions of gross additions to oil reserves from conventional and
unconventional oils and enchanced recovery for regions I (NA), III
(WE/JANZ), IV (LA), V (AflSEA), and VI (ME/NAf) (that is, the
world outside regions II, SU/EE and VII, C/CPA) are shown below,
together with the WAES estimates for the additions to conventional
oils in, basically, these same regions. Assumed are somewhat greater
additions in the near term than WAES assumed (recent evidence from
Mexico, for example, tends to confirm this), with additions dropping
off faster later. The slack could then be taken up by unconventional
oil additions, enhanced recovery and ultimately (and possibly) shale
oils and/or tar sands.
ADDITIONS TO
RESERVES
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• After having reached peak production levels, production rates decline
exponentially.
• Reaching peak production rates for enhanced recovery methods takes
five years (because of the injection stage).
• Oil production plants for tar sands, shales, and heavy crude oils (treated
by advanced methods) keep constant production levels over their
thirty-year lifetimes.
The buildup of a shale or tar sands facility requires five years and, like coal
liquefaction, once a rate of 6 GWyr/yr is reached (for the developed regions),
the previous period's capacity may be doubled each five-year period.
These several assumptions about buildup and decline rates, aggregated,
allow estimation of the maximum potential oil production profiles shown in
Figure 17-5. These profiles differ from the global oil production profile of
Chapter 2. This is because, as noted before, the two exercises are performed
for different purposes. The chapters of Part II of this book seek to explore
global potentials; here, regional real world possibilities are sought. The pro-
files of Figure 17-5 are a first step in the latter process, which ends with oil
production rates lower than those of Figure 17-5.
Potential Oil Supplies by Region
In region I (NA), production from known oil reserves would continue its al-
ready begun precipitous decline. Presently known reserves would be virtually
exhausted by the end of the century. Increasing total production (or even
holding it constant) requires the finding and developing of new conventional
reserves. High, but gradually declining, additions to reserves could add some
430 GWyr/yr (2.4 billion barrels per year) annually to North American oil
production by the year 2000. Beyond that date, the assumed limiting
reserve-to-production ratioe forces production of conventional oil down-
ward, to just 120 GWyr/yr (0.6 billion barrels per year) by 2030 (Figure
17-5A). Enhanced recovery can stall the decline somewhat, but its consid-
erable potential is limited in varying degrees by technological development,
commercial risk, and water and carbon availability. The maximum contribu-
tion from enhanced recovery could be about 730 GWyr/yr (3.8 billion
barrels per year) in 2005; the potential is likely to decline after that, as pres-
ently known oil reserves (which have the greatest enhanced recovery poten-
tial) become depleted. Deep offshore and polar area oil might add a certain
fraction to maximum production. But the major resources potentially
available to halt the region I production rate decline are shale oils and tar
sands. For the Canadian tar sands, a wide application of conventional (strip
mining) and in situ methods could allow production of up to 1 TWyr/yr
(5.2 billion barrels per year) by the year 2030. The difficulties of handling
el t is assumed that the current U.S. reserve-to-production ratio of about ten to one could not be
economically maintained over the long term.
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Figure 17-5. Maximum potential production profiles by type of oil, regions I, III, IV,
and V.
A. Region I (NA)
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the waste from oil shale production and the lack of sufficient water supplies
strongly restrict their development. Therefore, rather minor contributions
of shales are assumed in the oil supply in North America.
In region III (WE/JANZ), the North Sea oil deposits will be the greatest
contribution to potential domestic oil production. They could add some 350
GWyr/yr to annual production by 1985-1990. (This, again, is potential. A
more realizable figure is likely to be on the order of 3 mbd [200 GWyr/yr]
from the North Sea.) The drop in production of conventional oil might be
delayed by new discoveries in Turkey, Australia, and New Zealand, but the
impact is not expected to be large. Total conventional oil production would
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Figure 17-5 continued.
C. Region IV (LA)
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not exceed 340 GWyr/yr (1.8 billion barrels per year) in 2000 and would
fall to just 30 to 50 GWyr/yr (0.15 to 0.25 billion barrels per year) by the
year 2030. The peak contribution of enhanced recovery (160 to 170 GWyr/
yr) is expected to be in 2010-2015. Another 180 to 200 GWyr/yr in 2030
could come from deep offshore areas. Production of oil from shales in region
III (some resources of which are available in the United Kingdom, the FRG,
and Italy and are of economic size) would apparently depend on commercial
availability of in situ methods and water supplies and is not, in any case,
expected to occur on a significant scale.
A major portion of the potential conventional oil resources of region IV
(LA) is found in offshore Mexico. This, and the rather large conventional
resources elsewhere in region IV, could allow some 430 to 450 GWyr/yr of
oil production by 1990-1995 and about 160 GWyr/yr by 2030. Increasing
the total production after the year 2000 requires the development of the
deposits of heavy crude oils, which would be affected by buildup constraints
on drilling equipment, steam generation, and upgrading capacity. Heavy
crude oil production could be enormous, depending on the extent of tech-
nological assistance by highly developed countries. It seems likely that much
smaller rates of production will actually occur. Here, a moderate develop-
ment of heavy crude oil resources is assumed-one that would nevertheless
provide a substantial contribution to the potential oil production after the
year 2000 (i.e., more than 3 TWyr/yr or 15.5 billion barrels per year by
2030).
Oil production in region V (AfiSEA) has had a short history; most coun-
tries in the region started their oil production in the 1950s and 1960s. Devel-
opment in the previous five years, especially, has been rapid. Rather high
additions to the existing reserves up to the end of the century are assumed,
with a decline thereafter. The peak potential conventional oil production of
480 to 500 GWyr/yr may come around 1995-2000. By 2030, production
could reach some 750 GWyr/yr, taking account of enhanced recovery and
other unconventional resources.
The total production in region VI (ME/NAf) is discussed in the next
section.
Summarizing, the gross maximum potential oil output for regions I, III,
IV, and V is assessed to be 2.2 TWyr/yr (about 11 billion barrels per year)
in 1985, 3.2 to 3.3 TWyr/yr (16.5 to 17 billion barrels per year) in 2000,
3.8 to 4.0 TWyr/yr (20 to 21 billion barrels per year) in 2015, and as much
as 6.3 to 6.5 TWyr/yr (32.5 to 33.5 billion barrels per year) by 2030. When
compared with demands for liquid fuels, these numbers seem to be too high.
For example, under assumptions of the Low scenario, the oil-importing
regions appear (in aggregate) to be self-sufficient as early as 2020.
However, one should not forget that the maximum potential oil produc-
tion rates reported here represent those that could not be higher and that
are supported by all potential sources of oil no matter how much they cost.
In fact, production rates would certainly be much lower than these maxi-
mum assumptions. The oil production rates actually used in the High and the
Low scenarios are significantly lower, as will be shown in the section on oil
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demand and supply, following a discussion of the oil production and export
prospects from region VI (ME/NAf).
The Special Case of Region V I
There are two overly broad categories of members of the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)-the "swing producers" or "low
absorbers" (of oil revenues) as they are sometimes called and the "competi-
tors" or "high absorbers". The swing producers can relatively easily expand
or restrict oil output; they are not critically dependent on large oil revenues.
The "competitors," on the other hand, need all the oil revenues they can get
and must therefore maintain production at highest possible levels. Most of
this latter group have large (and growing) populations, substantial develop-
ment needs, and limited oil reserves. Most of the former group have some-
what smaller populations, (therefore) limited development needs, and tre-
mendous oil reserves. It is not an equitable world.
The world region labeled here region VI (ME/NAf) includes, intentionally,
the large, swing producers of OPEC-in particular Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and
the United Arab Emirates. These countries dominate the aggregated region
VI. The swing producers of OPEC hold about one-third of the world's oil
reserves, and they could (theoretically) expand their annual production by
several times. Within this "core of balancers," Saudi Arabia has been thought
to hold the ability to be quite literally the residual supplier for the world,
varying its production up or down to meet the fluctuations in demand and
supply of the rest of the globe.
With very large oil reserves and with little or no other resources, it is in
region VI's self-interest to stretch out the lifetime of its reserves-to avoid
an early, high peak of production followed by rapid decline. Oil revenues,
optimally, should keep pace with (but need not exceed) development needs
and should continue as long as possible-that is, until alternative sources of
income (new industries, business, etc.) can be created.
In 1975, Saudi Arabia received an estimated $23 billion in oil revenues:
an estimated $6 billion was spent in Saudi Arabia or for imports, and an
estimated $ 3 billion was invested in other Arab or developing nations. Most
of the rest of the surplus was put into Saudi Arabian official reserves-mak-
ing these national reserves third largest in the world, smaller only than those
of the United States and the FRG. Today Saudi Arabia has about the same
per capita income and total imports as Sweden. Saudi Arabia, and some of
the other Arabian Peninsula countries, are expanding their economies at
rates not thought possible even two or three years ago. While their "low
absorbers" label may therefore be in some doubt, it remains true that there
are reasons why the region may well restrain its oil production and exports.
Too rapid development can create economic and social instability-ram-
pant inflation and quick riches to the elite. This, of course, is one partial
explanation of the political upheaval in Iran in 1978. Peninsula nations are
recognizing the wisdom of moderate production and export levels, of
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stretching out the lifetime of their oil wealth, and of attempting to distribute
the benefits carefully and equitably. And so they announce their intent to
stabilize production.
At the same time, there is reason to doubt the ability of these countries
to literally be swing producers on a large scale. Recent estimates of present
productive capacity put region VI at just over 30 mbd, while present actual
production is about 27 mbd. One must ask where-in which country-an in-
crease in capacity beyond the estimate in this study (33.6 mbd, as noted
below) could occur. And one must not ignore political instabilities in the
region when estimating future production potentials.
Because of these considerations, it is assumed that total production in re-
gion VI will rise (in the near term) to meet demand until a level no more
than 50 percent higher than the region's 1975 production is reached (see
Table 17-9). This ceiling of 33.6 mbd, or 12.2 billion barrels per year (2380
GWyr/yr), is highly arbitrary. Variations up or down can have rather large
implications for the timing of and needs for new energy technologies. This
should be borne in mind as the results of the global supply scenarios appear
in the following pages. But ultimately, even region VI will be forced by
limited resources to lower production rates, thus pushing the world sooner
or later toward alternative energy sources. By 2030, region VI would in fact
be forced toward lower outputs by reserve-to-production ratio constraints if
a production level of 33.6 mbd were maintained up to that time.
A FRAME OF REFERENCE
Before presenting the results of the global and regional supply analyses, a
frame of reference for interregional energy trade is offered-a set of assump-
tions about the potential evolution of world energy markets, particularly oil.
The oil market will remain a global one because oil is virtually irreplace-
able for some essential purposes such as transportation and (to a certain ex-
tent) petrochemical feedstocks; oil resources of industrialized countries are
rapidly being exhausted; and oil is easily transportable.
The use of coal could increase markedly if oil (and gas) reserves prove in-
sufficient to meet industrial heat needs; if natural gas and oil cease to be
used as primary fuels in central conversion processes; and/or if coalliquefac-
tion technologies prove to be relatively inexpensive. These represent major
uncertainties that cloud any projection of the role of coal as a substitute fuel
for oil in industry and central conversion processes. The fact that coal is
more difficult to transport than oil is only partly mitigated by the fact that
coal deposits lie largely within the same countries where demand will be
large. Unlike oil trade, the coal trade is not likely to be dominated by a few
exporters forming a cartel.
Like coal, natural gas has so far been a major energy source generally only
within the countries or regions in which it is found (the notable exception
being Japan with its sizable gas imports): the question is, Will this continue
to be the case? Gas is an important fuel in industry; it can increasingly be
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Table 17-9. Region VI oil production rates and capacity and assumed
production ceiling (million barrels of oil per day).
Production Rates
OPEC member countries
non-region VI OPECa member countries
OPEC and region Vl b countries
non-OPEC region VIc countries
Region VI
of which exported
Production Capacities
7975
27.19
- 5.82
21.37
+ 1.05
22.42
21.23
7977
31.53
- 6.52
25.01
+ 0.99
26.00
24.64
Saudi Arabia
Iran
Iraq
Kuwait
Libya
UAE
Algeria
Qatar
Estimate of other region Vl f countries
Region VI
Estimated long-term region VI "ceiling": 33.6
7975
DOE Estimated
10.7
6.5
3.0
2.9
2.3
2.3
1.3
0.6
1.4
31.0
7977
PIW Estimatee
10.8
6.8
2.6
3.0
2.5
2.3
1.0
0.7
1.4
31.8
aNon-region VI OPEC countries are Venezuela, Ecuador, Nigeria, Gabon, and Indonesia.
bEight OPEC member countries are in region VI-six in the Middle East (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
UAE, Iran, Iraq, Qatar) and two in Northern Africa (Algeria and Libya).
cSeven countries in the Middle East-Bahrain, Jordan, Lebanon, Oman, Syria, Yemen and Yemen
(Democratic)-and one in Northern Africa (Egypt).
d U.S. Department of Energy estimate, International Energy Indicators, April 1979.
epetroleum Intelligence Weekly (1979).
f llASA estimate.
used in buildings. But very difficult and costly long-distance transportation
problems-the alternatives are undersea pipelines or cryogenic tankers-may
restrict gas to local or regional markets in the future. The potentials are
great (as explored briefly in Chapter 18), but so are the obstacles.
The cost of long-distance transmission of electricity is also high, and in
general this will continue to limit the market for electricity. But electricity
may turn out to be less expensive than moving coal over long distances,
particularly if major improvements in superconducting cables can be realized
or if long-distance DC transmission proves conclusively to be economic.
Energy markets interact, to the extent that one fuel whose price is low-
ered may substitute for another whose price increases. For example, if crude
oil becomes relatively scarce and expensive, synthetic oil from coalliquefac-
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tion would be stimulated. Large-scale development of liquefaction plants
would in this way dampen growth in oil prices, while at the same time stimu-
lating the demand and price for coal. Also, successful development of in
situ coal gasification schemes, with combined cycle gas turbine plants, en-
hances the potentials of coal supplies and gas markets.
INTERREGIONAL OIL BALANCING
As already observed, oil dominates international energy markets today, and
this dominance will not decline quickly. The procedure followed in this
study for interregional oil balancing recognizes this and is designed to pro-
duce acceptable balances only after several iterations. Also, it should be
noted that it is primarily the long term that is of interest here; these pro-
cedures are not precise ones for the short to medium term.
A Procedure for Interregional Oil Balancing
Three dynamic elements of the world oil market must be reflected in any
study of global, long-term energy supply systems-regional domestic oil
production, interregional oil trade, and oil prices. The procedure of Figure
17-6 describes their assessment as performed in this study.
Dealt with first is the problem of integrating the demand for imported oil
of the potentially importing regions (regions I, III, IV, and V) and available
oil exports from region VI. It is assumed that regions II and VII are neither
oil exporters nor oil importers. Second, region VI is believed to dominate the
world oil market through cartel-like behavior. The maximization of revenues
over the planning period is assumed to be a driving force for region VI in
choosing oil production (and, thereby, export) figures. Third, oil-exporting
countries outside region VI are taken as price-takers; their trade with import-
ing countries is assumed to take place under perfect market conditions.
The response of importing regions to changing oil prices must result from
their domestic oil supply elasticities. Such elasticities have been generated by
considering the potential oil production profiles of Figure 17-5, as well as
estimates of various types of oil resources available at different prices (Tables
17-6 and 17-7), and taking account of other published studies of national
and international energy research teams such as the World Energy Confer-
ence, EPRI, and the U.s. Office of Technology Assessment. The resulting
regional potential oil production profiles as a function of prices represent the
first major input to interregional oil-balancing calculations. Two more inputs
to the process are demands for liquid fuels over time and judgments about
the dynamics and costs of synthetic liquid fuel production from coal.
Comparing the domestic oil supplies available at varying prices with liquid
fuel demands region by region (and taking account of production of syn-
thetic liquid fuels from coal), regional curves of economic oil imports versus
prices, period by period, can be produced, followed by generalized curves
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Figure 17-6. Interregional oil balancing methodology.
Curves of Oil
Imports (Exports)
vs. Prices by Region
(excl. Region VI)
Assumption of
Dominance of
Region VI in
Oil Market
Definition of Globally
Consistent Domestic
Oil Production and
Imports (Exports)
by Region
MESSAGE
Runs
Maximum
Available
Exports from
Region VI
for the whole group of importing regions. The top graph in Figure 17-7
shows a sample of such a generalized curve, for the year 2015, in the Low
scenarIo.
Looking at these curves from the perspective of region VI, values of im-
ports and prices that give maximum revenues to the exporter over time are
selected, while not exceeding values of admissible exports (see the lower
graph in Figure 17-7). The prices chosen represent world oil market prices.
Unfortunately, one iteration of the balancing procedure is insufficient
to achieve acceptable results, because of feedbacks of prices to the amount
of synthetic liquid fuels that could be economically produced from coal-
and thereby to the amount of coal available to compete with nuclear energy
in the production of electricity and heat. To take this into account, the
IIASA energy supply model (MESSAGE) is involved in the procedure. At
the initial iteration of interregional oil balancing (assuming some dynamics
of oil prices), the first order values of the price-consistent portion of domes-
tic oil production and values of imports region by region over time are se-
lected. These values are input into the MESSAGE model, which gives the
regional dynamics of production of liquid fuels from coal, consistent with
assumptions concerning oil prices, production, and imports and the develop-
ment of other sectors of the energy supply systems. This is then used in the
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Figure 17-7. Oil imports and exports versus price, Low scenario, 2015.
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balancing calculations. Having more reasonable estimates of oil prices and
interregional oil trade by the end of each iteration, the inputs to MESSAGE
are corrected and the runs repeated until acceptable results are reached.
Several iterations of this procedure are required for acceptable results-to
remove inconsistencies among oil demand, production, and import/export.
Also, note that this procedure is designed for long-term analyses. That is,
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it lacks the degree of disaggregation and careful consideration of national
politics that would be essential to a study of the near-term prospects of the
world oil market. This is not, of course, to say that the next few years of
development of the oil market are unimportant; surely the opposite is true.
Still, the long-term perspective offered here may not be valueless, in spite of
certain short-term dynamics that have not been treated here.
Prices and Oil Trade
The prices of globally traded liquid fuels over the next fifty years can be esti-
mated from the methodology just described. Of course, there are great un-
certainties in such exercises, not least among them the potential impacts of
noneconomic, nontechnical forces. Nonetheless, these procedures allow one
to postulate consistent price dynamics for the High and Low scenarios, to
evaluate the consequences, and to draw inferences about the range of real
possibilities. The major arguments in the logic of these analyses for gener-
ating international oil prices in the long term are as follows:
Prices of oil from region VI are highly flexible because of low produc-
tion costs; they are calculated in these scenarios, as described, to maximize
revenues within a stated production ceiling. In order to compete, region VI
must maintain its oil price just below the price of that source (the "back-
stop" source) that could displace its oil exports in each case. As a response
to the price policies of region VI, importing regions could vary their domes-
tic oil production within the entire range from zero (in theory) to the "maxi-
mum potential" ceiling already described. The flexibility of such a response
is described, of course, by the price elasticities of potential oil supplies.
The cost categories used in these analyses for domestically available liquid
fuels are summarized in Figure 17-8. The cost figures are necessarily aggre-
gate, reflecting substantial uncertainties. Note that only one estimate is used
as the cost assumption for synthetic liquid fuels from coal (at about $21.50
per barrel) and that this is somewhat less than the cost of most of the very
large category 3 oil resources (oil shales, tar sands, heavy oils).
These considerations result in estimates of prices for internationally
traded crude oil. In the Low scenario, prices would increase in real terms
(from about $13.40 per barrel in 1975) at about 4 percent per year (in cur-
rent dollars) until reaching $19 per barrel (1975$) in 1990, and then remain
constant to 2030. In the High scenario, prices would rise in real terms at
about 5.5 percent per year (in current dollars) until reaching $21 per barrel
(1975$) in 1990, and then remain constant to 2030f The current (late
1979) OPEC price of approximately $20 (1979$) would be just $15 in 1975
dollars; the two scenario prices in 1979 dollars would be about $25 and $28
per barrel, respectively.
f For flights of fancy, consider these scenario price projections in current dollars: assume a 7 per-
cent average annual inflation rate from 1975 to 1990 and a 5 percent average annual rate from 1990
to 2030 and get some $100 per barrel in the year 2000 (in year 2000$) and some $800 per barrel in
the year 2030 (in year 2030$).
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The Low scenario analysis leads to prices of internationally traded liquid
fuels that reach levels just under the prices assumed for coal liquefaction.
The assumed liquid fuel demand, supply, and constraints in the Low scenario
indicate that at international oil prices greater than that of synthetic liquid
fuels, these synthetic fuels (being cheaper) would replace imports in certain
regions to the extent that region VI would sell less oil and (even at somewhat
higher prices) would therefore earn lower total revenues.
Conversely, the replacement (or "backstop") source in the High scenario
is largely unconventional oil-oil shales, tar sands, heavy crude oils, polar
area oil deposits, and so forth-not because the synthetic liquid fuel resource
has been exhausted, but because imposed coal production constraints and
the constraints of the synthetic liquid fuel industry buildup rate limit the
coal available for synthetic liquid fuels production.
Clearly-as has been suggested recently by many-it could turn out that
tar sands and oil shales (for example) will be available in large quantities at
costs less than those of coal liquefaction. If this were the case, then these
sources would replace synthetic liquid fuels in these scenarios, and interna-
tional prices would be set just below shale prices (say). This implies large
exports of these fuels from North America (if they are to be a true global
"backstop") and would result in increased availability of coal for power
production. Yet much of the rest of these analyses remains insensitive to
whether synthetic liquid fuels or shales or tar sands or heavy crude oils are
the backstop liquid source. Another very possible source, not considered
carefully here, is liquid fuels produced from natural gas. With relatively
large and inf1exible liquid fuel demands and economic gas sources (and
available liquified natural gas technology), this may ultimately prove to
be a very important and practical source.
These international oil prices are the same for all world regions-in spite
of very different capabilities in different regions to respond to price changes
imposed by the exporters. The only available alternative to this simplifying
assumption, it would seem, would be multitiered price structures, with high-
est prices being paid by the regions (as it turns out, the less developed coun-
tries) without cheap alternatives, and lowest prices being paid by regions (the
developed ones) with relatively cheap alternatives. This would not appear to
be a likely outcome. It is not the purpose of this study to postulate bidding
contests with differential prices stemming from relative political muscle or
abilities to pay. So, the single global price calculation was done as described,
recognizing the desires to restrain total production in region VI and to keep
oil prices roughly comparable among regions.
Data for internationally traded oil, following these price considerations,
are given in Figure 17-9 (for both the High and the Low scenarios). Figure
17-9 graphically illustrates the changing nature of global oil trade in the
scenarios. With the projected price dynamics, demand for oil exports from
region VI is believed to decline in both scenarios within the next 10 to 15
years. This is a measure of the response of importing regions to the oil price
escalations of the 1970s (in part, more non-region VI domestic oil potential
becomes economic in these regions). After 2000, as the domestic resources
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Figure 17-9. Interregional oil trade, 1975-2030, High and Low scenarios, primary
equivalen t.
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of importing regions become increasingly expensive, the attractiveness of
exports would again grow.
In the High scenario, global demand for oil exports is expected to decrease
to around 1.3 TWyr/yr (6.7 billion barrels per year) by 1990 (compared to
nearly 8.5 billion barrels per year in 1975), and would grow afterward,
reaching a ceiling of around 1.9 TWyr/yr (9.8 billion barrels per year) by
2010. In the Low scenario, the demand for exports would decrease to 0.8
TWyr/yr (4.1 billion barrels per year) by 2000, and increase thereafter until
reaching about 1.9 TWyr/yr by 2025.
Region I (NA) with relatively substantial resources of relatively cheap oil,
and with enormous resources of cheap coal, is believed to be capable of be-
coming self-sufficient by the end of the century or soon thereafter, under
the assumptions of both scenarios. For region III (WEI] ANZ), results show
high import dependence through 2030, by which time region III would need
as much as 7.5 billion barrels of imported oil per year (in the High scenario)
or 6.2 billion barrels per year (in the Low scenario).
According to assumptions here concerning maximum rates and costs of
heavy crude oil development in region IV (LA), this region is expected to be
neither a net importer nor a net exporter in the long term in the High sce-
nario. In the Low scenario, region IV could even be an exporter of oil. Its
oil exports in that case are projected to grow to 1.2 to 1.5 billion barrels
annually 2005-2010, but to decline thereafter to zero by 2025.
Region V (AfiSEA) is believed to stay a net exporter of oil until 1990,
but to turn then into a rather major oil importer. It would have to import
annually from 3.6 billion barrels (Low scenario) to 4.1 billion barrels (High
scenario), in order to meet its 2030 demand for liquid fuels.
The oil trade figures described here provide-after having achieved con-
sistency through numerous iterations-inputs to the supply scenario results
which follow.
OIL SUPPLY AND DEMAND
Under the assumptions of the High and Low scenarios, the oil era would not
be over by 2030. The world would be moving from the petroleum era to the
unconventional fossil era. In the High scenario, the share of conventional oil
in the total liquid fuels supplies of the globe would be declining from today's
nearly 100 percent to 80 percent by the year 2000, to 56 percent by 2015,
and to as little as 30 percent by 2030. In the Low scenario, this share would
equal 80 percent in 2000,66 percent in 2015, and 47 percent in 2030.
In order to meet 70 percent of the High scenario's or 53 percent of the
Low scenario's primary demands for liquid fuels by 2030, world unconven-
tional oil production would have to reach as much as 7.8 TWyr/yr (40.2 bil-
lion barrels per year) in the High scenario and about half as much in the Low
scenario. No single source of liquid fuels could support this level of demand.
However, these analyses show that economic production from natural
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sources of unconventional oil would not exceed 3.5 TWyr/yr (18 billion bar-
rels per year) in the High scenario and 1.6 TWyr/yr (8.2 billion barrels per
year) in the Low scenario by the year 2030. Another 2.2 to 4.4 TWyr/yr
could come from coal liquefaction. Synthetic oil in 2030 in the High sce-
nario at 4.4 TWyr/yr exceeds present total global oil production by 16 per-
cent; it provides almost 40 percent of total demands for liquid fuels in 2030.
What does this mean? Will the coal-rich countries mine their vast resources
at rates sufficient to quench the world's thirst for liquid fuels? The analyses
here point to few other solutions, if liquid fuels continue to be required on a
large scale, even if for only premium uses.
By 2030, world crude oil production would have peaked and begun a
slow decline under the conditions of the scenarios, as Figure 17-10 indicates.
At the global oil production peak (around 2020 in the High scenario, 2015
in the Low scenario), the annual rate would be nearly 6.9 TWyr/yr in the
High scenario and 5.6 TWyr/yr in the Low scenario compared to 3.6
TWyr/yr today.
The regional oil supply and liquid fuel demand results of the two scenarios
are presented in Figure 17-11, in order to underscore the long-term liquid
fuel supply dilemma and to illustrate the different characteristics among dif-
ferent regions. This figure shows the High and the Low scenarios for all
seven world regions.
As noted, region I (NA) is projected to be capable of becoming self-suffi-
cient by the year 2000 or soon thereafter at both (high and low) growth rate
assumptions on demand for liquids. In the High scenario (Figure 17-11B),
domestic oil production could increase gradually to a peak of 1.2 TWyr/yr
(6.2 billion barrels per year) in 2000, but the rate could not be sustained. In
the Low scenario (Figure 17-11A), a peak of domestic oil production of 1.1
TWyr/yr (5.7 billion barrels per year) could occur by 2010, with a decline to
0.5 TWyr/yr (2.6 billion barrels per year) by 2030.
Development of coal liquefaction technologies in region I is expected to
start in 1995 in the High scenario and in 2000 in the Low scenario. Coal
liquefaction could contribute some 1 TWyr/yr (5.2 billion barrels per year)
of liquid fuels by 2030 in the High scenario (0.75 TWyr/yr in the Low sce-
nario) or about 50 to 55 percent of all liquid fuel supplies in region I.
Region II (SU/EE), Figures 17-11C and 17-110, with substantial re-
sources of oil and with large resources of cheap coal, is believed to be self-
sufficient through the next fifty years-that is, neither a net importer nor
exporter. Its domestic oil production could reach a peak of 0.8 to 0.85
TWyr/yr in the High scenario and 0.75 to 0.8 TWyr/yr in the Low scenario
by 2005-2010, matching demands for liquid fuels. Thereafter, a growing
gap between total liquid fuel demand and conventional oil supplies could be
expected-a gap that could reach some 0.4 to 0.9 TWyr/yr by 2030. To
meet this need, liquid fuels from coal and oil shales could be produced start-
ing from about 2010-2015. Coal liquefaction, especially, is expected to con-
tribute 0.7 TWyr/yr of liquid fuels in the High scenario or 0.3 to 0.4
TWyr/yr in the Low scenario by 2030.
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Figure 17-10. Global oil supply and demand, 1975-2030, High and Low scenarios,crude
oil equivalent. (See Table 17-6 for definitions of categories.)
A. High Scenario
Total Primary
Liquids Demand
GWyr!yr
15,000
12,000
9000
6000
3000
1500
1975 1985
Total Crude
Oil Production
Cat. 1
2000
Year
2015
Cat. 3
Cat. 1A
2030
Figure 17-11. Oil supply and demand, regions I through VII, 1975-2030, High and
Low scenarios, crude oil equivalent. (See Table 17-6 for definitions of categories.) All
plots of Figure 17-11 result directly from the linear programming MESSAGE model runs
and do not include constraints for the gradual buildup and depletion of separate oil cate-
gories. (There are constraints on total oil production, of course.) Therefore, the dynamics
of the exploitation of different oil categories should not be taken literally. Also note:
Only the five year period around 1975 (see pages 412 to 414) is the basis for the scenario
calculations.
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Figure 17-11 continued.
C. Region II (SUjEE), High Scenario
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Figure 17-11 continued.
E. Region III (WE/JANZ), High Scenario
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Figure 17-11 continued.
G. Region IV (LA), High Scenario
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Figure 17-11 continued.
I. Region V (AfjSEA), High Scenario
GWyr!yr
2000 ....---------------------.-
1500
Total Primary
Liquids Demand
1000 Total Crude
Oil Production
Exports~ Imports /500 //
.,.;
~ -- ..............,-_ ..... .....---
-
I Cat. 1
1975 1985 2000 2015 2030
Year
Synliq.
GWyr!yr
2000
1500
1000
J. Region V (AfjSEA), Low Scenario
Total Primary
Liquids Demand
------::::o~.....
.....-
------
500
1975
Total Crude
Oil Production
1985 2000
Year
Cat. 1
2015
Imports
2030
ENERGY SUPPLY AND CONVERSION 563
Figure 17-11 continued.
K. Region VI (ME/NAf), High Scenario
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Figure 17-11 continued.
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Region III (WE/jANZ), Figures 17-11E and 17-11F, would continue its
high import dependence through 2030 under the conditions of the scenarios.
Its domestic oil production could reach a peak of some 0.5 TWyr/yr (2.6
billion barrels per year) by 1985-1990 in both scenarios (because of expan-
sive development of North Sea oil deposits, but would tail off afterwards. By
2030, the gap between primary demand for liquid fuels and domestic oil sup-
plies would be as large as 1.9 TWyr/yr in the High scenario and 1.5 TWyr/yr
in the Low scenario. In the High scenario, because of a tighter interregional
oil export-import balance, region III would have to produce a rather large
amount of synthetic liquid fuels from coal, starting in the year 2000. To pro-
vide the required synthetic liquid fuel production of some 1.2 to 1.3
TWyr/yr, coal imports (a total of nearly 1.7 billion tons per year by 2030)
would be necessary either as coal for domestic liquefaction or as synthetic
liquids produced in the exporting region. In the Low scenario, the import
dependence is nearly total, since imports of oil are cheaper than liquefaction.
In region IV (LA), Figures 17-11G and 17-11H, conventional oil that
could be produced economically at projected interregional oil prices could
meet only short-term demands for liquids. In the long term, liquid fuel de-
mands will exceed production of conventional oil by around 0.3 TWyr/yr by
the year 2000 and by as much as 1 to 1.6 TWyr/yr by 2030, depending on
the scenario considered. To meet these needs, however, enormous heavy
crude oil resources are available. Given the judgments of this study concern-
ing maximum rates of development and costs, the High scenario production
of heavy oils would make region IV neither a net importer nor a net exporter
in the long term. Its oil exports in the Low scenario could, however, grow to
0.2 to 0.5 TWyr/yr by 2005-2010, but decline thereafter to zero by 2025.
The major feature of the region V (Af/SEA), Figures 17-111 and 17-11j,
long-term liquid fuel demand-supply integration, is that under the conditions
of the scenarios, it would stay as a net exporter of oil until 1990 (High sce-
nario) or until 2000 (Low scenario), but then become a rather substantial
oil importeO Domestic production of conventional oil could support a peak
of nearly 0.5 TWyr/yr (2.6 billion barrels per year) by 2000 in both sce-
narios. Further decreases of conventional oil production could economically
be replaced, partially, by developing a coal liquefaction capability. These
could supply a total of 0.7 TWyr/yr, produced domestically, in the High
scenario by the year 2030 and about half that amount in the Low scenario.
Another 0.7 to 0.8 TWyr/yr, necessary to meet 2030 demand, would have
to be imported.
Region VI (ME/NAf) would continue to be the main supplier of oil to
other regions. Although this region would produce, cumulatively, some 105
TWyr (541 billion barrels) of oil by 2030 in the High scenario, this is entirely
conventional oil and represents about 80 percent of total category 1 oil
availability. (For the Low scenario, cumulative production to 2030 would
be 82 TWyr-427 billion barrels-or about 63 percent of total category 1.)
gRegion V is an exporter at present because of the few exporting countries-Indonesia, Nigeria,
Gabon-within the region. The scenarios here show aggregate domestic liquid fuel demand surpassing
the ability to export; hence the region would become a net importer.
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Nearly all of the oil produced is exported, although as Figures 17-11 K and
17-11L indicate, domestic uses grow steadily and are hardly negligible (20
to 40 percent of total production by 2030). Demands for imports from
other regions imply that the assumed region VI production ceiling of 2.38
TWyr/yr (33.6 mbd) would be constraining by 2010 in the High scenario
and by about 2030 in the Low scenario.
Region VII (C/CPA), Figures 17-11M and 17-11N, would experience
rapid growth of both liquid fuel demand and crude oil production under the
conditions of the scenarios. While this analysis does not claim any special in-
sights into region VII, it does seem that domestic oil and coal resources may
be adequate to make the region neither a net importer nor an exporter of
oil over the next several decades. If this is the case, then-as in some other
regions-a large coal liquefaction industry would be called for sometime after
the turn of the century.
Of course, such regional considerations are necessarily aggregate and thus
mask the special characteristics of the many different countries comprising
each region. The regional results should be seen in this light.
GAS SUPPLY AND DEMAND
Natural gas, as is well known, is a clean and convenient fuel. It is also well
known that natural gas is difficult to transport over long distances; its major
markets to date have been within national or regional boundaries. The High
and Low scenarios project a range of increasing gas uses, in relative terms
at least, in the developed regions, where significant amounts of gas resources
are believed to be located. Gas use in region VI would probably increase dra-
matically; resources there are almost certainly enormous.h In regions IV and
V gas use may be relatively moderate.
Although, here, major international gas trade has not been studied with
care, one should not exclude the possibilities of undersea pipelines or cryo-
genic tankers, in spite of complexities and potential dangers. And projects
such as the pipeline under the Mediterranean are already in progress.
Whether such schemes prove to have large-scale significance remains to be
seen.
Gas markets compete with oil, electricity, and to a certain extent, coal-
and they will most likely come to compete with solar devices. Iteratively,
demands for different fuels were modified in these analyses in order to arrive
at reasonably consistent prices among fuels-given assumptions about market
constraints and the built-in price differentials that naturally accompany local
conditions, regional singularities, and national policies. (These preferential
value considerations are described in Chapter 16.)
Figures 17-12A and 17-12B show global supplies of gas for the High and
the Low scenarios. In the High scenario, gas demands exhaust (regionally)
hThis increased gas use may well be at the expense of local oil use. That is, oil may be more and
more reserved for the valuable export market, while otherwise flarable gas would be used for domestic
consumption.
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Figure 17-12. Gas supply and demand, 1975-2030, globally and by region. (See Table
17-6 for definitions of categories.)
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category 1 gas (conventional gas resources at costs of $12/boe or less) and
use (regionally) 35 percent of category 2 gas (conventional gas but from
enhanced recovery and offshore areas, for example, at costs from $12 to
$20/boe). In the Low scenario, all of category 1 gas is used (regionally), as
well as 15 percent of category 2 (regionally). (For region VI only, there is
also a category 0, with natural gas available at $21boe.)
Two regions, compared in Figures 17-12C and 17-12D illustrate some of
the local diversities in gas supplies. Region I relies on domestic production
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Figure 17-12 continued.
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of gas to meet all projected gas needs. Region II is able in these scenarios to
export rather substantial amounts of gas, in spite of increasing its own de-
mands for gas quite markedly. (Gas production and demand in region II
should begin to level off by 2020 or so.) Region III (Figure 17-12E) would
import substantial amounts of gas from region II to meet its needs. Region V
(Figure 17-12F) produces small quantities of its relatively limited conven-
tional natural gas resources and relies to some extent (13 to 17 percent of
gas demands) on biogas.
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Region VI (not shown in Figure 17-12), with prodigious resources of
easily and cheaply accessible gas (most of it still flared away as a nuisance to
oil production), is projected to increase its uses of natural gas-for industry,
for buildings, and for electricity generation. Gas in this region seems to be a
perfect match of an abundant source and local (if relatively small) market.
COAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND
Much has been said already of the vast potentials and real limitations on
future large-scale production and use of coal. Here, the coal possibilities are
placed within the overall supply-demand frame of the High and Low
scenanos.
Again, it should be pointed out that the scenario considerations are not
meant to repeat or conflict with the considerations of Chapter 3. There, the
global coal potential was assessed; here, the global and regional coal needs, in
relation to other energy sources, are assessed.
A Large Resource
In both the High and Low scenarios, virtually only category 1 coal is re-
quired; the regions that use coal are those (by assumption, mostly) that
have large coal resources. And the resource base of coal category 1 is (as
already noted) by almost any measure enormous. For region I, category 1
coal is nearly as large as the oil resources of the Middle East. Globally, of
the total resource base of 561 TWyr in category 1, only 341 TWyr, or 61
percent of the total, are used by 2030 in the High scenario (224 TWyr,
40 percent in the Low scenario). In region I, 46 percent in the High sce-
nario (24 percent in the Low scenario) of the category 1 is consumed by
2030. Region III uses nearly 50 percent of its category 1 resource: If this
region were to not import coal, use of domestic resources could reach 83
percent. The coal resource amount in regions II and V are also sufficient to
easily avoid depletion, even in the High scenario, by 2030. Region VII, as-
sumed to not enter the import market for energy in the next fifty year, faces
the prospect in the scenarios of using much of its vast coal resource for do-
mestic growth. In the High scenario, nearly all of its category 1 coal is ex-
hausted, yet all of its higher cost (up to $50/ton) category 2 coal remains
available after 2030. The region VII options, other than imports, seem few
in our rather data-scarce and aggregate analysis of that region.
Coal Liquefaction
The uses of coal over time for the world are illustrated in Figure 17-13 for
the High and Low scenarios. The "solid" uses of coal were outlined in Chap-
ter 16: coal use in production of synthetic fuels is driven by demands for
gaseous and/or liquid fuels and the availability of other sources.
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Figure 17-13. Global coal supply and demand, 1975-2030.
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It is clear from Figure 17-13 that the assumptions behind the High and
Low scenarios lead to very large future coal liquefaction industries. Indeed,
the lowest assessment of demands for liquid fuels, coupled with optimisti-
cally high oil availabilities in various regions, coupled with favorably low cost
estimates for synthetic liquids production, produce great needs for liquids
produced from coal.
This is a major observation. Coal will be needed in very great amount for
the production of liquid fuels. Unless the scenario estimates of demands for
liquid fuels (see Chapter 16) are greatly in error, there seems little margin
for other than synthetic liquid fuel production to meet the needs. The mag-
nitude of the result warrants some careful regional looks.
The United States has fantastic coal resources. So does the USSR. The
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open question in both cases is the rate of extraction. And the range of
answers can make great differences in the long-term energy picture in region
1, region II, and the world. For region I, a ceiling of nearly 2.9 billion tons
per year (2700 GWyr/yr) of coal production has been assumed-based on
limitations of rail transport, water availability for Western U.S. surface min-
ing, limited coal uses (as coal) within the United States and Canada, few deep
water port facilities, and air quality and other environmental considerations.
This ceiling, and the constraints assumed for region II and other regions, are
summarized in Table 17-10. Three billion tons of coal per year in the United
States is an enormous mining activity: it is nearly five times the 1978 U.S.
production rate. (For comparison, in the High scenario, the North America
gross domestic product grows by 3.75.) It is nearly twice the present coal
mining of the whole world. It means great capital investments, large land
uses, substantial numbers of new miners. Presumably, it could be done; the
assumptions of these scenarios imply that it must.
The rapid rise in coal output (including coal for export) in North America
from 2015 to 2030 (Figures 17-14A and 17-14B) in these scenarios is at
an annual rate of about 3.5 percent per year. This vigorous but not implaus-
ible effort at coal expansion during the peak of the "transition period" sig-
nals again the great need for-and the restricted availability of-liquid fuel
during that time.
The coal supply and demand in the High and Low scenarios in region II
does not differ greatly from that in region I, as Figures 17-14C and 17-14D
illustrate. Coal is used for solid fuel demands and for liquefaction, with
electricity-generated uses declining near the end of the period in the High
scenario as coal production limits (3500 GWyr/yr, including coal produced
for export either as coal or as synthetic liquids) are reached. Some 1060
GWyr/yr of coal are input to coal liquefaction by 2030 in the High scenario
(480 GWyr/yr in the Low scenario) or nearly 40 percent of all coal produced
for domestic use.
Table 17-10. Coal maximum production assumptions, High and Low scenar-
ios (maximum annual domestic production constraint [GWyr/yra ] ).
Base Year
Year
Region 1975 1985 2000 2015 2030
)b (NA) 559 900 1500 2000 2700
II c (SU/EE) 807 1300 2400 3000 3500
III (WE/JANZ) 466 600 800 1000 1000
V (At/SEA) 116 225 450 825 1315
VII(C/CPA) 325 800 1500 2000 3500
a l GWyr/yr = 1.08 x 106 tce per year.
bTo reach 2700 GW by 2020.
CFigures given are for High scenario; Low scenario limits, from 1985 to 2030, are 1600,2600,
2900,3000.
Note.' These constraints represent the roughly assessed composite and aggregate limitations of
water, manpower, transport, environmental safeguarding, and so forth in each region.
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Figure 17-14. Coal supply and demand for regions I, II, III, and V, 1975-2030.
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At the same time, coal is in increasing demand as a source of district heat
and heat from combined heat and power plants. This use of coal reflects a
definite intent in the Soviet Union and several East European countries to
make use of available primary resources (coal as well as nuclear and natural
gas) in this way (see the section below on centralized heat supply).
Part of the coal outputs from regions I and II is exported to region III in
the scenarios. Figure 17-14E shows the reason why. With restricted oil ex-
ports from region VI in about the period 2005-2020 and with limited do-
mestic oil production possibilities, region III is forced to import coal from
coal-rich regions I and II for rising liquid fuel needs. Region III options in
these scenarios are quite limited. Domestic oil production is small; coal pro-
duction is large-even at 1076 million tons per year it is two and a half times
today's level-but it is not sufficient for the requisite scale of synthetic
liquid fuel production within the region. The greatest expansion in coal pro-
duction is assumed to occur in Australia-with completely internal (to region
III) movement of coal assumed. Still, the truly binding constraint for region
III is the supply of liquid fuels. By 2030 in the High scenario, regions I and
II could be liquifying an aggregate total of over 2.5 TWyr Iyr of coal (1.6
TWyr/yr in the Low scenario). Total coal imports to region III in 2030 are
more than 1.5 TWyr/yr.
Although coal trade is treated here, the traded quantity could as well
(perhaps better) be synthetic liquid fuels produced from coal. Whether
regions I and II would choose to produce coal and export it or to produce
coal, convert it, and export the synthetic oil is not crucial to these analyses.
What is vital is the need for liquid fuels in region III and the availabilities of
coal as the ultimate source of these liquids on a truly global scale.
The vast exploitation on a global scale is mirrored also in a relative way in
region V (see Figure 17-14F). There, domestic coal production would ex-
pand more than elevenfold in fifty years in the High scenario (GDP would
grow tenfold in the same period, High scenario). However, in this region coal
is used directly as a solid fuel to a large extent in these scenarios, but with a
significant portion generating electricity as well, while a relatively modest
fraction goes into a synthetic fuels industry.
In region VII (not shown) the same general trend of coal results appears.
The coal resource base is large, but so is demand growth. By 2030, 72 per-
cent of all primary energy uses would be met by coal. This coal would be
used in fairly large proportions both as a solid fuel and to produce synthetic
liquid fuels. Economic growth and development in region VII is likely to be
constrained, as in other regions, by limited resources: more growth than
postulated here would mean more coal, already produced at 3.2 TWyr/yr
(nearly 3.5 billion tons per year) by 2030 under the conditions of the High
scenario. This is some 19 percent higher than region I coal output in the
High scenario in that year. Nearly 60 percent of total coal output is required
to produce liquid fuels.
Worldwide in 2030, about 6.7 TWyr/yr-56 percent of all coal produc-
tion-would go to the production of synthetic liquid fuels under the assump-
tions of the High scenario. This 6.7 TWyr/yr is over 80 percent of the total
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energy use in the world today. Some 38 percent of all the liquid fuels con-
sumed in 2030 in the High scenario originates with coal. And 80 to 90 per-
cent of this liquid fuel consumption total, as explained in Chapter 16, is for
difficult to substitute transportation and feedstock uses.
All of this leads to the central observation that liquid fuel supply is the
critical problem in the long-term-that meeting essential needs for liquid
fuels poses the greatest challenge to future energy supply systems. And in
particular, it leads to the observation that the world's oil resources are in-
adequate for the job unless shale oils, tar sands, or heavy oils are developed
on a truly global, terawatt scale without the supplement of synthetic liquid
fuels from coal. Even then, coal is pressed to (and maybe beyond) its fea-
sible limits of supply. New technologies that stretch out the lifetime of coal
resources by greater efficiencies-coupled with large heat sources such as the
breeder reactor or the sun- have been mentioned in Chapters 4 and 5, re-
spectively; in Chapter 18 they will be placed generally in an overall supply
context. Also in Chapter 18, the possibility of exploiting the world's natural
gas resources as a means of producing liquid fuels will be taken up. The
analyses here seem to point to the need to explore alternatives of these
kinds.
CENTRALIZED HEAT SUPPLY
In several world regions steps are being taken (and have been taken) to use
indigenous primary energy sources for the centralized production and dis-
tribution of heat. These schemes include district heat plants and facilities
for the combined generation of heat and power (commonly called cogen-
eration).
In the Soviet Union, and in a number of Eastern European countries,
district heat and cogeneration plants already supply a substantial fraction
of heating requirements-70 percent of total low and medium temperature
heat needs in the Soviet Union, for example. Also, some 30 percent of
heating needs of buildings in urban areas come from cogeneration plants;
this share is thought to rise to perhaps 50 percent by the year 2000 and to
70 percent by 2030. Soviet national planning and siting of industrial and
housing construction is being designed to facilitate the expansion of high
capacity cogeneration plants. This continuing move toward centralization,
it is argued, will improve urban air quality and allow for a broader use of a
variety of fuels (including indigenous low grade coal, for example-an
extremely important consideration in much of Eastern Europe).
In cities in the Soviet Union, centralized heat sources (both district heat
plants-large boilers-and combined heat and power plants) now account
for some 45 percent of all heat consumption. Plans to expand these facili-
ties are vigorous and include the use of many primary sources, including
nuclear energy, solely for heat supply. As Figure 17-15A shows, coal is
likely to be the largest source of total district heat in region II, with abun-
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Figure 17-15. Centralized heat supply in region II (SlI/EE), High scenario, 1975-2030.
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dant gas also being used extensively, particularly in the near to medium
term.
Figure 17-15B shows the projected sources of heat for combined cycle
plants in region II, High scenario. Coal is seen as the largest source of the
future, with conventional nuclear reactors contributing a growing share,
particularly after the turn of the century, when coal comes more and more
to be required for synthetic liquid fuel production.
Oil will not be used as a major source for centralized heat supply. Indeed,
in region II at least (and to lesser degrees in other regions), it is precisely the
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desire to minimize liquid fuel consumption that leads to the centralized heat
supply exploitation. The planned concentration of residential areas and in-
dustrial complexes not only facilitates centralized heat supply, it also miti-
gates the need for long-distance daily travel-and hence dampens the growth
in liquid fuel demand.
Other regions are projected in these scenarios to have growing centralized
heat supplies, but none approaching the scale of that in region II. In region
III, several Western European countries (most notably Sweden) already make
use of district heat schemes. While in the region as a whole the number is
still quite small, the scenario assumptions lead to as much as 138 GWyr/yr
of district heat demand by 2030-or about 3 percent of total secondary
energy needs.
Widespread global adoption of centralized heat schemes is uncertain. As
buildings become better insulated, heat demands become less intense, and
the economics of district heat become less clear. Cogeneration, however,
should be an attractive option wherever industries can be suitably concen-
trated. In general, most regions are projected to continue the present pat-
tern-decentralized heat supply and centralized electricity generation.
ELECTRICITY GENERATION
The sources of electricity today vary considerably from region to region. In
North America (region I) in 1975, 43 percent of electric power was gener-
ated with coal, 27 percent with oil and gas, 21 percent with hydroelectric
power, and 8 percent with nuclear reactors. (The nuclear share was nearly 15
percent by 1979.) In Western Europe and Japan, the role of fossil fuels was
somewhat lower and that of hydroelectric power higher. In the developing
regions, however, hydroelectric power provided in 1975 as much as 40 per-
cent of the electricity generated, with coal providing 30 percent, and oil and
gas together about 30 percent.
In contrast, by 2030 the picture may change markedly. Figure 17-16
shows electricity generation globally and for three sample regions for the
High scenario to 2030, as they result from the assumptions already stated
and the calculations in the MESSAGE model. Hydroelectric resources, for
example, contribute in significantly different ways in different regions, as
Figure 17-17 illustrates.
Total secondary electricity demand for the world grows at an average 2.4
to 3.3 percent per year in the two scenarios to 2030-reaching 3000 to 4700
GW(e) of capacity. This electricity, as was described in Chapter 16, is used
primarily for those purposes for which electricity is specially suited. Thus,
the electrical capacity estimate here is less than the 10 TW(e) of installed
nuclear capacity considered in Chapter 4, whereas in other chapters of Part
II, the maximum potential of a particular supply source is evaluated. When
real world constraints are introduced region by region, as in these scenarios,
revised estimates inevitably result.
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Figure 17-16. Electricity generation, 1975-2030, High scenario, globally and by regions
I, II, and V.
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Some Regional Characteristics
In regions I and III, electricity demand and generation grew at rates of 5 to
7 percent per year during the 1960s and early 1970s. But the 1973-1974
global recession, coupled with rapidly rising oil prices and heightened atten-
tion to holding down energy use, reduced electricity growth in the late
1970s. In both the High and Low scenario projections, electricity is reserved
more and more for its special purposes-for example, lighting and home ap-
pliances (see Chapter 16). Because of this, secondary electricity demand in
region I would grow by just 1.4 to 2 percent per year, to 640 to 880 GW(e)
of capacity in 2030 in the scenarios.
As Figure 17-16B illustrates, nuclear power would be a dominant source
of electricity in region I in these scenarios by 2030. Nuclear power would
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Figure 17-17. Global hydroelectric resources, total installed and installable capability,
world regions. Top arrow in each regional column is the assumed maximum realizable by
MESSAGE. Bottom arrow is the actual realized by MESSAGE in 2030, both High and
Low scenarios; area of column proportional to total potential installable capacity.
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provide 39 to 43 percent of electricity production in the year 2000 (from
15 percent today) and nearly 81 percent by 2030 in region I. The situation
is very similar in region III: 85 percent of all electricity would be from nu-
clear power in 2030 in the High scenario (76 percent in the Low scenario).
Such large shares mean that virtually all baseload power generation would be
from nuclear power, as well as some intermediate load: however, the pro-
jections represent growth rates that are only a fraction of the maximum
rates considered in Chapter 4. Because natural uranium supplies are limited,
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fuel for conventional reactors would be very costly after 2000. The breeder
reactor would become economically competitive under these scenario
assumptions from 2010 to 2030, and the installed capacity of breeders
would grow at a rate of some 15 percent per year in region I in the High
scenario. Other potential sources of electric power-oil, gas, and coal-would
be required to meet other fuels demands, with only nuclear and to a certain
extent hydroelectric power remaining to supply electricity needs.
In region II, the same general trends as in region I can be observed. Nu-
clear sources would provide as much as 66 percent of all electricity generated
in 2030. Coal declines as an electricity source in the High scenario as it be-
comes increasingly needed for synthetic fuels production; it meets 6 percent
of electricity needs in the High scenario and 17 percent in the Low scenario.
Hydroelectric power supplies a relatively constant 3 to 4 percent of elec-
tricity needs (see Figure 17-16C).
As the plot for region V in Figure 17-16D indicates, the situation for the
developing regions differs substantially from that of the developed regions.
Nuclear power would provide a noticeable but relatively modest share of
electricity needs by 2030 in both of the scenarios. Hydroelectricity would
meet a substantial and growing share of demand; a large potential for hydro-
power development remains in many countries of Africa and Asia. (Of
course, the resource is not inexpensive, as shown in Table 17-4, and the
infrastructure needs for development are not small. But the potential is
large.) Where hydroelectric power is not available, coal could be a major
source of electricity, and oil and gas would provide substantial fractions.
By 2030 in region V, the mix of electricity generation is very roughly
one-third coal, one-third nuclear, and one-third hydroelectric power-but
coal seems to be declining (relatively) while hydroelectric and particularly
nuclear power grow. The result is qualitatively the same in the High and
the Low scenarios. In region IV, where coal is not plentiful, hydroelectric
plants would provide nearly 30 percent of electricity generated by 2030.
Region VI would rely heavily on cheap, locally available natural gas-coupled
with modest amounts of nuclear energy-for electricity production. The mas-
sive coal deposits in region VII would provide for up to 34 percent of elec-
tricity output; nuclear and hydroelectric power generate most of the remain-
ing electric demand.
The large emphasis on nuclear power in these scenarios warrants closer
examination. What will be the character and timing of worldwide nuclear
power development during the coming five decades?
Electricity Sources: The Choices
Many constraints to worldwide nuclear power development are obvious-the
time and cost and both design and construction, especially of breeders or
advanced converter reactors; the uncertain availability of natural uranium
and plutonium; and the social constraints resulting from the popular distrust
of nuclear power because of perceived environmental, safety, or military
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risks. The attempt here is to embrace (in a highly aggregate fashion) all these
issues in the MESSAGE model, where the calculations for the development
of nuclear power for the two scenarios are performed. One observation from
these calculations is that, whether breeder reactors or an intermediate pop-
ulation of advanced converters are visualized, the availability of uranium is a
serious constraint. The amount of "cheap" ($80/kg U) uranium is fully used
everywhere, and in the High scenario in the developed regions I, II, and III
the total available amount of even high cost ($80 to $130/kg U) uranium is
consumed. Indeed, in the High scenario virtually all of category 1 and more
than 15 percent of category 2 uranium throughout the world would be con-
sumed by 2030. In the Low scenario, nearly all of category 1 and some of
category 2 uranium would be consumed. The total potential uranium re-
sources assumed here was some 24.5 million tons worldwide (see Chapter 4).
By 2030, the total global installed capacity of conventional and advanced
reactors would reach 2600 to 4400 GW(e) in the scenarios from 72 GW(e) by
1975. Table 17-11 shows that this is some 40 percent of all installed elec-
trical capacity by 2030 or about 60 percent of total electricity generated
(from 5 percent today). By the year 2000, the nuclear capacity would be
630 to 870 GW(e). Since present worldwide plans and commitments for
nuclear power stations (which take ten years or so to bring on stream) are
well known, we know that the global 1990 nuclear installed capacity can be
Table 17-11. Global electricity generation in two supply scenarios to 2030:
highlighting nuclear shares.
Base High Scenario Low ScenarioYear
Secondary Electricity 7975 2000 2030 2000 2030
Generated
Electricity, secondary (TWyr/yr) 0.75 2.1 4.7 1.7 3.0
Electricity as share of total secondary (%) (12) (16.4) (19.3) (16.4) (19.1)
LWR (TWyr/yr) 0.04 0.61 1.06 0.45 0.57
LWRa as share of total electricity (%) (2) (29.4) (22.9) (27.1 ) (19.2)
FBR (TWyr/yr) 0 0.01 1.81 0.01 1.21
FBR b as share of total electricity (%) (0) (0.67) (38.2) (0.44) (40.6)
Rest (TWyr/yr) 0.67 1.46 1.87 1.21 1.21
Res{ as share of total electricity (%) (95) (59.9) (39.4) (72.5) (40.3)
Installed Capacityd
LWR (TW) 0.08 0.85 1.8 0.62 0.91
LWR as share of total capacity (%) (5) (19) (18) (17) (14)
FBR (TW) 0 0.02 2.6 0.01 1.7
FB R as share of total capacity (%) (0) (0.5) (26) (0.3) (27)
Rest (TW) 1.49 3.5 5.5 2.9 3.7
Rest as share of total capacity (%) (95) (80) (56) (82) (58)
a LWR includes conventional burner reactors (e.g., light water reactors and CANDU reactors).
b FBR includes breeder reactors and advanced converter reactors.
c" Rest" are all nonnuclear electricity generating sources-coal, advanced coal, oil and gas, hydro,
hard solar.
d Assuming a load factor of 70 percent.
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no more than 390 GW(e). It could easily be less. Thus, the estimates of the
year 2000 nuclear installed capacity in the High and Low scenarios here
reflect a renewed commitment, over the next few years, to nuclear power
buildup in many regions of the world. And, the year 2030 estimate reflects
a continued nuclear buildup, constrained only by the buildup rate limits of
Table 17-5, the availability of uranium, and certain restrictions on the ex-
tent to which nuclear can produce nonbaseload power.
Obviously, the renewed and vigorous buildup of nuclear electric capacity
over the next few years is in some doubt. At this writing, the 1979 incident
at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania,
has caused U.S. utilities, government regulators, and the public to pause-
indefinitely, perhaps-and to rethink the swirl of issues surrounding alter-
native sources of electricity. It is not the intent here to say whether this is
right or wrong. Rather, the point is to produce estimates, for scenarios, that
speculate on the possible. To constrain nuclear more than has been done for
these scenarios would, in our judgment, be to unduly react to very complex
current modes and tendencies. There is no telling, for example, to what ex-
tent coal-fired power plants may face similar or even more serious ob~tacles
than nuclear. The constraints on all energy sources in these scenarios are
intended to represent best available assessments of what is possible in each
case, given economic, physical, and (only generally) environmental and insti-
tutional realities.
Still, one observes that the energy supply-demand-balancing analyses pro-
duce large nuclear shares and much smaller shares of other sources of elec-
tricity. There are two main reasons for this. First, cost. Table 17-4 reported
the assumptions that show the cost advantage that nuclear may hold over
certain alternative sources of electricity (solar, in particular). Solar, in addi-
tion, would be constrained by maximum buildup rate limits.
Second, the viable large-scale nonnuclear sources of electricity are supply
constrained in these cases. Coal, a potential major contributor to power pro-
duction, is constrained by the assumptions of Table 17-10 and is needed in
large measure for synthetic liquid fuel production. Oil is clearly supply
limited; gas turns out to be a very expensive electricity source. Hydropower
is exploited, as already noted, to perhaps its feasible limits. On a large scale,
only nuclear is left.
Clearly, the collective assumptions here point to the global need for nu-
clear electricity in the medium and long term. And there is much in the sce-
narios presented here, it would seem, to substantiate that view. But in this
instance, as in others, there are choices-choices that have costs. Nuclear
electric shares could be much lower if electricity demands were lower (see
discussion in Chapter 16), or if the coal constraints were much higher, or if
solar technologies become viable much sooner than anticipated. Prudent
planning would, in our judgment, argue against any of these choices. If the
world is to have low nuclear shares, then some of the consequent hard
choices must be made.
Recognizing the potentiality of this, in Chapter 18 a "no nuclear" case is
explored. The choice for little or no nuclear can be made, as will be demon-
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strated for the Low scenario. In the final analyses, it may simply be a ques-
tion of relative priorities and values. Different regions of the world are likely
to take very different paths to the future.
RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCESi
Nuclear energy is not the only new source on the horizon. Over the next
fifty years, one would expect substantial energy contributions to come from
renewable energy sources-for example, "soft" solar systems, biogas, wood,
wind. This, to a degree, will be the case. Yet one should carefully examine
the technical and practical production potentials of these sources, and this
has been done (see Chapters 5 and 6).
Here, only commercial supplies of renewables are discussed-energy
sources bought and sold. Noncommercial sources are discussed briefly in
Chapter 16, as are the potentials for soft solar. In this section, the potentials
for certain other renewable and local energy sources in developing regions
are assessed.
Although these sources are in principle eternally available, their use to
date has been limited by generally unfavorable economics. This may change,
as costs of traditional energy supplies rise. Also, the difficulties of exploiting,
harvesting, transporting, distributing, and using renewable energy sources are
today generally greater than for fossil fuels. Nonetheless, some renewable
sources are in rather wide use already-notably hydroelectric power in both
the developed and the developing regions and biomass as a noncommercial
source in some developing regions.
Large-scale, centralized hydroelectric capacity plays an important role in
the scenario projections reported here (see Figure 17-17). In addition, small-
scale hydroelectric power facilities and wind converters may have useful
applications in certain favorable locations. (Romania, for example, plans the
construction of a series of 50 MW(e) hydroelectric stations along the Dan-
ube.) In spite of typically high per unit generation costs, transmission costs
for small-scale facilities sited close to villages and small towns near rivers or
high wind coastal areas may be lower than costs for electricity transmitted
to these places from distant central grids. While the reliability of such
sources might be a question, this should pose no serious problem for rural
and agricultural requirements. By assuming that about half of the villages
and small towns in the developing regions are sufficiently favorably located,
one can roughly estimate the possible supply from small-scale hydroelectric
and wind sources-up to 80 percent of electric power needed for agriculture
and as much as 60 percent of the electricity needs of villages (and 30 per-
cent of that of small towns). These assumptions lead to small-scale hydro-
electric and wind power supplying 6 to 8 percent of all electricity demand in
2030 in regions IV, V, and VI. However, there are many uncertainties
underlying these estimates-the geographical distribution of populated areas,
iThis section reports on the work of A.M. Khan. For further analysis, see Khan (1980).
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the financing and management of large numbers of decentralized facilities,
cost economics, and so forth. Accordingly, these potentials are not incorpo-
rated explicitly in the supply schemes of the High and Low scenarios already
described, but are assumed to be implicitly covered in the shares of hydro-
electric power projected for the developing regions.
The possible share of biomass (wood from forests and plantations, agri-
cultural and animal wastes) in meeting the substitutable fossil fuel demands
in regions IV and V was considered in Chapter 16. It was estimated that if
an aggressive policy is pursued in regions IV and V to make use of charcoal,
wood, and biogas, by 2030 about 166 to 247 GWyr/yr of substitutable fossil
fuel in region IV and 273 to 424 GWyr/yr in region V could be replaced by
charcoal/wood or biogas-if a sufficient supply of these could be organized
on a commercial basis. In addition to these it should also be possible to use
charcoal in place of coke in steel making. Assuming that up to 60 percent of
coke requirements of steel industries in regions IV and V in 2030 would
also be met by charcoal, the total quantity of fossil fuel to be replaced by
wood/charcoal would, by 2030, amount to 196 to 301 GWyr/yr of final
energy in region IV and 259 to 433 GWyr/yr in region V. An additional 35
to 40 GWyr/yr of fossil fuel equivalent in region V could be met by biogas
generation by 2030. These demand estimates have been incorporated in the
supply scenarios as part of "renewables" supply (see Figures 17-2 and 17-3).
The estimated fuel production costs from organized harvesting of the
natural forests, from plantations based on fast-growing trees, and from bio-
gas plants are already quite competitive with the prices of some fossil fuels.
Their costs may even gain an edge as fossil fuels become more scarce and
their prices increase. However, the question is whether available resources of
biomass could meet the above estimates of demand on a sustainable basis.
The present land utilization patterns of different world regions are shown in
Table 17-12. Developing regions IV and V both have relatively large re-
sources of forests-extending over areas of the order of one billion hectares-
while region VI has a meager 28 million hectare area covered under forests
and woodland. The potential regenerative capacity of forests in these re-
Table 17-12. Distribution of population and land in 1975, by region.
Forests
Popu- Arable Permanent and Other Total
lation Lancfl Pastures Wood Land Land Land
Region (70· ) (7 D· ha) (70· ha) (7 D· ha) (7 D· ha) (7 D· ha)
I (NA) 237 253 240 627 715 1835
II (SU/EE) 363 278 387 949 712 2327
III (WE!JANZ) 560 192 651 318 239 1400
IV (LA) 319 142 527 1071 374 2115
V (At/SEA) 1422 456 710 963 1074 3203
VI (ME/NAt) 133 44 172 28 802 1045
VII (C/CPA) 912 141 359 201 450
" 50
alncluding area under permanent crops.
Source: FAO (1 977).
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gions, expressed in terms of average annual increment of dry wood above
ground, is estimated at about 3.5 tons per hectare (Earl 1975). This gives
a total annual regeneration of about 3.5 billion tons of dry wood with an
energy content of about 2 TWyr in each of the two regions. Much higher
yields of wood-6 to 30 tons per hectare and even higher (e.g., Earl 1975;
Revelle 1979) may be obtained in energy plantations by raising specific vari-
eties of fast-growing trees on marginal farm land. However, arable land in
the developing regions is in short supply; the development of new land for
energy plantations must be considered in direct competition with the addi-
tionalland required to support the food needs of a rapidly increasing popu-
lation. And the apparent and widely publicized problem of deforestation
in these regions leaves little to spur hope of developing energy-producing
forests.
In view of these difficulties and those of access, transportation, manage-
ment, and environmental safeguarding, it is assumed that by 2030 no more
than about one-third of the forest areas in regions IV and V could be har-
vested for energy purposes. Moreover, since wood is also not a convenient
fuel in industry or urban areas, most of available wood would have to be
converted to charcoal-a relatively more transportable fuel, burned with
an efficiency comparable to that of fossil fuels. As the conversion efficiency
of wood to charcoal is about 45 percent (Earl 1975), the forests in each of
regions IV and V could supply a maximum of about 300 GWyr/yr of fossil
fuel replacement. This would be quite adequate for meeting the charcoal!
wood demands of region IV in both the High and the Low scenarios as well
as the Low scenario demand of region V, but would need to be supple-
mented by some 150 GWyr/yr by plantation wood or some other means
(e.g., crop residues) for meeting the High scenario demand of region V in
2030. If the entire remaining demand were to be met by plantations, the
corresponding land requirements would be about 17 million hectares, which
is equivalent to about 4 percent of the present arable land in region V.
Agricultural wastes in 1975 in regions IV and V from cereal production
alone amounted to about 55 and 200 GWyr/yr (Parikh 1980; Revelle 1979).
These figures could be perhaps 50 percent higher if residues from other crops
and dung of cattle fed on pastures are also included (Revelle 1979). About
one-third of all agricultural and animal wastes was probably used as a non-
commercial fuel in these regions in 1975 (Parikh 1980). Over the next fifty
years, agricultural production and the consequent usable wastes will likely
increase by factors of three to five. Some of these farm and animal wastes
will certainly be returned to the fields in order to maintain the soil quality,
and some more may find nonenergy applications in industry-for example,
as feed material in the paper and pulp industry. Still, if fossil fuels are scarce
or if wood supply from forests is inadequate and/or if the plantations are
undesirable-as may well be the case in region V-a significant fraction of
the agricultural and animal wastes would necessarily become an important
fuel source.
In Chapter 16, the requirements for biogas for rural households in region
V were estimated as 35 to 40 GWyr/yr in 2030. This implies that by 2030
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Table 17-13. Resource utilizationa of renewable energy sources in regions
IV (LA), V (Af/SEA), and VI (ME/NAf) in the High and Low scenarios.
Maximum
Capacity in 2030
Production High Low
Capacity Scenario Scenario
(GWyr/yr) (GWyr/yr) (GWyr/yr)
Hyd roe lec tricity b
IV (LA) 583 355 355
V (Af/SEA) 761 426 426
VI (ME/NAf) 68 12 12
Wood from ForestsC
IV (LA) 2090 704 458
V (Af/SEA) 1880 673 604
VI (ME/NAt) 55 0 0
Wood from Plantationsc
IV (LA) NA 0 0
V (Af/SEA) NA 340 0
VI (ME/NAf) NA 0 0
Agricultural and Animal Wastesd
IV (LA) 291-374 0 0
V (Af/SEA) 1054-1355 67 58
VI (ME/NAf) 98-126 0 0
aCommercial energy use only.
bThe figures refer to primary energy equivalents at an efficiency of about 37 percent.
cThese data refer to dry wood above ground; it is assumed in the scenarios that the harvested wood
will be converted to charcoal with an efficiency of about 0.45 before it is used as a replacement of
fossil fuels.
dThe agricultural and animal wastes are assumed to increase by 2030 to 3.5 to 4.5 times the
1975 value. The commercial use of these wastes is assumed through biogas generation for which the
conversion efficiency is taken as 0.60.
NA-Not available.
about 60 to 70 GWyr/yr of agricultural and animal wastes would be used for
biogas production, assuming a conversion efficiency of 60 percent (Makhi-
jani and Poole 1975). The charcoal/wood needs (150 GWyr/yr of fossil fuel
replacement in the High scenario) not covered by forest biomass in region
V may also be met by turning some agricultural wastes into pellets suitable
for use as fuel in urban households and industry.
Table 17-13 reports both the assessed maximum production capacity in
each of regions IV, V, and VI and the capacity used in the scenarios in 2030.
These figures are within the potentials analyzed in a more global fashion in
Chapter 6.
It is certainly not possible to prescribe an optimum allocation of biomass
sources for meeting the future needs of developing regions. The supply
scheme for region V considered herd envisages by 2030 an annual supply of
jThere are other approaches for using biomass energy that have not been considered here. For
example. Brazil in 1976 produced about 0.2 GWyr/yr of fuel alcohol using sugarcane and intends to
extend this activity to about 3 GWyr/yr by 1980 (GoJdemberg 1979). This would require about 1
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272 to 303 GWyr/yr of charcoalk from natural forests, 0 to 153 GWyr/yr of
charcoal from plantations, and 35 to 40 GWyr/yr of biogas from agricultural
and animal wastes. In region IV, biomass fuel supplies are assumed to come
solely from forests, at levels of 206 to 317 GWyr/yr of charcoal by 2030.
CARBON DIOXIDE AND FOSSIL FUEL USE!
Large-scale exploitation of fossil fuels, as these scenarios project, carries with
it the likely buildup of the carbon dioxide content in the atmosphere, and
this carries possible implications for the globe's climate (see Chapter 10).
Here, the carbon dioxide buildup resulting from the High and the Low sce-
narios is assessed.
The calculated carbon dioxide emissions into the atmosphere resulting
from fossil fuel use in the two scenarios enter the global carbon cycle simu-
lated by a model described in Niehaus (1976, 1978). The following calcula-
tions are based on a preindustrial atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration
of 298 ppm (by volume), which increased to 335 ppm in 1978 (NOAA
1979). Biomass on land was assumed to grow by 10 percent until about the
year 2000.
Estimates of global average temperature changes were taken from Au-
gustsson and Ramanathan (1977). They calculated a nearly linear contribu-
tion from the weak bands and a leveling off contribution from the 15 pm
bands, which sum to a total increase of the average global temperature in
the lower troposphere of about 1.9 K for a doubling of atmospheric carbon
dioxide concentration from 300 to 600 ppm. For polar regions an ampli-
fying factor of about three to five times the average temperature would have
to be considered.
The results for the High and Low scenarios are given in Figures 17-18A
and 17-18B. It is estimated that by the year 2030 atmospheric carbon diox-
ide concentration would have increased to about 500 ppm for the High sce-
nario and to about 430 ppm for the Low scenario. The temperature changes
would then be about 1.1 K and 0.8 K, respectively, above the temperature
level of 1967 by 2030, with all other climatic parameters held constant.
It is not yet possible to give a final evaluation of the consequences of such
a change in global average temperature; it could result in shifts of climatic
zones or rainfall patterns with implications for the world's food production.
It is not even possible to give probability estimates of their occurrence or
to add uncertainty bands to the concentration and temperature curves
million hectares of arable land (i.e., about 3 percent of Brazil's present arable land area) and $2 to
$4 billion of investment. However, in view of the uncertain cost economics of this operation and its
strong competition with food production requirements of arable land, alcohol production at several
tens of GWyr/yr scale is not considered a viable future option.
kCharcoal figures assume 5 percent losses in transportation. Both charcoal and biogas are then
equivalent to primary fuels replacement.
lThis section is contributed by Friedrich Niehaus.
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Figure 17-18. CO2 emissions, atmospheric CO 2 concentration, and temperature change,
High and Low scenarios.
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of Figures 17-18A and 17-18B. However, a comparison of the estimated
changes with the historical trends in the northern hemisphere (Mitchell
1970) demonstrates the magnitude of this problem. Climate is not a stable
system, and changes do occur. As has been shown by Flohn (1977), several
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rapid changes in the order of 2 to 4 K did occur in Central Europe over the
past 20,000 years. The time constants of these changes were in the order
of decades.
According to the estimates given here, it should be possible to detect a
"carbon dioxide signal" before the turn of the century, if the present esti-
mates of the greenhouse effect are correct.
The steep increases in carbon dioxide concentration in the year 2030 also
demonstrate that the time period used for these calculations is much too
short to evaluate the potential consequences of any large-scale exploitation
of fossil fuels. It has been shown (Niehaus 1978) that if a signal were de-
tected around the year 2000 and even if drastic steps were taken to reduce
fossil fuel consumption, the atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration
would still be expected to increase for at least another forty years.
The remaining rather disturbing uncertainties in this area demonstrate
the urgent need for extensive and continuous research. The implications
could be great, and the lead times for action are clearly long.
CUMULATIVE FOSSIL FUEL USE
The High and Low supply scenarios detailed here incorporate a number of
nonfossil fuel energy sources. Yet as has repeatedly been pointed out, fossil
fuel use in these scenarios remains high. Since there is, of course, a finite
amount of such resources available for ultimate use, a fair question is: How
much of the total resource would be consumed in the scenario projections?
The estimate of this study of total oil resources at costs less than $20/boe
is 464 TWyr (327 billion tons or 2400 billion barrels of oil equivalent). This
total includes some small amounts of shale resources, rather large amounts
(at least 90 TWyr) of heavy crude oils, and much enhanced oil recovery. Of
this total, the High scenario uses by 2030 some 317 TWyr (1630 billion bar-
rels of oil equivalent); the Low scenario uses 264 TWyr. Of the assumed 373
TWyr of the unconventional, high cost ($25/boe) oil (mostly shale), only
4.4 TWyr are used in the High scenario, none in the Low scenario.
In Table 17-14 these cumulative oil figures are given, as well as those for
natural gas and coal. The world is not running out of resources. But the
world is running into expensive, difficult, unconventional fossil resources.
We are running uphill and remain rather unsure of what is on the other side.
For better or worse, it seems to be a large hill.
Table 17-14 shows that natural gas is not consumed, relative to the avail-
able resource base, nearly as much as oil. Only 66 percent of cheap category
1 gas is consumed by 2030 in the High scenario; only 16 percent of category
2 gas is used. This result points to the possibly vast potential for exploiting
gas resources (perhaps to produce liquid fuels, as posed in the next chapter),
as well as to the restricted uses and difficult transport of gas.
The world's coal resources would not be consumed very severely relative
to their total availability. However, coal is produced in tremendous quanti-
ties in these scenarios, as has been repeatedly observed. This simply illus-
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Table 17-14. Cumulative uses of fossil fuels, 1975 to 2030, High and Low
scenarios. a
High Scenario Low Scenario
Total
Resource Total Remaining Total Remaining
A ~ailableb consumed resource consumed resource
(TWyr) (TWyr) (yrsl (TWyr) (yrs)d
Oil
Category 1 + 2 464 317 21 264 40
Category 3 373 4 54 0 74
Natu ral Gas
Category 1 + 2 408 199 35 145 76
Category 3 130 0 22 0 38
Coal c
Category 1 560 341 18 224 52
Category 2 1019 nil 85 nil 158
a For definition of terms and categories, see Tables 17-6 and 17-7.
bTotal resources, including to be discovered, as of 1975.
cCoal use includes coal converted to synthetic liquid fuels and gas.
d Number of years the remaining resource would last if it were consumed at the 2030 annual
rate of fuel use and if it all came from the designated category.
trates the vastness of the coal resource and the contrasting difficulty of
greatly expanded coal production. Even with plenty of coal resources avail-
able, there may be many compelling reasons for restraining its exploration,
as illustrated by the carbon dioxide considerations of the preceding section.
WHERE DO THE SUPPLY SCENARIOS LEAD?
Fifty years is a long time. In this period it is not likely, as shown in this
chapter, that the world will "run out" of oil. Or as one energy analyst has
put it, it is not so much that we are running out as that we are running. The
pace of energy growth, coupled with its large global magnitude, challenges
energy supply systems to keep up-even while total resources (perhaps at
high cost) are quite abundantly available.
The supply scenarios detailed in this chapter have been built up through
consideration of a great many possibilities and constraints. These inputs,
based on work reported in earlier chapters of this book, were generated piece
by piece and integrated only in these quantitative analyses, using the IIASA
set of energy models. Having done this, it may be instructive to step back
and look, from a quite different angle, at the total energy supply system de-
velopment as postulated by the scenarios.
Figure 17-19 presents the scenario-generated global primary energy totals
by source in "market penetration" terms (see Chapter 8). The logistic be-
havior of the market shares of primary fuels in the past is apparent. The
decidedly nonlogistic behavior of the market shares of primary energy in the
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Figure 17-19. Global primary energy market penetration, High scenario. Logarithmic
plot of the transformation of f/{l-f) where f is the fractional market share. From 1860
to 1974 the substitution lines show historical data, from 1975 to 2030 the IIASA High
scenario.
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scenarios is also apparent. According to our scenarios, the observed market
behavior of the past will not occur in the future. In fact, it may be somewhat
startling to see the projections, plotted in this way, evidencing such a
smooth, almost nondynamic character after all of the detailed wrenching
constraints have been aggregated.
Does this imply that the scenarios postulate a violation of some intrinsic
behavior or "rules" of energy systems? Does it convey a measure of how
drastic are the changes (from the past) in the scenarios? Frankly speaking,
perhaps. None of us is a prophet; none of us knows with surety that the
logistic substitution process of the past is-or is not-a rigid system rule. But
the changes from past behavior, clearly apparent in these projections, offer
food for thought.
One mechanism for assessing the possibility of large changes to the High
and Low scenarios is to test alternative cases and to perform sensitivity
analyses. The next chapter does just this, in hopes of probing the system
boundaries and generating insights into both possibilities and implausibilities
in the world's energy future.
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18 ALTERNATIVES ANDSENSITIVITI ES
The High and Low scenarios detailed in the preceding four chapters are not,
clearly, the only possible future states of the energy world. (In fact, one can
be confident that the real outcome of events will be neither of these
scenarios.) In this chapter, a selected few of a great many alternative possibili-
ties are examined.
First, to recapitulate, the High and Low scenarios can be regarded as
bounding the middle range of expected economic performance for the
world: they are neither "extreme" nor "most likely" conditions. That is,
while the structure of global energy systems would change markedly in the
scenarios, the input assumptions and judgments underlying them are well
within the mainstream of expert opinion. Practical constraints are imposed
on resources, economics, information, organization, and technology. (For
example, the energy technologies included in the scenarios are either in
operation or in an advanced stage of development.) It would seem advisable
to explore, at least tentatively, some radical departures from the accepted
middle ground of opinion. This, in part, is the purpose of this chapter.
Roughly the same energy demands as in the High and the Low scenarios
are used to examine two alternative supply cases through a series of
MESSAGE model runs. (The alternative cases were also examined using the
IMPACT model, as reported in Chapter 19.) These two alternative cases
are specified so as to represent extreme poles of opinion-purposely to reach
to the boundaries of conjecture, to pose wide choices, and to assess their
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consequences. These are labeled here as the "Nuclear Moratorium" and the
"Enhanced Nuclear" cases and are defined and described below.
A third case explores the possibility that global energy demand might be
very much lower than that projected in the scenarios. In particular, it
examines the sorts of changes that would be necessary to bring zero or
negative energy growth to developed market economies over the next
fifty years (while maintaining the economic growth projection of the Low
scenario) so as to have a global 16 TWyr/yr energy use in 2030. This "16
TW" case is also defined and described below.
Still other extreme variations on the scenarios are possible. Some sample
"sensitivity" analyses, discussed later in this chapter, probe variations in
results following extreme variations in assumptions. This is an attempt to
focus on the main factors affecting global energy prospects in the long
term and the conceivable global impacts of wide changes in these factors.
A word of caution is necessary for interpreting the results of these al-
ternative cases and sensitivity analyses. The careful and detailed iterative
adjustments performed for the scenarios (described in Chapters 13 and
14 and illustrated with specifics in Chapters 15, 16, and 17) have not been
done for the cases and analyses of this chapter. That is, these extreme cases
contain, inevitably, inconsistencies. They are not put forward here as fully
analyzed and consistent cases, but as an instructive probing of limits. They
are experiments. Nevertheless, they provide sufficiently interesting and
revealing insights so as to be worth reporting here in relatively general
and qualitative terms.
TWO ALTERNATIVE SUPPLY CASES
At least two broad and polarized views on future energy supply problems
exist today. One view maintains that nuclear energy is unsafe, uneconomical,
and/or unnecessary. Another view contends that with long-term oil replace-
ment as the highest priority, nuclear energy-not nuclear energy solely for
electricity production-can be called upon to contribute to liquid fuel
supply. One view would put a stop to expansion of nuclear capacity (or,
at an even greater extreme, close down all existing capacity); the other
would accelerate nuclear growth.
The energy supply system implications of these two perspectives are
sketched here. First, Table 18-1 summarizes the main defining parameters
of the two cases-Nuclear Moratorium and Enhanced Nuclear. The Nuclear
Moratorium case is based generally on the Low scenario, awith the additional
constraint that no new (post-1979) nuclear capacity is ordered. To accommo-
aAdvocates of "no nuclear" energy futures generally cite the complementarity and consistency of
this with low overall energy growth-that is, greater energy conservation and efficiency of energy
use. A nuclear moratorium case with higher total energy demands would simply place even greater
pressure on fossil fuel supply.
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Table 18-1. Summary definition of two alternative supply cases.
Assumptions
FBR a buildup
LWRb buildup
Oil production limits
Coal production limits
Centralized solar
electric (STEC)
Nuclear Moratorium Case
(based on Low scenario's demand)
None
No new installations
Higher than Low scenario
Higher than Low scenario
2000 onwards (all regions)
Enhanced Nuclear Case (based
on High scenario's demand)
1995 onwards (all regions)
Same as High scenario
Same as High scenario
Coal consumption is "minimized"
Unchanged
a Fast breeder reactors or other advanced converter reactors.
blight water reactors or other conventional reactors.
date this, the Nuclear Moratorium case allows (by assumption) higher
fossil fuel annual production rates than the Low scenario (including higher
ceilings on regional coal production) and allows an earlier buildup of central-
ized solar electricity generation.
The Enhanced Nuclear case is based generally on the High scenario, with
a somewhat tighter constraint (by assumption) on fossil fuel supplies
(particularly coal) and with a somewhat earlier introduction of breeder
reactors. The two cases are further defined and some results are presented
in the pages to follow.
The Nuclear Moratorium Case
In spite of the intent in this chapter to confine attention to global aggregate
results, certain regional characteristics help to illuminate global phenomena.
For example, a nuclear moratorium in the future would almost certainly
have its greatest impact in the developed regions (I-NA, Il-SU/EE, and III-
WE/JANZ), where nuclear energy's contribution is expected to be the largest.
In the developed regions in the Nuclear Moratorium case, annual coal
production is allowed to rise to levels of the High scenario (see Table 17-10).
This, it turns out, is not a sufficient supply of coal to completely replace
nuclear electric capacity, so the balance must be met by central station solar
facilities ("hard" solar). By 2030, some 6 percent of total primary energy
could come from central solar facilities; this figure matches the maximum
penetration rate Issessed in the hard solar option (Chapter 5). In the Low
scenario, hard solar would not contribute at all to primary energy needs
before 2030.
The overall energy supplies for the Nuclear Moratorium case and for the
Low scenario are presented in Table 18-2. Coal and solar fill mostly the
"nuclear gap"; gas and, especially, oil may have limited capacity for expan-
sion over the Low scenario estimates. Yet natural gas could hold a greater
potential for contributing to the liquid fuel problem than is reflected in the
Nuclear Moratorium case.
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Table 18-2. Primary energy, Nuclear Moratorium case and Low scenario,
2030 (percent of total primary energy).
Nuclear
Energy Low Moratorium
Form Scenario Case
Coal 29 39
Oil 22 24
Natural gas 15 20
Nuclear 23
Hydro-geothermal 7 7
Solar and other
renewable sources 4 10
Total 100 100
A methane-to-methanol schemeb , for example, could unlock what are
thought to be vast natural gas resources in many regions of the world as a
substitute for tight oil supplies. This would be quite apart from simply
expanded gas trade-liquefied natural gas (LNG) for example-where the
real constraint is thought to be rather limited end use markets for gaseous
fuels (see Chapter 16). But gas as a source of liquids more closely meets the
market needs. A possible boost to such uses of gas may come if coal produc-
tion limits are lower than assumed here (with consequently less coal available
for liquefaction); this prospect would seem to be quite plausible.
Fossil fuel consumption figures show coal uses increasing significantly
from the Low scenario to the Nuclear Moratorium case, with gas uses growing
only moderately. Oil production is already near conceivable upper limits in
the Low scenario, so little additional capacity can be called upon for the
Nuclear Moratorium case. These upper limits (see Chapter 17) are based
on price-production profiles and (very generally) on the ability of economies
in a low growth scenario to support the requisite investments.
The sources for electricity generation, with no new nuclear capacity,
shift moderately among load regions. Coal-fired plants, which would operate
in the peak and intermediate load regions in the Low scenario, would take
over the nuclear baseload share in the Nuclear Moratorium case. Solar and
gas would then provide peak load power.
Coal inputs to power production would be so great under the conditions
of the Nuclear Moratorium case that the coal available for liquefaction would
actually be less than in the Low scenario-in spite of raised coal production
limits in the Nuclear Moratorium case. As a result, the share of synthetic
liquids from coal in liquid fuel supply drops from 39 percent (Low scenario)
to 33 percent (Nuclear Moratorium case) by 2030.
The amounts of fossil resources remaining in 2030 in the Low scenario
and the Nuclear Moratorium case (Table 18-3) show the effects of the larger
b Such technologies are coming increasingly under discussion. Still, their technical and economic
feasibility remain in some question, and their politics are no less certain. (Most of the world's natural
gas resources are in the Middle East.)
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Table 18-3. Fossil fuel consumption, Nuclear Moratorium case and Low
scenario.
Resource Type
and Cost Categorya
Low
Scenario
Nuclear
Moratorium Case
A. Percent of Original Resources Remaining at 2030
Coal
Category 1 65 44
Category 2 100 100
Oil
Category 1 21 14
Category 1A 24 27
Category 2 86 90
Category 3 100 100
Gas
Category 1 51 32
Category 2 96 96
Category 3 100 100
B. Years of Resource Remaining After 2030 (expressed in 2030
annual production rate)
Coal
Category 1 52 30
Category 2 158 136
Oil
Category 1 11 7
Category 1A 2 2
Category 2 27 25
Category 3 62 54
Gas
Category 1 30 15
Category 2 39 28
Category 3 38 27
aCost categories represent estimates of costs at or below which the stated volume of resources
are recoverable (in constant 1975 U5$).
For oil and gas: Cat. 1: 12$/boe
Cat. 2: 12-20$/boe
Cat. 3: 20-25$/boe
For coal: Cat. 1: 25$/tce
Cat. 2: 25-50$/tce
For uranium: Cat. 1: 80$/kgU
Cat. 2: 80-130$/kgU
A subcategory of oil, 1A, exists only for regions I (NA) and IV (LA) and includes oil available
at prod uction costs of $12 to $16/boe. Also, a subcategory of gas, 0, exists only for region V I
(ME/NAf), with gas available at $2/boe.
fossil consumption of the latter case: resources are seriously depleted,
leaving uncomfortably small amounts for post-2030 needs. Time, then,
becomes an increasingly constraining factor in this case. Time is required to
develop an acceptable, large-scale energy source. If no nuclear capacity were
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to be built in the coming decades, it may be that fossil fuels would be
consumed too rapidly and that the time to develop viable substitutes would
be too short.
One observes two main features of these Nuclear Moratorium case results.
First, primary energy needs can be met without new nuclear capacity (for a
low energy demand). Fossil fuel supplies would be depleted more alarmingly,
solar electric would expand at its maximum rate, gas would become a more
important fuel of the future (with even greater potential)-but needs could
be met. In this context, nuclear power is seen to be not an absolute neces-
sity. But, second, the price is great. Large-scale exploitation of fossil fuels
carries environmental, climate, cost, and social burdens. These could be
critical. The choices are not easy ones.
The Enhanced Nuclear Case
By allowing a more rapid buildup of nuclear energy supplies than in the High
scenario, and by further constraining coal production limits, one can con-
struct another alternative case-an Enhanced Nuclear case. The intent is to
introduce nuclear energy at its maximum possible rate-a rate calculated and
discussed at some length in Chapter 4 in order to use the generated heat to
produce a liquid fuel. This alternative case, then, provides a direct link to the
more global limit-probing arguments of Part II of this book.
This expanded nuclear option, which is elaborated in Chapter 4, is con-
ceived as a long-term scheme to make use of an essentially infinite heat
supply (from nuclear breeders and/or advanced converter reactors such as
high temperature reactors [HTRs]). This heat source could generate hydro-
gen-through electricity generation and then electrolysis-or directly through
thermolysis. The hydrogen could be combined with coal to produce meth-
anol. Thus, breeders could be a source of liquid fuel. This option would
be particularly attractive since it would use coal much more efficiently
than otherwise for producing synthetic fuels (see Chapter 22 on new old
technologies). Such a coal-efficient technology is specified for the Enhanced
Nuclear case and is described in Figure 18-I.
The source of heat could, in theory, as easily be the sun as breeder reac-
Figure 18-1. An assumed methanol production technology (schematic) for the En-
hanced Nuclear case.
0.5 kWyr Electricity Capital Cost:
250 $/kW (meth)
0.8 kWyr Coal Operating/Maint. Cost:
25 $/kWyr (methl
1 kWyr Methanol
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Table 18-4. Primary energy, Enhanced Nuclear case and High scenario,
2030 (percent of total primary energy).
Energy High Enhanced
Form Scenario Nuclear Case
Coal 34 29
Oil 19 17
Gas 17 17
Nuclear 23 29
Hydro-geothermal 4 4
Solar and other
renewable sources 4 4
Total 100 100
tors. Large, methanol-producing solar facilities in the deserts can be conceived
(see Chapter 5). The point here is not to choose between the natural heat
"endowments" of breeders or the sun, but simply to envisage a large-scale,
sustainable, liquids-producing system.
In addition to supplying an alternative source of liquids, the Enhanced
Nuclear case seeks to minimize fossil fuel production in general and coal
production in particular. In spite of the increased nuclear capacity in this
case, global coal production would be reduced by just 2 TWyr/yr by 2030.
This coal production is not unimportant. And the modest size of the reduc-
tion somewhat conceals the rather dramatic changes in global coal trade.
A reduction of 500 to 1000 million tons per year of coal production and
export from each of regions I (NA) and II (SU/EE) could be seen as a major
benefit of a regional enhanced nuclear strategy for the otherwise coal-
importing region III (WE/JANZ).
The Enhanced Nuclear case increases the role of nuclear energy to 29
percent of total primary energy supply by 2030, compared to 23 percent
for the High scenario (see Table 18-4). This seemingly modest increase is
all but that; it means very roughly an additional 1000 GW(e) of installed
nuclear capacity by 2030. These extra 1000 (or so) power plants need to be
sited, built, and integrated into national grids. The analyses of the nuclear
option (Chapter 4) indicate that, globally, this expansion (and more) could
be done. But regional and national singularities would make the task a
challenging one.
The unsettling depletion of fossil resources apparent in the scenarios and
in the Nuclear Moratorium case is just slightly abated in the Enhanced
Nuclear case. Table 18-5 shows that this case would stretch cheap (category
1) coal resources by just six years, more expensive (category 2) coal by
eight years. Gas resources are depleted somewhat faster in the Enhanced
Nuclear case than in the High scenario, but their exploitation is in any
case regarded as more market limited than supply constrained. The Enhanced
Nuclear case adds some six years to the High scenario projections of re-
sources remaining after 2030 for all four categories of oil taken together.
By 2030, the supply of liquid fuels in the Enhanced Nuclear case would
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Table 18-5. Fossil fuel consumption, Enhanced Nuclear case and High
scenario.
Resource Type
and Cost Categorya
High
Scenario
Enhanced
Nuclear Case
A. Percent of Original Resources Remaining at 2030
Coal
Category 1 43 51
Category 2 100 100
Oil
Category 1 11 11
Category 1A 2 1
Category 2 76 81
Category 3 99 99
Gas
Category 1 39 36
Category 2 84 81
Category 3 100 100
B. Years of Resource Remaining After 2030 (expressed in 2030
annual produc tion rates)
Coal
Category 1
Category 2
Oil
Category 1
Category 1A
Category 2
Category 3
Gas
Category 1
Category 2
Category 3
18
85
4
a
17
54
15
20
22
24
93
5
a
20
47
12
18
22
a For definition of cost categories see footnote to Table 18-3.
be a mix of crude oil, methanol, and synthetic liquids produced from coal
using the more "conventional" technology of Chapter 17. Methanol would
replace a fraction of the liquid fuel supplies of the High scenario. Instead
of secondary liquid fuel demand being met 39 percent by synthetic liquids
from coal and 61 percent by crude oil (mostly unconventional) as in the
High scenario, the liquid fuel demands of the Enhanced Nuclear case would
be supplied 31 percent by synthetic liquids from coal, 55 percent by crude
oil (mostly unconventional), and 14 percent by the nuclear-based methanol
technology. This case, then, could be seen as a way of speeding the transition
away from depletable, nonrenewable crude oil (and coal) and toward some
sustainable source of liquid fuels (assuming that the coal needed for methanol
production would last a very long time), In a sense, the point of the En-
hanced Nuclear case is the phase-out of fossil fuels. The idea here is to
exploit capital-intensive, expensive technologies in order to build up a stock
(or "endowment") of plutonium (if breeders are the source of heat) that
could be drawn upon later.
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Methanol in the Enhanced Nuclear case is generated by using off-peak
electricity from nuclear breeders. This process allows looser constraints on
the maximum fraction of nuclear in total electricity generated, for reasons of
load curve characteristics. Nuclear in this case provides as much as 75 percent
of all electricity generated. Methanol is assumed to compete economically
with coal liquefaction only if off-peak electricity is used as an input. This
assumption matches the need for the methanol introduction process to be
a slow one-so that energy end use technologies can adjust to using methanol
rather than conventional hydrocarbons.
As with the Nuclear Moratorium case, there are perhaps two main features
of the Enhanced Nuclear case results. First, one observes that nuclear
capacities could be expanded beyond the High scenario estimates and could
contribute to the liquids supply problem-pending, of course, the successful
development and commercialization of the methanol-producing technology
postulated here (Figure 18-1). That is, the gradual buildup of an energy
endowment seems to be possible-with all of the caveats about costs, tech-
nologies, politics, and other uncertainties.
Second, one observes that this endowment-creating potential could not
be as large, by 2030, as one might hope. Nuclear sources would contribute
some 29 percent of total primary energy by 2030 and not 40 percent as
proposed in Chapter 4. The reasons are legion and have to do with constraints
in each region on expected nuclear buildup, availability of cheaper alter-
natives, and so forth. Global projections of "maximum potential" capacity
miss these regional considerations. (For example, the methanol from breeders
option may be a very attractive one for region III but less so for coal-rich
regions I and II or, particularly, for oil-rich region IV.) Still, 14 percent of
liquid fuel supply from an "endowment" source is not inconsequential; it
could signal the start of the inevitable transition toward sustainable energy
supplies.
The analyses of the two alternative cases can be expanded by considering
their investment requirements and comparing these with the High and the
Low scenarios. This is done, using the IMPACT model, in Chapter 19.
Other alternative supply cases could be evaluated in the same way as is
done here. This requires time. For now, it was thought to be a sufficient
minimum to explore and discuss the two polar Nuclear Moratorium and
Enhanced Nuclear cases. These extremes may lead, in future IIASA research,
to consideration of other, more plausible, alternatives.
AN ALTERNATIVE DEMAND CASE:
"16 TW"
Energy supply systems for the scenarios of Chapter 17 or for the alternative
supply cases just discussed would be impressively difficult to build. Repeated
mention in these pages of the challenges of expanding oil production or coal
mining or the synthetic fuels business would lead the skeptic to wonder
whether it could be done. While it is maintained here that indeed it could
be done-that the necessary energy supply systems could be established-it
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seems worthwhile to consider a popular and increasingly plausible alternative
to large supply schemes-namely, much lower energy consumption than the
scenario projections.
Lower energy demand, of course, would ease the pressure on energy
supplies. It would also somewhat ameliorate the environmental impacts of
ever-increasing energy use, and (perhaps most compellingly) it would offer
a bonus of time-time to develop oil alternatives or to discover some viable
and sustainable energy source. Lower energy demand, therefore, is worth
exploring. Yet one wonders, Is it feasible in the context of continuing global
economic growth? What measures would be required to drastically reduce
energy consumption growth over the next five decades?
The case examined here was proposed by Dr. Umberto Colombo, a
member of the Club of Rome and director of the Italian Atomic Energy
Commission. In response to a preliminary presentation of IIASA results
(Hafele and Sassin 1979), Colombo (Colombo 1978; Colombo and Bernardini
1979) proposed an alternative scenario-a simple doubling of global energy
demand from some 8 TWyr/yr (1975) to some 16 TWyr/yr by 2030. (This
proposed doubling of global primary consumption compares to the scenario
increases of factors of 2.7 and 4.3 by 2030.) With a doubling of population
in the same period, this would lead to a constant global average energy use
per capita. But of course, the energy use distribution around the world
would change.
In this section, the 16 TW case initiated by Dr. Colombo is evaluated
using the MEDEE-2 model (see Chapter 16). The intent is to describe, in
modest detail, the sorts of changes required in order to have a 16 TWyr/yr
world by the year 2030. This case is presented with somewhat greater
specificness than the alternative supply cases just described. This is not
necessarily because the 16 TW case is thought to be more plausible or more
important, but rather because of the many and inescapable details of energy
consumption. The focus is on the demand side.
Definition of the Case
The major premise of the low energy growth (16 TW) case, as specified by
Dr. Colombo, is that requirements for energy in the developed regions would
saturate-as economies mature and population growth rates decline-while
energy growth in developing regions would continue to increase-although it
may be slowed there by resource availability difficulties. The next fifty
years would be the critical period, after which global energy use may well
stabilize.
This hypothesis stems from "general" considerations dealing with the
nature of technological development and its effects on the economy and
society and not from a detailed modeling exercise.c
cThis argument is made in explicit terms in Dr. Colombo's specification of the case in a communi-
cation to W. Hafele, 13 October 1978.
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Table 18-6. Assumptions on GDP growth rates, 16 TW case and IIASA
scenarios (percentjyr).
High Scenario Low Scenario 16 TW Casea
Region (1975-2030) (1975-2030) (1975-2030)
I (NA) 2.87
1.
681 1.70 }II (SU/EE) 3.91 2.99 2.09 2.37 2.00
III (WE/JANZ) 2.93 1.88 2.04
IV (LA) 4.37 348) 394)V (Af/SEA) 4.32 3.27 3 24 ~:~: 3.84VI (ME/NAf) 5.09 3.57 .
VII (C/CPA) 3.77 2.64 3.44
World 3.44 2.37 2.50
aSource: U. Colombo communication to W. HaJele, 13 October 1978.
Notes: Figures are average real GDP growth rates over the period 1975-2030. The IIASA scenarios
assume declining growth rates; the 16 TW case assumes constant average growth rates over the fifty-
five-year period.
The population projection for the 16 TW case is identical to that for the
High and the Low scenarios (see Table 14-2). The GDP assumptions differ
only slightly between the 16 TW case (Colombo definition) and the Low
scenario, as Table 18-6 illustrates. One notices a somewhat greater economic
growth assumed for developing regions in the 16 TW case than in the Low
scenario and a slightly higher overall global growth as well. But it seems fair
to say that the economy in the 16 TW case is, in general terms, like that of
the nASA Low scenario.
The 16 TW case presupposes a substantial decline in the energy-to-GDP
ratio in the developed regions. Colombo contends that such decrease,
however, does not depart from the historically observed trends-as Figure
18-2 illustrates. For comparison, the nASA Low scenario primary energy-
to-GDP ratios are plotted in Figure 18-3. The higher ratios resulting from
the Low scenario assumptions are evident; part of the difference in projec-
tions may be due to some apparent and troublesome differences in historical
data (particularly for regions n and VII). Also, the region n projections for
both the High and the Low scenarios may be relatively more optimistic in
assumptions for the success of energy developments in this region than the
projections for other regions.
The 16 TW case specifications from Dr. Colombo included regional
primary energy use in 2030; these are compared with the Low scenario in
Table 18-7. There, clearly the major differences in the two projections are
in regions 1, n, and lll-the developed regions. The 16 TW case projects
an absolute decline in energy use over the next five decades in these three
regions. This characteristic is evidenced also in the primary energy-to-
GDP elasticity, €p, in Table 18-8. (See Chapter 15 for the definition and
discussion of this elasticity.) While the differences are significant for all
regions, they are especially vast for the developed regions. In Dr. Colombo's
words: "The basic assumption was that the future economic and social
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Figure 18-2. Energy-to-GDP ratios in the 16 TW case for the IIASA world regions.
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growth in the advanced countries will be largely based on technologies
requiring very little energy consumption and characterized by high infor-
mation-carrying capacity. "d
Per capita primary energy consumption data, Table 18-9, offer a start to
setting targets for MEDEE-2 runs. MEDEE-2 was used to study only regions
dpersonal communication with W. Hafele, 13 October 1978.
2000
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Figure 18-3. Energy-to-GDP ratios in the IIASA Low scenario for the IIASA world
regions.
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I and III (together these regions are mostly GEeD member countries) for
the 16 TW case. Insufficient data for region II and, quite frankly, the ex-
tremely unlikely prospect of such low energy futures in this region (in the
view of IIASA energy analysts) argued for concentrating on regions I and
III. The differences for developing regions between the 16 TW case and the
Low scenario were not thought to be sufficiently great to warrant MEDEE-2
analysis.
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Table 18-7. Primary energy consumption in the IIASA scenarios and in the
16 TW case (TWyr!yr).
Base Year Low Scenario 76 TW Casea
Region 7975 2030 2030
I (NA) 2.65 4.37 2.52
II (SU/EE) 1.84 5.00 2.98
III (WE!JANZ) 2.26 4.54 2.45
IV (LA) 0.34 2.31 2.23
C (At/SEA) 0.33 2.66 2.50
VI (ME/NAt) 0.13 1.23 1.27
VII (C/CPA) 0.46 2.29 2.05
Total 8.21 b 22.39 16.00
aSource: U. Colombo communication to W. Hafele, 13 October 1978.
bThis total includes 0.21 TW of bunkers-fuel used in international shipments of fuel.
Note: The Low scenario numbers came from the MESSAGE model analyses reported in Chap-
ter 17.
Target Values
The 16 TW case specifies a global primary energy consumption of 16 TWyr/
yr in 2030; of this, 5 TWyr/yr are specified for regions I plus III. The Low
scenario projects a global primary energy consumption of 22.4 TWyr/yr in
2030; of this 8.9 TWyr/yr would be used in regions I plus III. Thus, of the
global reduction of 6.4 TWyr/yr in 2030 from the Low scenario to the 16
Table 18-8. Primary energy-to-G DP elasticities, Ep a.
La w Scenario
Historical
7950- 7975- 2000-
Region 7975 2000 2030
I (NA) 1.03 0.36 0.89
II (SU/EE) 0.77 0.62 0.62
III (WE!JANZ) 0.96 0.65 0.73
IV (LA) 1.28 1.06 0.97
V (At/SEA) 1.52 1.18 1.19
VI (ME/NAf) 1.20 1.23 1.10
VII (C/CPA) 1.57 0.98 1.27
World 0.99 0.67 0.93
76 TW Caseb
7975- 2000-
2000 2030
-0.20 0.06
0.75 0.01
0.04 0.10
0.96 0.82
1.38 0.90
1.04 0.75
1.12 0.54
0.50 0.34
aThis elasticity, E, is defined by the following relationship:
E(t,) _( GDP(t, )}€
E(t,) - GDP(t,) ,
where t, and t, are two given times, E is energy consumption measured in physical units, and GOP
is gross domestic product measured in real noninflated monetary units. This elasticity is calculated
with respect to primary energy, Ep '
bDerived from U. Colombo's specification of GDP and primary energy consumption growth
(U. Colombo communication to W. Hafele, 13 October 1978) and is not consistent with methodol-
ogy of II ASA scenarios.
ALTERNATIVES AND SENSITIVITIES 607
Table 18-9. Primary energy consumption per capita in 2030 (kWyr/yr,cap).
Bose Yeor High Low
Region 1975 Scenorio Scenorio 16 TW Coseo
I (NA) 11.2 19.1 13.9 8.0
II (SU/EE) 5.1 15.3 10.4 6.2
III (WE/JANZ) 4.0 9.3 5.9 3.2
IV (LA) 1.1 4.6 2.9 2.8
V (At/SEA) 0.2 1.3 0.7 0.7
VI (ME/NAt) 0.9 6.7 3.5 3.6
VII (C/CPA) 0.5 2.6 1.3 1.2
World 2.1 4.5 2.8 2.0
aSource: U. Colombo communication to W. Hafele, 13 October 1978.
Note: The High and Low scenario numbers result from energy supply analyses reported in Chapter
17.
TW case, 3.9 TWyr/yr must come from regions I plus III. Analyses with
MEDEE-2 can show the kind of detailed assumptions necessary to achieve
such a reduction.
But MEDEE-2 calculates final, not primary, energy. And, MEDEE-2
accounts for a great many parameters, including a disaggregation of GDP.
In Table 18-10 some final energy target values for MEDEE-2 runs are
specified. Setting such targets necessitates some careful consideration of
Table 18-10. "Target" values for MEDEE-2 analysis of the 16 TW case.
Region I (NA) Region 11/ (WE/jANZ)
1975 2030 1975 2030
1670 4170 2385 6656
2654 4367 2256 4542
1670 4421 2385 7242
2654 4400 2256 4760
1871 2656 1589 3143
1670 4421 2385 7241
2654 2520 2240 2424
1871 1840 1589 1745
Low Scenario
GDP (109 1975$)
Primary energy (GWyr/yr)
Low Scenario (Modified)a
GDP (109 1975$)
Primary energy (GWyr/yr)
Final energy (GWyr/yr)
16 TWCase
GDP (109 1975$)
Primary energy (GWyr/yr)
Final energyb (G Wyr/yr)
Difference Between 16 TW Case
and Low Scenario
(Modified)
A Primary energy (GWyr/yr)
A Primary energy (percent)
-1880
-42.7
-2336
-49.1
aUsing exactly the same GDP evolution as the 16 TW case but keeping all other assumptions
identical to the Low scenario produces the Low scenario (modified).
bOnly primary energy is specified by Dr. Colombo for the 16 TW case. To calculate final energy,
losses from primary to final energy are assumed to be the same as for the Low scenario, except that
no losses for coal liquefaction are included. This assumes that, because of the lower liquid fuel de-
mands of this 16 TW case, no coal liquefaction would be required.
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conversion losses, primary to final, and a careful specification of GDP.
The intent is always to produce detailed assessments of the 16 TW case,
being as true as possible to the Colombo definition of the case.
For comparative purposes, the Low scenario projections are modified by
using the same GDP projections for regions I plus III as specified in the
16 TW case. This means that differences, cited below, between the "Low
scenario (modified)" and the 16 TW case will be due solely to detailed
MEDEE-2 input assumptions and not to differences in aggregate GDP
growth rates.
To achieve the targets for the 16 TW case, primary energy consumption
must be 43 percent lower in region I and 49 percent lower in region III than
in the Low scenario (modified) by 2030. In the Low scenario (modified),
losses from primary to final energy increase from 30 percent in 1975 (for
both NA and WE/JANZ) to 40 percent in NA and 34 percent in WE/JANZ
by 2030. For the 16 TW case, a reduction to 27-28 percent is expected as
a result of lower electricity use and no requirements for high loss synthetic
fuels. Thus, the final energy targets for MEDEE-2 runs are 1.8 TWyr/yr
for region I and 1.7 TWyr/yr for region III by 2030. Detailed analyses
yield results that are slightly below these target figures, as will be described
in the next pages.
Assumptions and Results
In order to achieve these targets, changes to the Low scenario assumptions
were introduced in several steps. First, electricity penetration into thermal
uses was reduced or phased out completely (this was already rather restricted
in the Low scenario); efficiency improvements were increased even further
than in the Low scenario; the shift in the structure of GDP formation
toward services, and within the manufacturing sector away from (energy-
intensive) heavy industries and toward (less energy-intensive) construction
of machinery and equipment, was accelerated, especially in region III;
and finally, activity level projections were reduced, primarily in the trans-
portation sector. These changes are listed in Table 18-11.
A great many changes were made in the Low scenario in order to reach
the 16 TWyr/yr target values for regions I and III. Table 18-11 records only
a few of them. They were selected so as to reflect, as much as possible, the
current thinking on the most "reasonable" or most plausible mix of altera-
tions that would lead to very low energy consumption in the future (see
Leach et al. 1979).
In some cases, changes to important energy-using activities were rather
modest because, it was felt, sufficiently aggressive changes were already
introduced into the Low scenario. For example, automobiles were assumed
to reach an average efficiency of 7.411100 km (32 mpg) in region I by 2030
in the Low scenario from a 1975 average of 17.1 11100 km (14 mpg); this
projection to 2030 was unchanged for the 16 TW case runs. In region III,
automobile efficiency was assumed to improve from about 9.9 11100 km in
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Table 18-11. Major assumptions for the 16 TW case, compared to the Low
scenario.
Region III
Region I (NA) (WE/jANZ)
2030 2030
Base Base
year Low 76 TW year Low 76 TW
7975 scenario case 7975 scenario case
Macroeconomics, lifestyle
Manufacturing (% of GOP) 24.5 23.8 20.0 33.6 29.7 20.0
Services (% of GOP) 64.8 65.8 69.6 48.5 55.0 64.7
Basic materials (% of
manufacturing-VA) 24.8 23.2 20.0 33.0 29.4 20.0
Machinery and equipment
(% of manufacturing-VA) 43.2 47.0 50.2 42.0 47.1 55.0
Intercity passenger transportation
Distance traveled per person
per year (1000 km) 10 15 10 7.5 10 7.5
Persons per car 2.0 1.9 2.0 5.21 3.20 4.0
Distance driven per car per year,
intercity (1000 km) 7.0 7.8 5.0 5.0 5.6 5.0
Bus (% of public transportation) 15 12 30 35 29 35
Train (% of public transportation) 5 5 20 50 56 60
Plane (% of public transportation) 80 83 50 5 15 5
Dwellings
Electrical use for appliances
(1000 kWh/dwelling) 3.85 6.25 3.85 1.95 4.50 2.20
Useful energy for air conditioning
per dwelling (1000 kcal) 4472 5800 4472 3000
Dwelling with air conditioning
(%) 39 50 20 0 20 0
Note: These assumptions are selected from an array of changes. They both represent the largest
changes and have the most energy-reducing impact. In some instances (e.g., automobile efficiency or
home insulation) the assumptions for the Low scenario were regarded as sufficiently rigorous so that
only rather minor further improvements could be introduced into the 16 TW case.
1975 to about 7.2 1/100 km in 2030 in the Low scenario and to about 5.5
11100 km in the 16 TW case. Similarly, improvements in the technical effi-
ciency of fossil fuel use from the Low scenario to the 16 TW case could not
be too substantial, given the already high efficiencies assumed for the former.
Of course, no one really knows what are "reasonable" or "plausible"
assumptions for future changes of these kinds. The intent in making judg-
ments for the 16 TW case was to reach for the potentials for energy-reducing
changes. One may (or may not) doubt the likelihood of such changes, but by
all evidences they are possible. Such potentials are instructive-for example,
one wonders what actions (energy price increases, tax benefits, early amor-
tization allowances, and so forth) would be required to achieve such changes.
(The answers could spur earlier and more vigorous measures than might
otherwise occur.) But as has already been observed, such potentials may
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not be the wisest projections of energy demand for use in energy supply
planning.
In Table 18-12, the final energy projections resulting from these changes
are compared with the Low scenario projections, sector by sector. The
household/service sector seems to be the least affected by changes. This
is partly because insulation improvements were already extensive in the Low
scenario, but also partly because of the reduction of electricity penetration
assumed for the 16 TW case. The strong reduction in industry is primarily
the result of two changes. First, the value added of heavy industries in these
16 TW case runs is assumed to grow only by a factor of 1.7 in region I and
1.1 in region III, instead of 2.3 and 2.4, respectively, in the Low scenario.
Construction of machinery and equipment, on the other hand, would
still grow by a factor of 2.4 in both regions, instead of 2.7 and 3, respec-
tively, in the Low scenario, but the value added of the whole manufacturing
sector is assumed to grow by only a factor of 2.1 in region I and 1.8 in region
III, compared to 2.5 and 2.7, respectively, in the Low scenario. The assump-
tion of a structural shift of GDP formation away from manufacturing toward
services, and within the manufacturing sector away from heavy industries
toward construction, machinery, and equipment, obviously has a significant
impact on energy consumption. (To give a frame of reference: the energy
intensiveness of heavy industry is about four to five times higher for elec-
tricity use and about eight to ten times higher for thermal energy use than
the energy intensiveness of other industrial sectors.)
Table 18-12. Final energy results, 16 TW case and Low scenario (absolute
figures are GWyr/yr).
Region I (NA) Region 11/ (WE//ANZ)
2030 2030
Base Base
year Low 76 TW % re- year Low 76 TW % re-
7975 scenario ductiona 7975 scenario case ductionacase
Total final energy 1871 2656 1819 -32 1589 3143 1723 -45
By sector
Transportation 541 688 410 -40 313 716 394 -45
Industry 757 1327 818 -38 805 1588 725 -54
Household-service 573 641 591 -8 417 839 604 -28
By fuel type
Substitutable fossil fuels b 921 964 789 -18 801 1012 607 -40
Centrally supplied heatC 0 0 0 n.a. 0 103 68 -34
Soft solar 0 74 61 -18 0 71 46 -35
Electricity 228 547 265 -52 201 640 285 -55
Motor fuel 597 804 510 -37 381 864 518 -40
Coke and feedstocks 125 267 194 -27 206 453 199 -56
apercent reduction is the reduction from the Low scenario to the 16 TW case, as a percentage of
the Low scenario.
bSubstitutable fossil fuels are substitutable (mostly heat) uses of oil, gas, and coal.
cCentrally supplied heat is heat produced by district heat and cogeneration facilities.
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If this assumption were dropped and structural changes as in the Low
scenario were assumed, primary energy consumption would be 300 GWyr/yr
higher in region I and 670 GWyr/yr higher in region III in 2030. These are
large amounts-some 16 and 29 percent of the total primary energy dif-
ference between the Low scenario and the 16 TW case by 2030.
The changes in assumptions concerning the transportation sector (the
main ones of which are given in Table 18-11) result in a reduction of energy
use (in terms of primary energy) of 270 GWyr/yr in region I and 250 GWyr/
yr in region III by 2030. In region I, this difference is mainly attributable to
changed assumptions on passenger transportation (135 GWyr/yr), inter-
national and military transportation (90 GWyr/yr), and freight transportation
(50 GWyr/yr). The latter two components are of minor importance in region
III, where the components contributing most to the total difference are again
intercity passenger transportation (110 GWyr/yr) and urban passenger
transportation (60 GWyr/yr); the remaining components are freight, inter-
national and military transportation (40 GWyr/yr), and fuel economy of cars
(30 GWyr/yr).
Although the final energy projections for the household/service sector
do not change drastically, assumptions of saturation of electricity consump-
tion for specific purposes (lighting, refrigerators, freezers, dishwashers, etc.)
at the 1975 level in region I, and only slightly above the 1975 level in region
III, make up for 140 GWyr/yr and 330 GWyr/yr in regions I and III, respec-
tively.
In sum, for the 16 TW case, the major factors that succeed in reducing
energy use in regions I and III over the Low scenario projections are the
following:
• Modifications in assumptions concerning energy use in all buildings save
(in primary energy terms) 370 GWyr/yr in region I and 610 GWyr/yr in
region III by 2030. In both regions, about 25 percent of this difference
is attributable to technological improvements and 75 percent to a
reduction of useful specific energy consumption.
• Electric energy intensiveness in manufacturing was assumed to decline by
10 percent and useful thermal energy intensiveness by 20 percent from
1975 to 2030 in the Low scenario and by 35-40 percent and 40 percent,
respectively, in the 16 TW case. These changes account for 270 GWyr/yr
of primary energy saved in region I and 280 GWyr/yr in region III-or
about 65 percent of the combined effect of energy-reducing assumptions
introduced in the manufacturing sector in region I and 70 percent in
region III.
• Avoiding synthetic fuel production (and its conversion losses) accounts
for 9 percent of the total primary energy difference in region I and 3
percent in region III between the Low scenario and the 16 TW case by
2030.
Table 18-13 offers a sector-by-sector listing of energy consumption, eco-
nomic activity level, and energy intensity. Energy consumption is specified
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Table 18-13. Comparison of sectoral energy consumption in the Low
scenario and the 16 TW case (in terms of primary energy).
Region I (NA) Reqion III (WE/jANZj
Base Low 76 TW Base Low 76 TW
year scenario case year scenario case
7975 2030 2030 7975 2030 2030
Freight transportation a
Energy consumption (GWyr) 76 244 109 114 324 196
Activity level (10" ton-km) 2.4 5.9 3.5 1.4 3.8 2.5
Specific energy consumption
(kWh/ton-km) 0.28 0.36 0.27 0.69 0.75 0.68
Passenger transportation
Energy consumption (GWyr) 431 508 251 217 496 204
Activity level (10" passenger km) 4.1 7.4 5.6 5.2 10.7 7.9
Specific energy consumption
(kWh/passenger km) 0.92 0.60 0.40 0.37 0.40 0.23
International and military
transportation
Energy consumption (GWyr) 78 264 107 24 80 56
Activity level (GOP, in 10" $75) 1.7 4.2 2.4 7.2---
Specific energy consumption
(kWh/$VA) 0.40 0.55 0.22 0.09 0.10 0.07
Agriculture, construction, mining,
man ufactu ring b
Energy consumption (GWyr) 1077 2076 1090
" 71 2349 1008
Activity level (VA, in 10" $75) 0.5 1.3 1.1 1.1 2.9 2.2
Specific energy consumption
(kWh/$VA) 18.0 14.2 8.5 9.2 7.2 4.1
Of which: mining and manufacturinga
Energy consumption (GWyr) 1007 1882 954 1091 2140 856
Activity level (VA, in 10" $75) 0.4 1.0 0.8 0.8 2.2 1.4
Specific energy consumption
(kWh/$VA) 21.6 16.4 9.9 11.9 8.7 5.2
Dwellings
Energy consumption (GWyr) 680 968 643 617 1222 760
Population (106 persons) 237 315-- 560 767--
Dwellings (10 6 units) 79 141-- 187 300--
Specific energy consumption
(10' kWh/person) 25.1 26.9 17.9 9.6 14.0 8.7
Specific energy consumption
(10 3 kWh/dwelling) 75.0 60.3 40.0 28.9 35.7 22.2
Service sector
Energy consumption (GWyr) 310 341 305 116 290 171
Number of workers (10 6 persons) 62 84 90 107 187 228
Floor area (109 m') 2.7 3.8 3.9 3.0 6.0 6.1
Specific energy consumption
(kWh/worker) 43.7 35.5 29.6 9.6 13.5 6.6
Specific energy consumption
(kWh/m' area) 998 788 681 340 423 243
aExciuding pipeline transportation.
bExcluding mining, refining, and conversion of energy products.
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in terms of primary energy equivalent to avoid creating trends because of
different fuel mix. The table shows that the Low scenario projects a signifi-
cant decline of specific energy consumption in nearly all sectors. However,
for the transportation sector, the shift to synthetic fuels projected in the
Low scenario tends to increase the sector's energy intensiveness. In passenger
transportation, the shift to synthetic fuels, coupled with an expected strong
shift to automobiles (in region III) and to airplanes (in both regions I and III)
leads to a reduction in energy intensiveness of only 35 percent in region I
and to an increase of 8 percent in region III.
A decline in energy intensiveness in the manufacturing sector of 24 percent
in region I and 27 percent in region III was projected in the Low scenario
while a reduction of more than 50 percent would be required to reach the
16 TW case. The study by Leach et al. (1979) projects savings in final energy
in manufacturing for the United Kingdom to be 22 to 35 percent by 2010,
depending on the sector. Whether this is likely or not, and whether such
potential savings really could be realized by the wide array of countries in
the whole of region III (for example), is worth further study.
In the household and service sector, improvements in energy use have
impacts only in region I, while energy intensiveness is expected to increase
in region III. This development in region III is because of the region's non-
homogeneity: while one can expect a saturation effect like that in region I
for the north and northwestern part of Europe, substantial improvements in
living standards have to be achieved in the southern part, and it is this area
that evidences the highest population growth.
A critical point raised in the 16 TW case is the projection of activity levels,
for which a comprehensive view of the whole economy would be necessary.
The assumed shift in the structure of GOP formation toward services can
hardly be expected to occur simultaneously in all countries of such a macro-
region, where a number of countries (e.g., Japan, the FRG, France) have
to export manufactured goods to pay for raw material imports. Nevertheless,
a final judgment on these scenarios could be made only if the costs of a
reduction in energy use were compared with the costs of increased supplies.
While this can be done for individual countries, it does not seem feasible for
a still-evolving global energy study.
With this detailed presentation, an attempt was made to reveal some of
the impressive dimensions of sharply reducing energy growth. All of the
assumptions made here could occur; the question remains whether they will-
or should-occur. But it is important, at least, to explore such a low future
energy demand: the difficulty of energy supply underscored in Chapter 17
may lead the world to such a future.
SOME SENSITIVITY ANALYSES
At least one intent of the alternative cases presented thus far has been to
provide some "sensitivity" insights. These have hopefully revealed a few of
the consequences of changes in certain crucial assumptions. Yet the alter-
614 ENERGY IN A FINITE WORLD
native cases described so far certainly do not exhaust the conceivable varia-
tions in crucial assumptions. Changes in other key inputs can be tested, and
the sensitivity of results to such changes can be assessed.
Here, just three such "sensitivity analyses" are offered. They are posed as
"what if" possibilities of alterations in assumptions.
• What if the ceiling on region VI (ME/NAf) oil production were to be
much less (or much more) than assumed here, for example, because of
political instabilities, vast new discoveries, or policy changes?
• What if technological breakthroughs in energy research (e.g., solar cells,
fusion) were to occur?
• What if cost estimates for energy sources and technologies were signifi-
cantly greater than assumed?
Obviously, any list of such questions could be indefinitely long. One is
forced, then, to explore only a few examples-examples that offer important
and generalizable insights. Together, the scenarios, the alternative cases, and
the sensitivity analyses should build both a broad enough understanding of
the vital characteristics of the energy problem and a set of sufficiently
specific facts so that conclusions and recommendations for the energy
transition can be formulated.
The sensitivity analyses to follow are not formal results of the complete,
iterative, quantitative approach described in Chapters 13 through 17. Rather,
they are largely the judgments of those who, through much experience with
the formal analytical approach, have gained some insights into the sensitivity
of results to changes in certain inputs. Therefore, these sensitivity analyses
are best characterized as informed and experienced opinion, based on other
quantitative analyses. They are illustrative, not conclusive. They should
convey a "feeling" for the dimensions and texture of energy's future, rather
than a prescription for its activities. And of course, these sensitivity analyses
do not necessarily deal with events thought to be likely j they do deal with
possibilities that are thought to be among the most instructive ones for
analysis. The likelihood (or implausibility) of the events treated below is
not a subject of discussion in this chapter.
An Altered Region VI Oil Ceiling
The High and Low scenarios of Chapter 17 are shaped in no small measure
by a critical and admittedly highly arbitrary assumption-an annual oil
production ceiling of 33.6 mbd (2380 GWyr/yr) for region VI (ME/NAf).
This ceiling is exactly 50 percent greater than the 1975 oil production of
this region and about 30 percent above their 1977 production rate. (The
section entitled "The Special Case of Region VI" in Chapter 17 presents
some of the reasoning behind this assumption.)
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In one sense, the assumed ceiling on oil production is a small number.
The resource base in the region could support a much higher production rate
in the near term. Globally, demands may face higher production rates.
But in another (perhaps more realistic) sense, the assumed ceiling is a
large number. Region VI would not reach the assumed ceiling (in response
to rising world liquid fuel demands) until 2010 in the High scenario (2025
in the Low) and would have, after 2030, just eleven years of category 1
«$12 per barrel) oil remaining at 2030; they would have twenty-one
years of category 1 oil left in the Low scenario. Another eleven years of
production after 2030 could come from category 2 oil «$20 per barrel).
But considering any reasonable reserve-to-production ratio constraints, it
becomes clear that region VI's production would be forced rapidly downward
from the ceiling rate-even before 2030 in the High scenario.
Also, it must be recognized that the region is, has long been, and will
likely remain a politically unstable one. A number of possible terrorist
actions, or national revolutions, or acts of political defiance could easily
eliminate planned oil production increases. The events in Iran in 1978 and
the resultant oil market dislocations of 1979 are a painfully obvious example.
The situation is highly uncertain. Thus, one is led to wonder, What if
the oil production ceiling were lower than assumed? What would be the
impact on global energy balances? What would be the replacement source of
liquid fuels?
Assume a simple (and, on the face of it, small) 10 percent reduction in the
previously imposed ceiling of 33.6 mbd, for a new ceiling of 30 mbd (2124
GWyr/yr). In the High scenario, this would extend the category 1 oil re-
source remaining at 2030 by a total of just over 4950 GWyr, or 25.5 bil-
lion (109 ) barrels. At the new production ceiling, this would mean just
four years additional production from category 1 and no more than two
years more from category 2. Yet even this requires oil production in region
VI to increase by 15 percent over 1977 rates.
The reduced ceiling implies a shortfall of some 3.6 mbd of exports. What
options would be available to fill the gap? In both scenarios, only regions
III (WE/JANZ) and V (AfiSEA) would be net oil importers by 2030.
Assume, first, that these two regions share the shortfall in proportion to
their imports. Thus, region III would have to absorb 73 percent of the
shortfall (or about 2.6 mbd) in 2010 and 46 percent (1.7 mbd) in 2030 in
the High scenario. If the region III would (or could) increase its coallique-
faction to meet its share of the shortfall, this would require more than 330
million tons of additional coal production in 2010 and over 200 million
additional tons in 2030. These increases over the High scenario coal produc-
tion constraint of 1150 million tons for this region seem most unlikely.
Indeed in the High scenario, region III would be a coal importer (1700
million tons in 2030) for liquefaction.
Region V (AfiSEA) is also unlikely to be able to expand its domestic
coal production for liquefaction. Coal resources are probably not sufficient
for growth above that of the High scenario, and the technological capability
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of the region to support such expansion may also be questionable. The region
would need an alternative source for its liquids.
These considerations may lead regions III and V to turn to region I
(NA) and/or region II (SUlEE) for extra coal-based liquid fuels. Coal re-
sources in these latter two regions are more than ample. But High scenario
production in the year 2030 would be 2.9 billion tons in region I and 3.8
billion tons in region II. The two regions might share the extra 458 million
tons per year of coal required to fill the oil shortfall with synthetic liquids;
but this extra production is nearly 75 percent of the total coal production
in region I today.
Suppose such coal production (and export) increases in regions I and
II were not possible. An alternative would be more higher cost, unconven-
tional crude oil production outside of region VI. Perhaps this could be shale
oil from region I-a required export of 3.6 mbd to meet the global shortfall.
This would be the necessary increase over the High scenario oil production
projections of 11.8 mbd (in 2030). Concerns about the environmental
implications of large-scale shale production in the United States, coupled
with uncertain economics, dim the prospects for such a solution.
Another potential non-region VI source of oil could be region IV. (LA).
But in spite of large unconventional oil resources in this region, it seems
unreasonable to expect the region to be a net oil exporter. The High scenario
projects some 25.5 mbd of oil production in region IV by 2030 (from less
than 5 mbd today), solely for internal use. It is unlikely that the region
will want to expand production much farther or faster; too rapid expansion
and income generation lead to economic and social instability and resource
depletion.
Any answer to a lowering of the oil production ceiling for region VI
would have to be a combination of partial solutions. And any answer would
have some component of oil demand reduction, following the higher prices
resulting from reduced region VI exports. The explanations of Chapter 16
and the explorations of the 16 TW case in this chapter illustrate the dif-
ficulties of further liquids demand reduction.
Yet the demand reduction possibility may be the inevitable one. If the
10 percent reduction in region VI oil production were applied to the Low
scenario, for example, the new 30 mbd ceiling would be reached around
2020, just ten to fifteen years later than in the High scenario. This buys
some time-time that should be used to develop the requisite oil alternatives
and to shift uses more and more away from liquid fuels. But the Low sce-
nario is also lower economic growth. This may inhibit rapid investment in
and development of new sources.
And if the reduction in region VI oil production were more than the 10
percent postulated here, the situation for the world could be proportionately
worse. One is left with speculation about how quickly the world could
adapt to restricted oil supplies. Some measures of adaptation would surely
be less difficult than others-and the preferred choices would vary from
region to region. Still, it remains clear that there are no easy pathways
under a low oil ceiling.
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Technological Breakthroughs
What if technological breakthroughs in energy research were to occur? What
if some new source of energy such as fusion or solar photovoltaic cells or a
new liquids from coal (or garbage?) scheme were to become technically and
economically attractive well before expected? How would the future energy
paths so far described be redirected?
In Chapter 4 mention is made of the fusion option (see also Hafele et al.
1977). Even if fusion were commercially available as early as the year 2000
(an unthinkable notion to nearly all experts), it would likely only replace
some foreseen nuclear fission electric capacity. (Fusion is planned as a
source of electricity.) Even if it unexpectedly becomes available at modest
costs, it seems implausible that any country would rapidly expand both
fusion and fission power supplies. Thus, a fusion breakthrough would
probably not alter the scenarios noticeably; one could simply replace "FBR"
in the energy supply system graphs with "fusion" and perhaps modestly
increase electricity demand estimates.
Solar technologies will, ultimately, provide a major-if not the major-
portion of the world's energy needs (see Chapter 5). The solar estimates for
the next fifty years in the scenarios assume the application of solar collectors
for a certain fraction of the low temperature heat market. They also assume
very optimistic costs for central station solar electric facilities. Yet direct
solar technologies contribute a mere 0.3 to 0.4 TWyr/yr to total primary
energy by 2030-not more than 1 percent of total demand. (Other renewable,
solar-derived, technologies-biogas, wood, hydroelectric, and so forth-
contribute somewhat more in the scenarios, so that all renewable (nonfossil,
nonnuclear) sources would provide some 2 to 3 TWyr/yr or 8 to 10 percent
of primary energy by 2030.) What if a technological breakthrough occurred
to possibly increase this figure greatly?
If rapid technological advances do occur, as many experts expect they will,
the relative contribution of high technology solar devices could be signifi-
cantly greater than the scenario projections. Technological innovations and
mass production techniques could be stimulated by government incentives.
The overall scenario results might then change noticeably-but this would
demand a careful matching of appropriate solar technology to appropriate
end use market.
Solar cells, if conveniently-and relatively cheaply-produced, could
replace many now stationary sources of energy and alter economic activities
markedly. In particular, if such cells could be an attractive power source for
transport (small urban automobiles, for instance), this could have an impor-
tant effect on liquid fuel demand. And highly efficient solar conversion
devices could conceivably penetrate the urban market, where presently
solar collectors are all but excluded because of the high energy density
requirements of tall buildings.
But one must consider "market penetration" constraints: How quickly
could new solar devices contribute? (see Chapter 5). And one must consider
the potential markets for each energy source, recognizing that consumers
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might be willing to pay a high price for assumed backup supplies to supple-
ment primary solar devices. It is not clear that solar energy, even if suddenly
much cheaper, could easily contribute much more than in the scenario pro-
jections. The best possibility may be the one already noted: photovoltaics
offering a dispersed and mobile power source.
Any new technology that supplies an alternative liquid fuel to crude oil
can substantially alter the scenario projections. Liquid fuels are the problem
in the long term. If some process using wood or garbage (at least potentially
abundant and renewable raw materials) could make a competitively priced
liquid fuel, this would certainly lessen the pressure on oil supplies. Crude oil
and the new source of liquids could then together help developing regions
develop more comfortably; they could ease the requisite rapid buildup of
new electricity generation facilities, and they could perhaps lessen the need
for massive coal production (necessary otherwise as a liquids substitute or as
a source of synthetic liquid fuel).
In short, some conceivable technological breakthroughs could ameliorate
the liquid fuel dilemma, while others would attack the wrong problem.
The sensitivity of scenario results to such possibilities is not easy to gauge;
it seems most likely that the result would be simply the substitution of one
new technology for one old, scenario-assumed technology. The new idea, if
it is to significantly change the oil results, would probably have to contribute
more than the coal liquefaction amounts-up to 4000 GWyr/yr (or over 55
million barrels per day) by 2030. And the new technology would need to
produce liquid fuels far under $25 per barrel (1975 U.S. dollars) to compete
with oil from shales. This would be a sobering challenge indeed for a tech-
nology not yet developed.
Escalations in Energy Costs
The costs of energy resources and of energy supply and conversion tech-
nologies used in the scenarios are based on a modest survey of existing
studies. It may be that these cost estimates will be found to drastically
understate reality; the world is not unused to rapid cost escalations even
today. What then?
What if, for example, synthetic liquids from coal were to cost, say, $60
per barrel instead of the scenario estimate here of $21.50 per barrel (1975
U.S. dollars)? One (or both) of two things would happen. Either some
alternative source of liquid fuel (e.g., oil from shales) would replace liquids
from coal in the scenarios (and coal production would be reduced), or
demands for liquid fuels would plummet as (less expensive) substitutes
are found, or as consumers use less, or both. If, in general, alternatives to
conventional crude oil are found to be much more expensive than antici-
pated, then one could expect increased liquid fuel conservation, shifts to
electric modes of transport, and probably depressed economic growth rates.
The High scenario growth rates, for example, would be quite unrealistically
high.
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In these broad considerations, the preference for synthetic liquid fuels
from coal over oil from shale is moot. The scenario assumptions of Chapter
17 favor coal liquefaction j vast increases in coal production result. If, instead,
oil shales were favored, then the exploitation of shale in the United States
(for example) would replace the mining of coal, and the same export of syn-
thetic liquid fuels as in the scenarios could occur. The environmental implica-
tions of both coal and shale production are severe. In either case, it would
be a large, complex, and expensive undertaking to produce the liquid fuel.
Still, the globe's energy future is not insensitive to energy costs. If the
costs of all sources were to grow in real terms, then, surely, there would be
more serious impacts on economies than are assumed here. The international
balances of trade and aid could easily be upset (one is tempted to observe
that they already are); national development goals would not be met. This,
to a certain degree, is a likely prospect: the economic growth rates of the
scenarios were reduced from historical rates for just this reason. But the more
instructive consideration, perhaps, is that of the possible variations among
the relative price changes of new sources of energy.
Imagine three possibilities: (1) that all electricity generation costs doubled
(in real terms); (2) that all fossil fuel production costs doubled; or (3) that
both electricity and fossil fuel costs doubled. Number (1) perhaps reflects
a currently popular view that nuclear costs, for example, are widely under-
estimated-or that, in general, the electricity generation technologies used in
this study have too low cost estimates. Number (2), analogously, may
represent the view that unconventional fossil fuels-whose cost estimates
have continually risen in real terms-will ultimately be much more expensive
than current estimates. With number (3) one can test both given prospects.
For sensitivity analyses of these three possibilities, select region I (NA).
Take the High scenario year 2030 costs, escalate them according to the
three possibilities, assume the same "add ons" of costs as in Chapter 15 to
get final energy (consumer) prices, then use the implicit price elasticity
(Chapter 15) of the High scenario to calculate the resultant implied changes
in energy demands. The relevant figures for this simple analysis are given in
Table 18-14.
Assumed electricity production cost doubling would reduce demand by
8.4 percent in 2030 from the High scenario, as Table 18-14 shows ("2030
demand factor" 0.916). Fossil fuel cost doubling would cut demand in 2030
by 18.2 percent, and doubling of all costs would reduce demand by almost
24 percent. These reductions, less than those of the 16 TW case described
above, would surely ease the supply squeeze-with the extent of relief
depending on how much of the savings would be liquid fuels.
One can debate the validity of such use of price elasticities. Still, the
analysis does reveal that savings do not come easily beyond a certain point
(i.e., there are a lot of savings already assumed for the scenarios). Rising
prices may not be the panacea that many expect. Indeed, a sizable number
of analysts contend that many conservation measures are cost effective now.
It could be argued that the scenario assumptions of Chapter 16 concur with
this. Even if energy savings beyond the scenario assumptions were to occur,
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Table 18-14. Sensitivity analysis of energy supply cost assu mptions.
Production Costs 2030
High scenario (ll (2l (3)a
Energy Source GWyrjyr ($jkWyr) ($jk Wyr) ($jkWyr) ($jkWyr)
A. Region I (NA), High Scenario
Fossil fuel 2832 117 117 234 234
Electricity 749 161 322 161 322
Total 3581 126 160 219 252
Product "Other"
Cost Costs Price Price (P) DemanJ
High Scenario (tjkWyr) ($/k Wyr) (tjkWyr) Relative Factor
Possibilitiesa 2030 2030 2030 to 7972 p-o.5Bb 2030
B. Prices and Demand Reduction
126 84 210 3.0 0.53 1.0
(1) 160 84 244 3.49 0.48 0.916
(2) 219 84 303 4.33 0.43 0.818
(3) 252 84 336 4.80 0.40 0.761
apossibilities: (1) Assume all electricity production costs double in the High scenario. (2) As-
sume all fossil fuel production costs double in the High scenario. (3) Assume both (1) and (2) in the
High scenario.
b€p for High scenario, region I is -0.58.
c2030 demand factor is the fraction of primary energy in 2030 that would result from each pos-
sibility.
one should maintain an healthy skepticism about their potential in devel-
oping regions. Energy-saving measures often require sophistication-technical,
political, and societal sophistication. In developed economies, large energy
savings may be feasible; in developing economies, it seems much less likely.
The world, under almost any conceivable circumstance, will face increasing
demand for energy-and, more importantly, for liq uid fuels.
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19 ECONOMIC IMPACTS: COMPARISONOF ENERGY SCENARIOS
AND ALTERNATIVE CASES
Quantitative analyses of scenarios and alternative cases can go farther than
the simple comparisons of Chapter 18. One can also evaluate the economic
implications of these futures; to an extent Chapter 15 dealt with such evalua-
tions, or interpretations, for the scenarios. But an additional consideration is
the level of investments necessary for various energy projections. This chap-
ter investigates the capital investments as well as the manpower and material
and equipment requirements of the High and Low scenarios (Chapter 17)
and of the Nuclear Moratorium and the Enhanced Nuclear cases (Chapter 18).
Capital investments may be particularly worth calculating if, as seems
likely, energy supply systems become increasingly capital intensive. The pro-
jected growth in real energy production costs for the scenarios was described
in Chapter 15. Indeed, the suspicion that energy may become increasingly
capital intensive is based on observations of cost escalations of new sources
of liquid and gaseous fuels. Table 19-1 offers some indicative costs that sup-
port this argument.
The shift to more capital-intensive energy sources would probably occur
concurrently with expected increases in capital costs of many other resources.
New technologies in agriculture and many industrial sectors also tend to be
capital intensive. And capital would be required for environmental protec-
tion, particularly if present industrial practices of "fixing" pollution by add
on technologies persist. All of these' would compete for investment capital,
which may thereby become a serious constraint on the rates of introduction
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Table 19-1. Expected production and investment costs for sources of liquid
and gaseous fuels (1975 US$).
Investment Cost
Production
(70' $/boe/day)
Cost Liquid Gaseous
Energy Source ($ /boe) fuel fuel
Natural fuel
Giant fields (Saudi Arabia, Libya, Algeria) 1-3 4-5.5 1.6-3.2
Relatively favorable conditions (present
U.S. and North Sea deposits) 4-7 7.5-10 6.5-10
Unfavorable conditions and enhanced
recovery (U.S. and North Sea deposits) 10-12 15-18.5 16-20
Extreme conditions (deep offshore and
polar areas) 20-25 28-38 33-40
Synthetic fuel
Tar sands, heavy oils 10-20 15-20
Shale oils 15-25 19-26
Coal liquefaction and gasification 17-28 20-29 19-26
Hydrogen (electrolytic) > 25 > 100 > 70
Notes: The data for synthetic fuels include not only costs of conversion but also costs of primary
energy production. Investment costs means constructor's plus owner's costs and includes the cost
of refining. To reflect the uncertainties in cost estimates, figures are given here as ranges. Such un-
certainties force judgments to rely more on criteria other than cost. They also imply that over reliance
on purely economic models for finding "precise" or "optimal" energy solutions for forty to fifty
years ahead is meaningless. Still, this does not diminish the utility of models as tools for exposing
new trends and problems in energy futures.
of new energy sources. In short, it seems worthwhile and important to calcu-
late all energy investments likely in the future.
Implementation of energy scenarios may face bottlenecks not only of
shortages of capital but also of constraints of some other essential resources
(manpower, raw materials, land, water). Therefore, in these comparisons of
the scenarios and alternative cases an attempt is made to give rough assess-
ment of their WELMM requirements. (WELMM analyses are described in
Chapter 9.)
In this chapter, both direct and indirect requirements for energy supply
systems of the future are considered. Direct requirements are energy system
investments and WELMM needs. Indirect requirements refer to resources and
investment requirements of nonenergy sectors, the additional development
of which is induced by energy supply system development. For example, if a
rapid transition to new capital-intensive energy sources were to occur, addi-
tional (indirect) investments in machinery, metallurgy, construction, and
other energy-related industrial sectors could amount to 25 percent or more
of direct investment in the energy supply system. (This assessment is based
on work performed at the Siberian Power Institute and reported in Kononov
and Makarov [1975] .)
A word of caution: the numbers presented in this chapter should not be
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interpreted literally. Fifty-year economic analysis is a risky business. The
studies here are intended simply to present some general and dominant trends
and to search for order of magnitude estimates of future investment (and
WELMM) requirements for energy supply systems. If anything, the numbers
here may be too low; the discussion in Chapter 17 of cost estimation pointed
to the assumption made here of constant (in real terms) capital costs for
energy technologies and the admitted possibility that the assumed costs
reflect resource and technological optimism that may yet prove to be
unwarranted.
SOME INPUT ASSUMPTIONS
The primary tool used for these economic analyses is the IMPACT model.
IMPACT describes dynamic production relations between the energy supply
system and economic sectors that are particularly relevant to energy system
development. (The IIASA version of the model includes fifty-eight energy
activities and thirty-six energy-related sectors and aggregated kinds of materi-
als and equipment.)
First, IMPACT evaluates the direct requirements of a given energy strategy
in terms of investments for industrial goods and serrices. Then the model
assesses the required additional development of energy-related sectors of the
economy (taking into account exogenously given imports of equipment and
materials). Finally, the model estimates investment in energy-related sectors-
direct and indirect WELMM expenses. (IMPACT is described in Chapter 13
and in Kononov and Por [1979].)
Each activity is characterized in IMPACT by the following indexes:
• Input coefficients per unit of output (operation and maintenance re-
quirements for materials, equipment, and services);
• WELMM coefficients (specific expenditures of water, energy, land, man-
power, and some limited materials for operation and construction;
• Capital coefficients (material and equipment requirements per unit of
new capacity or per dollar of capital investment);
• Incremental capital-output ratios (specific investment per unit of new
capacity) ;
• Typical construction time and a pattern of lags between construction
and completion of the plant.
In an energy-oriented model such as IMPACT, the accuracy required of
the data for energy activities must be higher than that required of data for
the energy-related sectors. Many different data sources were analyzed and
used. The data received from the Bechtel Corporation (1978) were particu-
larly valuable.
Yet one should not rely too much on cost data. A multicriteria approach
to long-term economic problems is to be preferred to modeling approaches
that seek "least cost, optimal" solutions.
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A special task that had to be completed before IMPACT could be used
was to evaluate the capital costs of extraction of different categories of oil,
natural gas, and coal in different world regions, taking into account present
marginal capital costs, known resources and their distribution by price cate-
gory, anticipated time of exhaustion of these resources, and other factors.
Some of these estimations are given in Table 19-2. The generalized material
structure of the capital investments for fuels extraction is shown in Table
19-3. These figures were used for estimating corresponding capital coeffi-
cients in IMPACT.
Capital cost and other economic indexes for power plants and energy con-
version technologies do not depend so strongly on local conditions as do the
indexes for primary energy resources. Therefore, they were assumed to be
identical for all regions and based on U.S. prospective data. The values used,
as in the IMPACT model, are shown in Tables 17-4 and 19-1.
The evaluation of input-output and capital coefficients for energy-related
sectors for separate world regions and for a perspective of thirty to fifty
years can be, inevitably, only very rough and aggregated. It is impossible to
obtain average regional indexes by means of conventional procedures because
of the lack of corresponding information for all countries of each of the
regions. Therefore, for each region, one representative country is selected, its
coefficients are aggregated, and the results are then generalized for the entire
region. Thus, for example, the United States was considered the representa-
tive country for region I (NA), the FRG for region III (WE/]ANZ), and India
for region V (AflSEA).
Table 19-2. Capital costs of fuels used in the IMPACT model (1975 $/kW).
Regions
Resource Cost I (NA) and /II IV VI V (AI/SEA)
Category /I (SU/EE) (WE//ANZ) (LA) (ME/NAf) and VII (C/CPA)
Oil 1 110 135 130 35 110
lA 205 205 185 110 190
2 305 330 260 270 290
3 410 410 410 410
Gas 1 100 160 85 25 100
lA 280 315 250 80 270
2 455 455 420 250 435
3 665 668 665 668
Coal 1 32 74 70 37
lA 74 150 95 74
2 160 225 190 115
Note: These resources are defined in Tables 17-6 and 17-7. They cover fuel resources from present
marginal production cost (category 1) to $25/boe (category 3). The regional differences in capital
cost of the same resource categories reflect differences in known resources, present capital cost of
their extraction, and time of exhaustion of given resource category (in accordance with the scenarios).
The data do not include intraregional transportation costs for moving energy from resource site to
end user.
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Table 19-3. Composition of costs of energy production and conversion
facilities as used in the IMPACT model (percent).
On-
shore
Materials 33
Primary iron and steel 15
Nonferrous metals
Fabricated metal products 3
Glass, clay, and stone products 7
Chemical and allied products 6
Miscellaneous materials 2
Equipment 31
Electrical 1
Oil field 20
Mining
Transportation and material handling
Fabricated plate products 4
General industry 3
Miscellaneous 3
Manpower 26
Services and other constructor costs 10
Total constructor's costs 100
Owner's costs as %of constructor's
costs 51
Oil
Off-
shore
30
12
12
2
3
1
41
1
34
1
1
4
13
16
100
96
On-
shore
36
14
2
13
7
18
1
9
3
2
3
28
18
100
51
Gas
Off-
shore
33
17
9.5
3
3
0.5
31
1
24
1
1
4
18.5
17.5
100
94
Coal
Under-
ground
15
3
1
7.5
1
1.5
2
49
3.5
32
7.5
2.5
1
2.5
22
14
100
76
Surface
5
1
0.5
1.5
1
0.2
0.8
61
1.5
52
4.2
2
0.3
1.0
19
15
100
29
Note: These figures are based on Bechtel data. They reflect the conditions of the United States
but are used in IMPACT with small corrections for other regions because of lack of data. Owner's
costs include interest during construction, land lease, and so forth.
CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS
This section presents the IMPACT model assessment of the capital require-
ments associated with the energy supply scenarios of Chapter 17 and the
alternative supply cases of Chapter 18. All capital costs are expressed in con-
stant (1975) U.S. dollars without discounting.
High and Low Scenariosa
Global investments for exploration, production, conversion, transportation,
and distribution of primary and secondary energy under the assumptions in
aThe two scenarios evaluated here differ slightly from the supply scenarios of Chapter 17, the
former being somewhat earlier versions of the final IIASA scenarios. The gross, almost qualitative,
evaluations given here would not be affected in any important way by the minor differences actually
obtained.
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the two (High and Low) scenarios would be very large. Even in the Low sce-
nario, the global energy supply system would need about $7 trillion (012 )
of direct energy investment during the period 1975 to 2000 and about $20
trillion during 2000 to 2030. These investments would represent about 2.9
and 3.8 percent of cumulative gross world product (GWP) during the two
periods. The High scenario would require $2 trillion more than the Low over
the first twenty-five-year period and $13 trillion more over the next thirty
years. These High scenario energy investments would be about 3.1 and 3.9
percent of cumulative GWP during the two periods.
The dynamics of global annual direct investment requirements for energy
supply systems are illustrated in Figure 19-1. They would start from about
$13 5 billion (09 ) in 1975 (2.2 percent GWP) and would increase up to
$840 billion by 2030 in the Low scenario and up to $1400 billion in the
High scenario (3.7 to 3.5 percent of GWP in the two scenarios, respectively,
by 2030). The direct energy investments obviously would be more and more
important in macroeconomic terms. Still, the increase of these investments as
a share of total gross economic product does not appear alarming, on a glob-
ally aggregated scale. Regional differences may reveal considerable capital-
generating difficulties. Greater and greater energy capital needs occur in
developing regions (regions IV-LA, V-AfiSEA, VI-ME/NAf, and VII-C/CPA)
in the scenarios. These regions now spend only about 15 percent of the
global energy investment; in the year 2000 their share would increase to 32
to 38 percent in these scenarios, and later it would reach 40 to 44 percent or
more.
Energy capital requirements, this analysis shows, would grow more rapidly
than energy consumption (Table 19-4). This is mainly because of the exhaus-
tion of cheap oil and gas resources in these scenarios and because of the
greater role in the global energy balance of more and more capital-intensive
energy sources (Figure 19-2). Appreciable changes in the industrial structure
of energy investments occur in the scenarios (Table 19-5).
Two important scenario results must be mentioned-the rapid growth in
the share of investment in synthetic fuels (from 1 to 12 percent) during the
period of 1980 to 2030 and in nuclear power plants and the nuclear fuel
cycle (from 14 to 25 percent). At the same time, one can observe (Table
19-5) that total electricity generation investment is projected to drop as a
percentage of total (direct plus indirect) energy investment, while electricity
increases its contribution to energy supply. This follows from the assumption
of relatively less expensive sources of electricity compared to unconventional
fossil fuels. Large-scale development in many countries of solar heating and
cooling, district heating, and various small-scale energy technologies would
lead to an increasing share of these items ("other" investment in Table 19-5)
in total energy investment-from 6 percent in 1980 to 12 percent after 2000.
The development of new capital-intensive energy sources on a large scale
necessitates the additional development of the metallurgy, engineering,
chemical, and building industries and other sectors of the economy. The
dynamics of such indirect investments are reflected in Figure 19-3. At the
present time, global indirect investments to the energy supply system equal
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Table 19-4. Annual growth rates of energy and capital requirements (per-
cent/year) .
High Scenario Low Scenario
7975- 2000-
2000 2025
Developed regionsa
Primary energy
Final energy
Direct capital investment
Developing regions b
Primary energy
Final energy
Direct capital investment
World
Primary energy
Final energy
Direct capital investment
7975- 2000-
2000 2025
2.3 1.8
2.1 1.4
4.6 3.5
5.7 3.8
5.5 3.4
9.6 5.0
3.0 2.5
3.0 2.2
5.9 3.7
1.6
1.5
3.3
4.3
4.2
8.7
2.1
2.1
4.7
1.1
0.8
2.5
2.9
2.6
3.5
1.7
1.4
2.9
aRegions I (NA), II (SU/EE), III (WE/JANZ).
bReg;ons IV (LA), V (Af/SEA), VI (ME/NAf), VII (C/CPA).
roughly $22 billion per year. During the period under consideration, annual
indirect investments would increase to $90 billion for the Low scenario and
to $150 billion for the High scenario. The absolute maximum of indirect
investment could occur between 2010 and 2020 by this analysis and precede
by ten to twenty years the maximum of direct investment.
Maximum ratios of indirect to direct investment resulting from calcula-
tions for the High scenario are region I (NA), 28 percent (in the period
1995-2000); region II (SU/EE), 21 percent (1995-2000); region III (WEI
JANZ), 15 percent (1990-1995); region IV (LA), 24 percent (1995-2000);
Table 19-5. Structure of direct global energy investment, High scenario
(percent).
7980 2000 2000
Natural fuels 22 22 19
Synthetic fuels 1 3 12
Fuel transportation and distribution 13 9.5 8
Nuclear power plants 14 22 25
Other power plants 19 11 9
Electricity transmission and distribution 25 20.5 15
Othera 6 12 12
Total 100 100 100
Total (10 9 $/yr) 238 580 1330
a"Other" consists of decentralized energy sources and certain others not listed (i.e., solar heating
and cooling systems, district heat and cogeneration systems, and renewable small-scale heat or power
supply systems).
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region V (AflSEA), 21 percent (2000-2005); region VI (ME/NAf), 20 per-
cent (1995-2000); and region VII (CICPA), 36 percent (1995-2000 and
2005-2010). Indirect investments, while rather small compared to direct
investment requirements, should not be neglected. In the developing regions
(IV, V, VI, VII), 35 to 50 percent of indirect investment would be spent for
the development of engineering and chemical industries. In the developed
regions (I, II, III), the largest part of indirect investments would be needed
for ferrous metallurgy (30 to 35 percent).
The Low scenario requires $3.5 trillion and the High scenario $5.7 trillion
of indirect investment to the energy system during 1980 to 2030. These fig-
ures are 13 and 14 percent, respectively, of cumulative direct investment.
The sum of direct plus indirect capital investment requirements (Table
19-6) during 1980-2030 could amount to $30 trillion for the Low scenario
and $46.5 trillion for the High scenario. These figures are 3.9 and 4.1 per-
cent, respectively, of cumulative GWP during this period. Total (direct plus
indirect) investment in the scenarios grows faster than does GWP. The share
of annual GWP used for total energy investments would increase from 2.2
percent in 1975 to 4 percent by 2030 in the Low scenario and to 4.3 percent
in the High scenario. This doubling of the share of total energy investment in
GWP is striking; whether it reveals an alarming problem, or simply a chal-
lenging shift of economic resources, remains to be seen. Regional differences
in this context are revealing.
Table 19-6. Total (direct and indirect) cumulative energy investment re-
quirements, 1980-2030.
Developed Developing
Regionsa Regionsb World
High Low High Low High Low
Period scenario scenario scenario scenario scenario sceanrio
1980-1990
(10'2 $(period) 2.8 2.3 1.4 0.8 4.2 3.1
(as %of GOP) 3.6 3.3 6.0 4.2 4.0 3.5
1990-2000
(10 12 $(period) 3.6 2.9 2.1 1.4 5.7 4.3
(as % of GDP) 3.3 3.2 6.0 5.2 3.9 3.7
2000-2010
( 10 12 $(period) 6.1 3.8 3.4 2.2 9.5 6.0
(as %of GOP) 4.1 3.5 6.4 5.9 4.6 4.1
2010-2020
(10 12 $(period) 7.7 4.6 5.1 2.9 12.8 7.5
(as % of GOP) 4.0 3.6 6.6 6.0 4.7 4.3
2020-2030
(10 12 $(period) 7.8 5.2 6.6 3.6 14.4 8.8
(as %of GOP) 3.2 3.6 6.1 5.8 4.1 4.2
Total 1980-2030
(10 12 $(period) 28.0 18.8 18.5 10.9 46.5 29.7
aRegions r (NA), II (SU(EE), III (WE(JANZ).
bRegions IV (LA), V (At(SEA), VI (ME(NAt), VII (C(CPA).
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The developing regions, which in 1975 spent about 2 percent of their GDP
on energy investment, would have to drastically increase this figure by 2030
(see Figure 19-4) under the conditions of the scenarios. The maximum share
of total energy investment in GDP in these regions would reach 6.1 percent
in the Low scenario and 6.7 percent in the High scenario.
For region IV and region VI, the maximum share of total energy invest-
ment in GDP fluctuates between 6.5 and 8 percent in the scenarios. For
region V, this index would not exceed 6 percent in the Low scenario and 7
percent in the High scenario. But the economic problems of this region
become complicated by the need for hard currency to pay for oil imports
(Figure 19-5).
In the developed regions, the growth of total energy investment as a frac-
tion of GDP would not be as high as in the developing regions in the scenar-
ios. In the Low scenario, this index would be close to historical figures (2 to
3.5 percent). It would appear that this would not present serious difficulties
in providing the required capital. But this may not hold true for the High
scenario. In regions I and II, the share of total energy investment in GDP
may increase to 5 percent in the High scenario. For region III, energy invest-
ments in GDP would not exceed 3 percent. But this reflects the continued
dependence of this region on imported energy resources; the figures cited
here do not include investments in increased production of some export
goods to compensate for required energy imports. Such additional invest-
ments could be substantial. The costs of energy imports to region III would
grow from $80 billion in 1980 to $220 billion in the scenarios by 2030
(Figure 19-5).
Alternative Supply Cases
The Nuclear Moratorium and Enhanced Nuclear cases of Chapter 18 are ex-
treme cases, but their analysis gives some indication of the possible economic
consequences of deviations from the conditions and constraints contained in
the scenarios. It should be remembered in this context that one of the crite-
ria of energy supply source selection for the High and the Low scenarios was
minimizing capital costs. Because of this, the alternative cases should be ex-
pected to have higher investment requirements than the scenarios against
which they are compared. As will be seen shortly, this is indeed the situation.
In the Nuclear Moratorium case, constraints on coal production were re-
moved, and as a result, its share in global primary energy consumption was
increased in 2030 from 29 to 39 percent. This step would actually contribute
to a decreasing of the capital intensiveness of the energy supply system. But
simultaneously, additional resources of expensive categories of oil and gas
would be involved in the energy balance-thereby increasing the energy capi-
tal intensiveness.
As a result, the Nuclear Moratorium case would require some $4600 bil-
lion more (cumulative) direct investment for the global energy supply system
up to the year 2030 than in the Low scenario (i.e., about 19 percent more).
The major part of these additional investments ($3300 billion) would have
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to be accumulated in the developed regions. If one compares the dynamics
of direct investment requirements for the Nuclear Moratorium case and for
the Low scenario (Figures 19-1 and 19-6), then one can see that all addi-
tional investments are needed after the year 2000. In the beginning of the
period under consideration (i.e., the next fifteen to twenty years), the Nu-
clear Moratorium case is less capital intensive.
The indirect investment requirements of the Nuclear Moratorium case are
higher than for the Low scenario during the whole period. The indirect in-
vestments of the Nuclear Moratorium case exceed those of the Low scenario
by 24 percent or about $880 billion. During the period of peak global annual
investment (direct and indirect) for development of energy-related branches
of the economy and infrastructure, indirect investment would amount to 26
percent of direct investment. This peak period would be 1995-2000 (Figure
19-6). Over the entire period of 1975-2030, indirect investments average 16
percent of direct investments.
Total (direct and indirect) global investments for the Nuclear Moratorium
case are 17 percent higher than for the Low scenario (Table 19-7). The Nu-
clear Moratorium case results in an increase in the share of total energy
investments in GWP-to as high as 6.8 percent, compared to 6.1 percent for
the Low scenario.
In the Enhanced Nuclear case, nuclear power plants would provide 75 per-
cent of total global electricity production. (This share was 61 percent in the
High scenario.) This, together with breeder reactor capacity as part of the
methanol production technology (Chapter 18), would lead to additional cap-
ital requirements. In comparison with the High scenario, the Enhanced Nu-
clear case would require 8 percent more direct capital investment for the
developed regions and 10 percent more for the developing regions (excluding
region VI). For the world, additional direct energy investment in the period
1980-2030 for the Enhanced Nuclear case would come to about $3400 bil-
Table 19-7. Total (direct and indirect) capital requirements of the Nuclear
Moratorium case (1012 $/period).
Total
7980- 7990- 2000- 2070- 2020- 7980-
7990 2000 2070 2020 2030 2030
2.9 4.5 5.7 6.7 22
1.3 2.3 3.3 4.4 12
4.2 6.8 9.0 1.1 34
0.7 1.1 1.5 3.3
0.1 0.4 0.8 1.3
0.8 1.4 2.2 4.6
Deviation from Low scenario
Developed regions
Developing regionsa
World
Nuclear Moratorium case
Developed regions (I-NA, II-SU/EE,
111-WE/lANZ) 2.2
Developing regions (IV-LA,
V-Af/SEA, VI-ME/NAf, VII-C/CPA) 0.7
World 2.9
dExciuding region VI (ME/NAf).
Fi
gu
re
19
-6
.
D
ir
ec
t
a
n
d
in
di
re
ct
a
n
n
u
a
l
in
ve
st
m
en
t
re
qu
ir
em
en
ts
fo
r
e
n
e
rg
y
su
pp
ly
sy
st
em
s
fo
r
th
e
tw
o
a
lte
rn
at
iv
e
ca
se
s.
(S
ee
Fi
gu
re
19
-1
fo
r
c
o
m
pa
ra
bl
e
fig
ur
es
fo
r
th
e
H
ig
h
a
n
d
Lo
w
sc
e
n
a
rio
s.
)
20
30
W
or
ld
D
ev
el
op
ed
20
15
.
.
-
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
~
-
-
-
-
_
.
.
.
.
.
-
D
ir
ec
t
In
ve
st
m
en
t
In
di
re
ct
In
ve
st
m
en
t
20
00 Y
ea
r
E
nh
an
ce
d
N
uc
le
ar
11
09
$)
N
uc
le
ar
M
or
at
or
iu
m
(10
9 $
)
16
00
10
00
+
IA
l~
rl
.J
/
14
00
BO
Ot
/
D
ev
el
op
ed
12
00
10
00
60
0
~
80
0
40
0'\
-
J
r
D
ev
el
op
in
g
(w
ith
ou
t
60
0
~
40
0
20
0~
/
..
-
.
-
r
W
or
ld
20
0
,
'
-
-
.
-
.
-
O
.
~
I
-
-
-
-
- I
I
0
19
15
19
85
20
00
20
15
20
30
19
15
19
85
Y
ea
r
K
ey
:
-
-
D
ir
ec
t
In
ve
st
m
en
t
K
ey
:
-
-
-
In
di
re
ct
In
ve
st
m
en
t
0
\
<
;.
J
'
0
640 ENERGY IN A FINITE WORLD
Table 19-8. Total (direct and indirect) capital requirements for the Enhanced
Nuclear case (1012 $/period).
Total
7980- 7990- 2000- 2070- 2020- 7980-
7990 2000 2070 2020 2030 2030
Enhanced Nuclear case
Developed regions (I-NA,
Il-SU/EE,III-WE/JANZ) 2.9 3.7 6.3 8.2 8.8 29.9
Developing regions (IV-LA,
V-Af/SEA, VI-ME/NAf,
VII-C/CPA) 1.3 2.1 3.45 5.55 7.35 19.75
World 4.2 5.8 9.75 12.75 16.15 49.65
Deviations from the High scenario
Developed regions 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.5 1.0 1.9
Developing regionsa 0.05 0.45 0.75 1.2
World 0.1 0.1 0.25 0.95 1.75 3.1
aExciuding region VI {ME/NAf}.
lion or about 8 percent higher than the High scenario. About 60 percent of
this sum would be required after the year 2015, when the introduction of
fast breeder reactors would occur rapidly and on a large scale.
Indirect investments for the Enhanced Nuclear case are, on average, 9 per-
cent of direct investments or about $390 billion. Both the relative and abso-
lute values of indirect investments for the Enhanced Nuclear case are less
than those for the High scenario. To provide for the Enhanced Nuclear case,
global investments in energy-related sectors would have to be, on average,
$70 billion per year before 2000 and $120 billion per year after 2000 (Figure
19-6).
Total energy investment requirements for the Enhanced Nuclear case in
the period 1980-2030 would equal some $29.9 trillion for the developed
regions and some $19.75 trillion for the developing regions (Table 19-8).
These figures are just 6.5 and 8 percent higher than the corresponding figures
for the High scenario. The share of GWP taken up by total energy invest-
ments in the Enhanced Nuclear case would be (at maximum) 7.4 percent,
compared to 6.7 percent for the High scenario. The technology cost assump-
tions for the Enhanced Nuclear case are sufficiently optimistic so that the
increased capital burden would be relatively light.
These capital investment requirements for the scenarios and alternative
cases do not yet deal with the problem of capital availability. This issue will
be discussed briefly at the end of this chapter, after an evaluation of the
WELMM requirements for the scenarios and alternative cases.
WELMM ANALYSIS
This section presents some generalized results of the IMPACT model's assess-
ment of the requirements for manpower, materials, energy, land, and water
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in the scenarios and alternative cases. Two rather similar studies were made
recently-in the United States by the Bechtel Corporation (Gallagher et al.
1978) and in the USSR by the Siberian Power Institute (Kononov and Maka-
rov 1975)-for WELMM type conditions in these two countries over the
medium term. The results of these works were used here for examination of
IMPACT results for regions I and II.
The assessments provided here are inevitably very rough; they give only
the order of magnitude of possible WELMM requirements. This is especially
true for the developing regions. But it is felt that they reasonably reflect the
major impacts of alternative energy strategies on the requirements for limited
resources, and they may help to better understand some of the economic
problems to come during the transition to new energy sources.
Manpower Requirements
In calculating the manpower requirements of the scenarios and alternative
cases, an average growth of 1.5 to 2 percent per year in labor productivity in
energy industries and in energy-related sectors of the economy was antici-
pated. Under this condition, direct requirements for manpower for operation
and construction of the global energy supply system would grow by 0.4 per-
cent per year from 1975 to 2000 and by 0.7 percent per year over the fol-
lowing thirty years for the Low scenario. The High scenario would require
more rapid growth of labor forces-1 percent before and 2.3 percent after
the year 2000 (see Figure 19-7). In 2030, about 24 million people in the
world would be involved in fuel and electricity production and transporta-
tionb in the High scenario-that is, 13 million more than at present and 8.6
million more than for the Low scenario.
The largest part of the labor force would be employed in the coal indus-
try-25 percent in the developed regions and 38 percent in developing regions
(Table 19-9). Manpower requirements for synthetic fuel production would
reach, by 2030, levels comparable with those for electricity generation.
About a quarter of the total required labor force would be engaged in fuel
transportation and distribution.
Indirect manpower requirements, which at present exceed direct require-
ments, would grow at 1.2 percent per year on average during 1980-2030 for
the High scenario and at 0.3 percent for the Low scenario (Figure 19-7).
About eleven to nineteen million people would be employed in energy-
related sectors of the world in 2030. Total (direct and indirect) annual man-
power requirements by 2030 would equal about twenty-six million people
for the Low scenario and forty-two and a half million for the High scenario.
The Nuclear Moratorium case would require in the year 2030 some 14 per-
cent more workers than the Low scenario, while the Enhanced Nuclear case
would require 13 percent less manpower than the High scenario (Table
19-10). And the labor savings in the Enhanced Nuclear "endowment" case
would come after 2000, when labor might be in short supply.
bThese figures do not include manpower requirements for production of noncommercial sources
of energy.
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Table 19-9. Structure of direct energy manpower requirements for the
High scenario, 2030 (percent).
Oil and gas industry
Coal industry
Synthetic fuels production
Fuel transportation
Electricity generation
Electricity transmission and distribution
Total
of which unskilled labor
Developed
RegionsG
5.5
25
14
14
17.5
14
100
9.5
Developing
Regionsb
11.5
37.5
8
25
11
7
100
11
World
9
31
11
24.5
14.5
10
100
10.4
aRegions I (NA), II (SU/EE), III (WE/JANZ).
bRegions IV (LA), V (Af/SEA), VI (ME/NAf), VII (C/CPA).
Table 19-10. Comparison of total (direct and indirect) global manpower
requirements.
(70· person-yr/yr)
Low scenario 17.4 18.8 21.3 24.1 26.3
Nuclear Moratorium case 17.8 21.0 25.3 27.2 30.1
Difference 0.4 2.2 4.0 3.1 3.8
High scenario 21.1 23.9 30.8 37.1 42.5
Enhanced Nuclear case 20.8 24.4 29.1 35.0 37.2
Difference -0.3 0.5 -1.7 -2.1 -5.3
With these considerations, it would appear that manpower requirements
during the next fifty years may not be serious for the world as a whole. The
problem of labor force quality is much more serious. This is especially true
for the developing regions where, for the High scenario, the energy sector
alone would require in 2030 some nine to ten million more skilled workers,
technicians, and engineers than at present.
Material and Equipment Requirements
Energy supply systems strongly affect the development of many branches of
industry by requiring the output of these branches.c Conversely, lack of
some materials or equipment can negatively influence the rates of develop-
ment of energy supply systems.
For the High scenario the total (direct and indirect) basic materials re-
cFor example, in both the United States and the USSR, development of the energy supply system
requires, directly or indirectly, up to 20 percent of metallurgical products, approximately 10 to 20
percent of copper and aluminum, 11 to 16 percent of cement, and more than 10 percent of the gross
machine-building production.
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quirements of the global energy supply system would increase by a factor of
5.9 over the period 1975 to 2030. This is 36 percent higher than the growth
in world primary energy production. Requirements for chemical products
would increase particularly rapidly (Figure 19-8).
Global energy supply needs for industrial equipment would be higher than
needs for basic materials. The requirements for equipment for fields, coal
mines, and other primary energy extraction facilities may increase over the
period by a factor of seven to twelve.
The Low scenario would require 30 to 40 percent less material and equip-
ment than the High scenario. But even for the Low scenario, the total costs
of materials directly or indirectly used for operating and developing the
global energy supply system would be about $400 billion per year in 2000
and about $760 billion per year in 2030. The cost of equipment required
annually is estimated at $3000 billion in 2000 and $520 billion in 2030.
The Nuclear Moratorium case would lead to a 25 percent increase (over
the Low scenario) in total (direct and indirect) material and equipment re-
quirements by 2030 (Figure 19-9). The Enhanced Nuclear case, on the con-
trary, would save 12 to 14 percent of the materials and equipment required
by the High scenario.
The considerably increased requirements for materials and equipment in
the scenarios and alternative cases leads one to wonder how difficult this
might be. A sense of the problem can be gained by comparing these require-
ments with projections of the total global outputs of two very aggregated
industrial sectors-basic materials (ferrous and nonferrous metals, building
materials and cnemical products) and machinery and equipment. d
The analysis shows (Figure 19-10) that at present some 10 percent of
total global production of basic materials and some 6.5 percent of total
equipment output are used for the development of the energy supply system.
These figures would increase slightly in both scenarios. In neither scenario do
materials and equipment needs seem unreachable, although the relative ease
or difficulty of meeting the needs cannot now be known with any confidence.
The Nuclear Moratorium case materials and equipment situation may be
more serious: after 2000 the ratio between the energy supply system require-
ments and world production of these commodities would rise to 13.9 per-
cent for basic materials and to 9 percent for equipment.
The problem of providing energy requirements in basic materials and
equipment may become more challenging in the developing regions. Avail-
ability of hard currency in the developing regions may be a serious obstacle
to expanded imports of materials and equipment on a scale large enough for
requisite development of domestic energy systems.
Energy Requirements
Production materials and equipment for energy and energy-related sectors of
the economy require fuel and electricity. The energy content of industrial
dChapter 16 describes the procedure used in calculating the output of these sectors.
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goods used for construction and operation of energy facilities represent the
indirect energy requirements of energy supply systems.
Results of IMPACT model runs show that the global indirect requirements
for fuel and electricity are equivalent by 2030 to 1.1 TWyr/yr of primary
energy for the Low scenario and 1.85 TWyr/yr for the High scenario. These
figures would be approximately 4.2 and 4.6 percent of total primary energy
demand.
The Nuclear Moratorium case, which requires additional development of
some energy-related sectors, would increase indirect energy needs by 0.4
TWyr/yr over the Low scenario. The amount of this direct requirement
seems small, yet its financial impact could be nonnegligible. Additional devel-
opment of expensive, alternative energy sources (synthetic fuel, solar power
plants) to meet the increased energy needs would require some $300 billion.
The Enhanced Nuclear case provides a saving of 0.25 TWyr/yr of primary
energy in energy-related sectors.
Land and Water Requirements
If the global energy supply system were to develop in accordance with the
Low scenario, it would require in the next fifty years the extension of land
occupied by energy facilities and energy-related enterprises during their life
by about 330,000 km 2 . In addition, about 400,000 km 2 would be needed
for nonexclusive energy use (for instance, aerial electric corridors do not
exclude farming). The High scenario would require about 500,000 km 2 of
fixed land and about 750,000 km 2 of "right of way" land.
The land requirements in the scenarios and alternative cases would be dis-
tributed between the developed and the developing regions rather equally
(Table 19-11). Some 20 percent of total fixed land requirements in the
developed regions concern the energy-related enterprises that provide energy
development. In comparison with the scenarios the Nuclear Moratorium case
Table 19-11. Land and water requirements.
Developed Developing
regionsC regionsd World
Fixed Land (10 3 km'l
Low scenario
Nuclear Moratorium case
Difference
High scenario
Enhanced Nuclear case
Difference
170
240
70
260
250
-10
160
175
15
240
220
-20
330
415
85
500
470
-30
Water (10' m 3 /year)b
Developed Developing
regionl regionsd World
143 34 177
123 33 156
-20 -1 -21
210 60 270
215 70 285
5 10 15
aCumulative (1980-2030) direct and indirect requirements.
bAverage (2010-2030) annual total consumption.
CRegions I (NA), II (SU/EE), /II (WE!JANZ).
dRegions IV (LA), V (Af/SEA). VI (ME/NAf), VII (C/CPA).
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requires 25 percent more fixed land and the Enhanced Nuclear case 6 per-
cent less fixed land.
The average annual water consumption requirements (including the water
supply of the energy-related branches) are estimated by the IMPACT model
to be 177 billion m3 for the Low scenario and 270 billion m 3 for the High
scenario (Table 19-11). This estimation does not consider the availability or
nonavailability of sources of water and, in particular, the possibility of re-
peated use of the water in closed systems of water supply. The latter could
reduce the stated water requirements substantially in these scenarios and
cases. About 80 percent of water demand would be concentrated in the
developed regions, where the problem of water is expected to become one of
the most crucial ones.
The Enhanced Nuclear case would require 5 percent more water than the
High scenario. This is because a large part of the water consumption is con-
cerned with electricity production. Nuclear power plants require 30 percent
more water than fossil-fuel-fired power plants. For this reason, the Nuclear
Moratorium case needs less water than the other case and the scenarios and
saves about 11 percent in comparison to the Low scenario.
SUMMARY OBSERVATIONS
The scenarios and alternative cases evaluated here seem to indicate that the
transition to new energy sources would be characterized by a definite in-
crease in energy costs. The investment costs of unconventional fossil re-
sources may increase in many regions by a factor of four to five for crude oil
and natural gas and by a factor of two to two and a half for coal by the year
2030. Simultaneously, the sharpness of competition among the energy sector
and other sectors of the economy for limited national and natural resources
would heighten. Of course, the progress of development would generate a
good deal of capital for energy purposes. Nevertheless, under these condi-
tions even a rough assessment of future capital and WELMM requirements
and their availability becomes an important consideration for the energy
transition.
Here, direct and indirect resource requirements have to be taken into
account. From the IMPACT model runs of the IIASA energy scenarios, one
finds that ratios of indirect to direct requirements would (with the array of
assumptions made) amount to 20 to 25 percent for capital investment, 200
to 300 percent for basic materials and nonenergy equipment, 160 to 200 per-
cent for manpower, 20 to 25 percent for land, and 12 to 18 percent for
water.
The comparative analysis of the scenarios at the global level shows the
following:
• The Low scenario would not create any serious and additional difficulties
in providing capital and other scarce resources for energy systems. The
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more stretched transition to new, capital-intensive energy sources shifts
the related economic problems beyond the year 2030.
• The High scenario envisages elevated rates of economic development
(especially for the developing regions) and more rapid exhaustion of rela-
tively cheap energy resources. Its cumulative direct and indirect require-
ments in capital are $17 trillion (55 percent) higher than for the Low
scenario. The largest difficulties in providing for energy capital needs
may arise in the period 2005-2020.
• The Enhanced Nuclear case, in comparison with the High scenario, would
require $5 trillion (12 percent) more cumulative direct capital investment
but $0.2 trillion (4 percent) less indirect investment. It would exert less
influence on other sectors of the economy and seem to be more favor-
able than the other cases regarding the total (direct and indirect) material
and equipment requirements.
• The Nuclear Moratorium case is the most capital, labor, and material
intensive case. While before 2000 its total (direct and indirect) require-
ments in capital investment are about the same as for the Low scenario
(less direct but more indirect investment), after 2000 it would require
$5.7 trillion (20 percent) in addition. Additional annual total require-
ments in other resources by 2030 would be 15 percent for manpower, 20
to 25 percent for total materials and equipment, 36 percent for energy
(indirect), and 25 percent for land.
A summary of the total cumulative energy sector capital investment require-
ments of the scenarios and alternative cases is given in Table 19-12.
The observations concerning the regional features of the scenarios and
alternative cases indicate the following:
• In all scenarios and cases the requirements of the developing regions for
capital, investment goods, and manpower would rise much faster than
Table 19-12. Cumulative energy sector capital investment requirements,
1980-2030 (1012 $).
Developed Developing
Regionsa Regionsb World
High scenario 28.0 18.5 46.5
Low scenario 18.8 10.9 29.7
Nuclear Moratorium case 22.0 12.0 34.0
Enhanced Nuclear case 29.9 19.75 49.65
Note: These figures are the composite of Tables 19-6, 19-7, and 19-8. They are highly approxi·
mate and are meant to convey no more than the relative magnitudes of total (direct and indirect)
investment requirements for quite different energy futures.
aRegions I (NA), II (SU/EE), III (WEIJANZ).
bRegions IV (LA), V (Af/SEA), VI (ME/NAf), VII (C/CPA).
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those of the developed regions. As a result, their share of the global
requirements would increase from 20 to 25 percent at present to up to
42 to 50 percent by the year 2030.
• The developing regions, which in 1975 spent about 2 percent of GDP on
development of their own energy resources, would have to increase this
figure to 6.1 to 7.4 percent by 2030. Availability of capital and invest-
ment goods would be a key factor in the future energy strategies of non-
industrial countries. A shortage of capital could create serious economic
problems, complicated by skilled manpower requirements. Hard currency
shortages for imports of energy equipment and energy resources may
have to be faced.
• The developed regions would increase the share of GDP that goes into
energy and energy-related investments from 2.3 percent at present to 3.3
to 3.8 percent by 2030 in the scenarios and as high as 4.6 percent in the
Nuclear Moratorium case.
Each of the scenarios and alternative cases has highlighted potentially seri-
ous problems of energy supply and/or trade. Yet it may be that the invest-
ment and financing requirements of energy systems would be binding earlier
than the physical availability of fuels. The calculations of this chapter are
intended as a start toward consideration of just this possibility.
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20 BALANCING SUPPLYAND DEMAND:
THE SUMMARY
A DOMINANT THEME
The central observation of the preceding seven chapters is simply that over
the next five decades, even with vigorous conservation measures in industrial-
ized regions, increasing needs for liquid fuels throughout the world may
exceed the capabilities of global energy supply systems. The "energy prob-
lem," viewed with a sufficiently long-term and global perspective, is not an
energy problem, strictly speaking; it is an oil problem or, more precisely, a
liquid fuels problem.
A great deal of information and a good many insights lie behind this analy-
sis of the globe's long-term energy future. Different regions of the world face
widely different economic and energy prospects, with widely different poten-
tials and constraints. Some energy end use markets can be more easily sup-
plied than others. And different energy supply options carry different
economic, environmental, political, and institutional implications.
Energy systems are complex. They are closely linked with our economies
and our lives. Because of this, definitive statements on energy futures must
be greeted with skepticism. No one yet fully understands the intricate work-
ings of energy in the world, and no one is a prophet of the future. The uncer-
tainties are great j but at the same time, they are not infinite.
Based on several years of analysis at BASA, with contributions from many
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international experts, a number of compelling observations can be made. A
few of them are presented here. (The following numbers, as throughout Part
IV, are meant to be indicators, not predictors. They result from the specific
and carefully designed and analyzed High and Low scenarios.)
• The supply analyses show world crude oil production peaking in about
2010, at nearly 7 TWyr/yr in the High scenario (or in 2015 at 5.5 TWyr/
yr in the Low scenario), and declining thereafter. Only large-scale exploi-
tation of oil shales and tar sands seems capable of reversing this decline,
because these unconventional sources are the only ones of sufficient
global magnitude identified so far.
• Indeed, by 2030, only 61 percent of liquid fuel demands would (under
the assumptions of the High scenario) be met by produced crude oil. The
remainder (39 percent) must come from synthetic liquid fuels made from
coal. The level of demand for liquid fuels is the engine for change in
these scenarios, especially after the year 2000 when most of the major
changes in energy supply patterns are expected. In combination with this,
the ceiling assumed on oil production in region VI (2380 GWyr/yr or
33.6 mbd) would have a great impact on the extent and timing of oil
alternatives: as imports become restricted, alternatives appear sooner and
to a greater extent.
• Coal would be required in tremendous quantities-7 to 13 billion tons
per year in 2030 under the conditions of the scenarios. Some 56 percent
of these amounts would be required for the production of synthetic
fuels. Whether this amount of coal can be mined in the world is open to
serious question.
• Efficiency improvements and "substitutions" of less energy-intensive
economic activities for more energy-intensive ones would reap substantial
energy savings in the developed regions. There, technical and economic
sophistication and saturation effects could reduce growth in final energy
from the 3.8 percent per year values of the past two or three decades to
1.1 to 1.7 percent per year over the next five decades.
• Development needs, expanding populations, and increasing urbanization
would lead to continued energy growth in the developing regions. The
prospects for saving energy-reducing energy growth relative to economic
growth-seem dim for these regions; there, energy-to-GDP elasticities are
expected to be greater than one, while they are likely to be less than one
in the developed regions.
• The mix of sources for electricity are likely to undergo great transforma-
tion. By 2030, if liquid fuels are to be reserved for transportation and
petrochemicals, then some 60 percent (in the High scenario) of all elec-
tricity generation would be from nuclear. The share of electricity gener-
ated by coal would decline from 40 percent in 1975 to about 15 percent
by 2030 in the High scenario. This decline would occur as demands for
coal to produce liquid fuels increase rapidly. In general, oil and gas would
be withdrawn from power plants in the near future; yet gas may be
forced to return later as a source of electricity (as other sources become
supply constrained).
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• Production of natural gas would increase moderately throughout the
study period under the conditions of the scenarios, reaching 3.5 to 6
TWyr/yr in 2030 (compared to 1.5 TWyr/yr in 1975). There is plenty of
natural gas in the world; the problem is transporting it economically to
where it is needed. With this resolved (and several solutions are in devel-
opment), gas could become a truly global-scale fuel in the coming
decades.
• Hydroelectric power, exploited to essentially its full potential in the sce-
narios, would meet from 4.1 to 6.5 percent of primary energy demand
by 2030; this would represent 11.3 to 17.8 percent of total electricity
demand, depending on the scenario. Over 60 percent of the world's total
hydroelectric potential capacity is in the developing regions; exploitation
of this potential would meet 17 to 31 percent of electricity demand of
the developing regions by 2030 in the scenarios.
• Soft solar, geothermal, and other renewable energy sources would make
important, although usually local and relatively small-scale, contributions
to the supply mix by 2030. (The potential in developing regions may be
considerably higher than in the developed regions.) Together, in the High
scenario, they would account for as much as 1.3 TWyr/yr (about 3.7 per-
cent) of primary energy. All renewables (including hydroelectricity)
would account for just 5 to 7 percent of primary energy by the year
2000 in the developed regions (6 to 7 percent in region I, NA); by 2030,
the share still would not exceed 8 percent.
The energy system of the future would be a mix of many sources-some
small, some large, some conventional, some unconventional. The mix would
be the product of an intricate balancing act, allocating limited supplies of
each fuel to meet the varied and, in the aggregate, relatively inelastic prefer-
ences of consumers. The mix of sources would become more heterogeneous
in the future than it has been or is now. International dependencies would
increase; energy systems would become increasingly complex.
By 2030, substantial shares of the (estimated) available fossil resources
would be consumed. By 2030, some 68 percent (in the High scenario) of
crude oil resources available at a cost of less than $20 per barrela and 49 per-
cent of equivalent cost gas resources would be exhausted. By far the largest
resources available for future use after 2030 would be expensive, unconven-
tional oil (principally oil shales and tar sands), unconventional gas, and high
cost coal.
This chapter summarizes the assumptions and findings of the IIASA En-
ergy Systems Program's quantitative analysis. The summary does not neces-
sarily represent equitably the various pieces of the work reported in detail in
the preceding seven chapters. Nor does the summary purport to state the
unequivocable "most important" findings. It does claim to summarize
the main threads of the analysis and to highlight many of the key issues. The
probing reader is urged to consider the preceding seven chapters and to refer
to the lists of references provided at the end of these chapters.
aprices are given in constant (1975) U.S. dollars.
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TWO SCENARIOS OF THE FUTURE
As has been described in Part I and in Chapter 13, the goal of the quantita-
tive analysis of the IIASA Energy Systems Program is synthesis-the integra-
tion of many special studies into a global, long-term, energy supply and
demand whole. The synthesis is meant to explore the dimensions of a fore-
seen energy transition away from cheap oil and gas and toward a sustainable
energy system. A highly iterative procedure (Chapter 13) is adopted for this
purpose.
Two scenarios (the High and the Low) are constructed as a means of span-
ning the conceivable evolutions of global energy systems over the next fifty
years. Criteria for the development and acceptance of these scenarios include,
foremost, consistency and reasonableness. The scenarios also must have con-
tinuity-they must recognize the inherent lead times and inertia of economic
and energy systems. Finally, the scenarios must span a sufficiently wide range
so that a spread of plausible outcomes is encompassed.
Two basic development variables define the scenarios-population growth
and economic development (measured in growth of gross domestic product).
Chapter 14 presents the scenario definitions in detail. Table 20-1 summarizes
some of the key assumptions.
The scenarios, by assumption, are moderate departures from observed
trends. They postulate no major surprises-disasters or bonuses-and no
sweeping political or economic overhaul in any world region. In a high-low
range of such scenario futures, there is thought to be considerable learning.
Economic growth rates gradually decline in these scenarios, by assump-
tions, and are iteratively adjusted based on analytical results, because among
other things higher cost and more difficult to supply energy restrain eco-
nomic growth. In the High scenario, growth rates are halved in the developed
regions and nearly halved in the developing regions from average rates over
the past twenty-five years; the rates in the Low scenario are, of course, even
Table 20-1. Two global scenarios, major assumptions.
Population
Factor increase, by 2030
To, in 2030
GWP (gross world product)
High Scenario
2
8 X 109 inhabitants
Low Scenario
2
8 X 109 inhabitants
Factor increase, by 2030
For average annual growth (percent)
G RP (gross regional product)
Per capita
Increases from (1975$/cap)
To (1975 $/cap) by 2030
Declining Growth
6.5 3.6
3.4a 2.4a
240-7050
1000-25,000 550-13,000
aThe numbers here are not meant to indicate constant and, by implication, ongoing growth rates;
rather, they link the years 1975 and 2030.
BALANCING SUPPLY AND DEMAND 657
lower. Per capita growth rates in OECD countries by 2030 are 1 percent or
less than 1 percent per year; in other regions per capita growth rates by 2030
are 1 or 2 percent per year. In short, by any recent historical perspective, the
economic growth rates of both scenarios are quite low.
Still, some have argued that the recent past was an extraordinary period in
economic history and that economic growth rates should be expected to
decline. Energy problems and maturation of economies will combine to hold
down growth, it is said. The scenario projections already reflect this to an
extent. Yet no one has yet satisfactorily described a viable no growth econ-
omy. Still, a stronger reflection of this view would contend that the scenario
growth rates here might be too high; the energy supply analyses (Chapter 17)
might tend to substantiate the contention. Lower economic growth rates
than those projected here would surely ease the energy problem, but would
almost equally surely exacerbate other problems.
For example, for some regions, the scenario projections might be discour-
agingly low relative to hoped for economic development. In GDP per capita
terms, only the Middle East/Northern Africa (region VI) is projected to reach
average 1975 OECD levels by 2030. In the High scenario, Latin America
(region IV) reaches $4480 per capita; region III (WE/]ANZ) in 1975 was
$4259 per capita. The scenarios, which presume an important dependence of
the developing regions on the developed regions, hardly reflect a "new inter-
national economic order."
At the same time, even with very low economic growth rates in the devel-
oped regions, very low population growth rates in these regions would com-
bine to produce hard to imagine average GDP per capita figures by 2030.
Region I, for example, would reach over $25,000 per capita by 2030 in the
High scenario (or $13,000 per capita in the Low scenario), compared to
$7046 per capita in 1975. Region III would reach $8700 to $15,200 per
capita by 2030. Region II would have levels of GDP per capita comparable
to region III in 2030-or 50 to 100 percent higher than those of region I
today. At the same time, the poorest of the poor, region V, would reach less
than $1000 per capita in the High scenario by 2030.
In the scenarios, economic growth rates are projected to be higher in the
developing regions than in the developed regions; but per capita GDP levels
by 2030 remain very high in the North and disturbingly low in the South.
Political and economic relationships-North/South and EastlWest-seem sure
to change under such conditions.
Without further exploration of these dimensions, the scenarios as described
here are evaluated in energy terms; the richness of the analysis can lead then
to the study of a fuller set of possible implications.
HOW MUCH EI'JERGY WILL BE NEEDED?
Over the previous twenty-five years, global primary energy demand has
grown at a surprisingly consistent 4.8 percent per year. This cannot continue
indefinitely. It is a simple fact that, in a finite world, exponential growth
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must ultimately stop. A 5 percent per year growth in energy use, if contin-
ued over the next five decades, for example, would necessitate an increase in
one year (2030) of 75 percent of today's total annual energy use. Seven
years later the required annual growth would exceed today's total annual use.
The question is not whether energy growth will slow down, but when, at
what level, in which world regions? With what implications will it slow down?
In the scenario analysis process, the implicit assumption is made that there
will be no drastic sociopolitical or economic evolutions over the next five
decades. The developed regions, it is assumed, would shift economies more
to services and more to less energy-intensive industries and would adopt a
broad array of more efficient energy practices-thus altering lifestyles to an
extent. Developing regions' economies would grow at relatively high rates,
would industrialize extensively, and would (in some cases) be nearing "devel-
oped" status. But these tendencies are more like observed or expected trends
than they are like radical chapges of economies or lifestyles. If truly radical
departures from trends were to occur, they could change energy demand
prospects markedly.
Radical changes of two kinds, especially, could alter energy demand fu-
tures significantly.b First, a very rapid and extreme shift to service-sector-
dominated economies could save appreciable amounts of energy. But, one
must question the extent to which such shifts could occur and viable global
economies could still exist. (Someone has to produce concrete for office
buildings. )
Second, a strong decoupling of transportation activity from economic
growth could lower energy demand significantly. Over the last two decades
in the United Kingdom, for example, two-thirds of all energy use increases
have been due to transportation activities; one-half of the total increase has
been due to private automobile travel alone (Leach et al. 1979). Does this
reflect an inviolable pattern of development? Can economies-mature or
developing-grow without attendant large increases in transportation?
The assumptions made for the scenarios here reflect the need-and the
expectation-of a slowdown in energy demand growth in the developed
regions. For example, the scenarios project that total global primary energy
growth over the next fifty-five years would be just 1.9 to 2.8 percent per
year. They project large improvements in the developed regions in automo-
bile efficiency, home insulation levels, and efficiency of energy use in indus-
try. They project, for some regions, saturation of many energy-intensive
activities and the introduction of new, fossil-fuel-saving energy sources and
uses. For the High scenario, solar systems would cover 13 percent of all
household/service sector space heat and hot water needs in OECD countries
by 2030; renewable energy sources would meet 36 percent of heat and hot
water needs in dwellings in the developing regions. Electric automobiles
could account for 20 percent of all urban automobile travel in the developed
regions by 2030.
These and other measures are introduced in the scenarios not so much to
bSee the discussion of the 16 TW case in Chapter 18 for a quantitative exploration of such changes.
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reduce energy growth as to reduce the demand for liquid fuels. Liquid fuels
in the scenarios come to be used more and more for their essential purposes
only-for motor fuel and as feedstocks for petrochemical industries. In 1975,
some 64 percent of total liquid fuel use went to these purposes; the scenario
assumptions lead to 88 to 92 percent of all liquid fuel use being for either
motor fuel or feedstocks by 2030 (see Table 20-2). Liquid fuels, as the sup-
ply analyses here show, are almost too dear to burn.
In spite of vigorous measures to conserve liquid fuels, these fuels still rep-
resent the major component of energy use in the scenarios in 2030 (Table
20-2). Liquid fuel use would grow at 1.6 to 2.4 percent per year over the
next fifty years, compared to a growth of 1.7 to 2.5 percent per year for all
final energy. It is relatively more difficult, in many instances, to conserve
motor fuel and feedstocks than it is to use energy in other demand sectors.
And it is relatively more difficult to conserve liquid fuels in the developing re-
gions than it is in the developed regions. This last point deserves elaboration.
Whereas liquid fuel use, as a share of total final energy, is projected to
decline (from 56 to 46 percent) by 2030 in the developed regions, its share
would increase slightly (from 48 to 50-54 percent) in the developing regions.
Liquid fuels are easy to use. They meet flexible demands and are easily trans-
ported. In short, they serve the purposes of development and industrializa-
tion rather well. The developing regions need liquid fuels. Wherever possible,
the developed regions should conserve liquid fuels by using them only where
essential, and there more efficiently, and thus leave the world's oil supplies
for the developing regions.
Table 20-2. Shares of electricity and liquid fuels in final energy.
Base High Low
Year Scenario Scenario
1975 2030 2030
Regions I (NA) and III (WE!JANZ)
Final energy (TWyr/yr) 3.5 8.0 5.6
Electricity (%) 12 21 21
Liquids (%) 56 46 46
Region II (SU/EE)
Final energy (TWyr/yr) 1.3 3.7 2.6
Electricity (%) 10 23 20
Liquids (%) 34 32 30
Regions IV (LA), V (At/SEA),
VI (ME/NAt), VII (C/CPA)
Final energy (TWyr/yr) 1.0 10.6 6.0
Electricity (%) 6 13 13
Liquids (%) 48 50 54
World
Final energy (TWyr/yr) 5.7 22.8 14.6
Electricity (%) 11 17 17
Liquids (%) 50 45 46
Motor fuel and feedstocks in liquid fuel
Final demand (%) 64 92 88
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This critical dimension of difference between the developed and the devel-
oping regions might be restated in the following way. Energy can be "con-
served" in three ways-by doing better, by doing differently, or by doing
without. Doing better means introducing new, more efficient energy-using
devices-a technical fix. It means doing the same things more efficiently.
Doing differently means altering the mix of economic activities-having fewer
energy-intensive activities. It means doing a different set of things without
reducing total economic activity. Doing without means saving energy by cut-
ting out some economic activities.
Of course, most energy-saving measures are combinations of these three.
And it is sometimes difficult to say whether, for example, driving a smaller
automobile is doing better or doing differently. Still, these categories are
instructive: the first two require some sophistication (technical and/or soci-
etal), while the last one is generally unacceptable. The developing regions, by
definition in the midst of the challenges of development, lack sufficient
sophistication for either of the first two options. And for them, "doing with-
out" means not developing. It is in the developed regions where energy can
be saved; it is in the developing regions where energy will be needed in in-
creasing quantities and where liquid fuels must be available.
Total primary energy can be saved by minimizing the extent of electrifica-
tion. But electricity serves many useful purposes, is nonpolluting at the end
use side, and can even be energy conserving if off-peak electricity is used or
if the end use device is a highly efficient heat pump. The potentials in this
direction seem rather limited according to the analysis here; electricity gen-
erally is assumed to be restricted to its essential uses.
HOW CAN NEEDED ENERGY BE SUPPLIED?
Unless the preceding considerations of future energy demand are very wrong,
they would lead quickly to a simple but far-reaching observation: energy-
and particularly liquid fuels-must be supplied in prodigious amounts over
the next fifty years. Globally, the challenge looks immense but not insur-
mountable. When examined regionally, the situation may be worse.
The scenario assumptions lead to primary liquid fuel demands of 1.9 to
2.9 times the 1975 level-or 102 to 157 mbd-by 2030 (see Table 20-3).
These amounts would exceed, by 44 and 64 percent, the global oil produc-
tion levels thought to be the maximum possible and consistent with the
scenario assumptions. The difference would have to be made up by coal
liquefaction-amounting to 31 to 61 mbd by 2030 in the scenarios (Table
20-3). The latter figure is nearly equal to the 1978 total world crude oil
production.
Chapter 17 details these and many other observations about global energy
supply systems in the long term. The analyses demonstrate the severe supply
pressure on liquid fuel sources. They show the potentially vast exploitation
of coal (as a source of liquid fuels), the underutilization of gas, and the rela-
tively limited potential (globally) of some other energy supply alternatives
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Table 20-3. Two global scenarios: 2030 liquids demand and supply.
Strong Shifts
Assuming
Population factor increase
GWP factor increase
Shift away from liquid fuel demands
Result in
Primary energy factor increase
Primary liquid fuel a demand factor increase
Primary liquid fuel demands level
Assuming
Potential oil resourcesb
RIP ratio C
Result in
Oil production level
Coal liquefaction (primary energy equivalent)
High Scenario
2
6.4
4.5X
2.9x
157 mbd
4300 X 109 bbl
15:1 to 30:1
96 mbd
61 mbd
Low Scenario
2
3.6
2.8X
1.9x
102 mbd
4300 X 10 9 bbl
15:1 to 30:1
71 mbd
31 mbd
aprimary liquid fuels are aJlliquid fuel uses counted at crude oil equivalent.
bSee Tables 17-6 and 17-7 for definitions of resource categories.
cReserve-to-production ratio varies from region to region; see discussion in Chapter 17.
Note: mbd = millions of barrels per day.
over the next five decades. The supply analyses of the High and the Low
scenarios, in short, paint a grim picture.
Part of the grimness of the picture reflects the absence of a true energy
transition in the scenarios to 2030. The scenario assumptions produce a
transition not from cheap, conventional oil and gas to some renewable, sus-
tainable sources, but a transition from cheap oil and gas to expensive, uncon-
ventional oil and gas. In the scenarios, the oil and gas era would not be over
by 2030: in that year, some 12.8 TWyr!yr (181 mbdoe) of oil and gas would
be produced in the High scenario (8.5 TWyr!yr, 120 mbdoe, in the Low sce-
nario). The 1975 global production of oil and gas was 5.46 TWyr!yr (77
mbdoe).
For the world, excluding the centrally planned economies, the "transi-
tion," in these terms, is quite striking (Figures 20-1 and 20-2). Known con-
ventional reserves of oil become rapidly depleted in the next twenty to thirty
years, while new sources of both conventional and unconventional oil are
called upon to meet growing liquid fuel demands. With oil production and
exports from the Middle East (or from all of region VI) held about constant,
oil sources-including synthetic liquid fuels from coal-from outside of this
region are needed more and more.
Oil resources, even in these shift away from oil wherever possible situa-
tions, would continue to be exploited in the next five decades. Cheap, acces-
sible, environmentally acceptable resources would be disappearing and would
be rather rapidly replaced by expensive, remote, environmentally disagree-
able resources. These include poorer fields requiring more intensive drilling
and expensive recovery techniques; continental shelves, deep basins and polar
areas; and difficult to extract heavy oil and oil trapped in shale rock and so-
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Figure 20-1. Oil supply and demand, 1975-2030, world (excluding centrally planned
economies), High scenario.
Region VI (ME/NAt)
oil production
Unconventional oil
(tar sands, oil ~hales,
heavy crudes,
Enhanced Recovery)
mud TWyr/yr
7
90
80 6 Trading regions'
70
primary liquids demand
5
60
4
50
40 3
30
20
10
2000
Convent ional
oil (presently
known reserves)
Year
2010 2020 2030
Oil
production
outside
Region VI
(ME/NAt)
Figure 20-2. Oil supply and demand, 1975-2030, world (excluding centrally planned
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called tar sands. The world is already witnessing the lack of new sources of
easily accessible oil. Today, oil is drilled in the frozen shores of North Alaska
and the hot liquid is sent through more than 1200 km of a $10 billion pipe-
line. Oil is extracted from the North Sea via rigs whose size dwarfs New
York's United Nations Headquarters building. Exploration in remote areas of
Siberia is vigorous.
More-many more-oil resources are presently physically available: the
world is not yet running out. But the price to be paid-in dollars, in land use,
in air quality, and in carbon dioxide buildup-may be too great, for example,
to exploit U.S. oil shales or Canadian tar sands at production levels that rival
those of the Middle East today. Alternatives to "more oil at whatever costs"
are imperative.
The heavy reliance on unconventional fossil fuels and on coal in the sce-
narios makes their sustainability beyond 2030 doubtful. Some day the world
will likely become resource short. Yet the inducements to avoid that day
have more to do, in the medium term, with constraints on the maximum
rates of oil production than on resource limits. A production ceiling of 33.6
mbd is imposed on region VI in the scenarios-reflecting the explicit desires
of that region to stretch out the lifetime of its oil wealth. In other regions,
the challenges of starting and/or building up large-scale oil production capa-
bilities are mirrored in the lead times required for such undertakings. The
assumptions here allow coal liquefaction capacity in each of the world regions
to double every five years (for fifteen to twenty years) after startup. This
generous "constraint" does, in fact, become binding in the computer model
runs: even more liquefaction is desired in the scenarios.
The international oil trade implications of the continuing tight liquid fuel
supply problem could be important. In these scenarios, North America and
the Soviet Union become major global energy exporters, particularly after
about the year 2020. They would export coal, or synthetic liquids produced
from coal, in these scenarios. But what if they chose not to do so-or were
unable to do so? Analysis shows that the next available source would be
unconventional oils-shale oils, heavy crude oils, and tar sands. Most of these
sources are located in North America. c In a broad, long-term, and global
sense, it may not matter whether synthetic liquid fuels from coal or from
shales are cheaper. In either instance, the world would look to the Americas
for its extra oil. And in either instance, it may be difficult for the exports to
be forthcoming.
These very sweeping global observations are not meant to imply that such
"details" as costs do not matter. Quite the contrary, different relative costs
than have been assumed here could matter a great deal in many regions of
the world. Generally, the energy supply cost assumptions behind these analy-
ses are optimistic-both for resource extraction methods and energy conver-
cA notable exception is the heavy crude oil deposits in Venezuela. But Latin America as a whole is
forced, in these scenarios, to increase oil production for domestic needs at a rate sufficiently high as to
cast doubt on any net export prospects.
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sion technologies. High real costs could lead to very different energy supply
mixes or to rather low energy demands. Chapter 18 briefly explores this
possibility.
As it is, the global primary energy supply mix in the scenarios seems to
stretch almost every source to its logical maximum (see Table 17-2). Coal
production would grow by 2.9 to 5.3 times in fifty-five years in the scenar-
ios; oil production by 1.4 to 1.9 times; natural gas by 2.3 to 4. Nuclear
power would contribute some 23 percent of primary energy in the High sce-
nario; in 1975 it was just over 1 percent. Solar and other renewables seem to
fall far short of their hoped for potentials five decades from now. The poten-
tial of each supply source is discussed at length in Chapter 17. And Chapter
18 explores some ways in which different utilizations of gas, nuclear, and
solar could change the global supply picture.
Natural gas resources could, conceivably, augment liquid fuel supplies by,
for example, direct conversion of methane to methanol. Globally, this would
make fuller use of relatively abundant natural gas resources. Viewed region-
ally, this answer to the liquid fuel problem is a less than perfect one. Natural
gas resources of the world are largest in region VI, where conversion to liq-
uids for export would simply compete with intentionally restricted oil ex-
ports. Natural gas is also rather plentiful in North America and the Soviet
Union, which are also both endowed with vast coal resources. Thus, greater
use of available gas resources to make liquid fuels (generally a good idea)
may simply be a replacement of one abundant primary source (coal) by
another (gas).
The global uncertainties over nuclear capacities induced the creation and
examination of two "alternative cases" (Chapter 18)-the Nuclear Morato-
rium and the Enhanced Nuclear cases. The Nuclear Moratorium case postu-
lates no new nuclear capacity in the world, starting now; the solution would
use more coal than that predicted in the Low scenario, upon which this case
is based, and some solar electricity production. The Enhanced Nuclear case
postulates a more rapid buildup of nuclear capacity than that projected in
the High scenario, for the purpose of generating a liquid secondary energy
carrier (methanol) through use of the heat of breeder reactors. Particular
regional situations preclude an overwhelming nuclear buildup; some regions
simply have better options.
These analyses of energy supply systems for the scenarios and the alterna-
tive cases have sobering implications. The challenges to be faced, if energy is
to be supplied for worthy development needs, are not small. One way of
assessing whether the scenarios and alternative cases represent feasible energy
systems evolutions is by interpreting their results in economic terms.
Economic Interpretations
A fundamental uncertainty (if not the fundamental uncertainty) in projec-
tions of energy consumption is captured by the question: Must energy use
and gross economic activity go lock step into the future, inflexibly bound by
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history and/or "the system"? The answer offered by this study is "partly yes
and partly no."
Energy as a productive input to the economy is strongly tied to economic
production. The only ways to loosen the tie are through technological devel-
opment (do better)-a slow, steady process if history offers a lesson here-
and through substitution of nonenergy inputs such as more capital or more
labor for less energy (do differently). In general, interpretation of the sce-
nario results indicates (as expected) that the developed regions would have
significantly greater potential for reducing energy use per unit of economic
output by means of technological development and substitution than would
the developing regions. Sophistication is required. In particular, it turns out
that region II, having a very industry-intensive economy, shows the greatest
potential for saving energy in this way.
But energy is not only a productive input to the economy; it is also a
"final demand" item-it is consumed like other final products. And energy as
a final demand item is probably not strongly tied to economic production.
Consumers could spend disposable income on less energy-intensive instead of
more energy-intensive goods and services. (This would be a departure from
past behavior.) And even the energy-intensive items that are purchased (auto-
mobiles, appliances, travel) might become considerably more energy effi-
cient, and the energy-economy fetter would loosen.
Chapter 15 deals in depth with these energy-economy issues. And it
presents an evaluation of the overall scenario results for primary and final
energy demand in terms of income and price elasticities. In this way, one
observes a definite reduction in the growth of total energy use relative to
economic growth in the developed regions. In the developing regions, income
elasticities would be lower than in the past, but would still be greater than
unity: it takes more than a 10 percent increase in energy use to give a 10 per-
cent increase in GDP.
The projected decline in income elasticities for the developed regions is
significant (see Chapter 15), particularly for North America (region 1)-
implying that strong energy saving measures are, indeed, incorporated in the
scenarios. Price elasticities are expected to be generally high in the developed
regions and much lower in the developing regions. This signals that the poten-
tials for technological development and substitution (as relative prices for
energy rise) in the developed regions would be considerably greater than in
the developing regions. Faced with higher prices for an essential commodity
(energy), the developing poor are hard pressed to do better or to do differ-
ently: to do without is only a last resort.
One could calculate all energy savings as if they were price induced, and
many economists do just that. For the very long term, this seems inade-
quate-and various government mandates and energy-saving innovations are
only questionably "price induced." Still, prices are important in both the
long and the short term. Energy prices for the scenarios are calculated here
(Chapter 15) from energy production costs-which would increase by be-
tween three and four times in various world regions over the next fifty years.
By 2010, the scenarios give price increases for final energy prices (paid by
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consumers) of 2.4 to 3 times 1972 prices; by 1975, real consumer prices had
risen by just 40 percent (i.e., a factor of 1.4) since 1972, so an additional
increase of 1.7 to 2.1 times is expected by 2010. Part of the reason for this
price rise is the projected growth in the international crude oil price to $19
and $21 per barrel in the two scenarios reached by 1990. (These figures are
1975 dollars; in 1980 dollars the same prices would be $28 and $31 per
barrel.)
One final observation is worth making here about energy prices. Increased
payments for energy-energy prices multiplied by energy use-reflect a poten-
tially unsettling trend. In the developed regions, the scenarios would increase
energy payments as a share of GDP by some 18 to 35 percent by 2030. In
the developing regions, the increase would be 300 percent and more. Such
indicators dim hopes for more rapid economic development in the future.
Another cut through the energy payments issue is to consider energy
investments. These, discussed in some depth in Chapter 19 for both the
scenarios and the alternative cases, are projected to double as a share of GDP
in the developed regions and to more than triple in the developing regions by
2030 (Figure 20-3). The alternative cases, in very aggregate terms, differ
only slightly from the scenarios in this regard.
These various economic interpretations of scenario results perhaps raise
more questions than they answer. At this stage of analysis, this is good. The
potential impacts on economies of rising energy costs is already a primary
concern of governments; by these projections, it is likely to remain so for
quite some time to come.
REGIONAL AND INTERREGIONAL PROSPECTS
Regions Are Different
On the surface, it would seem that region VI (ME/NAf) would be the most
resource rich of the world regions, while region III (WEI} ANZ), for example,
would be noticeably resource poor. A closer scrutiny offers some surprises.
In conventional oil,d region VI is rich, with 159 TWyr of resource com-
pared to 100 TWyr for region IV or just 20 TWyr for region III. But if all
(conventional and unconventional) crude oil resources are counted, region VI
places third (almost fourth) among the regions; the heavy oils of region IV
and the oil shales and tar sands of region I give each of those regions more
total oil resource than region VI. Of course, the issue is extracting and using
the unconventionals. Regions are different.
Consider total fossil resources. If one sums the total resource estimates of
Tables 17-6 and 17-7 for each of the regions, the richest fossil resource
regions are found to be regions I and II. Region V is found to be relatively
resource poor. All other regions are about the same-for example, regions III
dConventional oil here is oil estimated to be producible for less than $20 per barrel (1975 U.S.
dollars); oil categories 1 and 2 are defined in Table 17-6.
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and VI have about the same total fossil resources! The reason is coal. Regions
I, II, III, and VII have over 90 percent of the world's coal resources, by the
estimates here. But the difficulties of using such large resources tend to
dampen enthusiasm about their size.
In the end, resource richness or poorness has more to do with the size of
domestic resource pools relative to internal demand for fuels. The resource
rich, it seems logical to believe, are those who can export energy. Consider,
then, resources per capita (using 1975 population data).
Region VI obviously leads in conventional oil resources per capita; the
same is true for gas. The region is blessed with relatively large volumes of
cheap to produce oil and gas and a very small population. The apparently
high oil resources of region I and region IV shrink somewhat when divided
by their large populations. And in terms of all fossil resources, the high coal
resources in regions I and II reduce in significance when confronted with
large populations; in total fossil resources per capita, region VI still appears
resource rich. And the most resource poor, by far, is seen to be region V.
The spread is from over 2000 kWyr per capita for regions I, II, and VI to
115 kWyr per capita for region V.
These resource comparisons reveal some of the many differences among
regions. The next sections summarize briefly the peculiarities of each region.
Of course, it is impossible to capture the richness of diversity among the
regions and the depth of considerations important in each region. What fol-
lows is illustrative of the analyses and findings of this part, organized now
by region rather than by topic.
There are hazards in this approach. The necessary regional grouping of
countries necessitates some simplifying assumptions. For example, it is
assumed here that there would be completely free energy trade within a
region-that is, that domestic, regionally aggregated resources would be used
first and that then a net import or export (but not both) could occur. Clearly
this violates reality. Today region IV is a net exporter of oil, but Venezuela
exports to the United States, and Brazil imports from the Middle East.
Also, one must recognize that the decisionmaking entities of the world
are-and are likely to remain-countries, not regions. Each country within a
region would find that its own energy prospects would differ from those of
the region as a whole. Sometimes regional aggregates are dominated by just
one or two countries. But generally, regional trends are instructive, and
regions do differ from one another.
The presentations that follow have been extracted from the preceding
seven chapters, where fuller elaborations for each of the regions can be found
under topical headings.
Region I, North America (NA)
In these projections, the character of the North American energy future is
dominated by three considerations-a postindustrial, mature economy "slow-
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down"; substantial energy savings because of technological advances and
some restructuring of economic activities; and a rapid buildup of a coalliq-
uefaction industry to replace domestic and imported oil. None of these
changes, except possibly the last, is expected to produce profound or sweep-
ing changes in lifestyles of North Americans.
The North American economy is projected here to grow at real rates
declining to 1 and 2 percent per year after 2015, from more than 3 percent
per year in the 1950s and 1960s. Per capita GDP growth rates would, of
course, be somewhat lower. People's traveling and other energy-consuming
activities are expected to saturate-meaning that aggregate growth would be
slower. But growth is still expected. People, in these projections, would use
public transit more, would live in better insulated homes, would live (on
average) more in apartments or townhouses, and would consume a less
energy-intensive mix of industrial products. But still, they would commute
to their jobs, take vacations, drive automobiles. These scenarios do not pos-
tulate an all bicycle or an all high rise apartment future.
The well-publicized "fat" in the North American energy system would be
substantially cut out in the scenario projections. Automobiles averaging 35
mpg in 2030, homes 40 percent more efficient in terms of heat loss, and
solar collectors attached to 50 percent of all post-1975 single family homes
are assumptions that contribute to the diet.
Oil would be avoided wherever possible. Still, liquid fuel demands would
grow sufficiently to require a major exploitation of synthetic liquid fuels-
from shales or from coal. Coal production in region I is projected to reach 1.5
to 2.7 TWyr/yr by 2030, 3.1 to 5.6 times its 1975 level. In the High scenario,
some 55 percent of this production would go to a synthetic liquid fuel
industry.
The environmental, labor, water, and transportation issues surrounding
coal production in the United States cast some doubt over rapid coal produc-
tion increases. Yet the liquid fuel demands seem irreducible, and the coal
resource is available. The world would need the coal-based liquid fuel supply
that region I could export. (In the High scenario by 2030, region I would pro-
duce 750 GWyr/yr of coal for export, either as coal to produce synthetic liq-
uid fuels elsewhere or as synthetic liquid fuels produced in region I.) The
major global alternative to coal liquids would seem to be shale oil-also a
region I export.
Primary energy use in region I would grow from some 2.65 TWyr/yr in
1975 to more than 6 TWyr/yr in the High scenario (4.4 TWyr/yr in the Low)
by 2030. Of this, the dominant sources would be nuclear and coal (see Fig-
ure 20-4). In 1975, nuclear and coal together were 0.55 TWyr/yr (21 per-
cent), while oil and gas together provided 1.93 TWyr/yr (73 percent); in
2030, nuclear and coal together would give 2.9 to 3.9 TWyr/yr-65 percent-
while primary oil and gas together would total just 1.2 to 1.8 TWyr/yr (27-
30 percent), given the assumptions of these scenarios. The supply mix of the
future seems to be driven toward coal and nuclear, based on the aggregate of
supply constraints and market restrictions. With greater flexibility in these
Solar
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Figure 20-4. Primary energy consumption by source for region I (NA), 1975-2030.
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Figure 20-4 continued.
C. Total Annual Primary Energy, Low Scenario
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constraints than assumed here, a conceivably big energy source for the future
in NA could well be natural gas.
Region II, The Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe (SUjEE)
In the centrally planned economies of region II, the energy future is shaped
by a clear intent to expand industrial production and productivity while
minimizing oil use wherever possible. Central economic management would
seem necessary to do this, as would successful development of the energy
riches in inhospitable Asian portions of the region.
Economic growth rates are expected to be high in this region-higher than
in other developed regions, yet lower than the ra tes of the 1950s and 1960s.
The growth rates of the scenarios would give GDP per capita levels 40 to 100
percent higher in this region than today's region I level. Much of the GDP
would be industrial output, as it is today, and slow population growth in the
region would keep labor supply as a major constraint on economic growth
prospects.
Industrial productivity gains are expected to be the main source of energy
savings. Soviets and East Europeans already drive small, fuel-efficient cars
(and relatively few cars) and generally do not lead as energy-intensive life-
styles as do consumers in region I or in region III.
The shift away from a reliance on oil has three main elements. First, com-
munities would be sited so as to maximize public transit use and minimize
automobile travel. Second, oil would not be used in power plants-these
shifting more to gas (now), coal, and (eventually) nuclear. And third, district
heat and combined heat and power capacity would be rapidly expanded for
buildings and industrial heat supplies.
The intent thus to minimize liquid fuel use and to exploit the vast gas and
coal resources of Soviet Asia for district heat and power supplies leads to the
conclusion here that the Soviet Union would not become an oil importer in
the foreseeable future. Some oil exporting from the Soviet Union to Eastern
Europe would continue, and expanded net exports of gas and coal from the
region as a whole could occur.
The greatest shift in region II's among primary energy sources would be
toward nuclear and, to a certain extent, toward coal (see Figure 20-5). In
the High scenario nuclear power would provide 33 percent of total primary
energy by 2030; coal would add 38 percent. Oil production, as a share of
total liquid fuel supply, would decline substantially in these estimates as coal
liquefaction largely takes over liquid fuel supply. Gas production would
remain high, at over 1 TWyr/yr in 2030 or 16 percent of total primary en-
ergy, in the High scenario. These primary energy trends look, in the aggre-
gate, very much like those of region I. This is particularly interesting since
the underlying energy demand structure and mix of economic activities in
the two regions are very different.
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Figure 20-5. Primary energy consumption by source for region II (SU/EE), 1975-2030.
A. Total Annual Primary Energy, High Scenario
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Figure 20-5 continued.
C. Total Annual Primary Energy, Low Scenario
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Region III, Western Europe, Japan, Australia,
New Zealand, South Africa, Israel (WE/J ANZ)
Region III is a highly heterogeneous region. All countries in the region can be
considered "industrialized," but to varying degrees, and countries differ con-
siderably in their energy resource endowments. Today the region as a whole
depends extensively on imported oil. This dependence is likely to continue
in the coming decades, even as the region's economic growth slows and indig-
enous coal and (to a lesser extent) domestic oil resources are developed. A
strong reliance on nuclear power for electricity production can free domestic
coal resources for synthesis of liquid fuels; ultimately, nuclear breeding may
be a viable sour~e for liquid fuels in this capital-rich but, basically, energy
resource-poor regIon.
GDP growth in region III is projected to decline as many national econo-
mies mature and population stabilizes. By 2030, real annual economic growth
would be as low as 1 or 2 percent per year by the scenario assumptions. At
the same time, the economy would continue shifting toward services. In
2030, GDP per capita levels would exceed (by 20 to over 100 percent) those
in region I in 1975. Yet the region would not entirely take on North Ameri-
can lifestyles. Extensive use of public transit systems would continue, air
conditioning use would remain rather small, and electricity use for home
appliances would not reach 1975 U.S. levels, for example. High energy costs
have affected-and would continue to affect-the specific development paths
for this region.
Because of its high costs, energy is currently being used more efficiently in
region III than anywhere else. The potentials for energy savings through tech-
nical fixes are smaller in the region than in region I. Still, various measures
can reduce energy demand growth-by dampening tendencies of increased
automobile travel and by building even more energy-tight buildings.
The high oil import dependence of this region would cause it, in these pro-
jections, to shift strongly away from using liquid fuels wherever possible. Yet
liquid fuel demand would necessitate 1400 to 2100 GWyr/yr of secondary
liquid fuels by 2030, from just 980 GWyr/yr in 1975. If for the region domes-
tic oil production were 300 GWyr/yr (High scenario) by 2030, and if domes-
tic coal production were 1000 GWyr/yr, and if 400 GWyr/yr of this coal
were turned into synthetic liquids, then nearly 1600 GWyr/yr of coal imports
(or, equivalently, 1000 GWyr/yr of synthetic liquid fuel imports) would be
required from regions I and II simply to meet secondary liquid fuel demands.
These imports, coupled with oil imports of 600 GWyr/yr from region VI in
2030, paint a discouraging picture of continued import reliance for essential
liquid fuels in region III. (The Low scenario would be, in these terms, more
encouraging; no coal imports would be required. But oil imports from region
VI would total 1100 GWyr/yr, instead of 600 GWyr/yr, by 2030 in the High
scenario.)
Region Ill's primary energy demand would reach 4.5 to 7.1 TWyr/yr in
these scenarios by 2030, compared to 2.26 TWyr/yr in 1975 (Figure 20-6).
Nuclear power would represent the largest single addition to the primary
Oil
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Figure 20-6. Primary energy consumption by source for region III (WE/JANZ), 1975-
2030.
A. Total Annual Primary Energy, High Scenario
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Figure 20-6 continued.
C. Total Annual Primary Energy, Low Scenario
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mix, accounting for about 34 percent of primary energy by 2030 in the High
scenario. Domestic oil and, especially, natural gas would be expanded at the
highest feasible rate in the scenarios; still, their contribution would grow to
just 1.8 TWyr/yr by 2030 in the High scenario (from 1.49 TWyr/yr in 1975),
while their share together of total primary would drop from 66 to 25 percent
for the scenarios. The massive exploitation of coal in this region-domestic
and imported-still leaves an approximately constant (25 percent) share for
coal.
Region IV, Latin America (LA)
In region IV, the dominant energy source of the past, present, and future is
oil. Adding the recent increased oil resource estimates for Mexico to the vast
heavy crude oil potential in Venezuela and Colombia produces total oil re-
source figures that seem capable of supporting even the high growth pros-
pects of this region.
Region IV, like other developing regions, is projected to have a more rapid
GDP growth than that of the developed regions. The projected range is 3.5
to 4.4 percent per year (average) to 2030; these are high by global standards,
but still are reduced rates from the recent past. In the High scenario, per
capita GDP in 2030 would exceed that in region III today. But the challenges
to such development would be formidable; region IV would hold some 800
million people in 2030-two and a half times its 1975 population. Providing
sufficient services-and jobs-for so many people would require all the energy
and other wealth that the region can generate.
Assuming that some fraction of heavy crude oil can be produced at rela-
tively low cost, then all of the oil production necessary for domestic needs
in the scenarios to 2030 could be provided from resources at $16 per barrel
or less. Total LA oil production would grow from 4.6 mbd in 1975 to 16 to
25.5 mbd by 2030 in the scenarios. These are 2.3 to 3.2 percent per year
annual increases in output; from 1975 to 1978 the growth was 2.6 percent
per year. But can 3 percent per year growth be sustained for fifty-five years?
The assessment here is that region IV can increase its oil output to meet
domestic needs, but would choose not to export oil. Too rapid rises in in-
come can be destabilizing; there are signs already that the oil-rich countries
of the region would build up their petroleum industries only at a carefully
measured pace. Also, oil production solely for internal purposes would be
enormous, aside from any production for export. The oil production rates
for the region in 2030 in the scenarios equal 30 to 45 percent of the total
global production in 1975.
Major nonoil energy sources in the supply mix of the future in region IV
are expected to be hydroelectricity and some other renewable sources-nota-
bly commercially distributed wood (e.g., charcoal for industry and house-
holds) and ethyl alcohol from plantation crops (extensive plans are being
discussed currently in Brazil).
The primary energy source mix in the High scenario for LA (Figure 20-7)
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Figure 20-7. Primary energy consumption by source for region IV (LA), 1975-2030.
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Figure 20-7 continued.
C. Total Annual Primary Energy, Low Scenario
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shows that oil, while growing in magnitude, would be about constant as a
share of total primary energy-while renewables and nuclear would grow to
account for some 18 to 23 percent of total primary energy by 2030 (from
essentially 0 percent in 1975). Natural gas use could be somewhat market
limited in this region, but the resources base would allow gas to playa larger
role than that in the scenario projections.
Region V J Africa (Except Northern Africa and South
Africa), South and Southeast Asia (Af/SEA)
Region V may face the bleakest energy future of any region. Endowed with
neither energy resource riches nor capital wealth (skills, technological know-
how), while having large and rapidly growing populations, the favorable en-
ergy options for the long term seem few. Still, development objectives for
the region are legitimate; while the situation is challenging and somewhat dis-
couraging, it is not hopeless.
The region is the poorest, in per capita GDP, of the seven world regions. It
would still be the poorest by 2030 in the scenarios, in spite of "vigorous"
assumptions made about the region's economic and energy prospects. Real
GDP growth rates would average 3.3 to 4.3 percent per year from 1975 to
2030-higher than the rates in the developed regions. The development path
for this growth would continue the presently observed shifts toward the
industry, service, and energy sectors and a decline of the agriculture share
(from 36 percent of GDP in 1975 to around 16 percent by 2030 in the High
scenario).
Energy savings, as noted earlier, generally require sophistication, and thus
should not be expected to any appreciable extent in region V.
Today the region is a net oil exporter, because Nigeria, Gabon, and Indo-
nesia are exporters and because aggregate liquid fuel demands are quite low.
The scenarios project region V to become a net oil importer within the next
decade, and by 2010 imports would be greater than domestic crude oil pro-
duction. Coal liquefaction is then expected to provide a small but growing
domestic source of liquid fuels.
Although liquid fuels offer a convenience and flexibility of use that makes
them highly desirable for broad development objectives, they would become
more expensive. Region V would therefore be wise to tap other sources
where possible. Over the long term, renewables would playa growing role in
the scenarios here, with biogas and charcoal assumed (in the High scenario)
on an aggressive policy to meet up to 16 percent of household and industrial
final energy needs. All renewables combined (including hydroelectric power)
could account for some 20 percent of total primary energy by 2030 in the
High scenario or even 30 percent in the Low scenario (Figure 20-8). Electric-
ity needs (growing at 4.7 to 5.9 percent per year in the scenarios) would be
met by coal, nuclear, and hydroelectric power.
682 ENERGY IN A FINITE WORLD
Figure 20-8. Primary energy consumption by source for region V (Af/SEA), 1975-
2030.
A. Total Annual Primary Energy, High Scenario
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Figu re 20-8 con ti nued.
C. Total Annual Primary Energy, Low Scenario
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Region VI, Middle East and Northern Africa
(ME/NAf)
Not much is added here to the already extensive discussion of this resource-
rich region (see especially Chapters 16 and 17). The region as a whole would
want to constrain its long-term oil output-and would be wise to do so, since
oil resources would be seriously depleted by 2030, with a sustained produc-
tion rate of just 33.6 mbd (as assumed here).
GDP growth rates can be expected, of course, to be high for quite some
time. Development would come with the growth, and region VI would, by
2030 in the scenarios, be at GDP per capita levels comparable to those in re-
gions I and III today. Development also signals growing shares of manufac-
turing and services in GDP and a relative decline in the energy production
sector share.
Oil and gas together provide about 90 percent of primary energy in region
VI over the fifty-five-year scenario period in the High scenario (Figure 20-9).
An assumed quantity of cheap natural gas, used for domestic purposes, leads
to gas taking at least 50 percent of the primary energy market by 2030 in
the scenarios. Gas would even be used rather extensively for electricity
production.
Region VII, China and Centrally Planned Asian
Economies (C/CPA)
The primary observation about the energy future of region VII is that so very
little is known. Thus, the summary here is confined to a few key assumptions
and resulting generalizations about the energy prospects of the region.
• GDP growth seems likely to be high, but so does population growth.
With the projection of average GDP growth rates of 2.6 to 3.8 percent
per year and of an average population growth rate of 1.2 percent per
year, per capita GDP levels would reach by 2030 levels comparable to
those of region IV today.
• It is assumed that region VII would be neither a net exporter nor an
importer of energy. But domestic oil resources are not likely to be able
to keep pace with rising demands; coal liquefaction would be required
post-2000.
• Coal production, required for liquid fuel synthesis and electricity genera-
tion, would reach nearly 3.5 billion tons per year (3.2 TWyr/yr) by 2030
in the High scenario, from 0.48 billion tons per year (0.45 TWyr/yr) in
1975; over 2 billion tons per year of this would be needed simply for
synthetic liquid fuel production. This coal production would exceed that
of region I in 2030.
• The main primary energy source for the future in these projections would
be coal (Figure 20-10). Natural gas and nuclear would grow noticeably,
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Figure 20-9. Primary energy consumption by source for region VI (ME/NAf), 1975-
2030.
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Figure 20-9 continued.
c. Total Annual Primary Energy, Low Scenario
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Figure 20-10. Primary energy consumption by source for region VII (C/CPA), 1975-
2030.
A. Total Annual Primary Energy, High Scenario
Tl/Vyr/yr
4.,...----------------n""'T
3
2
;'/ ..... 4-- LWR
1975 1985 2000 2015 2030
Year
B. Percent Shares, High Scenario
Oil
80
20
60
40
(%)
100 ~=========;;:;;;;;::::====~~F= Solar
'" Hydro
---~;r--LWR
Gas
1975 1985 2000
Year
2015 2030
688 ENERGY IN A FINITE WORLD
Figure 20-10 continued.
c. Total Annual Primary Energy, Low Scenario
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but still represent together less than 20 percent of primary energy by
2030 in the scenarios.
THE LARGEST IMPONDERABLES
No one knows the future. This cannot be said too often or too strongly-
particularly after eight chapters of detailed thinking about the world and its
energy systems in the year 2030. Yet after (and during) these analyses, some
facets of the energy puzzle seem to be better known than others. There are
perhaps (subject, of course, to different interpretations) a finite number of
truly important uncertainties-a few large imponderables.
Will there be-can there be-a breaking of the link between economic
growth and transportation activity? Can the world grow, can the deVeloping
regions develop, and can the developed regions spend new disposable income
without large increases in transportation (and hence in liquid fuel demands)?
Will the Middle East cap its oil production at a level allowing a smooth
transition to alternatives, or will the tensions caused by their oil ceiling cre-
ate global instabilities? What can the world expect in oil output from the
Middle East?
Will the assumed energy savings and shifts away from liquid fuel use occur,
or will such attempts be thwarted by local or short-term considerations?
Can the developed world build the requisite oil-alternative industries to
replace oil imports in the coming decades? Can sufficient coal be mined or
shale oils or heavy oils be produced?
Will all of the energy problems restrain economic growth in the world to
the extent of causing a long-term global recession?
Will the developed regions succeed in reducing their dependence on liquid
fuels-by savings and by developing alternatives-so that the world's finite oil
supplies can be left for the developing poor?
No one knows. But, by knowing some of the implications of various paths
to the future, perhaps enough responsible decisions can be taken so that the
conceivable and horrible armageddon futures will be avoided.
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V PERSPECTIVES
The quantitative explorations for balancing energy demand and supply as
presented in Part IV have yielded insights and new views about some old
problems. They have helped us to look anew at certain elements of the
energy problem-to view them, for example, in thermodynamical and tech-
nological terms and to see how they relate to the area of urban planning
and other societal considerations. Our search has by no means been exhaus-
tive, but relates to a number of topics studied in depth at IIASA.
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21 ENERGY,NEGENTROPY,AND ENDOWMENTS
ENERGY AND ENERGY SERVICES
In Chapter 1 we differentiated between energy at various stages of conver-
sion and use in the energy system (see Figure 1-1). Here, as a prelude to
appreciating some aspects of energy and its transformation and as a step for
grasping the concept of negentropy, it may be useful to consider primary
energy as an input: it is the resource from which energy flows arise. Second-
ary energy is the medium through which energy is delivered to the consumer
(e.g., district heating grids and high voltage grids). In going from primary to
secondary energy, some fraction of the primary energy is always lost or re-
jected as waste heat. As energy is converted into a final form-the energy
stored in a motor, a computer, or a lightbulb-losses occur again, and more
energy is rejected as waste heat.
Ultimately, as the chain of stages proceeds from primary to secondary to
final energy, all energy supplied ends up as waste heat-that is, both the heat
generated in the end product application and the conversion losses. This dis-
sipated waste heat has lost its "usefulness" to us: it has become, in scien-
tific terms, en tropic. We shall return to the subject of entropy later in this
chapter.
What is useful depends to some extent on the situation of the user. For
example, at night it might be an electric lamp for illumination; in periods of
cold it might be warm air for comfort heating in a home; or it might be ki-
693
694 ENERGY IN A FINITE WORLD
netic energy as in an automobile. Each of these is a useful energy "service."
Yet when we turn on a light to read a book, for example, most of the illumi-
nation is in a sense wasted, for other things than the book are illuminated.
Similarly, warm air in a house heats not only the people but other objects
in the room as well whose heating may be unnecessary. Much of the kinetic
energy in an automobile is wasted as friction in the engine, as brake friction,
or as other actions that are not intrinsic to the process of transportation.
What one should examine, then, is not final energy, not even useful energy,
but energy services-that is, legible books, human thermal comfort, transpor-
tation. These services are not a mode of energy; they do not obey a law of
conservation; but they do engage energy.
SERVICES AND REQUIRED INPUTS
It is helpful to imagine a potter. He wants to earn a living by producing pot-
tery. For that he has equipment (a potter's wheel, a motor for driving the
wheel, and spatulas); raw materials (clay); an energy source for running his
motor; and his own labor and skill. Here we shall consider the potter's equip-
ment as his capital stock, and the clay as his resource. Note, too, that to en-
gage the services of his capital stock, the potter must employ resources,
energy, his labor, and his skill. Thus his capital stock may be considered a
stored form of such inputs. In time, the potter's output of pottery per day
improves: he produces less scrap, he uses less labor, and his skill improves.
The amount of sustained influx of kinetic energy per output of pottery de-
creases; energy is substituted in part by skill. Encouraged, our potter buys a
more sophisticated potter's wheel, but keeps his original motor. He also buys
more sophisticated spatulas and other tools. His output improves further
and, in turn, the amount of sustained influx of kinetic energy per output of
pottery decreases even more. The services of his capital stock and his skill
are substituting for the energy services and possibly for his labor as well.
We use the example of a required transportation service to illustrate fur-
ther the relationship between services and required inputs. A given amount
of goods must be transported from A to B. Two methods can be applied. In
the first instance an automobile is rented. The automobile travels the high-
way from A to B, thereby consuming a certain amount of gasoline (final
energy). The gasoline is converted in the engine into useful energy for run-
ning the automobile; energy services are engaged. Also, labor and skill are
engaged when a driver is hired. Engaging the services of the capital stock
(i.e., the automobile) again implies the use of the stored inputs of resources,
energy, labor, and skill.
But the same delivery of goods could also be made through an evacuated
tube connecting A to B. In principle, such a tube could be designed to be
exactly geodetic and to permit the totally frictionless gliding of a casket
within the tube. Indeed, the slightest initial push would make the casket
glide from A to B and stop there, to be unloaded. Here, too, resources,
energy, labor, and skill would have to be invested to design, install, and oper-
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ate the vacuum system, but the mix would be different. Although the capital
stock services needed for setting up the vacuum system are much greater
than those needed to build an automobile and a highway, and perhaps even
the energy needed for constructing the vacuum system may be greater, once
in operation, the vacuum system requires no further energy services. Thus,
the provision of energy services involves inputs not only of energy but also
of resources, labor, and skill, supplied in different degrees and at various
intervals in the provision of the service. The substitutability of these inputs
is a salient point: in fact, it is a key to understanding some of the basic issues
involved in the energy problem. In the next section we shall examine in more
detail the nature of energy services, relating to it the notion of order states.
For this purpose, we shall use a Gedankenexperiment proposed by Marchetti
(1976).
ENERGY SERVICES AND ORDER STATES:
A GEDANKENEXPERIMENT
Energy services are generally provided in the form of work in the physical
sense of the word. Although work is measured in the same units as energy,
it is not the same thing. The following thermodynamic Gedankenexperiment
illustrates this difference (see Figure 21-1). Consider a place in the ocean.
Figure 21-1. Negentropy city .
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Solar influx establishes a temperature gradient in the upper layers of the
oceans, say at the first 100 to 200 meters. The two boxes on the left-hand
side of this figure approximate this configuration: the upper box has the
temperature T 2 ; the lower the temperature T 1 (with T 2 > T I ). In the best
spirit of ocean thermal electric conversion (OTEC), a Carnot machine is
installed that uses this temperature differential by taking away the amount
of heat, Q2' from the upper box. The machine uses this heat to produce the
mechanical work, A. The remainder, Q I, is given to the lower box. And, of
course,
(21.1 )
and
(21.2)
But contrary to the expected uses of OTEC, the mechanical work, A, is now
used to compress an ideal gas in a piston that is in good thermal contact with
the upper box. Upon compression, the gas dissipates the work A into heat,
and this heat is returned to the upper box-or in other words, the share A of
Q2 is returned to the upper box. The piston with the compressed gas is then
transported to a town on the continent.
The energy content of the place in the ocean-the two boxes-has not
changed. Indeed, the piston with the compressed gas does not transport
energy, since its temperature is the ambient temperature T2 , and its internal
energy remains unaffected by the pressure of the gas. However, the entropy
content of the place in the ocean has changed: it has increased by + A/T 2 ,
because A has been returned to the upper box at the temperature T2 . This
is equivalent to saying that the state of order in the ocean, with cold water
below and warm water above, has been altered by the transfer of heat, QI ,
from the upper box to the lower box: the segregation of "hot" from "cold"
is less perfect. The entropy increase is just a mathematical, quantified state-
ment of this fact.
Consider what happens when the piston with the compressed gas is trans-
ported to a town on the continent. Upon decompression of the gas two
things happen: the gas cools off and, simultaneously, provides mechanical
energy. The amount of such mechanical energy is, of course, equal to A.
Because of the piston's thermal contact with the ambient atmosphere, the
cooling of the gas is compensated by taking on the equivalent amount of
heat from the atmosphere. The mechanical work, A, is then used as useful
energy-say, for running an automobile. This useful energy ultimately be-
comes waste heat, thus giving back to the ambient atmosphere the same
amount of heat that was taken from the atmosphere.
This is exactly the analog of what has happened to the energy share of A
in the upper box in Figure 21-1: it has circulated on the spot, between the
upper box and the piston, and in the atmosphere around the automobile. In
none of these places has the total energy content changed, nor has any waste
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heat been delivered to an energy sink. Both in the ocean and in the town the
energy balance is locally closed.
The entropy content of the place in the ocean has increased by f:.S =
+ AIT2' Its negative equivalent, f:.N = - AIT2, has been taken away by the
piston with the compressed gas. In other words, the compressed gas rep~e­
sents a technical "order state" that quantitatively equals the amount of dIS-
order remaining in the place in the ocean. (For now, we shall use the term
"order state" in just this technical sense; later in this chapter we shall explain
it.) This order state is then transferred to the running automobile, in which it
is ultimately consumed by friction. That is, the entropy amount + AIT2 is
produced, thus compensating for the amount - AIT2; the order state from
the place in the ocean is therefore consumed.
Note that without friction, the automobile would continue to run as long
as it stays on a flat place, and its energy could at any time be transferred
back so as to recompress the gas and transfer it back to the ocean. In other
words, this energy could be used to reverse the whole process.
This reversibility is a key notion of thermodynamics. Indeed, the total
entropy of a system is changed only by irreversible processes such as the dis-
sipation of the automobile's energy through friction. Irreversible processes
consume order states. We therefore observe that energy consumption means
the consumption of order states by means of energy services through useful
energy.
We continue with our line of reasoning. The provision of the amount of
mechanical work, A, to make an automobile run once is a one-time thing.
After friction has consumed the technical order state of running the auto-
mobile, more compressed gas would be needed to make it run further. We
would have to go back for another piston. In the Gedankenexperiment
above, the shining of the sun reconstitutes the original natural order state
of the ocean, making it possible to obtain the compressed gas continuously.
The Gedankenexperiment is meant to be a heuristic one only: the salient
point is that there is an ongoing influx of order states from the sun. It is not
the solar energy as such that matters. Indeed, all solar energy is radiated back
quantitatively to outer space in the infrared. The sun-outer space configura-
tion provides an order state that permits the influx of solar power to the
earth, thus creating a permanent source of order states. In other words, the
order states provided for are the energy services of the sun. This leads us
to a second observation that, upon reflection, is well-known, but whose im-
plications are not always recognized: All order states of the earth-be they
natural or technical-result from the openness of the earth's system. We are
not locked in.
Clearly, it is the abstract property of an order state that is important
rather than its materialization in one form or another. From this follows a
third major observation: Since resources are not consumed but are, in fact,
simply degraded by use to materials with less order, it is only order states
that can determine the usefulness of these resources. If there is a "limiting"
factor at all, it is how these resources are deployed rather than resource
quantity. As long as man cleverly uses and preserves existing order states
698 ENERGY IN A FINITE WORLD
and there is an influx of order states of some kind, a civilization-or a
world-could operate, in principle, without any steady input of new re-
sources. In our opinion, theories of limits to growth because of limited
resources are, in principle, senseless.
NEGENTROPY, INFORMATION, AND
ORDER STATES
How, then, can man cleverly make use of the earth's existing order states
and preserve them? To answer this question, we first equate thermodynamics
with communication and then go one step further and equate negentropy
and information with order states. We begin by referring again to our Gedan-
kenexperiment, analyzing it thermodynamically in terms of free energy, F:
F = U - TS (21.3)
where U is the internal energy of the gas in the piston, T is its absolute tem-
perature (an intensive parameter), and S is the entropy of the system (an
extensive parameter). The internal energy does not change upon compression
of the gas, but the entropy decreases, and the free energy increases accord-
ingly. Although the compressed gas does not carry energy away from the
ocean, it does transport free energy; it is this free energy that drives the
automobile.
However, in the discussion that follows, we have chosen to emphasize the
entropy rather than the free energy because, for consistency with our
Gedankenexperiment, it is the degree of order that can be found and pre-
served that is subject to man's control. If nature provides man with a high
temperature, he will get more free energy; but regardless of temperature, we
maximize F by minimizing S.
Here it is useful to introduce the term neJ!,entropy. By this we do not
mean negative entropy, which according to the third law of thermodynamics
is not possible: rather, negentropy is the negative value of entropy incre-
ments AS:
AN = -AS (21.4)
Indeed, friction losses and other irreversible processes increase entropy while
they consume (and thus decrease) negentropy.
To grasp the usefulness of the negentropy concept, we examine Shannon's
formal information theory (Shannon and Weaver 1949). He defines entropy
not in thermodynamic terms but in communication ones. He refers to the
negative increment of such entropy in communication as information. This
is only natural, because the entropy in communication expresses uncertainty
about the outcome of a certain question: once this information is obtained,
uncertainty decreases. Equation (21.4) relates to thermodynamical entropy,
but is otherwise exactly analogous to communication entropy.
Indeed, the analogy between negentropy and Shannon's information is
so close as to suggest that they are identical. But are they really the same
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thing? This question has stimulated much thought. For an overview of this
subject, the reader is referred to the work of Tribus and McIrvine (1971),
among others. Shannon developed his information theory in 1948. Much
earlier, Schrodinger (1926) pursued such questions within the context of the
adequate interpretation of the quantum theory. According to Schrodinger,
the so-called I/J function of quantum mechanics is an information catalogue;
as new information is received and measured, the information changes, thus
leading to the phenomenon of instantaneous and abrupt reduction of wave
packages. Significantly, Szilard (1928) reported on the reduction of the en-
tropy of a thermodynamical system upon interference of intelligent beings.
More recently, Brillouin (1956) dealt with the seeming violation of the
second law of thermodynamics by the Maxwell demon: he demonstrated
that there was no such violation when the information needed by the demon
was also taken into account.
The simplest and strongest link between negentropy and information is
provided by the use of information entropy to resolve Gibb's paradox. The
interpretation given here is derived from lectures by J. von Neumann (1949).
Consider a single particle in a box. Now partition the box. The volume con-
taining the particle is one-half of the original volume, and according to clas-
sical thermodynamics, the energy of the particle has increased by k T In 2.
Yet no work has been done on the system! Von Neumann, following Shan-
non, pointed out that, indeed, useful work could nevertheless be extracted,
provided one knows in advance which side of the box contains the particle;
a random choice of sides, on the average, would not provide work. Clearly
this knowledge, which is only one bit of information, is in fact the source
of the related negentropy that is gained. We conclude that thermodynamical
entropy and communication entropy are therefore the same.
Thus far, our reasoning has reflected an established scientific consensus.
We now go further, equating Shannon's information not only with negen-
tropy but with our so-called order states. It may be helpful to consider order
states as a generalized kind of information. Strictly speaking, Shannon's
notion of information refers to communication channels only.
Our purpose here is solely heuristic: rigorous and quantitative treatment
of the notion of order states is not yet possible. Only special cases, such as
the Gedankenexperiment, seem to lend themselves to that. In the Gedanken-
experiment, we were able to identify the entropy increase of the place in the
ocean and to equate it with the technical order state of running an automo-
bile. For the earlier example of the potter, there are patterns in the pottery
produced, but it is not yet possible to identify the negentropy content of
such patterns. Patterns point to an even deeper level of analysis. Human
values come into the picture, too. What is it that makes a piece of pottery so
beautiful that people are willing to pay a high price for it? What makes a per-
son suffer when he sees a spoiled landscape around a mine? What is negen-
tropy and what is entropy in this context?
Equating macroscopic order states-patterns, and particularly patterns
that have human value-with information and thermodynamics may seem to
be carrying the analogy too far. But for our heuristic purposes it may be
useful.
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MACROSCOPIC ORDER STATES AND
THE ENVIRONMENT
We have now crossed the threshold of scientific reasoning and conjecturing.
We have moved from order states that rigorously define thermodynamics to
order states that have analogous properties but are not yet well defined.
We need to say more about order states. The environment-the biosphere,
the geosphere, the atmosphere, and the hydrosphere~is ordered: it has a
pattern. Fossil resources, for example, are a part of this pattern. Indeed, it
took the biosphere billions of years to concentrate the carbon dioxide of
the atmosphere and, together with water and sunlight, to create the order
states that are stored as hydrocarbons. Likewise, the technoeconomic infra-
structure that makes our civilization function represents a high concentra-
tion of order states: it too is a pattern. Within this pattern, there are capital
stocks-be they in industry, agriculture, or elsewhere-through which the
yearly product is produced. As illustrated by the example of our potter,
capital stock is an investment (accumulated order states) that has the capac-
ity to generate more order states. In this way, we view these additional
order states as the interest on our investment; indeed, the monetary interest
obtained from capital investments can be subsumed under such a general
notion.
The generation of such an interest (the additional order states) does not
violate the laws of conservation. We again equate negentropy with order
states, with all the caveats already mentioned. Let us consider a closed sys-
tem. According to the second law of thermodynamics, the entropy of this
closed system does not decrease. However, if negentropy is produced
through the generation of interest, then somewhere in this closed system
entropy must be generated in order to (at least) compensate for the negen-
tropy produced.
Using the above line of reasoning, we examine the use of fossil fuels,
which could lead one to suppose that the earth is a closed system. The state
of vastly diffused atmospheric carbon dioxide or of a spoiled nature around
coal mines seems to reflect an increase in disorder (i.e. entropy). The analogy
would seem to support the pessimistic view of the Club of Rome about
man's future on the earth. Indeed, one could view environmental damages
and wastes as increased entropy that at least compensates for the negentropy
produced by man for his survival. Is pollution a necessary consequence of
increasing the number of order states? The answer fortunately is no, regard-
less of whether one views the earth's system as closed or open. The reasons
for this statement are explained below.
In a closed system, the quantitative relationship between the negentropy
gained in creating order states, and thus the entropy to be accepted in com-
pensating, involves very small numbers. Our earlier example of the friction-
less vacuum tube transport system can be applied here. In principle, the
order state of having a good at A or at B is just one bit of information. The
energy to be supplied in moving the goods from A to B can indeed be negli-
gible. What we have done in creating this system is to invest negentropy so
ENERGY. NEGENTROPY. AND ENDOWMENTS 701
as to improve the efficiency with which we create further negentropy. Prop-
erly invested negentropy makes it possible to approach the thermodynamic
limits of efficiency: in a closed system, just one additional bit of entropy has
to be accepted to create one bit of negentropy. But in the absence of appro-
priate investments, the efficiency of information output to entropy input is
usually very low; for many processes one can calculate efficiencies of 10-10
or less. Thus, exploring the potential for negentropy efficiencies most often
means exploring the potential of energy efficiencies. The goal of energy con-
servation has a deep, theoretical basis and justification. But for reasons that
will become apparent later in this chapter, our discussion here still centers
around the consumption of natural order states for generating technoeco-
nomic order states needed by man for his survival, not realizing that there
is a different mode of using resources.
Our second reason for not accepting pollution as a necessary result of
increased order states is that the earth is, in fact, an open system. As we have
seen in our .Gedankenexperiment, there is a steady influx of energy services
(order states) from the sun. It is therefore not necessary to equate the one
bit of negentropy needed for man's technoeconomic infrastructure with the
one bit of additional entropy to be accepted by the earth. But a prerequisite
to this is an appropriate investment, say, of a photovoltaic cell array. Once
the array is in place, electricity can be generated to deliver the negentropy
carried by the electricity. The environmental impacts of operating such an
array can be kept to a minimum. For instance, the waste heat at the place
of the photovoltaic cells can be compensated by appropriate albedo changes
in the surface around the cells, and surface roughenings can be avoided by
adapting the array to the original surface. In Chapter 5, we state that the
material investments for large-scale solar power will probably be very signi-
ficant. Such material investments will also require the use of resources, but
these resources would be used in an investive mode that would make the
negentropy bit of the sun flow directly into the technoeconomic infrastruc-
ture. By contrast, the above-mentioned consumption of natural order states
as, for instance, by the use of fossil resources can be seen as a consumptive
mode of resource use. Certainly, these resources were originally created by
influxes of negentropy from the sun, but as Marchetti (1978) has explained,
for now these resources represent one-time storages of negentropy that are
being consumed.
We have pointed to the distinction between consumptive and investive
uses of resources in Chapter 4, as well. Indeed, the continuous use of light
water reactors and of other nonbreeder reactors with once-through fuel
cycles would lead to the depletion of natural uranium. This, among other
things, would mean large-scale mining operations on a similar scale as for
coal-a scheme we have labeled mining "yellow coal." On the other hand,
the use of breeder reactors implies drastically smaller water, energy, land,
material, and manpower (WELMM) implications; once installed, the breeder
requires almost no new resources. As explained in Chapter 4, the factor of
3 X 106 -the ratio of specific energy content between fissile material and
coal-eliminates de facto the consumptive use of resources. However, what
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is needed is the investment of fissile material sitting in the breeder reactors,
the material functioning de facto as a catalyst for the use of fertile material.
In this way, the use of fissile resources may be properly regarded as in-
vestive. In the breeder reactor, both the fissile material and the power
produced may be considered "breeding gains" of the negentropy invested.
This, then, is in full accord with our notion of interest generated from a
capital investment.
ENDOWMENTS AND THE EARTH'S
CARRYING CAPACITY
Up to now we have considered the natural environment, focusing on con-
sumptive and investive uses of resources. Earlier we noted that the provision
of energy services involves a mix of inputs of resources, energy, labor, and
skill. Indeed, when looking at the investive uses of resources, be it the photo-
voltaic array or the breeder reactor, there is a concurrent investment of
energy, labor, and skill; they, too, relate to order states. This line of reason-
ing now leads us to the notion of endowment: An endowment is a negen-
tropy investment of resources, energy, labor, and skill for generating a
negentropy interest. It is only this interest that should be consumed in a
technoeconomic infrastructure.
But endowments are subject to deterioration and must be depreciated by
the influx of new negentropy. In many instances, this can be dealt with in
classical thermodynamical terms. The wearing out of surfaces and the cor-
rosion of metallic pieces are examples of irreversible processes that consume
order states: the negentropy decreases; the entropy increases. This must be
compensated by an influx of new order states, usually referred to as main-
tenance or replacement.
We use these notions of endowments and investive uses of resources to
consider the carrying capacity of the earth. In fact, it was the pessimistic
views held by others about man's future on the earth that led us initially to
examine these notions. As civilization progressed from hunting to farming,
several important changes occurred. For hunting societies, the earth's carry-
ing capacity was very limited (about one person per km2 or less), and the use
of resources (i.e., food gathering) was consumptive. But as man turned to an
agricultural society, an endowment was made-the seed grain. By maintain-
ing this investment, it was possible for man to live from the interest-the har-
vest. And with such an endowment, the earth's carrying capacity increased
by two orders of magnitude. However, when hunger was so great that it
forced people to consume the seed grain, this usually meant the end of not
only the endowment but also the population.
Similarly, Doxiadis (Doxiadis and Papaioannou 1974) estimates that the
infrastructure of the first industrial revolution increased the earth's carrying
capacity again by a factor of about ten. Yet the establishment of this infra-
structure (i.e., the endowment) called for large capital investments, which
required sacrifices. What can we learn from history? Intuitively, over the
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short term it often appears easier to have a consumptive mode of resource
use. But in view of the rapidly increasing world population, we consider it
possible to increase the earth's carrying capacity further only by means of
endowments. In this way, it is inconceivable that there are limits on carrying
capacity, even if the world's population were to reach the highly impractical
level of 1000 billion, as proposed by Marchetti (1978) in a mind-stretching
exerClSe.
Some additional comments should be made here about high capital costs
of technologies. Solar power in particular, but breeders and fusion as well,
have associated high capital cost investments, viewed usually in terms of to-
day's economics. Such costs are often obstacles to the deployment of these
technologies. The application of the notion of endowments should, however,
make these technologies more acceptable. A decrease in their costs by means
of further research and development is a rational response to this problem
of cost. In fact, this would alter the mix of the elements making up the
endowment, with skill-the most noble source of negentropy-substituting
to a greater degree for capital.
There is not yet a rigorous approach to evaluating the negentropy mix of
an industrial product, such as a piece of pottery or an electrical generator.
Today's economics, however, does this on an operational basis through
prices. Practically speaking, it is relative prices that are the common denom-
inator for resources, energy, labor, and skill by today's standards. But for the
assessment of future energy strategies and for overall long-term development,
it is the notions of investive uses of resources and endowments that are
essential.
A CONCLUDII\JG DIAGRAM
These largely qualitative and heuristic considerations can be summed up by
considering the diagram in Figure 21-2. Four strata are considered there.
The first is the cosmic stratum. The configuration sun-outer space permits
the continuous use of the energy services of the sun. The negentropy influx
from the sun is stored in hydrocarbons; it is supernova negentropy that is
available in uranium. In the second stratum, the stratum of nature (resources
and environment), mining these resources leads to a buffer of entropy. For
instance, in our Gedankenexperiment there is such a buffer-the natural
order state of the place in the ocean remains perturbed when negentropy is
taken to the city. For the photovoltaic cell array, there is a one-time per-
turbation while establishing the endowment. All this is contained in the
stratum of nature.
The third stratum is the technological stratum. By means of energy fluxes
that are subject to a conservation law, negentropy is processed into the
fourth stratum, the economic stratum. Losses of negentropy through the use
of irreversible non-Carnot processes do happen in the technological stratum.
In the economic stratum, negentropy is either stored in capital stocks or is
consumed by man for his survival and by the depreciation of these stocks.
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It is easy to identify the purpose of endowments: they are meant to mini-
mize the generation of entropy in the nature stratum by moving the negen-
tropy from the cosmic stratum as smoothly as possible into the economic
stratum. This is possible because the earth is an open system. And accord-
ingly, the future of man is open too and could be bright if man continues
to engage his skill.
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22 NEW OLD TECHNOLOGIES
INTRODUCTION
The IIASA High and Low energy scenarios elaborated in Part IV of this book
have given insights into the dimensions and quality of the energy supply over
the next fifty years. We feel strongly that these insights should be translated
into fresh perspectives on how we might better exploit and extend old and
existing technologies-thus the title of this chapter. In doing so, we do not
aim to be complete or to delve into elaborate detail. Rather, we hope to
stimulate the thinking of technologists-particularly those concerned with
research, development, and testing.
Technology plays a major role in increasing the resource-to-reserve ratio,
be it for coal in place or for deuterium in the sea. Consequently, projections
of technological development should be analyzed when one is designing
energy scenarios. However, the introduction of new technologies into the
energy market-not to mention their development-is a time-consuming
process, as was shown in Chapter 8 on market penetration. One should there-
fore hesitate to place undeserved expectations in sharp bends as many small-
bore prophets suggest.
For this reason, this chapter deals not so much with technological innova-
tions such as fusion or central solar as it does with potential developments
that are less glamorous but that may nonetheless significantly extend the
capabilities of technologies now in common use. For example, a new rig that
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would permit drilling deep oil wells at twice the speed and half the cost of
today's machines-a tiny development in comparison to making fusion oper-
ative-would, for a given exploration investment, perhaps double the magni-
tude of new additions to oil and gas reserves. And, this new technique could
well penetrate the market in only twenty years, bringing it to full fruition
during the golden years of the demand for hydrocarbons.
We begin by looking at four particular areas-energy storage, natural gas
transportation, drilling, and enhanced oil recovery. Within each area, and
with the results of Part IV as background, we explore briefly existing tech-
nologies and, in particular, aspects that show some promise for near-term
development. The purpose is to focus anew on potential developments that,
when appreciated within the context of the global energy system, are con-
sidered to ultimately have quite a lot to contribute. In the second half of the
chapter we take our explorations one or two steps further. That is, we exam-
ine, concentrating more on the longer term future, those technological devel-
opments that can both contribute to immediately expanding the capabilities
of existing technologies and, at the same time, facilitate a continuous gradual
transition to a sustainable, asymptotic energy system.
A robust analysis of the problems we touch upon would require a well-
elaborated evaluation: first, of the state of the art of different technologies;
second, of the probability of their technical and commercial success; and
third, of the receptivity of these technologies to stimuli in the form of
money and status. While this might be done by sounding the invisible col-
leges with Delphi surveys and by estimating market penetration rates by
analogy, we do not offer here anything quite so systematic. Consequently,
our aim is to attract attention to the very strong links and constraints that
bind the technologies to the system.
POSSIBLE NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN
OLD TECHNOLOGIES
On Energy Storage
The characteristics one requires of an energy storage technology depend on
the application one has in mind. In particular, technologies that are well
suited to stationary applications may be singularly inappropriate for use in
the transportation sector. For this reason the discussion below has been
divided into two rather broad categories-stationary storage and mobile
storage.
Stationary Storage. Energy storage has the function of buffering the
demand curve against the production and transportation curve. Since a de-
mand curve usually has daily, weekly, and seasonal cycles, storage can be
roughly classified according to the length of these three periods as short,
medium, or long term. In the particular case of renewable energy sources,
where production characteristics can be as complex and variable as are de-
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mand fluctuations, the buffering function of energy storage may provide
an integrating effect among various sources.
Essentially, storage is a substitute for production capacity, and the level
of storage is normally established on a trade-off basis. As production capac-
ity is usually expensive, all systems tend to have sizeable storages.
Electricity is not storable as such, and peak demand therefore must be
met with capacity. Because of the structure of demand, there are fairly low
system utilization factors, in the range of 50 percent; thus the system invest-
ment of about $2000 per kW(e) rises to $4000 per mean kW(e). With an
installed global electric generation capacity of about 1 TW, the fact that
electricity is not storable increases system investments by some $1 trillion
(012 ). All efforts of electrical "storage" should more properly be inter-
preted in terms of providing low investment capacity to be operated during
peak demand periods.
An entirely different approach to alleviating the problem of idle capacity
involves trying to influence the shape of the demand itself. This has been
attempted mostly through the manipulation of tariffs, and the major devel-
opments in cheap communication and computing equipment pave the way
to a more sophisticated intervention. Many appliances (e.g., water heaters
and refrigerators) have, as a result of their inherent storage capacity, a
built-in capability for automatically, alternatively starting and stopping. In
the case of washing machines, operation can be somehow displaced in time.
Direct control from the utility using signals sent along the line to switch off
these appliances during peak hours is technically possible and not very ex-
pensive, and its introduction is expanding (Siemens 1978). However, we see
that it is possible only to alleviate the problem, because weekly and seasonal
cycles could certainly not be influenced in this way.
When thermal generation is the basic electricity source, peaking machinery
usually comprises gas turbines or obsolete steam plants. Fuel costs tend to be
high. For hydraulic generation, the machinery is relatively inexpensive, and
when a storage basin is available, electric generation capacity is usually in-
stalled substantially in excess of hydraulic capacity and then used for peak-
ing, typically 1000 hours per year. The machinery can be used reversely,
with generators operating as motors and turbines as pumps. Thus, electricity
produced elsewhere when demand is low can be used to pump water and to
increase peak capacity. This system is widely used wherever water storage
exists, despite the fact that it results in large amounts of electricity circulat-
ing idly in the net. In some limiting cases, the basin has little capacity of its
own and is used only to store pumped water. Because hydroelectric ma-
chinery is inexpensive, pumped storage is easily one of the most important
means for turning around the investment problem (i.e. the requirement for
peaking capacity).
Storing compressed air in caverns using off-peak electricity has also been
tried (e.g., Whitehouse, Council, and Martinez 1968; Harboe 1971), but it has
never taken off as a technology. However, there are other "fluids" to com-
press that are more suitable for an electric system, and magnetic fields are
receiving increasing attention. The spur is given by the development of super-
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conducting windings, making it possible to "hold" very intense magnetic
fields with very few losses. A magnetic field has much in common with a com-
pressed gas-for example, with the same energy and volume, a magnetic field
would exert the same pressure on the walls (in this case the windings) as
would a compressed gas. The advantage of magnetic storage, then, is that the
interface with the electric net can be made with static electric equipment,
transformers, rectifiers, and so on, providing for the swift transfer of the en-
ergy in and out. The storable energy density is determined by the mechanical
forces acting on the containment, as in the case of a gas compressed in a cav-
ern. Because of this fundamental mechanical limitation , magnetic storage does
not appear likely to playa strategic role in the organization of the electric
system, although it may well play an important tactical role (Haimson
1978).
Because of the similarity between electricity and mechanical energy, in
the sense that the interface, the generator, is efficient and inexpensive (about
$20 per kW (e», flywheels may playa role very similar to that of magnetic
storage; but this is possible only if their use can become economic. Another
possible approach is to use electricity to produce chemical products that, in
turn, can be used to make electricity. This principle is best illustrated by the
battery. Batteries, however, have not really made a dent in the electrical
system, essentially because their prices cannot be made competitive, even
on the level of the daily cycle.
Nevertheless, we shall pursue the concept of storing the chemicals outside
the battery. In this way one can view efforts to produce hydrogen and oxy-
gen or hydrogen and chlorine in an electrolytic cell and to recombine them
in a fuel cell for making electricity. This system is under active development
in the United States, and the first target is to make it competitive, in terms
of capital and efficiency, with pumped storage.
The hydrogen and chlorine scheme may well be the first to reach this
objective, since the electrolytic overpotentials are very low and the same cell
can be used for both electrolysis and recombination, leading to efficiencies
in excess of 80 percent. Such cells, in the megawatt range, could be located
at the level of electric substations, thus releasing transportation and most of
the distribution net from peak load requirements. These chemical accumu-
lators seem to have large potential for cost reductions and consequently may
have a significant role to play in the future (Gileadi et al. 1977; Beaufrere
et al. 1977).
If the primary energy source is not a fossil fuel, then the primary electric-
generating capacity could be dimensioned to the highest peak, and all
off-peak electricity could be used to manufacture energetic chemicals. The
technology developed for electricity "storage" may well provide the basis
for this further expansion.
A bolder, but far more efficient, method would be to use the hydrogen to
substitute for some electrical applications in instances where the technology
is simple and the results are similar. The guidelines for such applications are
contained in the results of TARGET, a $100 million research effort spon-
sored mainly by the American Gas Association and directed toward expand-
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ing the use of natural gas in the home. In order to gain flexibility, this gas
was re-formed to hydrogen.
With the same characteristics of efficiency, cleanliness, absence of flue
gases, and instantaneous switching on and off, hydrogen can substitute for
electricity in heating, cooking, hot water production (through the use of
catalytic plates), and even lighting (through the use of proper phosphors
activated by the oxidation of hydrogen). It might be interesting to envisage
both "electronic" and "protonic" uses of the principal element hydrogen.
"Electronic" refers to electricity as a sensible form of secondary energy,
whereas "protonic" refers to the complementing form of hydrogen as a
chemical. For the "electronic" system, which includes such activities as
running motors and television sets, no direct storage is possible; while
this system is qualitatively important, it may not, in the end, be very sig-
nificant quantitatively. The "protonic" system, on the other hand, includes
most of the heavy tasks, and it is storable. In this way, the electronic genera-
tion system could run at full capacity all the time. The interface between
"electronic" and "protonic" is the electrolytic cell, which is discussed in
more detail later in this chapter.
This scheme is obviously a long-term one. Cities have undergone a painful
transformation from towngas (largely hydrogen) to natural gas and may not
be particularly amenable to a quick return. Also, the use of hydrogen in
place of electricity requires, on the consumption side, new appliances. But
the interesting fact to be kept in mind is that it can be done technically and
promises a definitive reduction in capital investments at the system level,
basically through a strong increase in the utilization factor as well as through
economies of scale.
The situation is better, but far from satisfactory, when we try to store
energy in the form of sensible heat. Heat is usually stored by changing the
temperature, and sometimes the phase, of a storage material. The weak point
in the procedure is that heat capacities are relatively small. For example, a
cubic meter of water heated to 100°C accumulates about 100 kWh. Just for
comparison, a cubic meter of oil contains about 10,000 kWh (of free en-
ergy).a The problem is physically insoluble, as the situation simply reflects
the difference between vibrational and chemical bond energies. For seasonal
storage, then, the only solution appears to be the use of very large masses.
These masses must be part of the earth, since moving and reassembling them
would lead to excessive costs. The problem is to make parts of the earth
thermally accessible.
One proposal for solving seasonal storage problems consists in using an
aquifer as a storage tank. The aquifer must be fairly stable or made so by
clay injections at the rim. Water is then pumped in and out at proper depths
and temperatures, just as though it were a giant water heater. Both cold and
heat can be stored, and in the limit, we can view the store as a flywheel be-
tween summer and winter. Thermal conditioning of houses and buildings
would then become inexpensive in terms of energy. Another proposal is to
aFree energy is defined mathematically in equation (21.3).
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use the earth. Soil is a very poor thennal conductor, the alternation of
seasons being barely felt a few meters below the ground. However, this is
not a particularly serious handicap, since seasonal heat is put in and ex-
tracted at very slow rates. Computer modeling indicates that it would be
feasible to construct a system in which heat is injected and extracted using
narrow pipes inserted in the soil like long hairpins at distances of 2 to 3
meters from each other and extending 10 or 20 meters downward. These
proposals should be pursued intensively as they promise a low technology,
low capital, and low energy solution to the problem of procuring low quality
heat (or, alternatively, in our tenns, low negentropy heat) for space condi-
tioning. In essence, the suggested mechanisms are not very different from
those exploited by primitive men living in caves, where the temperature is
mediated over the year by the surrounding earth and rocks.
A procedure similar to those above and using air as a heat vector might
be to store high temperature heat in, for example, dry sand or gravel basins.
This problem of storing large amounts of high temperature heat is particu-
larly critical for the large-scale production of solar electricity (Bergougnou
and Roy 1978).
Another category of storage technologies is that involving solid fuels, but
currently this area does not appear promising enough to warrant applied
research. Solids are stored in heaps. Rain leaches these heaps, producing pol-
lutions; similarly, wind blowing over them raises dust. Manipulation of these
solids is dirty, "noisy," and expensive. Small storages, so important for the
success of liquid fuels, are very unwieldy.
Liquid fuels are, especially for small quantities, by far the best form of
stored energy, since they are both light and easy to manipulate. Practically
the entire transportation system currently operates on liquid fuels. Their
storage, however, is expensive when the cycle is long (e.g. seasonal), as in
the case of heating oil. The storage tank for a single-family house may cost,
in place, $500 per ton of oil stored and can be filled only once or twice a
year. With oil costing in the range of $150 per ton (1979 dollars), the capi-
tal and maintenance charges because of the storage facility at the family
level are above $100 per ton of oil consumed. For reference, the Alaska pipe-
line, often taken as an example of extraordinary investments in the energy
system, has a capital investment of about $100 per ton of oil per year.
Storing oil on a large scale, as is needed for seasonal leveling and strategic
reserves, is significantly cheaper, though hardly inexpensive. We give about
$100 per ton of oil as a figure of orientation. If the storage is required only
once a year, as for seasonal leveling, then the investment cost of the storage
system is similar to that of the Alaska pipeline and substantially adds to the
price of the oil stored.
Gas, on the contrary, is difficult to store in small tanks and, in spite of
much technological ingenuity, has not really found its way into the trans-
portation sector, for example. Pressure bottles are too heavy, and liquefied
natural gas (LNG) is too complicated at present for widespread public use.
But the comparison of gas and oil changes drastically if one considers large
storage. Porous geologic structures can be easily used for gas storage. Typi-
NEW OLD TECHNOLOGIES 713
cally, exhausted gas fields that happen to be relatively near consumption
centers are routinely used as "lungs" to buffer daily, weekly, and even yearly
oscillations in demand. Similar structures, such as a porous layer sandwiched
between impervious layers, are very common in sedimentary basins. The
porous layer is usually filled with water, and gas can then displace the water
from the pores, creating a "bubble" around the gas injection wells. By choos-
ing the depth, one can choose the pressure of the operation. All the ancil-
lary techniques and geological know-how, both of which are similar to those
for gas fields, have been under development for the last thirty years, and
storage in porous structures appears as a good candidate for the large sea-
sonal storage of gas, which is expected to be required, given the current ex-
pansion of gas consumption in the domestic and commercial sectors (De-
Bernardi 1978).
Note that a gas system, unlike an oil system, does not require local stor-
age for individual buildings and that the investment saved can be more effi-
ciently placed upstream, in the production and transportation of gas. For
such reasons, it is important that technological evaluations and subsequent
policy decisions be based on comparisons of systems and not just on com-
parisons of fragments of systems.
As previously stated, the primary economic function of storage is to
reduce production and transportation capacity requirements by acting as a
buffer for oscillations in final consumption. If generation is linked to sources
with variable output-as, for example, for solar and wind power-then the
buffering action may be interpreted in terms of integrating the different
sources. The point of breaking even between extra storage and extra gener-
ating capacity is a complex function that depends on the demand curves, the
characteristics of generation, and the storage costs. Because storage tech-
nology usually has received less attention than have generation and transpor-
tation, more research on these storage issues may yield substantial reductions
in costs with immediate benefits at the system level.
The secondary function of storage is to provide resiliency against vagaries
in either the supply or delivery system. It is in this sense that one should in-
terpret the sixty- or ninety-day supply of crude oil that many countries have
in reserve. Natural gas offers a cheaper alternative to these strategic reserves,
and an automated gas grid is fairly resilient to strikes and boycotts.
Another function of storage is the saving of energy, particularly by sea-
sonal storage of low grade heat. In the limit, all heat and cold for space con-
ditioning could be provided in this way. The problem is certainly not one of
technical feasibility, but one of capital investment. The amount of energy to
be saved can be estimated today to be on the order of 30 percent of the total
energy budget, and among the different possible uses for fuel, it is in this
area that (second law) thermodynamic efficiency is at its lowest.
Storage in the Transportation Sector. The previous arguments refer basic-
ally to energy storage on a large scale or for fixed consumers. The problem
of energy storage for vehicles is a class of its own and is critical to defining
energy strategies for transportation.
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Currently, almost all free-range vehicles run on hydrocarbons. The reason
is simple: for a given volume or weight, hydrocarbons are a very efficient
store of energy. Their chemical flexibility makes it easy to adapt them to dif-
ferent final end uses (e.g., gasoline, diesel, jet, or naval engines); they can be
produced relatively simply and efficiently from crude oil-a primary resource
that for the moment is relatively inexpensive (before royalties and taxes) and
abundant. Their dominance of the energy market seems hard to dent, at
least in the transportation sector.
On the other hand, hydrocarbons have the drawback that they are a heavy
source of pollution. This is true at all stages of their manipulation, but par-
ticularly when they are finally burned, threatening among other things, the
global climate system (see Chapter 10) and creating risks to human health
(see Chapter 11). Consequently, research has been devoted to searching for
acceptable substitutes. A typical example is the electric car to which inven-
tors have dedicated their efforts for a century and that would be perfectly
feasible if the storage system, the batteries, were satisfactory. Electric bat-
teries can most simply be viewed as a bag of chemicals reacting to produce
electricity. And then, by passing electricity through the battery, the reacted
chemicals can subsequently be restored to their initial state. The weak point
in this system and the insoluble problem deriving from it is that no amount
or mix of chemicals can beat hydrocarbons burning to carbon dioxide and
water in an open cycle with oxygen from air. The rationale for continuing
research in this direction is that by restricting the purpose of the vehicle
(e.g., by running it only inside the city as a taxi or a delivery van), the full
potential of the hydrocarbons is not needed, and consequently a less energy-
efficient type of storage will do.
Another approach to circumventing the pollution problem is to leave the
internal combustion engine as it is, but to use an intrinsically nonpolluting
fuel-specifically, hydrogen. Here too, the technical problem focuses on
hydrogen storage. Carrying hydrogen as a cryoliquid is possible, and in fact
a liquid hydrogen "gas station" has been constructed and very reliably oper-
ated (Peshka and Carpetis 1979). But such an approach is not really well
adapted to general public use. The solution to the storage problem upon
which most research now concentrates involves the cryptometallic properties
of hydrogen. In the Mendelejeff table, hydrogen belongs to the series of the
alkalis, with lithium, potassium, and sodium located in the same column, and
is in fact capable of making alloys with many metals, improperly called
metal hydrides. These alloys often have high hydrogen pressures and can be
rapidly formed or destroyed by changing the level of this pressure. Such
storage, even in its present form as developed by, for example, Mercedes
Corporation in the FRG, is still inferior to the gasoline tank, but is suffi-
ciently superior to the battery as to be almost acceptable.
However, once hydrogen is available, there exist possible short-term solu-
tions that fit well with the current complex energy distribution and con-
sumption infrastructure. The most promising of these is the use of methanol.
Methanol can be synthesized using a carbon source in a reduced form, such
as coal, or even in an oxidized form, such as carbon dioxide. The use of ex-
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ogenously generated hydrogen, with either nuclear, solar, hydroelectric, or
geothermal energy as the primary source, permits one of two things-an open
cycle that consumes carbon resources or, given the development of a reason-
able method for recovering carbon dioxide from the atmosphere or from
stack gases, a closed carbon cycle. With methanol, automobiles can run
almost without modifications. For example, a single catalyst developed by
Mobil Oil Company in the United States (Meisel et al. 1976) can transform
methanol into light oil, which in turn is most probably adjustable to jet fuel.
In this configuration, hydrogen can be seen as the perfect chemical inter-
mediate with which to mobilize fossil fuels and intermittent sources of
energy into the oil system.
Since hydrocarbons cannot be the world's primary energy source forever,
and nuclear, fusion, or solar energy hold the most promise for making the
transition away from hydrocarbons, one can discuss at length the best long-
term systemic strategy to link the primary source to the vehicle. And be-
cause hydrogen will presumably be the inevitable intermediate between the
primary source and the synthetic fuel-whatever it is-it would obviously be
a great simplification to use hydrogen directly. As we have mentioned, most
of the problems are in the storage area, hydrocarbons being practically un-
beatable in terms of energy per unit volume. In terms of weight, liquid
hydrogen beats them by a factor of 2.5. Although liquid hydrogen may at
the moment be poorly suited to general public use, airplane designers, who
are very sensitive to weight considerations, have kept an eye on the possible
use of hydrogen in commercial aircraft. That day seems to be approaching,
and firm proposals to retrofit a fleet of twelve L-l 011 long-range cargo planes
have been made by the Lockheed Corporation in the United States (Brewer
1979). The basic technology for handling and storing liquid hydrogen is one
of the spinoffs of the space program.
An important second-order effect of these proposals would be to give cer-
tain people experience in handling liquid hydrogen, under a variety of cir-
cumstances and on a daily basis, and possibly confidence and know-how
could spread progressively to larger strata of vehicle users and finally to the
general public. One should not forget that only 150 years ago in the United
Kingdom automobiles had to be preceded by a man on foot waving a red flag
because they were carrying an extravagant and dangerous fuel-gasoline. At
that time coal was the reference fuel.
In its most succinct form, then, the lesson that emerges from this brief
explanation of possible transportation fuels is that through the shortest
route, liquid hydrogen can playa vital role in helping the transportation sys-
tem adapt to the use of nonfossil fuels, provided that the hydrogen storage
problem can be solved.
On the Transportation of Natural Gas
Throughout our analysis of the energy system and the way it is optimized,
we have seen the central importance of the transportability of fuels or of
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secondary energy carriers such as electricity. In fact, the success of oil glob-
ally is essentially because of its high transportability, by pipeline and espe-
cially by tanker. The Middle East would still be a barren desert if oil had to
be trucked like wood.
The transportability problem is now intensively felt in the area of natural
gas exploitation. Natural gas is in increasing demand, but as in the case of oil,
gas deposits and consumer areas are hardly coincident. It is only poor trans-
portability that makes oil producers flare perhaps 0.5 TWyr/yr of associated
gas.
The Pipeline. Historically, natural gas has always been transported by pipe-
line. As a rule of thumb, the economics of a pipeline can be condensed in
the following statement: the cost of transportation is roughly proportional
to Lid, where L is the length of the pipeline and d is its diameter; the
amount transported is roughly proportional to d 3 . Thus, there is a great in-
centive to have large diameters, provided gas deposits and consumer areas
justify the capacity of the pipeline.
To give a practical example, a 1.5 m diameter pipeline, the largest size that
can currently be constructed using present technology, can carry 20 GWyrl
yr of natural gas, with acceptable costs, up to 2000 to 3000 km. A 3 m di-
ameter pipeline would carry 130 GWyr/yr (nominal capacity) at the same
unit costs over 4000 to 6000 km-assuming, of course, that current tech-
nology could be homogeneously extended to that size. Taking into account
only associated gas, which now is mostly flared, the Middle East could have
two 3 m diameter pipelines to Europe providing 200 GWyr/yr of natural
gas. Steel pipelines of 2.5 m diameter have been constructed experimentally
in the Soviet Union, and the metallurgical problem of making such large
pipes capable of resisting pressures of up to 100 atm have been practically
solved. The real problems that remain have to do with the field erection of
such pipelines: specifically, the tube sections are too heavy, too rigid, and
too difficult to weld and to put in place. In other words, present technology
seems not to be directly extendable to such sizes, and consequently, by his-
torical analogy, we should look for a breakthrough via a new conception.
The existing stretches that could use such very large bore pipelines are Mid-
dle East to Europe, Eastern and Western Siberia to Europe (Figure 22-1),
Nigeria-Sahara to Europe, the Northern Slope to the United States, Northern
Canada to the United States, and Mexico to the eastern area of the United
States.
One important goal of research would be to design a pipeline that could
be assembled in situ, from easily transportable components, using automatic
machinery. Another possibility is to use pipelines of current sizes but to in-
crease the pressure of the gas, which can be done by reinforcing the pipes
(e.g., by winding them with a steel cable or a steel band, a technique devel-
oped a century ago for constructing large bore guns). However, going to
higher pressure does not substantially improve the economics of transporta-
tion, nor does it extend the range of the pipeline as a transport medium.
Current pressures of 50 to 100 atm are optimal economically. Still, the
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amount of gas transported by a pipeline of a given diameter grows roughly
proportionally to the pressure. Higher pressures would reduce the number of
pipelines in those cases such as the very rich fields of Siberia, where the level
of output would normally require many pipelines. Apart from the fact that
such developments in pipeline technology would make available to the con-
sumer areas perhaps a couple of terawatts of natural gas, we note here that
the approximately 500 GWyr/yr of natural gas actually flared worldwide
(valued at, say, $150 per ton of oil equivalent) represents a loss of around
$50 billion (09 ) per year. In this light, spending $1 billion per year on re-
search and development is a conservative proposal.
The Tanker. Because liquids can be transported by tankers, the next solu-
tion is to liquefy natural gas. If successful economically, the natural gas sys-
tem could take on global dimensions in the same way oil has done (Figure
22-2). A tanker system would have more operating flexibility than a pipeline
and, overall, more resilience. Historically, local problems have never really
upset the delivery of oil, mostly for this reason.
However, cryoengineering on such a scale is orders of magnitude above
what has been done before. Liquefying natural gas means cooling it to
-160° C and requires cryotankers for its transportation. Both technologies
are neither easy nor inexpensive, but they have been developed at a very fast
rate by private industry under the spur of fast-growing demand.
The liquefaction problem is not especially challenging in principle, as it is
easier to liquefy natural gas than air-an industry that is almost a century
old. Challenging is, first, the scale that is required and, second, the fact that
more often than not these complex and delicate plants have to be erected in
low technology countries. Technically, perhaps the most critical item in a
liquefied natural gas (LNG) plant is the heat exchanger. (The plant consists
basically of a compressor, expanders, and heat exchangers, the first and the
third items playing the most important role in the efficiency and econom-
ics.) Research and development could thus be concentrated on new and
promising concepts of heat exchange. Concerning the logistic problem, there
is a growing preference for mounting plants on oceanic barges and assem-
bling them in the friendly environment of a shipyard.
A gas liquefactor requires about 15 percent of the energy of the gas for
the liquefaction process and may add about $50 per ton of oil equivalent to
its cost. A cryotanker costs today an order of magnitude more than a corre-
sponding oil tanker and may add another $50 per ton of oil equivalent to the
cost of the gas. This explains why LNG may end up being sold at more than
$150 per ton of oil equivalent. In this case, LNG then has to be used for spe-
cial purposes appropriate to its premium value (e.g., for peaking, for burning
in power stations when meteorological conditions require low sulfur emis-
sions, or for domestic uses).
This initially marginal market leads to small (typically 125,000 m 3 ),
expensive tankers, for as is well known, the size of the ships is strongly cor-
related to the size of the market. However, the cost of a supertanker grows
roughly with the 0.4 power of its displacement, and perceptive ship engineer-
'
-
J
>
-'
\Q
Fi
gu
re
22
-2
.
Pl
an
s
fo
r
la
rg
e-
sc
al
e
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l
tr
ad
e
in
LN
G
re
qu
iri
ng
lar
ge
LN
G
ta
nk
er
s.
So
ur
ce
:
Ba
se
d
o
n
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
fro
m
C
om
ite
Pr
of
es
-
sio
nn
el
du
Pe
tro
le
(1
97
8)
.
E
xi
st
in
g
sc
he
m
es
Po
te
nt
ia
ld
ev
el
op
m
en
ts
-
-
-
-
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ing companies have designs for LNG tankers of up to 500,000 m3 on their
drawing boards. Apart from the question of what size will be in demand, the
market for LNG, when small, drives the learning curves toward lower costs,
thus paving the way for the potential boom of LNG transportation in the
1980s.
Methanol. In our discussion of storage we have briefly discussed the poten-
tial of methanol in future energy transportation structures. Here, we look at
methanol as part of the discussion of ways to transport natural gas. Natural
gas can be transformed into methanol by methane steam reforming into
carbon monoxide and H2 , followed by catalytic synthesis of methanol.
Methanol can be transported in supertankers, just like oil, but at double the
cost, as its calorific value per unit volume is half that of oil. But in absolute
terms the costs of transportation by supertankers are very low. Comparing
this technology with that of LNG one reaches comparable figures at the end
point, with the reforming and synthesis process generating energy losses on
the order of 40 percent of the input.
This "methanol route" is not very attractive if the methanol is used only
as a fuel substituting for gas (e.g., in power stations) because the younger
LNG technology may well reduce its costs faster over the medium term. The
approach could, on the other hand, become attractive once methanol is con-
sumed as such for premium uses (e.g., as an antiknock additive in lead-free
gasoline).
A first, courageous experiment in this direction has just been started in
the Soviet Union. Siberian gas is being transported as such to an industrial-
ized area and then transformed into methanol in two plants, each having a
capacity of 2500 tons per day. The methanol is then sent by a 3000 km
pipeline to Odessa for shipping abroad. This capacity is quite large per se,
world production being in the range of 25,000 tons per day. It is nonetheless
negligible when methanol is considered as a fuel.
Finally, methanol (CH3 0H), and methane (CH4 ) are very similar mole-
cules, the only difference being a hydrogen substituted by a hydroxide.
Thermodynamically it is possible to go from methane to methanol-for
example, by using a catalyst and a source of oxygen (e.g., air). Some aca-
demic research effort in this direction may well be worth a large investment
of public money.
On Drilling
As stated in Chapter 2 on fossil energy resources, the location and structure
of hydrocarbon deposits may be very different in one-hundred years because
of today's limited knowledge of these deposits. As statistical analysis has
shown, one must drill to be able to know accurately what is in the ground.
Drilling is very expensive, and only a very small volume of the earth's crust
has therefore been explored. To give a tangible example, a 10,000 m deep
"wildcat" may cost $5 million-a burning figure if one considers that nine
out of ten wildcats have proven to be dry wells.
NEW OLD TECHNOLOGIES 721
Drilling technology plays a pivotal role in hydrocarbon procurement, and
improvements or breakthroughs would be rapidly reflected in the extension
of reserves and resources. However, one should not get the impression that
geological insights and measurements are unimportant. Because of the very
high cost of the drilling operation, any improvement of the base case of sto-
chastic drilling can pay for large amounts of educated guesses. The actual
gain from geological methods seems to be nearer to a factor of two than to a
factor of ten (Varnado 1979).
Over the last forty years, the market has been dominated by rotary drills.
The basic mechanisms of drilling consist of breaking the rock by applying
concentrated loads through spiked rollers or crowns and then liberating the
working face from the chips by a flow of mud or compressed air. The rotary
drilling head is usually moved by a rotating pipe operated from the surface.
This pipe has a diameter of the order of that of the borehole, typically 20
cm, and the level of brinkmanship in a drilling operation can be easily per-
ceived if one visualizes a 20 cm steel pipe, twisted at one end and turning
a drilling head, perhaps 5 km distant, downward. One of the typicallimita-
tions in this sort of configuration is that the power transmitted cannot be
very high-perhaps 50 kW in the best conditions, with the drilling head run-
ning at 50 to 100 rpm. Part of the problem is because of the intrinsic limi-
tations of the pipe to transmit a torque, but there is also the problem of the
friction losses of the pipe turning in a hole often filled with viscous mud.
Typically, only 10 to 20 percent of the input power finally reaches the
drilling head.
Experiments have been tried with the alternative configuration in which
the motor is near the drilling head. The motor is then operated electrically
or through mud flow. This technique of downhole motors has received much
development effort, especially in the Soviet Union, and is currently used in
special cases where good control of the direction of boring is required (e.g.,
in curved wells). Performance, however, has not been impressive (under-
standably). The motor has to be very thin (20 to 25 cm in diameter) and
must operate reliably in a very hostile environment, with mud and grit circu-
lating, with temperatures of 100°C and more, and with pressures of hun-
dreds or even thousands of atmospheres. Today's drilling heads usually turn
at low rpm, in the range of 100, which severely constrains a motor that
should develop at least 50 kW. A gear might solve the problem, but it is too
complicated a construction, given such an environment. The alternative
would be to have "fast" heads, but for historical reasons only slow ones are
available on the market. However, as wells become deeper and consequently
transmission through the rotating pipe becomes more and more difficult and
inefficient, downhole motors certainly have a future as drill drives since they
are much less depth dependent.
A problem common to all types of rotating drills is that they wear quick-
ly, especially on hard rocks. For orientation purposes, a typical run in tough
structures can be 20 or 100 m of drilling. The wear is on the conical rollers
and on the bearings, both of which are difficult to protect from intrusions
of grit. When a bit is worn out, the whole pipe holding the bit has to be
pulled up; each pipe section has to be unscrewed progressively, the bit has
722 ENERGY IN A FINITE WORLD
to be changed, and the operation has to be repeated in reverse. With a 5 km
string this requires endurance and motivation. Consequently, compromises
are usually made that aim to save on the life of the bit (e.g., by low loading
at the expense of drilling rates).
With this as background, and limiting ourselves to discussing how to im-
prove established technology, the main problems to be solved are, first, how
to increase the life of the bit and, second, how to increase the power at the
bit. A third aspect could be added-how to increase the efficiency of the bit.
This is a tall order for technologists who operate mainly through expensive
empirical testing.
Much of the research has actually gone beyond variations on the basic bit
and has led to the invention of all types of drilling heads-for example, drill-
ing heads that spit supersonic jets of liquids, shoot projectiles, explode and
implode bombs, spark the rock, cavitate it, lase it, spray it with aggressive
chemicals, and so forth. The result of this random exploration will certainly
enrich technological museums, but for now it does not seem to have devel-
oped a reliable solution.
Not only the bit's efficiency and endurance but also its versatility are of
interest. If it is sufficiently tough, the bit may drill long enough to encounter
geological strata of quite different characteristics. In reviewing the literature
on what kind of bit is appropriate for what kind of rock, one sees that
deeper scientific insight is needed, but that a versatile bit, capable of effi-
ciently penetrating all sorts of formations, may be possible after all.
We have concentrated our brief exposition on drilling heads because at the
moment they appear to be the weakest link in the complex technology of
drilling. However, another fundamental question is how to remove the cut-
tings. If the formation is sufficiently compact and dry, this can be done with
compressed air; otherwise, water and mostly muds are used. These muds are
certainly a nuisance, but they are unsubstitutable for stopping fluids (e.g.,
water) from penetrating the well. If a different way to control the walls of
the borehole during drilling were discovered, this alone could be a funda-
mental breakthrough in technology.
Worms drill their holes mostly by compacting the soil around them, and
while it is true that topsoil is loose, even deep strata have usually some po-
rosity. For orientation, a not atypical figure might be 10 percent. This obser-
vation is the basis of the "subterrene" penetration developed by the Los
Alamos National Laboratory in the United States. There, a very hot cone is
used to drill holes by melting the rock first and then squeezing it into the
surrounding porosity. Ideally, a similar effect could be obtained with me-
chanical or other devices: currently, the cuttings not only have to be brought
to the surface and separated from the working fluids through a complicated
procedure, but their disposal also constitutes a source of pollution.
Our market penetration analysis (see Chapter 8) indicates that hydrocar-
bon demand within the 2030 time horizon will tend to concentrate on
natural gas, which for geological reasons associated with higher temperature
during formation periods, tends to be concentrated in the lower strata.
Therefore, the demand for drilling technologies can be characterized as two-
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fold-cheap and deep. The extraordinary rewards to be gained will probably
attract an increasing amount of industrial research into this area. The money
being spent today amounts to perhaps a few tens of millions of dollars,
which is a respectable sum. However, probably for commercial reasons, most
of this investment seems to be spent on empirical research with short-term
objectives. In view of the broad interest in this technology and of the large
geopolitical consequences of a breakthrough, it might be wise to finance,
with public money, more research and the dissemination of its results than
has been supported up to now.
On Enhanced Oil Recovery
Oil as a mineral appears in different configurations-as a low viscosity ma-
terial in a permeable structure, as is often the case in the Middle East; or as
a piceous stuff in structures of medium permeability, as in the Orinoco
basin; or as a glassy material mixed with sand, as in Atabasca. Depending on
geologic conditions and history, essentially any possible combination of fluid
and porosity can actually be found in nature.
Usually attention is restricted to the straightforward procedure of drilling
only oil of the first category. Even under the best of conditions, however,
the amount of oil squeezed or seeping into the boreholes is only a relatively
modest fraction of the oil in place, typically between 20 and 30 percent.
Understandably, harvesting the huge "leftovers" of the oil industry has al-
ways been the dream of inventors and managers. Visualizing an oil field as
a huge sponge, we see the problem as one of convincing the oil to come out
from the tiny pores in which it is held and to flow into larger channels where
it can be collected in the normal way. Unhappily, all the methods invented
have been relatively expensive-so much so that in general it has been
cheaper to discover and drill new oil fields than to squeeze the old ones dry.
We are referring here to what is usually defined as tertiary recovery and not
to current techniques for keeping the dynamics of the field in the brisk state
(e.g., by repressurizing the gas cap and by injecting water at the bottom of
the field and in other configurations).
A great stimulation for tertiary recovery processes was provided by the
"oil crisis" that occurred first in 1973. Although the statement that "it is
cheaper to discover than to recover" is probably still valid, in general the cur-
rent structural and institutional constraints on the energy system have given
new impetus to research on recovery. However, the application of that re-
search has yet to make an impact, and recovery levels remain in the 30 per-
cent area.
Because the problem of tertiary recovery is so complex and dynamic, we
can draw here only a rapid sketch, though later we focus briefly on a process
that is the most recent and perhaps the most promising. The main problem,
as we have said, is to make lazy oil flow, and the principal obstacles are high
viscosity, closed or tiny pores, and poor driving forces. Viscosity is probably
the most important parameter, if for no other reason than because it is
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present in all cases. To reduce it, two mechanisms are usually put to work-
increasing the temperature and dissolving something in the oil.
Increasing the temperature is not too difficult, although it requires large
amounts of heat, since all the geological mass containing the oil must be
warmed up. This is usually done by injecting steam in a continuous or alter-
nating way (huff and puff), and as the fields are often deep, the steam must
have high pressure. The process is rewarding but not uncomplicated; 30 per-
cent of the oil extracted must be burned again to produce steam.
In order to use the oil in the deposit wisely, proposals have been made to
employ nuclear steam for this purpose-that is, to install a nuclear power
station over a presumably very large oil field so as to provide the steam to
heat the deposit. Proposals of this sort have been studied by Atomic Energy
of Canada, Ltd. (AECL) for the Atabasca tar sands and by the Kraftwerk
Union (KWU) for Venezuelan heavy crude oils.
Another possibility is to inject air (or oxygen plus steam) into the field
and set it on fire (fire flooding). A hot-burning front chases oil ahead of it,
and the oil "wave" can be collected in nearby wells. However, controlling
fires at great depth and in a blind configuration is a tricky task, and it is
possible that ultimately everything could become plugged by hard tars
moving ahead of the flame front. Still, research and development is proceed-
ing in many places. One of the difficult problems to overcome is that oxy-
gen, in spite of its abundance, is expensive and may cost, per volume,
approximately the same as natural gas.
Decreasing viscosity chemically appears a more natural process. The use of
gasoline as a (recoverable) solvent has been successfully tested, although
again the economics are not brilliant. Short-chain hydrocarbons, such as pro-
pane and butane, can provide the same effect more efficiently. Both are
highly soluble in heavy oil and can reduce viscosity by one or two orders of
magnitude. Furthermore, both are recovered simply by changing the pres-
sure. Nitrogen as a sweeping gas operates in this way. In moving through the
oil field, nitrogen collects light hydrocarbon vapors; when the concentration
is sufficiently high, everything, including nitrogen, dissolves into the oil.
A fourth possibility, which we consider to be the most interesting in the
long run, involves using carbon dioxide as a fluidizer. This gas is highly sol-
uble in heavy crude oils and in fact increases their volume by up to 50 per-
cent while decreasing their viscosity by one or two orders of magnitude.
Because of its chemical properties in the presence of water, carbon dioxide
usually increases the permeability of the oil-bearing structures as well.
Large carbon dioxide fields exist in Colorado, and an industry is now
developing there to drill these fields and to pipe the gas to Texas. The de-
mand, however, can be enormous if the use of carbon dioxide increases;
recovering it from flue gases may then become an economic proposition.
Atmospheric disposal of the carbon dioxide generated by burning fossil
fuels is likely to generate a class of problems of its own (see Chapter 10).
In a geoengineering spirit one can think of integrating power generation and
carbon dioxide production by first separating air; then using the oxygen in
zero emission power plants that burn, for example, coal; and finally piping
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carbon dioxide (and even nitrogen) to the oil fields for recovering oil and,
if necessary, for the final storage of carbon dioxide. The scheme may appear
grandiose, with a "fuel cycle" concept being applied in a multipurpose way
to fossil fuels. Manipulation of gases, however, usually requires unexpectedly
high compression work, and this robs them of some of the advantages they
have in tertiary recovery with respect to liquids.
The field is wide open for research and invention. The last proposal,
patented in 1977, suggests hydrogenating residual oil in situ by heating the
bed to 400 to 500°C in the presence of high pressure hydrogen. This concept
is quite suggestive in principle; it even considers some refinery operations,
although the energy expended in heating would certainly be very large. If
such a concept could be embodied in a process operating at field tempera-
tures of, say, 100 or 200°C, with a catalyst in the form of a volatile hydro-
gen donor solvent, in analogy to what is done in coal refining, then the
scheme could become interesting indeed.
Assuming the oil left in the old fields and recoverable only by tertiary
methods to be in the range of 40 billion tons, its selling value is in the tril-
lion dollar range. This may explain the intense interest in the problem of
tertiary recovery, even in the face of competition from new discoveries.
MESHING THE OLD ENERGY SOURCES
WITH THE I\lEW ONES
Having explored briefly some of the potential for near-term technological
developments in the four areas of energy storage, natural gas transportation,
drilling, and enhanced oil recovery, we can now take our line of inquiry one
step further and ask which of the possible near-term developments might
particularly facilitate the eventual transition from fossil fuels to a sustain-
able, asymptotic energy system. Again, our examination cannot be vigor-
ously complete. Rather, our intent is to draw attention to some important
interconnections within the energy system-important in the sense that the
system as a whole may be particularly sensitive or responsive to technologi-
cal advances associated with these interconnections.
The Problem of the Active Interphase
Because the energy system is complex and slow moving, the success of new
energy technologies depends strongly on both the infrastructure created by
previous fuel systems and the ingenuity used in exploiting them. Competi-
tion can, in intermediate phases, become a fruitful symbiosis.
Nuclear energy is the first example of a (potentially) large, nonchemical
energy source to enter the market in substantial amounts. Nuclear energy ap-
pears from the nuclear reactor in the form of heat, and the structure it para-
sitized was the electrical system where heat is used in large amounts to make
steam. Similarly, the likely competitors in the electricity market are a variant
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of nuclear energy, fusion, and a variant of fusion, solar energy, both of
which are most easily converted to heat or electricity.
Still, if nuclear, solar, and fusion end up competing for the electricity
market, our dependence on fossil fuels and all the problems associated with
that dependence will be only slightly alleviated, with the day of jud~ment
displaced by only ten or twenty years. The only way to make a dent 10 the
system is to enter into the chemical energy area, and tactically, the most
rewarding way to make the transition may be one that also, initially, will con-
tribute to solving a major problem of fossil fuel use. The central problem in
fossil fuel use is that demand is moving progressively toward fuels rich in
hydrogen-typically methane-while reserves are mostly constituted by fuels
poor in hydrogen-typically coal and heavy crude oil. In other words, hydro-
gen is in short supply in the chemical fuel system.
Hydrogen can be produced using coal and heavy crude oil. However, it is
a final product that, with respect to oil and coal, accumulates inefficiencies
in the energy transformation and also requires significant capital cost invest-
ments. Thus, if the new energy sources are to be competitive, hydrogen is
the proper interphase. Water is the best source of hydrogen, and the impor-
tance we attribute to the development of this interphase justifies the rela-
tively extended treatment that is given here to the problem of water-splitting
using electricity or heat.
As stated previously, oxygen and carbon dioxide are also in short supply
in the fuel system. Therefore, we shall briefly touch upon some of the many
possible technological approaches that exploit systematic combinations of
these constituents and thereby widen the "penetration window" for such
technologies and, consequently, increase their chances of success.
Historical Background and Future Trends
For Electrolysis
Water electrolysis has a long scientific and industrial tradition. Originally, it
established itself in elucidating the structure of matter at the time of Preston
and Lavoisier. The first patent on water electrolysis was granted to the
Russian, Dmitri Latchinoff, in 1888; at the end of the century, the Italian,
Pompeo Gurati, discovered the monopolar cell, thus becoming the first per-
son to achieve industrial success. Initially designed with lead electrodes and
sulfuric acid (H 2 S04) electrolyte (similar to the wayan automobile battery
operates in the overcharging mode), the cell was soon modified using iron
electrodes and sodium hydroxide (NaOH) electrolyte. This basic technology
has evolved slowly, with no major breakthroughs up to now. The demands of
the space industry have stimulated the development of cells based on solid
state electrolytes-that is, cells in which the liquid electrolytes are replaced
by a plastic membrane of acidic type; sulfurous radicals (S03) are held to-
gether by the membrane polymeric structure, with water moving inside a
molecular porosity.
The first filter press water electrolyzer (in which unit electrolytic cells
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are packed together and connected electrically in series) appeared in the
patents of the Swiss, Oscar Schmidt, in 1899, and was manufactured by the
Oerlikon Corporation in Switzerland. The evolution of water electrolysis
plants was greatly assisted by the development in Switzerland of their hydro-
electric power system. Their system made electricity available at low mar-
ginal cost, and the Swiss were interested in using it for the electrochemical
industry. This hydrogen found its way into the fertilizer industry and into
use in metal reduction. The filter process electrolyzers developed by
Zdansky in the 1950s for the Swiss company Lonza and now commercial-
ized by Lurgi in the FRG are considered probably the best on the market
today.
As all water electrolysis plants have been designed for chemical purposes,
their scale appears small compared to what it would necessarily be if used for
the energy system. Table 22-1 shows the currently most significant water
electrolysis plants worldwide. All plants are associated with hydroelectric
projects, and the largest plant, by Norsk-Hydro in Norway, has a capacity of
about 200 MW. The largest electrolyzer unit now available commercially from
Lurgi has a rating of about 3 MW, while the largest conceptual design is
from General Electric (for a project sponsored by Brookhaven National
Laboratory in the United States), which contemplates a 75 MW unit. If elec-
trolysis has to interface with large reactors within the energy system, units
rated in the gigawatt range would be required.
This growth in power for the units requires a comparable increase in
power density, if for no other reason than to make them transportable. For-
tunately, current trends are in the right direction; the Lurgi electrolyzer has
a power density of about 0.15 kW/I, while the General Electric electrolyzer's
density is about 2 kW/l. For the latter, a 1 GW unit would have a volume of
about 500 m3 and a weight of 500 to 1000 tons, which is still too large.
Target power densities are about 10 kW/I, which would make these machines
factory assembled and easily transported. Such a target is not unrealistic,
given the solid polymer electrolyte technique, the high pressure, and the pos-
sibility of gains in current densities.
As the following economic analysis will show, the cost of the cell consti-
tutes a small fraction of the cost of the electrolytic plant, about 10 to 15
percent. Consequently, an increase in efficiency and reliability of these cells
should be the aim of research and development, since such increases would
Table 22-1. Large electrolytic plants of the world.
Approximate
Company Cell Name Location Capacity (M W) Year
Norsk Hydro Hydro Pech-Kranz Rjukan, Norway 210 1965
De Nora De Nora Nanagal, India 180 1960
Demag Demag Aswan, Egypt 130 1960
Lurgi Zdanski-Lonza Cuzco, Peru 20 1958
Source: Based on data from General Electric (1975).
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influence proportionally the cost of the whole plant, including reactors and
electric generators. Since the auxiliaries in electrolysis-namely, plant erection
and capital charges for construction-account for 90 percent of the capital
cost, there is significant potential for trimming the auxiliaries and producing
factory-assembled (turnkey) packages.
Efficiency of cells has been progressively improved from a historical 50
to 77 percent (high heating value [HHV]) of present commercial models
(by Lurgi). Laboratory cells (by General Electric) permit efficiencies (HHV)
up to 100 percent, depending on the optimization. Note, however, that this
is enthalpic efficiency; second law efficiency would be almost 85 percent.
A new method of water electrolysis, proposed at Oak Ridge Laboratories
in the United States about two years ago and now being successfully used at
laboratory scale at Dornier System in the Federal Republic of Germany, con-
sists in electrolyzing water at high temperatures, say 800 to 1000°C (Hot
Elly) (Doenitz et al. 1979); most of the irreversibilities in electrolysis are the
result of poor kinetics, and high temperature practically eleminates them.
But there is also a thermodynamic argument-namely, that the water mole-
cule is weakened by temperature and less electrical energy is needed to break
it. Essentially, part of the required work can be done using cheaper heat.
Expected savings in electricity consumption are on the order of 20 percent
when compared with advanced low temperature cells. However, making intri-
cate structures operate reliably at such high temperatures for ten or twenty
years would require a huge amount of development work.
Because of the resultant faster reaction rates, electrolyzers also tend to
improve their performance when pressure is increased, up to a point. Retro-
grade diffusion of oxygen (0 2 ) through the electrolyte acts against this
tendency, and consequently, there is an optimal operating pressure. How-
ever, because compressing hydrogen (H 2 ) is expensive, the design of most
modern cells is based on optimizing H2 pressures subject to the constraints
imposed by the pipeline system (i.e., 50 to 100 atm).
Technoeconomic Considerations for Electrolyzers
An analysis of present commercial pricing systems for electrolyzers would
not be worthwhile, since today's machinery is of too small a scale for the
purposes we have in mind and since large-scale application will probably not
become feasible for some ten to fifteen years. This is the same amount of
time needed for nuclear reactors to saturate the electricity system in some
countries (e.g., France and the FRG) and also for some large hydroelectric
schemes to mature. Consequently, our objective here is to give orientating
information and to describe the trends.
In Table 22-2 we present economic data for an electrolysis plant devel-
oped by General Electric and sponsored by Brookhaven National Laboratory
and Public Service Electricity and Gas Co. in New] ersey. All components
are. taken at present prices, with the exception of the cell, which has a price
estimated for about 1985. The analysis reaffirms our previous statement that
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Table 22-2. GE bipolar-solid polymer electrolyte.a
Component
Electrolytic cell
Power conditioner
Switch gear
Feed pump
Circulating pumps (3 required)
Feed water purification system
Deionizer system
0, /H, 0 separator tank
H, /H, 0 separator tank
Bleed cooler
Oxygen cooler
Main heat exchanger
Hydrogen cooler
Deoxo system
Dryers (3 required)
Back pressure regulators
Mixing valve
Main HW coolant pump w/auxiliaries
H, cooler pump w/auxiliaries
O 2 cooler pump w/auxiliaries
Controls
Fittings, piping, valves, instruments
Installation (12% of above)
Totals
Specific
Cost
($!kWH,)
7.41
35.46
3.43
0.52
0.65
2.75
5.59
0.52
0.52
0.52
0.23
0.93
0.22
0.86
1.82
0.09
0.09
0.15
0.05
0.02
0.17
0.71
7.52
70.23
Source of Estimate
GE/DECP
GE 28$/kW Input
GE 2.90$!kW Input
Buffalo Forge Co.
Buffalo Forge Co.
Rohm and Haas
Rohm and Haas
Carborundum Corporation
Carborundum Corporation
GE
American Standard
American Standard
American Standard
Engelhard
Kemp Manufacturing Co.
GE/DECP
GE/DECP
Purcell Pump Co.
Purcell Pump Co.
Purcell Pump Co.
GE/DECP
GE/DECP
GE/DECP
aTotal system cost breakdown for base case, with no allowance made for buildings and land.
Source: Based on data from General Electric (1975).
efficiency is the real parameter to choose. Even taking at face value the
approximately $10 per kW for the electrolytic cell proper, the cost of all the
machinery sitting behind it is in the range of $1000 per kW. Consequently, a
1 percent increase in efficiency pays for a doubling of the cell's cost. Prog-
ress is being made in that direction and in the direction of improving the life
and reliability of the components.
As can be seen from Table 22-2, power conditioning takes a sizeable share
of the total cost; to this must also be added the cost of the generator, which
for 1000 MW can be valued at around $15 to $20 per kW(e) (l974 dollars).
Recognizing this, particular consideration should be given to possibilities
for producing electricity as direct current (DC) at a voltage appropriate for
electrolysis, typically 103 V, and with currents in the range of lOs to 106
amp. Such machines have been constructed for special applications, and it
is expected that their cost would be in the range of $15 to $20 per kW(e).
Clearly, the main obstacle to increasing the efficiency of generating hydro-
gen using nuclear heat is the need to transform heat into mechanical work.
What are the prospects for this critical link in the chain of intermediate
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transformations? As is shown in Figure 22-3, a historical analysis of the evo-
lution of this efficiency shows a stable trend, with good promise for the
future provided there is sufficient time. In fact, the time constant of this
evolution (l to 50 percent) is about 300 years.
Given this, let us turn our attention to a different pathway that was con-
ceived about ten years ago in an effort to avoid this bottleneck-specifically,
thermochemical water splitting or, more concisely, thermolysis. As can be
seen in Figure 22-3, chemical processes appear to have faster learning curves
or shorter time constraints than do processes for transforming heat into me-
chanical work, and consequently targets would be reached in manageable
instead of historical time.
Thermolysis
The basic idea of thermolysis consists in decomposing water, using chemical
reactions driven by heat. The simplest scheme would be the one-step process
of water cracking, but since the temperatures available from nuclear reactors
are well below the 2500°C to 3000°C needed to do this, the operation has to
be performed in two or more steps. Since the thermodynamic constraints do
not change by changing the pathway, the basic thermodynamics of water
splitting, whether thermochemical or electrolytic, can be represented as in
Figure 22-4. As our starting material is water at room temperature, to
decompose it we must provide 57.2 kcal/mole of free energy. To give a
quantitative feeling of the limits, the maximum efficiencies for various types
of reactors are given in Table 22-3. All of the reactors listed have been con-
structed, although only the light water reactor (LWR) is commercially
available.
Since fuels are usually graded by their enthalpy of combustion, there is
good potential for a reactor heat-chemical fuel interface in the form of hy-
drogen. The crucial question is how fast this potential can be realized. The
rate appears fairly good for chemical processes. For some of the most prom-
ising processes, efficiencies have been calculated between 40 and 45 percent
where the efficiency is defined as energy (enthalpy) in the product divided
by energy (enthalpy) in the input. Since these processes usually depend on
high temperature reactors (HTRs) for heat, taking as a reference the theo-
retical enthalpic efficiency yields relative efficiencies of the order of 50 per-
cent. This would be a good starting point in absolute terms and also a
fortunate one, as the logistic learning curve has its maximum slope there.
Note that the efficiency of transforming thermal into mechanical energy is
in the same range, but that the time constant is much larger.
There are many closed cycle thermochemical processes that, in principle,
are able to perform the function of decomposing water. Computer searches
ha.ve listed them in the range of tens of thousands, although only twenty or
thIrty of these processes have been investigated thoroughly (see Veziroglu
and Seifritz 1979). Figures 22-5 and 22-6 illustrate two thermochemical
processes that have the same basic reaction but different closures. The pro-
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Table 22-3. Theoretical efficiencies for the reactor heat/hydrogen interface.
Reactor Characteristic Reference Second Law Enthalpic
Type Temperature (OC) Temperature (0 C) Efficiency (%) Efficiency (%)
LWR 300 25 46 54
LMFBR 600 25 64 75
HTR 800 25 70 83
Figure 22-4. The thermodynamics of water splitting. Curve E represents the energy
consumption of the fuel cell (in kWh per produced kg of H2 ); circles represent operating
electrolytic plants; black dots represent possible operation points of solid polymer elec-
trolyte (SPE) cells. Notes: The intermediate temperature cells are not under development
at present; their possible characteristics are indicated by the continuation of curve E
(dashed part); LlH is the change of enthalpy, and LlF the change of free energy. LlF must
be provided as electricity (or in another form of free energy). For electrolysis, LlH-LlF
must be provided as heat (LlH). Usually, because of inefficiencies in the cell, heat is pro-
vided through electric losses. This may not be the case for the Hot Elly process because of
expected high electric efficiency. Source: Based on information from U.S. Atomic Energy
Commission (1972).
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Figure 22-5. Hybrid and thermolytic water splitting. Sources: Based on data from
Farbman and Brecher (1975); Marchetti (1973); Russell et al. (1976); and Besenbruch et
al. (1978).
Basic Reaction
CLOSURES:
<850°C 1
H2S04 • H20 + S02 +"2 O2
EI I · SO 2H 0 +0.5Volts H SO H
- ectro YSIS 2 + 2 • 2 4 + 2
(Westinghouse)
300°C
2HI---+. H2 + '2
(Gene~al Atomic)
Figure 22-6. Scheme of the Westinghouse hybrid water-splitting process. Sources: Based
on data from Farbman and Brecher (1 975); Marchetti (1 973).
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cesses indicated are among the most intensely studied in terms of potential
industrial application. One of these processes is actually a hybrid: one part
of the operation of decomposing a water molecule is done chemically and
the other part by means of electrolysis. Electric consumption would be
roughly one-third that for pure electrolysis.
All systems that serve to connect a nuclear reactor with the chemical fuel
system are obviously sensitive to the cost of the nuclear heat. Nuclear energy
has so far developed mainly in the ecological niche of electricity production,
and had the electrical system not achieved its present size and structure, the
introduction of nuclear energy would not have been possible for several
reasons. First, the electrical system provides the capacity to "digest" large
power units, and second, the system requires heat, putting nuclear energy
at the same level as that of other fuels for which heat can be considered a
derivative product, though one easily obtained through combustion.
The use of nuclear reactors to produce synthetic fuels is a retrograde
operation: heat is transformed into a synthetic chemical that would compete
with natural fuels. Viewed in this manner, a tight constraint would be put on
the cost of nuclear heat, since only a substantially lower cost could absorb
both the transformation costs and the transformation losses.
Now, when fossil fuels had a price of $0.5 per MBtu, nuclear heat was
priced at $0.45 per MBw. But when the price of crude oil increased to $2
per MBtu, through a miraculous alchemy, nuclear heat costs rose to $1.8 per
MBtu. Also, coal increased in price, following the path of oil closely. What
this may mean is that once a large market opens up for absorbing nuclear
heat, all available elasticity will be put to good use to reduce costs.
An engineering study of an advanced nuclear-electrolytic production
facility was done by the Institute of Gas Technology for the National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration (NASA) in the United States (Escher
1975). The study considered a fully operative hydrogen plant powered with
either LWRs or HTRs. Since no electricity is generated, the entire system is
streamlined to produce hydrogen baseload. The capacity factor of the plant
was assumed to be 80 percent. Table 22-4 lists the relevant information,
compiled from the data in this report. Some comments may help to better
interpret these data.
For the base case (LWR), only technology available commercially in 1975
was taken into consideration. Prices for the reactor and for the electrolytic
units were taken from published literature and bids j the characteristics of
the reactor are roughly those of LWRs coming on stream in 1975. Cooling is
by wet tower. The electrolytic plant uses rectifiers to interface with the
electrolytic cells, and the cells adopted are the Lurgi-Lonza type: 280 units
of nominal 2.5 MW capacity are used. The advanced concept used a HTR
with basic design characteristics and costing as provided by General Atomic
in the United States. The very efficient cycle (50 percent) is based on a set
of three gas turbines operating a direct topping cycle and on an ammonia
turbine for a supercritical Rankine bottoming cycle. Cooling is again by wet
tower. A set of homo polar generators coupled to the turbines provide the
DC current for the cells, thus eliminating the need for expensive electrical
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Table 22-4. Fully dedicated nuclear-electrolytic H2 plant, 1975 and 1985
tech nol ogy.
Technical Characteristics
Reactor
type
Thermal
input
elee tricity
output
Primary
temperature
cycle
Final
efficiency H,
Electrolysis (HH V)/ Heat (%)
LWR (1975)
HTR (1985)
3 GW(th)
1 GW(e)
3 GW(th)
1.5 GW (e)
320°-
280°C
980°-
570°C
Direct
gas turbine
(3 X 360 MW)
Ammonia
turbine
(1 X 420 MW)
Rectifiers
Lurgi Cells
Homopolar
Generator
SPE Cells
24.7
42.9
Economic Characteristics
Operating Costs
Capital Fuel and
(at 75%)(M$) operation (M$)
Total
Reactor plant Elee troly tic
type cost (M$) system(M $}
LWR (1975) 935 327
HTR (1985) 806 70
140
121
35
35
H, costs
(NO 0, credit)
(80% plant
capacity)
($/MBtu)
~10
~5
Source: Based on data from Escher (1975).
conditioning equipment. The cells are of the solid polymer electrolyte type
being developed by General Electric. Costs and characteristics are those esti-
mated by General Electric for 1985. Capital charges are of the utility type,
leading to a gross charge of 15 percent per year. Plant capacity was assumed
to be 80 percent. For comparison, mature chemical plants can reach 90 per-
cent capacity, and this would lead to a straightforward reduction in the H2
cost of about $0.5 per MBtu. O2 credit at $10 per ton could add a similar
benefit. This may be critical for the first plants, but unless new large-scale
uses of O2 are found, the market would be rapidly saturated. (One example
of such uses is a zero emission power plant where fuels are burned with
oxygen; and carbon dioxide, water, and other combustion products are
removed as liquids, thereby eliminating emission releases.)
On Solar and Hydroelectric Power as
Primary Sources
Most of the previous treatment of water splitting refers to nuclear energy as
a primary energy source, mainly because most water-splitting studies have
been done in that context. However, for electricity generation, the primary
source of energy is, up to a point, immaterial.
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Solar energy systems, especially if conceived on a grand scale, will need a
transportable and storable energy vector. Here too, hydrogen is the most
suitable candidate. If solar energy is captured with photovoltaic cells, then
electrolysis is the best interface. If the plant is thermal, then thermochemical
splitting may come into play. Photoelectrolytic cells are also possible and
have been constructed at the laboratory stage (Hantala et al. 1979). A similar
situation exists for some large-scale hydroelectric schemes, as for example
those contemplated for Greenland or for Brazil. These projects would
probably be too large for the energy generated to be absorbed by one of
the current electric-intensive industries (e.g., aluminum); although sites are
usually too far away from very large consumption areas, electrolysis can then
connect them with a vast chemical market. A precedent is that of ammonia
synthesis, which provided a similar solution during the period between the
two world wars, when the large hydroelectric base of European electric
systems made available large off-peak electricity blocks.
Electrolysis for Electricity Storage
Solid electrolytes developed for the space program promise cheap and effi-
cient electrolyzers, and as mentioned earlier in the chapter, this has led to
contemplating the use of electrolysis and fuel cells as a storage medium for
electricity. The method promises to improve the economics of pumped
storage, and various schemes have been proposed-for example, electro-
lyzing water and storing hydrogen in metal hydrides or electrolyzing HCl or
HBr and storing C12 and Br2 as solution and condensates. The second solu-
tion in particular appears attractive since the same cell can be used with good
efficiency for electrolysis and electricity generation (Gileadi et al. 1977;
Beaufrere et al. 1977). These "batteries" could be incorporated into electric
substations, accumulating energy during off-peak hours and releasing it dur-
ing peak hours. This configuration has several advantages-specifically,
releasing the transport lines from peak loads and providing local generation
in case of failure of the main system, thus adding a great resiliency to the
net.
Coal Gasification: The Molten Iron Process
As mentioned earlier, methanol is an easily and cheaply transportable energy
storage medium. A first large-scale conversion of natural gas into methanol
has already been described in this chapter, and another approach to its syn-
thesis is that using coal as the primary input, as introduced in Chapter 3.
"Coal," in fact, is a name for a group of solid carboniferous substances
that range from "carbon-polluted rocks" and "carbon-polluted water" (the
lowest quality lignites) to anthracite, consisting of more than 90 percent
carbon. Consequently, the initial equation describing the gasification of coal
may be written in a symbolic form:
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[(C + 1/2 Hz) + minerals + HzO] + Oz ~
.
raw coal
[CO + Hz + Hz S + C
m
H
n
+ COz + ... ]
--.--
raw gas
+ ashes + nonreacted C + heat
In contrast to "simple" complete combustion of coals, where the reaction
products are just separated physically into stack gases and ashes and dis-
charged into the environment, the gas composition must be carefully con-
trolled if producing synthetic fuels is the objective. The chemical synthesis
step requires a clean raw material, especially for making methanol.
Coal gasification technologies in use or under development today generate
raw gas requiring costly additional treatment in order to make it suitable for
methanol synthesis involving catalysts that are extremely sensitive to poison-
ing. A few commercial gasification techniques have evolved that are capable
of producing pipeline gas or synthesis gas by making full use of the specific
properties of a narrow range of coals. Given such a situation, we took as a
reference the molten iron process (MIP)-a gasification technology that, al-
though it has not yet been proved commercially, appears to be insensitive
to the quality of the coal input.
Figure 22-7 illustrates the basic material flow of the process. The molten
iron process, mainly investigated by Klockner Humboldt in Cologne, FRG,
applies for a different purpose the Linz-Donawitz (LD) process for trans-
forming pig iron into steel. Figure 22-8 presents a schematic drawing of a
LD converter. Pure oxygen is fed in at the top as a supersonic jet impinging
on the surface of the bath. Dissolved carbon is oxidized and leaves the bath
in the form of pure carbon monoxide. Sulfur and other substances that were
transferred in the blast furnace from coal and iron ore into liquid pig iron
are fixed chemically by the slag forming on top of the bath. Molten raw iron
is discontinuously transformed into steel. However, the converter (Figure
22-8) can also be operated in principle as a coal gasifier. In this case, fresh
coal has to be added continuously to make up for the oxidized carbon leav-
ing the converter as carbon monoxide.
The molten iron process was selected here for several reasons. First, physi-
cal and chemical reactions at the temperature of 1500°C in a liquid metal
are very fast, and the difficulties of "surface" chemistry in the solid gas
systems common to other gasification processes are avoided, as are baking
problems and the formation of complex hydrocarbon substances. Second,
liquid slag chemistry is a comparatively simple and highly developed tech-
nique for absorbing ashes and impurities in coal and for separating them
continually from the reactive medium, the liquid iron. Finally, in present
steel plants, most of the components of the molten iron process operate with
physical dimensions that are appropriate for large-scale energy applications-
that is, they are potentially capable of converting coal at the gigawatt level.
The first two points suggest that no constraint on the specific properties of
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Figure 22-7. The Linz-Donawitz (LD) process modified for coal gasification for syn-
thetic liquid fuels production: TANDEM scheme. A and B distinguish between two dif-
feren t slag additives. Source: Based on Mietzner and Schwerdtfeger (1980).
Clean Gas
Feed Gas for
Heat Supply of
Satellite Units
02 and Slag Additives A 02 and Slag Additives B
Main Coal Waste Coal
Feed Feed
coal would be imposed as long as the energy balance of the reactions and the
composition of the slag can be controlled.
In order to allow for the flexible handling of varying coal inputs as well as
for a simple process control, the Tandem process of Figure 22-7 comprises
two separate gas- and slag-handling systems but one common liquid iron
loop. Within certain limits this concept allows low quality coal inputs with-
out modifying the output gas quality or the technical layout.
First tests of the molten iron process indicated that only limited purifica-
tion is necessary for the gas delivered by the Tandem process before it can
enter the catalytic conversion into methanol. Using data from steel convert-
ers, we estimated investment costs below $100 per kW for unit sizes in the
gigawatt range. This would place coal gasification for methanol synthesis at
a similar level as surface mine investment costs.
OBSERVATiONS
In Part VI, we will develop further some of the observations of this chapter,
suggesting how some of the technological developments touched upon here
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Figure 22-8. The iron/steel converter with bottom oxygen feed (OBM process, Max-
hLJtte). Source: Based on Mietzner and Schwerdtfeger (1980).
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might contribute to future energy strategies. Here, however, it is still useful
to focus briefly on one possible set of future relationships among some of
the technologies discussed.
We begin by observing that the difficulty of directly storing electricity has
led to generating capacity that is often idle. We can imagine introducing elec-
trolyzers and fuel cells at generating stations. The argument proposed here
would then apply to idle capacity of nuclear or solar origin since, for both,
the fuels and the fuel-related costs would be small, thereby making the full
load throughout the operation of nuclear or solar generating capacity prac-
tical. Such a development would provide for both experience with, and
improvements in, hydrogen technology, and it would initially not be con-
strained by hydrogen demand, as there already exists a hydrogen market for
ammonia synthesis and oil refining. If hydrogen were used for storing off-
peak electricity, then the system would be closed. If, further, we were to
introduce the synthesis of methanol (or whatever synthetic liquid hydro-
carbon turns out to be the most appropriate), then the market would be
practically unlimited. The methanol produced would help satisfy the press-
ing demand for liquid fuels, and the experience gained would help prepare
us for a time when electricity and hydrogen would be the principal, if not
the only, energy carriers in the system.
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23 ENERGY DENSITIES, LAND USE,AND SETTLEMENT PATTERNS
INTRODUCTION
The way humans settle on the land and use it is a key to understanding
energy supply and demand. The settlement pattern introduces large
inhomogeneities in energy demand densities, which in turn influence the
potential both for exploiting natural energy sources and for transporting and
distributing energy. This influence may be felt on a large scale (e.g., the
existence of large areas inhabited so sparsely that they can be significant
only as sources of centralized energy for large-scale transmission to remote
demand centers) and on a smaller scale (e.g., the existence of concentrated
human settlements-so-called "conurbations"-that require large, concen-
trated energy sources). Indeed, an understanding of the relationship among
settlement patterns, land use, and energy demand densities permits the
projection of global energy demands independent of regional analyses.
Obviously, a region's settlement pattern determines how it consumes
energy. The settlement pattern in turn results from orography, climate, the
availability of natural means of transportation-in particular of waterways-
the spatial occurrence of raw materials, soil, biosystems, or from a multi-
plicity of demographic, social, political, and historical factors.
Humans have tended to cluster their settlement patterns. The degree of
clustering is apparently limited only by the technology available to supply
materials and services to the cluster and to permit some degree of individual
mobility within the cluster. One of the services to be supplied is energy. It
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is generally easier to transport energy to places where all other conditions
for settlement are favorable than to transport other commodities and change
the natural conditions at those places where energy is abundant.
Only a few conurbations have developed on the basis of industrial exploi-
tation of nearby energy resources-for example, the Rhine-Ruhr area of the
FRG, the British Midlands in Europe, and the Ohio River (Pittsburgh) com-
plex in the United States, all based on coal; and the Texas-Gulf Coast
complex in the United States, based on oil. However, in general, large
metropolitan areas such as Tokyo, New York, London, Moscow, and Paris,
as well as some fast-growing ones in the developing countries such as Sao
Paulo and Calcutta, are not located on or very close to major coal, oil, or gas
deposits.
The impact of land use on energy consumption and generation is also
direct. Again, energy density is a key factor. For example, "soft" energy
technologies-that is, small-scale technical devices for harvesting energy from
the local environment-can largely be deployed only on inhabited land areas.
But only a fraction of the human population, and indeed a steadily decreas-
ing fraction, inhabits land at a low enough density so that the density of
natural supply exceeds the density of demand; the rest of the population
must import energy. And even where natural supply densities appear ade-
quate, there are competing demands for land use-for example, agriculture,
forestry, recreation, and wilderness preservation for ecological values.
The environmental impacts of energy conversion and use must also be
considered in relation to land use, settlement patterns, and energy densities.
Many of the environmental impacts of energy conversion units (e.g., re-
fineries, power plants, motors, and stoves) occur on inhabited land. These
impacts are felt predominantly as impacts on human health and safety. Con-
sequently, energy consumption densities provide more meaningful informa-
tion if calculated on the basis of inhabited or at least inhabitable land, rather
than on the total land area of a country or a region.
Energy densities thus enter into the assessment of energy problems at four
points. Two refer to the supply side-the assessment of the potential of soft
energy technologies and the assessment of the environmental effects of all
energy conversion technologies, be it at the supplier or the consumer end.
Third are the impacts resulting from the strong, nonlinear dependence of
the costs of energy transport systems on the amount of power transmitted
and hence on the consumption densities of the areas to be serviced. Finally,
energy demand densities appear to be characteristic of settlement patterns,
so that a projection of these patterns can be translated directly into an
energy demand projection.
HUMAN SETTLEMENT PATTERNS AND
ENERGY DENSITIES
Table 23-1, based on data from an analysis of potential long-term settlement
trends (Doxiadis and Papaioannou 1974), illustrates the global land use situa-
tion. Some 50 percent of the total global land area (of 148 X 106 km 2 ) is
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Table 23-1. Estimated global land use.
Land Use
Inhabitable
Human settlements
Arable land
Pastu res (partial use)
Forests (partial use)
Usable (but impracticable)
Total
Uninhabitable
Wastelands, deserts, high mountain regions
Polar regions, uninhabited islands
Total
Total land
Ocean su rface
Total of earth's surface
Source: Based on data from Doxiadis and Papaioannou (1974).
Area
(70· km 2 )
0.4
13.0
21.3
35.3
3.9
73.9
62.1
12.5
74.6
148.5
361.6
510.1
considered uninhabitable. These areas comprise the polar regions, sand and
ice deserts, high mountain regions, and a sizeable fraction of semiarid grass
lands and low productivity forests in extreme climate. Following this defini-
tion-which would suggest among other things that the tropical rain forests
can be fully exploited-Table 23-2 gives an (optimistic) estimate of the
inhabitable areas of the seven IIASA world regions discussed in this study.a
Table 23-2. Potentially inhabitable land of IIASA world regions.
Fraction Inhabitable
Total Area Uninhabitable Area
Region (70. km 2 ) (%) (70· km 2 )
(NA) 21.5 42 12.5
II (SU/E E) 23.5 34 15.5
III (WE!JANZ) 15.5 39 9.5
IV (LA) 20.6 28 14.8
V (Af/SEA)} 43.4 43 24.7VI (ME/NAf)
VII (C/CPA) 11.5 68 3.7
World 136.0 41 80.3
Source: Based on data from United Nations (1976).
aSee Figure 1-3 for a definition of these regions and Appendix 1A for the list of the countries
in each of the regions.
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Table 23-3. Population and potential energy consumption densities of the
Low and High scenarios, based on inhabitable land area.
Energy Density (W jm' )
Population Densitya
Base Low High(capjkm' )
year scenario scenario
Region 7975 2030 7975 2030 2030
I (NA) 19 25 0.21 0.35 0.48
II (SU/EE) 23 31 0.12 0.32 0.47
III (WE/JANZ) 59 81 0.24 0.48 0.75
IV (LA) 22 54 0.02 0.16 0.25
V (Af/SEA)} 63 158 0.02 0.16 0.28VI (ME/NAf)
VII (C/CPA) 246 463 0.12 0.62 1.20
World 49 99 0.10 0.28 0.44
aBased on data from United Nations (1975) and Keyfitz (1977).
Based on these estimates, Table 23-3 lists the expected changes in the
average population and energy consumption densities over the period 1975-
2030 for each of these regions. Dramatically high population densities may
be observed for China and the Asian countries with centrally planned econ-
omies (region VII) if one considers that the projected value of 463 cap/km2
for this region in 2030 is close to 50 percent of the current population
density of the large metropolitan areas of the world.
Certain countries in other regions would have similar dramatic situations
by 2030, which cannot be observed directly from the data in Table 23-3
because of the averaging process of grouping densely and less densely popu-
lated countries into regions. For example, high population densities would
occur principally in the Southeast Asian countries of region V and in the
countries of northwest Europe of region III.
A more even distribution may be observed from the energy consumption
densities listed in Table 23-3. The expected maximum and minimum levels
for the IIASA High scenario in 2030 differ by a factor of five whereas this
difference is as large as a factor of twenty for the population densities. The
global average energy consumption of 0.1 W/m2b of potentially inhabitable
land, achieved in 1975, is already a high figure. It is comparable to the activ-
ity level of the biosystems. The average production of wood in the global
forests (as of 1975) is 0.2 W/m2 (Revelle 1975). Against this figure the pro-
jected global energy consumption densities for 2030 appear significant
indeed. (For the Low scenario, the global energy density in 2030 is 0.28
W/m2 , and for the High scenario it is 0.44 W/m2.) They range between 0.16
W/m2 for the aggregate of regions V(Af/SEA) and VI (ME/NAf), and region
IV (LA) in the Low scenario and 1.2 W/m2 for region VII (C/CPA) in the
High scenario.
bThroughout this book energy flow densities are given as power densities.
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URBANIZATION
Population-and along with it energy consumption-are not homogeneously
distributed over the inhabited land area. The process or urbanization that
began in the nineteenth century in the now developed countries is a world-
wide phenomenon. The regularity and the incredible speed of this change in
the settlement pattern can be easily observed from Figure 23-1, which also
shows U.N. population projections for the coming decades (United Nations
1975). According to these projections, around the year 2030 the new
developing countries would reach a level of urbanization close to the current
level of the now developed countries. Even in the developed countries, where
currently more than two-thirds of the population live in urban areas, the
growth of urban versus rural lifestyles still goes on. When analyzed for
details, each city appears unique. Yet several characteristics exist that are
common to urban systems, even in different regions.
Table 23-4 summarizes 1975 population densities and energy consump-
tion densities of six large metropolitan areas. To be sure, the choice of
boundaries has a direct effect on the density data, but these are standard
definitions of metropolitan areas to which these boundaries conform (Hall
1977). They delimit a region of common cultural patterns (even allowing for
the healthy diversity that makes cities vital) within which mobility is much
greater than is mobility across the boundaries. As can be seen from Table
23-4, both population densities and energy consumption densities averaged
over the area covered by these metropolitan areas vary within a factor of
Figure 23-1. Estimated rural-urban population, 2030. Source: Based on papers sub-
mitted to the U.N. Population Conference, Bucharest, 1974.
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Table 23-4. Population and energy consumption densities, 1975.
Population Energy Energy
Inhabitants Area Density Consumption Density
Urban Area (70 6 ) (70 3 km') (cap/km' ) (k Wyr/yr, cap) (W/m' )
Tokyo-Yokohama 33 34 980 3.9 3.8
New York 19.7 35 560 11.4 6.4
London 12.7 11.4 1100 5.2 5.7
Rhine-Ruhr 10.9 8.5 1280 5.0 6.4
Moscow 10.6 14 750 5.4 4.1
Paris 9.8 12 820 4.3 3.5
Source: Based on data from Hall (1977).
two only, typical figures being 1000 inhabitants/km2 and an energy con-
sumption of 5 W/m 2. Within each of the areas a detailed structure exists,
with population densities reaching of the order of 50,000 inhabitants/km2
in the central parts, which are usually of the order of a few km2 in area. The
corresponding energy densities peak around 100 W1m2 . The concentra-
tion of activities in the centers is not balanced by much below average
density levels at the outskirts, however. Open areas, which are maintained
within the metropolitan areas for recreational purposes, have a spatial
distribution that tends to homogenize population densities, with the excep-
tion of the innermost parts of the "centers of gravity."
Figure 23-2 illustrates the spatial relationships of two conurbations-the
Rhine-Ruhr area and the Hooglyside area of Calcutta-in the format of a
simplified model. The core area of the Rhine-Ruhr metropolis has a poly-
centric structure. In contrast to monocentric conurbations, this settlement
pattern is largely self-sufficient in land requirements. There are relatively
small problems caused by commuting and segregation. The total population
within the rectangular area of 1200 km2 seems to have stabilized over the
past twenty years. Net population growth is found at the outer parts of the
conurbation, which is seven times larger than the core area represented in
Figure 23-2. The "open space" within the rectangular area is still used for
agriculture, although it also houses large industrial complexes as well as
forests preserved mainly for recreational purposes. Transport and municipal
service facilities compete for scarce "open" land. On the average, an inhabi-
tant of the core part of the Rhine-Ruhr conurbation arranges his life on an
area of 350 km 2, most of which is located at a distance of five to ten km
from his home.
By contrast, because the Hooglyside area extends along the river Hoogly,
th open land outside the core area is more accessible than is the case in
many other conurbations with monocentric patterns in developing countries.
The population densities of the Hooglyside area are much higher than those
found in the urbanized areas of developed countries. The Hoogly area seems
to exemplify the situation in developing conurbations much in the same way
as the Rhine-Ruhr area can be considered representative of developed
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Figure 23-2. Spatial relationships of the Rhine-Ruhr and Hooglyside areas. Source:
Forschungsgemeinschaft fur Hochspannungs- und Hochstromtechnik e.V. (1977).
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conurbations. Scarcity of land appears to be the overriding factor in the
developing conurbations: on the average, 80 m2 per inhabitant is available
in Hooglyside, with the incredibly low figure of 3 to 4 m2 per inhabitant
found in squatter areas on the outskirts of the central places.
Population densities in small towns and even villages, where direct access
to the natural environment is still possible, are generally higher than the
figures given in Table 23-4 for major urban areas. The reason appears to be
that recreational and agricultural areas are not incorporated into the town or
village area, as they are in metropolitan areas. Thus, various examples indi-
cate energy consumption densities of approximately 10 W/m2 for settlement
units of a few thousand up to the range of 100,000 inhabitants. When ad-
justed for open space in the immediate surroundings, energy consumption
densities are comparable: there is less difference between a small town of a
few thousand inhabitants and the large metropolitan areas than one would
expect-at least in the developed countries.
URBAN AND RURAL POPULATIONS
Studies of energy consumption densities for various settlement patterns are
scarce. Practically no material exists in this respect for the developing coun-
tries. Yet some indicative values can be derived indirectly. Table 23-5
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Table 23-5. Energy balance of India, 1971.a
Area
Total Rural Urban
Energy consumption (GWyr!yr)
Total 344 116 228
Commercial 181 16 165
Noncommercial 163 100 62
Population (10·) 547 440 107
Population (%) 100 80 20
Energy use per capita (kWyr!yr,cap) 0.63 0.26 a 2.13
aExcluding animal and human power, which is estimated to be 0.06 kWyr!yr per capita.
Source: Based on data from Goeltze (1977), Parikh and Parikh (1977), and Revelle (1975).
summarizes the findings of several studies for India, considering both com-
mercial (e.g. oil, gas, coal) and noncommercial (e.g., fuelwood from wastes)
energy forms. Most of the energy requirements of the rural population are
met by these locally available noncommercial sources. Commercial energy is
supplied predominantly to the towns where roughly 20 percent of the popu-
lation of India live. On a per capita basis, the urban population of India uses
ten times more energy than does the rural population. Taking for India the
same ratio as is found in the developed countries between the politically
defined smaller area of a conurbation and the area actually influenced by
that conurbation, the average energy consumption density for the larger
Hooglyside area-Greater Bombay, New Delhi, and the other large conurba-
tions-turns out to be of the order of lOW1m2.
In Table 23-6, population and consumption densities of urban and rural
areas are compared for the examples of India and the Federal Republic of
Germany. Their average population densities are relatively close, although
India will probably soon overtake the FRG in that parameter. Both coun-
tries are more densely populated than are the regions in which they are
located (Table 23-3), yet they can be considered typical (not average),
since the uneven distribution of population over the area of a whole region
leads to the situation where more people live in high density areas than in
the few places where actual and average densities coincide. According to
Table 23-6, the population densities of the urban areas in India are several
times above those of the FRG.
This relationship is also characteristic of major conurbations in other
developing countries. However, the lower per capita energy consumption of
the urban population in the developing countries seems to balance their high
population densities so that, on an area basis, energy consumption densities
of conurbations in developing countries are comparable to those found in
the conurbations of the developed countries. It may be that a given infra-
structure, with houses, transportation systems, utilities, and basic commer-
cial distribution, requires a specific throughput of energy that is insensitive
to the number of people using this infrastructure.
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Table 23-6. Energy consumption densities in developing and developed
countries.
Population Density (cap/km')
Average
Urbana
Rural b
Specific Consumption (kWyr/yr,cap)
Average
Urbana
Rural b
Energy Consumption Density (W/m')
Average
Urbana,e
Rural b
Federal Republic
of Germany
245
1500c
150
1.2
7.5
0.75
India
186
6000d
135
0.6
2.0
0.3
0.10
12.0
0.04
aConurbations.
blncluding farms and small towns.
cForty-five percent of total population.
d Represents 9 percent of total population.
eThe figure is higher here than that of Table 23-4 because conurbations down to 25,000 inhabi-
tants are counted here for the F RG.
Oversimplifying, one could say that the differences in urban material life-
styles are owing to the number of people that have to share a given urban
infrastructure. In terms of energy, conurbations pose nearly identical prob-
lems worldwide, a well-known fact among a few experts but one that has
been largely neglected in public discussions. Between the more developed
and the less developed countries, the chief differences in energy density are
to be found in rural areas. The rural energy densities of the developed coun-
tries are one order of magnitude smaller than the energy densities of the
urban areas in these countries. On the other hand, in developing countries,
rural energy densities are more than two orders of magnitude smaller. On the
basis of the data in Table 23-6, one might characterize rural settlement pat-
terns by an energy consumption density of 1 W1m2 or less and urban settle-
ment patterns by a benchmark figure of 5 to 10 W/m 2 .
SOFT ENERGY FOR URBAN SUPPLY
In Chapter 6, the usable energy densities from renewable energy sources
were demonstrated to be of the order of 0.1 W/m 2 . This seems to rule out
renewable energy sources for urban use, since it would require on the order
of one hundred times as much land for energy supply as is contained in the
urban area. Still, there is considerable land around many small cities, and
energy harvesting could conceivably compete with other uses of this land.
But "soft energy" is more than renewable energy. As was discussed briefly
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in Chapter 6 and will be treated in depth in the following chapter on the
hard-soft controversy, soft energy contains the element of individual access
in one way or another. Here, we question how far down the system one has
to go before one can expect even partial user autonomy.
To examine this point, we have set up a crude model to estimate the dis-
tance over which energy must be transmitted for various combinations of
total population and population density. The results are set out in Table 23-
7. Settlement types are characterized as "farm," "village," "town," or
conurbation, according to total populations listed. The table is set up so that
a settlement type spans two orders of magnitude of population size: thus,
a "village" is a distinct settlement containing 100 to 10,000 people. The
assumption is now made that the source of supply is located on a "planta-
tion" at the edge of the inhabited area, and the average distance from con-
sumer to source is listed in kilometers in the main column of Table 23-7.
It can be seen that the distances become large for towns of 100,000 people,
even when the towns are so densely populated as to approach "point sinks"
of energy demand (for which settlement pattern, individually controlled
[soft] energy sources must give way to collectively or corporately managed
ones). Somewhere between settlements of 10,000 people (for loosely settled
small towns in the United States pattern) and 50,000 people (for densely
settled towns typical of the Asian Far East region), the town loses the char-
acteristic of individual access to the energy supply system, even in principle.
In towns of 10,000 to 50,000 people, it may still be possible to generate
a useful amount of domestic energy autonomously from renewable sources.
This possibility disappears rapidly as the town becomes a conurbation. As we
have seen, the urban pattern of land use, even of uninhabited land, leaves
little remaining area for harvesting energy. Thus, from the standpoint of
"soft" energy, the chief opportunity for its application lies in the rural
sector-farms and villages-with some further contribution being possible
in the domestic sector of small towns. The distinction between urban and
rural made here seems to correspond to that used by the United Nations
(1975) in projecting urban and rural populations (Figure 23-1)-that is,
although their definition of urban seems to have been made largely on
sociological grounds, these are congruent with our distinction by population
aggregation.
Table 23-7. Distance of local energy source to point of use, as a function
of settlement pattern.
Typical
Population Density, Inhabitantsjkm 2
Distance in kilometers
Settlement Settlement
Type Population 50 700 500
Farm 10 0.4 0.3 0.14
Village 1000 4.0 3.0 1.4
Town 100,000 40.0 30.0 14.0
Conurbation 10 (10 6 ) 400.0 300.0 140.0
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24 THE HARD-SOFT CONTROVERSY
INTRODUCTION
During the past few years, the public perception of the energy problem has
been increasingly influenced by a controversy revolving around the concept
of a "hard" versus a "soft" path. "Hard" and "soft" have become catch-
words that lend themselves to a range of interpretation, a fact that has
tended to obscure some of the vital issues underlying the controversy. In
this chapter, we review the "energy problem" through the lens of the con-
troversy with the hope of clarifying what is really at stake for our world
civilization if it should choose one path to the exclusion of the other.
First, it may be useful to examine the recent origin of the terms hard and
soft. They were drawn from the domain of information handling in which
hardware connotes the computers and other physical elements, such as input
and output devices, and in which software connotes the programming
languages, logical structures, algorithms, and so on that are run on the com-
puter systems. The terms have also been adopted by some researchers in the
life sciences. For instance, neurophysiologists sometimes refer to nerve cells
(neurons) and networks of nerves in living systems as the hardware or hard
wiring and to the conditioning, learning, and behavior exhibited by such
nervous networks as the software. The fact that the basic elements of com-
puters (e.g., relays and magnetic cores) and the basic elements of living sys-
tems (neurons) act as essentially "yes/no" devices gave powerful support to
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the analogy as well as to the notion of computer hardware plus software
assemblages as being giant (artificial) brains.
But when the terms "hard" and "soft" were drawn into the energy field,
such a straightforward analogy broke down. One might, for instance, de-
scribe a particular energy technology within the frame of such an analogy
as "hard" once its function is determined by a fixed, in-built program of
performance. It is possible to view an interlinked national electricity grid,
running with automatic power control, as a piece of computational hard-
ware that translates the local stochastic demands of final consumers for
electrical power into a set of operations controlling the inflow of water into
turbines and of oil, gas, and coal into the combustion chambers of thermal
power plants. Ultimately, the inbuilt logic of the grid also controls the flux
of neutrons in the core of a nuclear reactor. As long as this computational
hardware performs according to its specifications, the national grid provides
energy. By and large, the electric grid has a yes/no characteristic: it either
works or it does not work at all. Therefore, a national electricity grid or
its components could properly be described as a hard energy technology.
It is not as easy, however, to define a soft energy technology within the
framework of the same analogy. Software, in contrast to hardware as noted
above, is not a material device but a logical structure, separate or distin-
guishable from the carrier on which it is imprinted. Its difficulty and its
advantage are tied to the fact that it needs some hardware to be utilized,
but that the software normally is independent of a particular type of hard-
ware. (For instance, a program may be designed to be run on different types
of computers.) One is thus led to look at the features of tools rather than the
features of "machines" when one searches for examples of soft energy tech-
nologies. An axe certainly would fall into the soft category or even possibly
a stove. Both do not automatically supply energy once a demand is sig-
nalized. Instead, they need determined, informed, and repeated activation by
individuals in order to produce the desired function. That is, a person needs
to learn how to cut wood with an axe, just as he must learn to light a fire-
and that learning is the software. As one scrutinizes this analogy, then, it
appears that "hard" and "soft" should not be defined on a purely technolog-
ical basis. Rather, these notions refer to alternate relationships between man
and his tools or devices.
And in fact, as one studies the thesis of the chief proponent of the soft
path, Amory Lovins, one finds that he refers to a body of energy technol-
ogies as being soft when they are flexible, resilient, sustainable, and benign
(Lovins 1977). Moreover, he generally seems to identify the soft technol-
ogies as those that are decentralized-spread throughout man's environment
and used and controlled by many individuals-as opposed to the centralized
energy technologies such as a large electric power station that is run (con-
trolled) by relatively few people and that is meant to serve the needs of
many people over a hard-wired grid.
We must agree with Lovins in his assertion that the distinction between
hard and soft energy paths rests not on how much energy is used, but on the
technical and sociopolitical structure of the energy system, thus focusing
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our attention on consequent and crucial political differences (Lovins 1977).
But without going into depth at this point, we must assert (in agreement
with the soft proponents) that the consequences of following either the soft
or the hard path will be crucially different for the future of mankind j how-
ever, the outcome of following the soft path will be radically different than
that projected by the soft proponents. Rather than the "millennium," it could
be disaster. When one analyzes the character of the "energy problem" on a
global scale, and when one looks sufficiently far into the future, one foresees
that the soft path can but aggravate an already existing problem and possibly
doom billions of people in the future, the very reverse of the hopes of the
soft path strategists. But before we can develop this argument further, we
must dive into the current hard-soft dialogue.
WHICH ROAD, WHAT CONSEQUENCES?
Any classification of technologies serves a specific purpose. And it is the
eventual goal that suggests one should discriminate a group of technologies
into renewable or nonrenewable, into cheap or expensive, into polluting or
nonpolluting, or into hard or soft subgroups. Obviously, the judgment of
what is preferable, tolerable, or should be rejected refers to well-established
rules in a resources analysis, an economic analysis, or an environmental
analysis. However, other than in the first three instances, it is difficult to
identify the underlying purpose and the goals behind the introduction of the
opposing notions of hard and soft.
Lovins (1976) put forward a soft energy path in contrast to a hard path.
Shortly thereafter we held extended discussions with soft proponents in
order to clarify the underlying perception of the "real" problems giving rise
to this hard-soft controversy. We reproduce-in part-a document that sum-
marizes some conclusions emerging from our discussions in 1976 with
Amory Lovins and Dennis Meadows on the subject of which concept should
govern the future evolution of the energy system (see boxed material and
also Sassin et al., 1977).
The challenge posed by Lovins and Meadows has forced us to rethink our
own biases and to express our ideas more clearly. The real problem facing
world civilization today is that it cannot continue doing things as it has done
in the past. Neither the hard nor the soft path holds the answer to the funda-
mental problem. The fact is that the principles that were sound and effective
for a world population of up to one billion-principles that were established
in a period 8000 or 10,000 years ago when mankind developed agricultural
settlements and gradually turned its back on hunting and gathering over wide
terrains-these principles, which lead inexorably to the urbanizations we
know today, are no longer valid. They no longer allow us to support even
the world population of four billion in a meaningful way. The demographic
trends that have been under way for more than a century and that point to a
population of eight billion or more by the year 2030 merely sharpen the
reality of this basic problem. Thus, all societies, developed and developing,
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CRITERIA FOR AN ACCEPTABLE APPROACH
TO THE ENERGY PROBLEM
In searching for the sources of opposing conclusions with respect to
nuclear, large-scale solar, coal, other renewable sources in a local or
regional context (such as wind, wave power, biomass utilization, and
small-scale solar heat), and energy conservation measures (such as better
insulation or the cogeneration of electricity and process heat), it turned
out to be helpful to address the following questions:
1. Which long-term fundamental problems other than energy ques-
tions have to be faced by mankind within the coming fifty years?
2. Is the appropriate scale for analyzing these problems global, re-
gional, or local?
3. In which subsectors should the economy be disaggregated in order
to tackle the problem of self-reliance and resilience?
4. How can one define a technological solution for the energy supply
with respect to the anticipated state of affairs in terms of dos and
not in terms of don'ts?
5. How can one specify an energy strategy leading from today's situa-
tion into a long-term future when the goals to be achieved vary
with time and in principle are subject to revision?
PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF THE
JOINT DISCUSSIONS
Questions 1 through 3 above were answered in some detail. Questions
4 and 5 remain open for further joint analysis.
Both sides agreed that major global reliance on conventional oil and
gas reserves must be phased out over the next fifty years. Both felt that
even the provision of plentiful energy supplies would leave many other
crucial problems unsolved. Beyond that, two obviously incompatible
global perspectives evolved. They are briefly outlined below.
Perspective of Dennis Meadows and Amory Lovins
The carrying capacity of the globe will continue to deteriorate. The
global population will not rise above eight billion people, perhaps not
above six billion. Population will stabilize in some regions through
reduced fertility, in other areas mortality will increase and may even
produce declining populations. War, pestilence, and famine will con-
tinue in cycles more or less as they have over the millennia. One might
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term this scenario "business as usual" except that it includes for the
first time the possibility of massive climate change. The conflicting
trends of consolidation of political blocks on the one hand and increas-
ing breakup of others will persist. The outcome of this is not clear, but
it will almost certainly combine with other trends to decrease the possi-
bilities for free trade worldwide.
Under these circumstances it is probably inappropriate to plan on
more than 2.5 kWyr/yr,cap or around a doubling of total global energy
production above current levels. The intermediate future could well see
a decline in energy availability with concurrent social disruptions. It is
unrealistic to expect that any significant political entity will be content
to plan deliberately for sole dependence on other national political
entities for its energy supplies. However, the difficulties of shifting off
oil and gas leave an inescapable period of several decades dependence
on the oil and gas exporters.
Under these circumstances, one does not count on the adoption of
global energy strategies or even on programs that require massive ship-
ments of energy across national boundaries. One must find sources that
use regionally available energy, that are very efficient in satisfying end
use demands, and that are highly resilient and easily decoupled.
According to Meadows and Lovins, sociopolitical constraints provide
the basic starting point for reanalyzing and further modification of the
technological system. For the analysis, no concept of a sociopolitical
lifestyle can be solely expressed in terms of technology. But general
notions of future sociopolitical prospects can lead directly to identifica-
tion of preferred technologies. Technological fixes are not an end in
themselves, however. This view leads to small-scale solar applications,
to wind, to the use of agricultural wastes, and to deliberate efforts to
attain zero energy growth in the wealthier nations as quickly as possible.
Soft technologies are less vulnerable with respect to social, political,
or military interference. If the IIASA approach is followed, Lovins and
Meadows suggest that the potential damage a nation could sustain from
the interruption of its energy supplies from centralized facilities will
exacerbate international tensions and lead to self-destruction of the
technologies and the infrastructure originally designed on the basis of
the assumption of international order and altruism. Small-scale tech-
nologies will, in contrast, tend to stabilize the political system, because
small-scale conflicts, which are inevitable in any foreseeable future
(this past year was really the first since the beginning of World War II
that did not see major armed conflict somewhere on the globe), do not
automatically lead to escalation.
It is also felt that the major problems are distributional rather than
related to absolute scale. One should concentrate on the minimum or
the modal energy availability rather than on the average.
760 ENERGY IN A FINITE WORLD
Perspectives of IIASA's Energy Systems Program
Starting from the observation that the technological possibility indeed
exists to have ample energy for all ages and thereby to provide a means
to practically eliminate all raw material problems and all environmen-
tal problems, it seems a prudent and necessary approach to separate
technological and sociopolitical considerations to the extent possible.
The rationale is to first identify the features of present and future
supply systems capable of providing the required carrying capacity for
man in the billions-a systems' capability that is orders of magnitude
beyond that which untouched and unmanaged nature can offer. Such
an effort shall then serve as a basis for political groups and decision-
makers in analyzing and weighing the indeed enormous institutional and
social problems against the benefits that accompany the extension and
evolution of modern energy systems. Some groups believe that our
sociopolitical constraints will be too narrow to permit for a still further
utilization of our technological possibilities to significantly extend
man's material resources. We hold that such a judgment can only be
based on an unbiased analysis of the inevitable conditions and implica-
tions of such supply systems. The decision to abandon these systems is
a highly political one, with very far-reaching consequences. Therefore,
a scientific analysis must not start by implicitly assuming that this deci-
sion has already been taken. Indeed, it should reveal as clearly as pos-
sible what is at stake.
It is in line with such an approach to reckon with the purely demo-
graphic growth path of the presently four billion people that will level
off, according to U.N. population projections, at twelve to thirteen
billion people. Consistent with the whole approach, a further growth of
the average energy consumption from the present 1.8 kWyr/yr,cap to
3 to 5 kWyr/yr, cap is fixed as a figure of orientation. Whether one con-
siders the accepted fact that dozens of TWyr/yr can be supplied only by
hard technologies as an attractive or a frightening perspective is not of
prime importance here. Such an evaluation asks for an assessment with
respect to the general framework chosen. Science can certainly put for-
ward alternative cases. An evaluation and final decision about what is
to be considered attractive or frightening is not to be performed, how-
ever, by scien tists; this is within the domain of politics.
Some of the present energy systems are already "hard" and global
in nature. The Persian Gulf is nearly a point source of energy, yielding
1.7 TWyr/yr, which are supplied across global distances. Discarding
hard options and limiting our choices to local, resilient forms of energy,
as suggested by Meadows and especially by Lovins, would deprive man-
kind of many of its cheapest energy sources, which are found in only a
few areas. This even holds for solar energy. Such a development, though
difficult to quantify, would tend to reduce the availability of energy
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and to put the burden of heavy investments on those countries that
lack rich natural resources, most of which belong to the family of the
less developed countries. Thus, reduction of world tensions would
hardly be an immediate and likely consequence of the introduction of
soft energy technologies. By contrast, IIASA's notion of resilience here
applies to large energy systems rather than to single, weakly interacting
small entities.
Implying the political preparedness to maintain and further evolve
present global structures resilience, as understood within IIASA's
Energy Systems Program, points to international cooperation and eco-
nomic exchange. These rely on efforts that are both a prerequisite and
an integral part of hard energy technologies. Such systems do have the
ability to compensate for unexpected outages. A case in point was the
closure of the Suez Canal, followed by the introduction of a new
class of large oil tankers, which now take the route around the Cape
of Good Hope.
Rather different geographical dimensions of the systems to be orga-
nized in a resilient way are chosen both by Meadows and Lovins and by
IIASA. In the one case, these dimensions result from the implicit goal
to adjust technology to an assumed deteriorating sociopolitical environ-
ment; in the other case, they are a consequence of the goal to explore
the role of energy technology in avoiding a possible degradation of that
environment.
This brief and certainly oversimplifying outline of the two ap-
proaches, which are characterized by diverging assumptions on develop-
ment of population, economy, and political interdependence, makes it
obvious why a purely technical argumentation will not be able to bridge
the gap between the general standpoints of "hard" and "soft" exponents.
that today rely on variations of the hard and soft paths, respectively, are in
the process of a rapid and fundamental change-a change in which energy
shortages are but a symptom. Efforts to carry the existing infrastructures for
either the hard or soft ways merely continue the past with all its limits. In
the future world, neither the hard path of overconsumption of resources nor
the soft path of mere subsistence should be allowed. It is these very limits
that make life so nearly intolerable in the world today for the majority of its
population. Therefore, there is a need to explore alternative ways of organiz-
ing global civilizations. We must learn how to build new infrastructures for a
world that would house (properly) four billion people and that would house
eight billions in the year 2030.
This is not such a unique problem of energy systems as the hard-soft con-
troversy has thus far led us to expect. We must focus our creative attention
elsewhere. To get perspective, one has only to realize that every year seventy
million babies are added on a "net" basis to this world-"net" meaning that
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they cannot hope to grow up in an infrastructure that they will inherit from
their ancestors dying away.
Some twenty years from now, this population increase will force the de-
velopment of an appropriate infrastructure-for example, housing, transpor-
tation systems, food production, and processing facilities-over and above
the need for energy that will have fully developed for this population incre-
ment. If the seventy million babies, added annually, were to live up to the
standards of the average U.S. citizen of today, a new East Coast of the
United States would have to be built every year. If the seventy million babies
were to live up to European standards, by and large, the present European
capitals and their supporting hinterland would have to be added somewhere
on the globe. For the transitional period, we must reckon with another
Mexico City, Teheran, Sao Paulo, Lagos, Calcutta, and Bombay every year.
The North-South issues indicate how slowly the world even recognizes the
mortgage it has thoughtlessly accepted over the past decades. Whether more
decent infrastructures are provided sooner or later is not the point here.
What counts is that mankind commits itself eventually to providing an
appropriate materials infrastructure with the arrival of every new citizen.
The fact that it seems impossible to respond to this commitment for the
roughly three billion "have nots" of today (found mainly in the developing
but also within the developed world) by simply multiplying present tech-
nologies is the deeper root of the North-South conflict and the real message
of the Club of Rome's prediction. A further doubling of the global popula-
tion adds just a quantitative difficulty to an already established new quali-
tative situation.
NEW DIMENSIONS OF THE
ENERGY-SOCIETY PROBLEM
The painful difficulties that many places, all over the world, are having in
providing an energy supply adequate for present or expected standards of
living are but an illustration that the world is finite. In planning for a world
that will have more people, the limitations become more apparent. In con-
trast to the past, we no longer consider it proper for the strong to pass their
problems on to the weak or to assume an infinite and forgiving natural
setting or for the present generation to mortgage the resources-and, indeed,
the lives of future generations.
It is against that background that we had to analyze and categorize energy
technologies. In fact, it was this gradually emerging future world background
that quickly guided and controlled the studies of the Energy Systems Pro-
gram, the results of which have been laid down in the preceding chapters of
this book. Through these considerations, and stimulated by the hard-soft
controversy, we were led to clarify the basic principles or notions that
should be used to assess energy technologies for a world that will ever more
intensely experience the burden of this commitment.
Our world is finite, but the human population is growing. The world is
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finite, but knowledge is increasing. We are learning that some things previ-
ously thought tolerable cannot be allowed to happen (world-scale war,
massive pollution) and that some things previously inconceivable are now
possible (space exploration, informatics, high speed, long-range communi-
cation). We are observing the evolution of new social structures, even within
societies that appeared static.
We can characterize our concerns about energy and society by asking what
is varied by new social techniques, new technologies, and new human condi-
tions. The variables that we have identified can be characterized as the
dimensions of the problem. That is, if we can assign some measure to them,
we can understand what the world would be like. These dimensions are
carrying capacity, interaction, equity, and legacy. How they relate to the
energy and social systems is explained below and summarized in Table 24-1.
Carrying capacity refers to global, regional, national, or local capability to
support human society. It has the extensive factor of population and the in-
tensive factor of individual activity, so that a small, mobile, and rich popula-
tion can saturate the capacity of an area as much as a larger, more stationary.
and poorer population can. Limits on carrying capacity are set by resources
and the ability to make investive use of resources (see Chapter 21). but also
by effluents and the ability to control them. Advancing human knowledge
tends to increase carrying capacity by improving production and control
capabilities.
Interaction refers to the degree to which goods, people, and ideas flow
from one place to another. A highly interactive world is characterized by an
emphasis on trade, on shifting personal relationships, and on rapid dissemi-
nation of and response to ideas. A weakly interactive world emphasizes self-
sufficiency, stable relationships, and traditional thought. Technology favors
interaction, but at any given time a saturation point may be reached such
that overspecialization results from trade, shifting relationships lead to per-
sonal confusion, and the kaleidoscope of ideas leads to fad and fashion.
Equity refers, of course. to distributional values. An equitable society is
one in which, by and large, everybody has access equally to the same oppor-
tunities and amenities. It is also a society in which duties and responsibilities
are shared equally. An inequitable society assigns both amenities and re-
sponsibilities in different shares for different people. Perfect equality is
virtually unachievable. because the abilities of people to carry out responsi-
bilities are variable and because tastes in amenity are likewise variable. There-
fore, compensation for greater responsibility is usually made through more
access to amenity; and so long as the measures of responsibility and amenity
are considered "appropriate," this much inequality is considered equitable.
Finally, legacy refers to a time sense. A society that consumes its re-
sources without making something out of them is wasteful and has a low
sense of legacy. A society that pollutes its environment is also low in legacy:
the pollution is a burden on the future, rather than an inheritance. A society
of builders and planters has a high sense of legacy. Knowledge is probably
the highest legacy of all; a society that learns and communicates its learning
is doing the maximum for posterity. A society that simply preserves is neu-
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tral. Technology is neutral to legacy, in the sense that it can be directed
toward consumption and pollution or toward construction and growth and
carrying capacity.
We are not in a position to scientifically quantify standards for these four
variables that would make the threshold between a stable and an unstable
world fifty years hence. Nevertheless, technological strategies can be com-
pared by assessing how they would rate relative to each other on these scales.
Traditionally, low technology societies are low in carrying capacity and
interaction, and neutral in legacy. They are highly variable in equity,
ranging from free bands of hunters or farmers to highly hierarchical tribes
and fiefdoms.
Today's high (advanced)technology societies are high in carrying capacity
and so high in interaction that saturation effects are beginning to appear.
They are moderate in equity; a trend toward increased equity is correlated
with higher carrying capacity, but there is no demonstrable cause-effect
relation, and there are examples of egregious inequity. They are variable in
legacy: construction and advancement of knowledge go hand in hand with
resource consumption and pollution.
The view of the world, as we interpret the position of Lovins and Mea-
dows laid down above, considers the moderate equity and the variable
legacy of today's advanced (high technology) societies as inevitable and
structural. They place the fault at attempts to improve carrying capacity by
advanced technology and argue that this can only be done by jeopardizing
legacy through pollution and resource consumption, by oversaturating inter-
action, and by moving toward inequity. In consequence, they argue that
global problems can be solved only by deliberately reducing the role of ad-
vanced (high) technology and accepting the reductions of carrying capacity
that go with it. In particular, they see centralized "hard" energy systems as
employing prototypically "bad" technology-technology that degrades both
equity and legacy. Their world of "soft" energy systems is one that has an
admittedly lower carrying capacity than today's advanced societies, and one
that is less interactive. It is claimed that such a world would be optimal in
interaction and high in equity and legacy.
Throughout the work of the IIASA Energy Systems Program, we have
tried to quantify the technoeconomic parameters of future civilizations by
fixing minimum goals for the evolution of the global energy infrastructure.
These minimum goals result from a quantification of the level of fulfillment
of the four dimensions of carrying capacity, interaction, equity, and legacy
required by the conditions of nature and the assumed levels of technological
skills. In such an approach, carrying capacity and legacy dominate considera-
tions of equity and interaction. In more simplistic terms, we have tried to
quantify how civilization "as we find it" could arrange energywise with
nature over an extended time horizon.
Sociopolitical requirements, expressed in the format of civilizations "as
they should be," will exert additional pressures on technological evolution.
Thus, our two scenarios as such (presented in Part IV) do not guarantee
sociopolitical stability, but they mark the line of survival for a growing
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global population. We maintain that these additional requirements on tech-
nological systems cannot be accepted as long as they reduce the possibility
of survival for significant fractions of mankind.
WHAT LIES AHEAD?
A comprehensive view of the energy problem of the major world regions
reveals rather quickly that a narrowly defined categorization of energy tech-
nologies according to the notions of soft or hard would impose a violation
of some, it not all, of the notions of carrying capacity, interaction, equity,
and legacy for many subgroups of the world's population, once such a strict
(and limited) choice were made. Should the bulk shipment of wood products
by a nationalized industry in the Amazon basin to Bangladesh be discour-
aged even if it makes economic sense, just because it is a "hard" approach?
Or should one discourage the use of a local windmill in India because, by
developed economy standards, it is uneconomic compared to nuclear elec-
tricity? Both questions illustrate the obvious limitations of generalizing from
the local experience with technological elements.
There is no alternative choice between soft and hard technologies in the
sense that we can discard one for reasons of principle. We really need all
technologies-from resource dependent to renewable, from simple to sophis-
ticated, from distributed to centralized applicability, of rugged or fragile
design, with selective or broad environmental impacts. The overriding cri-
terion is the adaptation of the global energy system infrastructure to the
many specific conditions in which it must operate. This operation of a basic
infrastructure requires a broad understanding and willingness to guarantee
conditions of life for complex technological systems-a real challenge in a
world in which all cultural levels from hunting via farming to the different
industrialization steps coexist.
To meet that challenge, youth must be given the chance to gradually
evolve its understanding of technological progress and of diverse cultural
levels. This can be done by experimenting and testing the strength and weak-
nesses of one's image of technology. The educational function of learning on
simple systems before proceeding to more sophisticated and powerful ones is
a learning experience both technically and in responsibility. The young per-
son steering a sailboat learns not only about winds and waves but also what
happens to other people if he or she does not perform well. This suggests
maintaining a certain fraction of soft technologies even if they are not
needed or are not competitive in all other categories that matter. Also, har-
vesting energy from a windmill and depending on it should contribute to
maintaining and defending those social conditions and virtues needed to
live with, say, nuclear technology or even with global environmental
engineering that goes along with a heavy reliance on renewable energy
sources.
Both the solar-based and the nuclear-based alternatives, as well as the
long-term fossil resources problem, require the same responsibilities and
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charisma to integrate a global society. At this level, the danger of misin-
terpreting the hard-soft controversy, no matter how inadequately it might
have ever been phrased, becomes obvious. It is not a technological issue,
dissociable from the political principles of organizing a civilization in a finite
world. What is at stake over the next few decades is the ability to survive at
a high cultural level, and this depends on the relationship we develop toward
technology. The calculatory differences in the billions of people for which
we plan might well turn into real fatalities once society should choose either
hard or soft technologies on the grounds that one would be socially less
demanding than the other. The real issue beneath is how can we harmonize
the ongoing process of developing individual capabilities with the parallel
process of intergrating an ever larger number of individuals into a true com-
munity. Our hearts have to follow our intellects. Faced with the often con-
flicting goals of the individual and mankind, we have to learn how to become
citizens of a finite world.
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VI ASSESSMENTS ANDIMPLICATIONS
Our aim throughout this book was to be objective, realizing, however, that
this is almost impossible when evaluated against absolute standards. The
unique nature of the energy problem demands that our study findings be
assessed and their implications be considered, since we are not treating a
neutral scientific problem in the traditional sense of the word.
Such a synthesis of ideas is, of course, the result of the thinking of all
members of the Energy Systems Program Group as all have contributed
significantly. Nevertheless, because assessments and implications of our
global energy study must be articulated by one person, Part VI has been
written by the Program Leader, who is solely responsible for the views and
opinions expressed.
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25 THE PROBLEM REVISITED
INTRODUCTION
• It could be done.
Our aim when we began our research some five years ago was to take a fresh
look at the energy problem facing the world over the next fifty years and to
characterize demands, supply opportunities, and constraints as objectively as
possible. Working from the premise that the world is finite, we questioned
whether civilization would be able to meet the energy challenge. Based on an
analysis of all the factors, we conclude that even with the technologies at
hand or potentially at hand, it would be possible to provide enough energy
for a world of eight billion people in the year 2030, using the world's re-
sources as perceived today. It could be done. This is not a trivial statement,
given the complexity of the problem and the degree of cultural pessimism
that one often encounters in today's world.
Solving the energy problem would require two overlapping transitions of
the infrastructures of the global energy system: the first transition would
lead to the use of unconventional fossil fuels, whereas the second would
bring us to an era in which there was no fossil primary energy and in which
nuclear and solar power would be the basis of a sustainable energy system.
This ultimate transition would not take place until after 2030.
In fact, the ultimate driving force of the global energy problem as well as
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of other supply problems is the increasing world population. Inherently
this can lead to serious world instability. Throughout our study we have
relied upon the population estimates of Keyfitz (1977), which led us to
envisage a world population of eight billion people in the year 2030. It
may be that we are being too conservative in our estimates. But even if that
should be the case, we still maintain: it could be done.
IMPLICATIONS OF VARIOUS LEVELS
OF ENERGY DEMAND
• Balancing energy demand and supply means balancing the services of
energy, capital, labor, and skill.
The solution to the energy problem is contingent upon many sets of cir-
cumstances that are cultural, technical, political, economic, and environ-
mental in nature. Formal scientific methods alone cannot solve the dilemma
of balancing supply and demand. Some claim that the supply-demand
balance could be settled at very low demand values, say at 16 TWyr/yr;
others argue for median values of, say, 22 TWyr/yr; while still others ad-
vocate a high energy world, with values as high as, say, 40 TWyr/yr.
No matter which position one subscribes to, the efforts called for would
have to be well organized and significantly larger than what society is used
to today, combining inputs of energy, capital, labor, and skill (Figure 25-1).
Clearly, the combination of these inputs would vary according to the level
of demand (Figure 25-2). For both the moderate and the very low energy
demand world, energy services could (conceivably) be replaced largely by
Figure 25-1. Inputs for the provision of civilization services.
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Figure 25-2. Substitutability of service inputs from capital, labor, and "skill" versus
energy.
y
Low Y IX ratio
--
--
Medium Y IX ratio
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
i High Y IX ratio
,
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I /
/
'/ --
--
-
Capital
Labor
Skill
Energy X
inputs of capital and labor. By contrast, in a high energy demand world,
the services that civilization needs to function would come largely from
inputs of energy. This is not impossible. What is impossible is to continue
present trends, since in any event, we must expect significant energy conser-
vation measures. If one foresees that radical changes have to be made, then
why not begin now.
• Only radical changes in lifestyles could lead to very low energy demand.
We considered the implications of a very low energy demand world, using
some of the data for the 16 TW case as presented in Chapter 18. Global
average energy consumption per capita for this case remains at 2 kWyr/yr.
We assumed gross domestic product (GDP) would continue to grow, but at
a modest ratea-for example, at 1.70 percent per year in region I (NA) and
at 2.04 percent per year in region III (WE/JANZ).b We were led to assume
income elasticities close to zero or even negative. But as our analysis has
shown, to achieve these values, fundamental changes would also have to
aThroughout our study we have assumed declining growth rates. The numbers here are not meant
to indicate constant and, by implication, ongoing growth rates; rather, they link the years 1975 and
2030.
b See Figure 1-3 for the definition of the I1ASA world regions and Appendix lA for the list of the
countries in each of the regions.
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take place in the structure of GDP. For instance, the service sector's contri-
bution would have to become 65 to 70 percent; losses in converting primary
energy into secondary forms (e.g., in electricity generation or coal lique-
faction) would have to be minimized; and both passenger and freight trans-
portation activities would have to be reduced. Further, there would have to
be an export of energy-intensive industries from the developed to the devel-
oping regions. (Checking the consistency of the latter assumption was
beyond the scope of our methodology.) Per capita demand would have to
be reduced by rigorous insulation of single family houses, and there would
have to be more energy-efficient apartment houses. Obviously, extreme
conservation would be characteristic of this very low energy demand world,
resulting in radical changes in lifestyles.
• Our Low scenario implies strong--but probably more realistic-energy
conservation measures.
At a slightly higher demand level-say, 22 TWyr/yr of the I1ASA Low
scenario-we also see the need for adjustments in how people live. The
conservation measures required at this moderate level, while certainly less
than in the 16 TW case, are still at the limit we consider feasible if present
lifestyles and freedom of choice are to be maintained. In our Low scenario
projections for the seven IIASA world regions, we see that there would have
to be a saturation in the per capita energy consumption in the regions of
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
(I-NA and III-WE/JANZ) and only modest increases in per capita consump-
tion in the developing regions (IV-LA, V-Af/SEA, VI-ME/NAf, and VII-
C/CPA).
• Our High scenario projects growth rates that might be considered moder-
ately satisfactory but that would transfer the hardship to the supply side.
Finally, we looked at what it would mean if the world were to choose a
high energy demand mode, say at the 36 TWyr/yr level of the IIASA High
scenario. The global average per capita consumption would then be about
4.5 kWyr/yr. For some, this would mean that many of the hardships of
having to live with very low energy demand, including all the difficulties
on the individual and local group level, would be relieved. Still, these hard-
ships would not be eliminated; they would only be transferred to the supply
side. For example, in our quantitative analysis in Part IV, we have elaborated
on the problem of large-scale uses of unconventional fuels. Also, the prob-
lems of a functioning world market for oil, coal, and probably for gas must
be mentioned in this connection. Such functioning markets could, in turn,
provide a stimulus for developing countries, and it is in this context that
we refer to the relatively high innovation rate that could become feasible
when economic growth rates are high. Table 25-1 gives comparative data on
the evolution of GDP growth rates, energy consumption per capita, and the
resulting elasticities for the seven world regions over the period 1975-2030
for the two reference scenarios and the 16 TW case.
Table 25-1. GOP growth rate energy consumption per capita, elasticities,
1975-2030.
A. Primary Energy Consumption per Capita (kWyr/yr,cap), 2030
Base Year High Low
Region 7975 Scenario Scenario
I (NA) 11.2 19.1 13.9
II (SU/EE) 5.1 15.3 10.4
III (WE/JANZ) 4.0 9.3 5.9
IV (LA) 1.1 4.6 2.9
V (Af/SEA) 0.2 1.3 0.7
VI (ME/NAf) 0.9 6.7 3.5
VII (C/CPA) 0.5 2.6 1.3
World 2.0 4.5 2.8
B. Comparison of Assumptions about GOP Growth Rates (percent/year)
Region High Scenario Low Scenario
I (NA) 2.87
1.6
81II (SU/E E) 3.91 2.99 2.09
III (WE/JANZ) 2.93 1.88
IV (LA) 4.37 3.48)V (Af/SEA) 4.32 3.27 3 24
VI (ME/NAf) 5.09 3.57 .
VII (C/CPA) 3.77 2.64
World 3.44 2.37
76 TW Casea
8.0
6.2
3.2
2.8
0.7
3.6
1.2
2.0
76 TW Casea
1.
7012.37 2.00
2.04
3.94)
3.34 3 84
4.79 .
3.44
2.50
C. Primary Energy/GOP Coefficient, €p b
High Scenario Low Scenario 76 TW Casec
7975- 2000- 7975- 2000- 7975- 2000-
Region 2000 2030 2000 2030 2000 2030
I (NA) 0.42 0.67 0.36 0.89 b -0.20 0.06
II (SU/EE) 0.65 0.67 0.62 0.62 0.75 0.01
III (WE/JANZ) 0.70 0.77 0.65 0.73 0.04 0.10
IV (LA) 1.04 0.98 1.06 0.97 0.96 0.82
V (Af/SEA) 1.15 1.11 1.18 1.19 1.38 0.90
VI (ME/NAf) 1.16 0.96 1.23 1.10 1.04 0.75
VII (C/CPA) 1.06 1.17 0.98 1.26b 1.12 0.54
World 0.70 0.90 0.67 0.93 0.50 0.34
aSource: U. Colombo communication to W. Hafele, 13 October 1978.
bThis elasticity, €, is defined by the following relationship:
E(t 2 ) = (GOP(t 2 )} c,
E(t, ) GOP(t, )
where t, and t 2 are two given times, E is energy consumption measured in physical units, and GOP
is gross domestic product measured in real noninflated monetary units. This elasticity is calculated
with respect to primary energy, €p.
cDerived from U. Colombo's specification of GOP and pri mary energy consumption growth (U.
Colombo communication to W. Hafele, 13 October 1978) and is not consistent with methodology
of II ASA scenarios.
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SOME REALITIES OF THE ENERGY PROBLEM
• Over the next fifty years, under any set of circumstances, economIc
growth rates will be limited.
When considering the implications of either a high, a low, or a very low energy
demand world, naturally we were concerned principally with economic
growth. A major qualitative finding of our study is that it will be difficult,
if not impossible, for the world to exceed annual growth rates of 3.5 percent
because of energy supply characteristics.c
Our estimates, compared with those of WAES (1977), WEC (1978), and
the UN-sponsored Leontief study (Leontief et al., 1977) are lower (Table
25-2). This concerns us. We looked very seriously at the estimates for the
Group of 77 in the U.N. study, not because they are the results of an analysis
of economic feasibilities, but rather, because they reflect a declaration of
political will. Indeed, this study done in 1977 evaluated world trade along
the lines of the data from the U.N. Council on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD); the global energy demand projected for the year 2000 is 29
TWyr/yr, which is some 53 and 93 percent more than our projections in the
High and the Low scenarios, respectively. The numbers are indeed irrel-
evant here: what is important is the political vision of the developing coun-
tries reflected in the U.N. targets. The lower the world growth rates, the
higher the probability for economic warfare in ways that are difficult to
anticipate. The global instability apparent in the events of the late 1970s
is probably only a forerunner of the unrest that will surface in the near
future. To maintain global order with these low growth rates is therefore
a point of major concern.
• The hard-soft controversy IS essentially a political Issue and not a
technical one.
Here, in considering the possibilities for placing the unavoidable hardships
of high or low energy demands, we also refer to the worldwide debate
between the proponents of "soft" and "hard" evolutionary paths of energy
systems. Living with very low energy demand favors a way of life in which
transportation is at the minimum and local affairs and local self-sufficiency
become highly priced virtues. This highly decentralized "soft" society
would scorn the "evils" of "hard" technologies with their emphasis on
complex systems and heavy technologies. For some, a traditional, conser-
vative way of life would be the panacea to the world's problems; to others,
such a mode of existence would be a nightmare and would invite disaster.
Those opposing this "soft" society view the forced immobility as a means
for destroying communication and interaction and ultimately causing
society to disintegrate and productivity to decrease so that man would be
doomed to failure in his efforts to meet supply demands.
CSee footnote a.
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It was not the goal of the IIASA Energy Systems Program to clarify such
societal visions, which are only implicit when quantifying energy demands.
Our discussion of the hard-soft controversy in Chapter 24 is intended to
provide insights into the problem.
In our quantitative analysis of Part IV we aimed to be pragmatic and to
take a middle of the road position. Clearly, labels of high and low change
their meaning over time. Today, for example, some consider our Low
scenario as probable, while others view our High scenario as "too high."
Irrespective of the emotional position one assumes, we see our scenarios as
benchmarks that allow for inter- or extrapolations.
• The reality ofpolitical, societal, and institutional problems will probably
make the situation more grim than has been described in our two
scenarios.
It could be done: the energy problem could be solved physically. To reach
this conclusion, we have relied greatly on the quantitative analysis of our
scenarios, as reported in Part IV. Still, our overall picture is based on the
accounting of regional differences among the seven world regions. We must
face the political reality of having many more countries in the world. The
situation is complex and certainly less than optimal.
At which points would reality be more grim? For our analysis we have
assumed a constant value for the U.S. dollar. What we have not done is to
translate these into real monetary terms, which means incorporating the
effects of inflation and the problem of the balance of payments. Decoupling
the terms of trade from the side effects of these problems is not optimal,
but is consistent with the determination to focus throughout this study on
the factual basis of the energy problem.
As a result of our findings, we see that a further extension into the po-
litical realm might also be an analysis of the stability or, more precisely, of
the resilience of the global energy supply system. The security of energy
supplies is indeed a problem. Oil embargoes would impede growth. Likewise,
the supply situation for natural uranium is being hindered by fear about the
proliferation of nuclear weapons and by antinuclear movements. In fact,
there is practically no free uranium market today.
For our scenarios we assumed that over the next few decades region VI
(ME/NAf) would set a production ceiling of 33.6 million barrels of oil per
day. We have also alluded to the relative inelasticity of demand. Evidently,
disturbances in the oil production levels of this region are a possible source
of major global instability. Let us examine this from the standpoint of
three world regions (Figure 25-3). In our scenarios, sometime around the
year 2010, region I (NA) will arrive at oil self-sufficiency; thereafter, any im-
ports to region I would have to be made at the expense (in terms of supply)
of region V (Af/SEA), which has the lowest purchasing power even at that
time. A similar situation could exist for region III (WE/]ANZ) if it were to
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Figure 25-3. Interregional oil trade, regions I, III, V, High and Low scenarios, pri-
mary equivalent, 1975-2030.
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import more oil than that projected for this region in our scenarios. Region
III is particularly vulnerable to any instabilities in energy supply-be it for
coal or for natural gas or oil-because of its limited indigenous supply
situation.
• The demand for liquid fuels is a principal driving force of the energy
problem.
In fact, meeting this demand may be the energy problem. Oil has been used
mainly to meet fluid demands up to now. But as our study has shown, this
precious fossil resource will become more and more difficult to get at and
thus more expensive. Ultimately, it will become exhausted. Thus, for any
energy strategy it is imperative that the uses of secondary liquid energy
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carriers (in all cases, hydrocarbons) be restricted to only the most essential
sectors where nothing else can be substituted for it-namely, for transporta-
tion and feedstocks in the chemical industry. This is not to say that eventually
transportation could not be accommodated by means other than by the use
of liquid hydrocarbons. Later, when we unfold our technical vision, we shall
picture a world in which hydrogen could provide such a service. But since
the transition to a hydrogen economy will not happen before 2030, we must
concentrate on what should be done until we reach this transition.
In both regions I and III, there must be a reversal of the trends of the
1950s and 1960s, when oil was used more and more to heat homes. (Note,
however, that this is not the situation in region II (SU/EE). Indeed, it is
remarkable to observe the degree of district heating there.) To gain perspec-
tives on this issue, we have identified, in Table 25-3, the evolution of the
uses of liquid hydrocarbons in the various IIASA world regions.
• The structure of secondary energy demand over the next fifty years
will not change very much, and the change that would be noted will
take place at a very slow rate.
This major finding of our study is particularly relevant when we turn to
electricity use. We saw, somewhat to our surprise, that the share of the
demand met by electricity would grow more slowly than originally expected.
Except for the 16 TW case, electricity's share in the secondary energy supply
increased from 14 percent and to only 20 percent by 2030. Naturally,
regional differences can be observed. For example, regions I and III have
higher rates. But the overall trend is between 15 and 20 percent. The trend is
certainly not toward an all-electrical society; the high investments (from
generation to end use) that would have to accompany the use of electricity
in other than its most appropriate sectors of demand cancel out such a trend.
The slow and moderate evolution of global secondary demand shares for
the High scenario can be observed in Figure 25-4. Here too, we were sur-
prised that our quantitative analysis did not turn up larger changes.
Table 25-3. Percentage of total use of liquid hydrocarbons for motor fuels
and feedstocks, High and Low scenarios, 1975-2030.
Base Year High Scenario Low Scenario
Region ]975 2030 2030
I (NA) 74 94 91
II (SU/EE) 65 100 100
III {WE/JANZ} 52 86 76
IV (LA) 69 90 89
V (Af/SEA) 58 91 88
VI (ME/NAf) 74 94 91
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Figure 25-4. Global secondary energy demand, High scenario.
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ENERGY SUPPLY
• Fossil fuels will continue to be available but will become unconventional
and expensive.
Both our High and Low scenarios are fundamentally fossil in nature, which
may appear surprising if one considers the many statements being made
today about our running out of fossil resources. As noted both in Chapter 2
on energy resources and in Chapter 17 on energy supply and conversion,
the cheap, easily accessible fossil fuels are at a premium (Figure 25-5 and
Tables 25-4 and 25-5). The world will have to look farther and dig deeper,
which also means that costs will increase, as will environmental hazards.
The transition to low grade fossil fuels reverses a trend that began a few
decades ago when oil became the reference carrier because it was a clean,
cheap, and easy to handle fuel. Previously, investments were in the range of,
say, $3000 per barrel of oil per day or less; today, these investments have
Figure 25-5. Shares of global fossil fuel supply, High scenario, 1980-2030. (For defini-
tion of resource categories see Table 25-5.)
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Table 25-4. Cumulative uses of fossil fuels, High and Low scenarios, 1975-
2030.
High Scenario Low Scenario
Total
Resource Total Remaining Total Remaining
Availableb consumed resource consumed resource
(TWyr) (TWyr) (yr/ (TWyr) (yr/
Oil
Categories 1 and 2a 464 317 22 264 40
Category 3 373 4 45 0 62
Gas
Categories 1 and 2 408 199 35 145 76
Category 3 130 0 22 0 38
Coald
Category 1 560 341 18 224 52
Category 2 1019 0 85 0 158
a For definition of terms and cost categories, see Table 25-5.
bTotal resources, including those to be discovered, as of 1975.
cNumber of years that the remaining resource would last if it were consumed at the 2030 annual
rate of fuel use and if all of the resource came from the designated category.
dCoal use includes coal converted to synthetic liquids and gas.
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Table 25-5. Summary of estimates of ultimately recoverable resources by
cost category.
Coalb Oil Natural Gas Uranium
Resourcea (TWyr) (TWyr) (TWyr) (TWyr)
Cost Categoryc 2 2 3 2 3 2
Region
I (NA) 174 232 23 26 125 34 40 29 35 27
II (SU/EE) 136 448 37 45 69 66 51 31 ne 75
III (WE/JANZ) 93 151 17 3 21 19 5 14 14 38
IV (LA) 10 11 19 81 110 17 12 14 1 64
V (Af/SEA) 55 52 25 5 33 16 10 14 6 95
VI (ME/NAf) <1 <1 132 27 ne 108 10 14 1 27
VII (C/CPA) 92 124 11 13 15 7 13 14 ne 36
World 560 1019 264 200 373 267 141 130 57 362
a For oil, gas, and coal, see estimates given in the text (translated here into units of TWyr); for
uranium, see estimates given in Chapter 4.
b For coal, only a part of the ultimate resource (-15 percent) has been included because the
figures are already very large for the time horizon of 2030 and because of the many uncertainties
about very long-term coal resources and production technologies.
cCost categories represent estimates of costs either at or below the stated volume of recoverable
resources (in constant 1975$).
For oil and natural gas: Cat. 1: 12$/boe
Cat. 2: 12-20$/boe
Cat. 3: 20-25$/boe
For coal: Cat. 1: 25$/tce
Cat. 2: 25-50$/tce
For uranium: Cat. 1: 80$/kgU
Cat. 2: 80-130$/kgU
A subcategory of oil, lA, exists only for regions I (NA) and IV (LA) and includes oil available at
production costs of $12 to $16/boe. Also, a subcategory of gas, 0, exists only for region V I
(ME/NAf), with gas available at $2/boe.
ne-no estimate.
Note: For conversion to other units see Appendix B to Chapter 1.
Sources: Ashley, RUdman, and Whipple (1976); Eckstein (1978); Grenon (1977); Grossling
(1976); Institute of Geological Sciences (1978); Lambertini (1976); Meyer (1977); Oil and Gas Jour-
nal (1978); O'Shaughnessy (1976); Penner and Icerman (1975); Perrine (1978); Uhl (1977).
risen three to six times, with $10,000 to $20,000 per barrel of oil per day
being encountered. The costs and complexity of obtaining oil from Alaska
and the North Sea are examples of what we will probably have to expect.
Let us look at these investments in still another light. One barrel of oil per
day is equivalent to some 71 kW of caloric power. Presently, costs of $20,000
per barrel of oil per day correspond to $300 per kW(th), which can be related
to $1000 per kW(e). Indeed, we came close to this figure in our discussion
in Chapter 17 of capital costs of electrical power generation. Future abate-
ment measures that would have to go along with the use of low grade fuels
may bring investment costs to as high as $500 per kW(th) or even higher over
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the longer term. Ultimately, it would seem that the use of unconventional
oil will probably approximate the use of other primary energy sources, and
oil's inherent advantage will most likely fade away.
There is yet another dimension to the problem of harnessing low grade
fossil fuels-the environmental impacts. We are not sure how large the
impacts will be from the requisite surface mining or deep sea operations. The
future coal-mining operation in the Federal Republic of Germany may
provide some insights into what we might expect (Figure 25-6). Only the
last "bit" of the coal stratum underneath northern Germany reaches the
surface and is therefore accessible, which means mining to depths of some
1200 meters. At this level, some 25 billion tons of coal equivalent could be
tapped. But according to estimates, more than 300 billion tons of coal
equivalent lie beneath this area. To harness this amount would probably
mean having to dig as deep as 3000 to 5000 meters: whole cities, villages,
and landscapes could possibly be destroyed and would then have to be
reclaimed. The Garsdorf open lignite pit, regarded today as one of the
most modern and advanced mining operations, must be seen as only a
small beginning of such large-scale operations.
By bringing in this example we are not trying to actually propose such
operations. Rather, our intent is to show that the world cannot continue to
look the other way as more and more fossil resources are used up in this
"consumptive" mode. How this mode of consumptive resource use can be
reversed has been discussed in Chapter 21, where we introduced the notions
of negentropy and endowments; we shall treat this subject in depth when we
come to our technical vision later in this chapter.
• Our two reference scenarios are in the middle of the road and imply two
overlapping transitions.
The realization that there would have to be two overlapping transitions was
also one of the unexpected findings of our study. When we began our
study of the global energy system, we anticipated that there would be only
Figure 25-6. Schematic vertical section of northern area of the FRG. Source: Rurup
(1978) .
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one major transition, which could be completed in fifty years. But by 1978-
1979, as our analysis developed further, we realized that the transition to
a sustainable energy system would not happen within our fifty-year time
frame.
We have just referred to the consumptive uses of resources as unjustifiable.
Yet our two supply scenarios and alternative cases call for a high degree of
consumptive resource uses. How did this happen? Here, as elsewhere through-
out this book, we must point to the inherent dualism between realism and a
vision. The objective of our quantitative analysis was to be realistic and
pragmatic; thus, we were led to supply structures with low investments. We
consider this a confirmation of our intended realism; still, we see it also as
support for our technical vision.
The second reason why we were driven to such fossil supply scenarios has
to do with our assumed production profile for the seven world regions
(see Figure 25-7). It was not possible to allocate a higher role for nuclear
and solar power over the next fifty years, because energy production during
this period will be constrained mainly by the rate of buildup of production
capacities and not by resource scarcity. As Table 25-4 indicates, even for the
High scenario only 68 percent of oil categories 1 and 2, 49 percent of gas
categories 1 and 2, and 61 percent of category 1 of coal would be used up
by 2030. Indeed, it is only in the second half of the twenty-first century
that resources become an active constraint. Realistically, then, because
neither nuclear nor solar power will be able to reach a high share of the
energy market until after 2030, we had to rely on fossil fuels (albeit un-
conventional ones) to carry us through this period smoothly. However, this
necessitates a second, more fundamental transition to a nonfossil world, in
which there are "investive" uses of resources. Again, we shall elaborate
further on this in our discussion of the technical vision.
• Our scenarios are globally comprehensive and allow for no escape.
The foregoing observations, when translated into national dimensions,
often evoke concern, if not objection. The question arises, Is there no other
solution than that being advanced here? We do not claim to have provided
the "only" solution, but our scenarios are comprehensive enough to demon-
strate that there is no way to escape the hardships. Let us look at the primary
energy sources for the two supply scenarios, summarized in Table 25-6. One
might immediately question the high coal figures, given today's production
levels. But if these coal figures are reduced, then some other fuel must be
increased. Unconventional oil? Gas? Or is demand to be reduced?
Equally, both the figures for unconventional oil and those for nuclear
power could be questioned; some consider them too high. Contrary to what
many believe, we cannot continually expect to discover yet still more
resources by, say, "going further west." The global comprehensiveness of
our study has shown that there is no escape from the finiteness of the earth's
fossil resources. We must reach out and tap the infinite resources of the
sun and the de facto infinite resources of the nuclei of the atom.
Figure 25-7. Domestic fossil fuel production, High scenario, 1980-2030.
.TWyr/yr
Coal
6
4
'-r=-,--,=====
Region
VII IC/CPA)
V (Af/SEA)
IV (LA)
III (WE/JANZ)
II (SUlEE)
I (NA)
r::= I I =:,
TWyr/yr
,
6
TWyr/yr
1980
Oil
1990 2000 2010
Year
2020 2030
VII (C/CPA)
VI (ME/NAf)
V (Af/SEA)
IV (LA)
III (WE/JANZI
II (SU/EE)
(NA)
VII (C/CPA)
VI (ME/NAf)
V (Af/SEA)
IV (LA)
III (WE/JANZl
II (SU/EE)
I (NA)
THE PROBLEM REVISITED 787
Table 25-6. Two supply scenarios, global primary energy by source, 1975-
2030 (TWyr/yr).
Base High Scenario Low Scenario
Year
Primary Sourcea 1975 2000 2030 2000 2030
Oil 3.83 5.89 6.83 4.75 5.02
Gas 1.51 3.11 5.97 2.53 3.47
C0al 2.26 4.94 11.98 3.92 6.45
Light water reactor 0.12 1.70 3.21 1.27 1.89
Fast breeder reactor 0 0.04 4.88 0.02 3.28
Hydroelectricity 0.50 0.83 1.46 0.83 1.46
Solarb 0 0.10 0.49 0.09 0.30
Otherc 0 0.22 0.81 0.17 0.52
Total d 8.21 16.84 35.65 13.59 22.39
aprimary fuels production or primary fuels as inputs to conversion or refining processes-for
example, coal used to make synthetic liquid fuel is counted in coal figures. (For definition of energy
types, see Figure 1-1.)
blncludes mostly "soft" solar-individual rooftop collectors-also small amounts of centralized
solar electricity.
C"Other" includes biogas, geothermal, commercial wood use.
dColumns may not sum to totals because of rounding.
• Renewable energy sources can contribute in an important, albeit limited
way to meeting demand.
For our supply scenarios we have argued for conventional and unconven-
tional fossil resources as well as for solar and nuclear power. Obviously,
there is also a role for renewable sources-specifically for the local uses of
solar power, wind, hydroelectric power, and the power from biomass.
In Chapter 6, we have assessed the upper potential of renewable sources
to be on the order of 15 TWyr/yr or about twice the present global primary
energy consumption. One of the attractive features of renewable energy
sources is that potentially they are endogenous, decentralized supply sources.
But harnessing some 15 TWyr/yr from these sources has many serious
implications. A crude but nevertheless good indicator is the production
densities of renewables. If we assume that the average production density
is 0.5 W/m 2 , we see that some 30 million km2 of land would be needed for
producing 15 TWyr/yr-be it for wood gathering, sunshine, wind, and the
like (Figure 25-8). For comparison, the amount of land being used today
globally is some 13 million km2 . Thus the larger the output expected from
renewables, the more difficult this option becomes; similarly, the less that is
expected from these sources, the more they are likely to retain their attractive
features of decentralization and local availability. This is a general observation
that of course may vary according to local conditions. Nevertheless, we
maintain that realistically the potential for renewable energy sources is
significantly smaller than 15 TWyr/yr-say, between 6 and 10 TWyr/yr.
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Figure 25-8. Energy densities.
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• The oil exporting countries will continue to dominate the oil market.
• Accordingly, an international coal market must be developed.
One important feature of our quantitative analysis is the trade links among
regions, primarily for oil but also eventually for gas. We developed our
assumption somewhat formally along the lines of a gaming approach where
revenues for dominant suppliers are maximized. We did not, however, apply
these procedures for the coal trade. It might be said that our assessment of
future energy trade worldwide was not very sophisticated. Perhaps it would
have been bestto focus directly on world trade and not only on energy trade.
But with our limited means this task was too complex.
Our goal was to add it all up and to assess a world energy trade pattern,
using identifiable rules. A salient finding is that region VI will continue to
dominate the market. As can be seen from Figure 25-9, the production of
oil outside of region VI is relatively large. Yet because of the inelasticity of
demand, current fluctuations in the contribution of region VI to world
energy supply account for the differences between a glut and a shortage.
Even by reducing the use of liquid hydrocarbons to those that are nonsub-
stitutable (transportation and feedstocks) and by taking into account the
contributions of a young coal liquefaction industry, we still see a major
contribution from region VI. We likewise assumed that region VI will
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Figure 25-9. Oil supply and demand, 1975-2030, world (excluding centrally planned
economies), High scenario.
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establish an oil production ceiling of 33.6 million barrels per day. This is
crucial, since it allows for a stretching out of the oil resources of region VI
(Figure 25-10). In Table 25-7, we relate the oil production in 1975 of
region VI with that of the other OPEC countries and that of the OPEC
countries not included in region VI. Essentially, the oil ceiling for region
VI means that the amount of oil for export will be determined by political
forces and not by the market.
The world trading relationship becomes even more problematic when we
consider the allocation of oil exports and imports among world regions
(Figure 25-11). Although regions V and IV (LA) were exporting oil in 1975,
by 2030 the scenarios call for a significant oil import into region V. But
where will this oil come from? How will region V, which has the lowest
purchasing power, be able to pay for this oil?
In our two scenarios we assumed that not only regions I, II, IV, and VII
would be self-sufficient in oil supply after the year 2030 but also that re-
gion III would decrease its oil imports and thus set free the oil for region V.
When referring to our allocation procedures (Figure 25-11), we see that there
is only one mechanism for accomplishing this-large-scale coal liquefaction.
This is true for regions I and II, and especially for region III, the latter con-
tinuing to be a major oil importer throughout our fifty-year study period.
Thus, for region III, and to a lesser extent for region I, coal liquefaction
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Figure 25-10. Oil production, region VI (ME/NAf), 1975-2030.
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becomes a means for holding down the costs of imported oil. Our scenarios
clearly demonstrated that beyond the year 2010, region III will have to
import coal on a large scale, with regions I and 11 being the principal suppliers.
Will regions I and 11 be willing to provide such exports? In what form? As
coal or as a liquid synthetic hydrocarbon? By what means-autothermal or
allothermalliquefaction? We can now observe a fundamental new interplay
Table 25-7.' Oil production in 1975 (thousand barrels per day).
Region VI Countries OPEC Member Countries
(excluding OPEC Region VI and OPEC (excluding region VI
member countries) Member Countries countries)
Bahrain 6.1 Algeria 1020.3 Ecuador 160.9
Egypt 23.3 Iran 5350.1 Gabon 223.0
Syrian Arab Iraq 2261.7 Indonesia 1306.5
Republic 18.2 Kuwait 2084.2 Nigeria 1783.2
Jordan 0 S.P.Lybian Venezuela 2346.2
Lebanon 0 A.J. 1479.8
Oman 34.1 Qatar 437.6
Yemen 0 Saudi Arabia 7075.4
Yemen, Democratic 0 United Arab
Emirates 1663.8
Total 81.7 Total 21,372.0 Total 5819.8
Total region V I: 21,453.7 Total OPEC: 27,192.7
Sources: Data for region VI countries from United Nations (1978); data for member countries
of OPEC from OPEC (1978).
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Figure 25-11. Oil trading between regions, High scenario, 1975-2030.
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between region VI (oil supply), regions I and II (coal supply) and regions III
and V (demand).
Again, it will be political forces that govern the quantity and price of oil
(and later probably coal) in world markets. This is a new situation that
existing economic and political institutions are not yet able to handle. It
is therefore imperative that there be a conceptual framework for viewing the
evolution of energy systems worldwide, which would give some perspective
and thereby foster the mechanisms for managing the situation. It is with
such goals in mind that we designed our scenarios.
• Coal liquefaction must be installed with a strategic view.
Given the importance of coal liquefaction in balancing demand and supply
of liquid fuels in regions I, II, and III, more must be said about it here. Coal
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Figure 25-12. Primary energy (or equ ivalen t) demand, High scenario, 1980-2030.
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use in our two supply scenarios is on the order of 12 billion tons equivalent
per year, most of it being used to meet internal energy needs of the various
regions and with only moderate amounts left for trading on the world
market. In Figure 25-12 we show the evolution of global primary energy
shares for the High scenario. To decrease the relative share of oil, coal
liquefaction must indeed come in. The necessary amounts of coal are made
available from the traditional use of coal for electricity generation. This
can be done by means of either the autothermal or the allothermal process.d
Let us examine the possible implications of both of these processes.
In the related MESSAGEe supply runs for our scenarios we have assumed
autothermal liquefaction; we did this in the best spirit of trying to be in the
middle of the road, realistic, and pragmatic. As we explained in more detail
in Chapter 22 on new old technologies, for coal liquefaction, the autothermal
process implies the use of three to four carbon atoms for placing one atom
into the right form of methanol. One carbon atom is used for shifting oxygen
from two water molecules to one carbon dioxide molecule, thus freeing the
d For the autothermal method, the process heat comes from the coal itself, while for the allothermal
method the process heat is supplied exogenously.
eFor a description of the MESSAGE model, see Appendix 13A.
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necessary hydrogen required for forming the one methanol (or methane)
molecule in question. And one to two carbon atoms are burned into carbon
dioxide to provide the necessary process heat for facilitating this chemical
reaction.
However, we do not recommend autothermal liquefaction for several
reasons. In addition to using three to four times more coal than necessary,
the autothermal process of liquefaction also leads to the release of three to
four times more carbon dioxide molecules into the atmosphere. And as
explained in Chapter 10 on energy and climate, the buildup of atmospheric
carbon dioxide must be restricted over the next decades to a prudent limit.
We used a climate model to monitor the carbon dioxide buildup that goes
along with the related reference supply scenarios. Here, it is helpful to
recall the order of magnitude: the natural carbon dioxide content of the
atmosphere is equivalent to the burning of roughly 500 TWyr of fossil fuels.
If, however, 1000 TWyr of fossil fuels are actually burned (Figure 25-13),
one can assume roughly that 50 percent of the carbon dioxide would remain
in the atmosphere, thus doubling the natural carbon dioxide content. This is
Figure 25-13. Evaluation of integrated conceivable world energy consumption, 1970-
2030.
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certainly beyond the limits that we consider prudent. Later in this chapter,
we shall discuss the carbon dioxide problem in more detail.
Thus, we believe that one should go to allothermal coal liquefaction. For
this process, the hydrogen is provided without burning coal; instead, nuclear
and/or solar power would be used for water splitting and accordingly for
providing such hydrogen. In effect, only one carbon atom is required for
producing one molecule of methanol (or methane). By using coal in this
way during the period between the two transitions, we gain time.
• If nuclear is used primarily, coal can be saved to produce liquid fuels
during the next one hundred years or so.
It was along such lines of reasoning that we conceived the Enhanced Nuclear
Alternative Supply case (see Chapter 18). We envisaged allothermal coal
liquefaction, using nuclear power close to the envisaged potential of 17
TWyr/yr given in Chapter 4. The coal supply situation was indeed relieved.
Nevertheless, our study revealed that the time is too short to come fully
into the second transition. It is essentially after the year 2030 that the
impacts of such strategies would be felt more strongly. Thus, from now until
this time it is important to aim strategically not only to save the world's
coal resources but also ultimately to eliminate the use of coal altogether.
Of course, these observations hold for the world regions as a whole. On
local or national bases, allothermal coal liquefaction schemes can become
important much earlier-for example, in region III-when coal imports
become less feasible than has been projected in our reference scenarios.
• If there is a nuclear moratorium, the gas supply will be largely exhausted
by the year 2030.
The Nuclear Moratorium case, as discussed in Chapter 18, is based on the use
of gas, which is in line with our goal in the quantitative analysis of being
realistic and pragmatic. Indeed, as can be seen from Table 25-4, only 49
percent of gas categories 1 and 2 will be consumed in the High scenario by
the year 2030; 339 TWyr of conventional and unconventional gas are esti-
mated to still be in place. However, for gas to be able to substitute for oil,
it must be transportable either by large gas pipelines or, if transported in
liquid form, by cryogenic means or by chemical means. These all will require
large-scale capital investments and considerable technological progress.
The forward application of our market penetration techniques (see
Chapter 8) also indicates enhanced uses of gas. It is likely that the role of
natural gas will be more important than that projected in our reference
scenarios. However, unless gas resources are found in excess of the 538 TWyr
currently estimated, then such a gas era will be of limited duration.
There is yet another condition of the Nuclear Moratorium case that
concerns us: it appears feasible only for the Low demand scenario, thus
implying, among other things, low economic growth rates. Earlier in this
chapter we discussed some of the implications of this case. Here, we
conclude that while the Nuclear Moratorium case could be perhaps an
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interim solution, it would have a price when viewed over the longer term-
that is, beyond 2030.
• Gas will have to be shipped long distances and in international commerce,
Gas could playa major role, provided the problem of transporting gas can
be overcome. Although our explorations of the technical possibilities have
not been extensive, in Chapter 22 on new old technologies we have briefly
examined the possible mechanical liquefaction and transportation of lique-
fied gas in large tankers. Transporting gas by pipelines is yet another possi-
bility that could be significantly improved by going to large diameters
(1400 mm), or high pressures (70 atmospheres), or both. Such a solution
could be particularly applicable to the Middle East (where the flare gases
alone are currently on the order of 0.25 TW/yr) and to the Soviet Union.
Conceivably, the chemical liquefaction of natural gas (methane to methanol)
could also solve the problem of transporting gas over large distances.
CONSTRAINTS
• Energy investments will grow significantly but will not be a large portion
of GDP in the developed countries.
Ideally, the problem of investments should involve an input-output pro-
cedure that embraces not only the energy sector but all economic sectors.
The pilot model of G. Dantzig of Stanford University is a prominent ex-
ample of such a procedure. But such models are very data intensive, and
the use of a similar model on the global level would present insurmountable
problems. Thus, in Chapter 19, we examined only the direct investments
in the energy sectors as well as those in the energy-related sectors that
indirectly contribute to the energy development. We made a number of
assumptions; a summary of the major ones are given in Table 25-8. We
Table 25-8. Capital cost assumptions for major energy supply and conver-
sion technologies.a
Capital Cost
(1975 $Ik W(e))
Electric Generation
Coal
Nuclear
Hydroelectric
Oil- and Gas-fired
Gas turbine
Other
Coal gasification, liquefaction (autothermal)
Crude oil refinery
a For more details see Table 17-4.
480-550
700-920
620
325-350
170
400
50
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Table 25-9. Cumulative energy sector capital cost requirements, 1981-2030
(1012 $).
Developed Developing
Regionsa Regionsb World
High scenario 28.0 18.5 46.5
Low scenario 18.8 10.9 29.7
Nuclear Moratorium case 22.0 12.0 34.0
Enhanced Nuclear case 28.4 15.3 47.7
aRegions I (NA), II (SU/EE), III (WEIJANZ).
bRegions IV (LA), V (Af/SEA), VI (ME/NAf), VII (C/CPA).
assumed that costs would remain the same throughout the period up to
2030. We did so not because we felt this would actually happen, but rather,
because assuming otherwise would have been less accurate. This led to some
rough overall orientations. Table 25-9 lists cumulative investments for the
High and Low scenarios and for the Nuclear Moratorium and Enhanced
Nuclear cases. Comparing the data for both cases and scenarios, we see that
the Nuclear Moratorium case has higher investments than, say, the Low
scenario, which has some 23 percent nuclear power by 2030.
The absolute sisze of the cumulated energy investments for this period
would range between $29 and $48 trillion (l 012 ). This is very much in line
with our propositions presented at the World Energy Conference in Istanbul
in 1977 (WEC 1978). We used the IMPACT modeIf to relate the yearly
energy investment to yearly GOP. As can be seen from Figure 25-14, today's
share of energy investments of 2 percent can be considered typical. For the
developed regions (I, II, and III) such investments increase, peaking at about
4 percent around 2015. For the developing regions (IV, V, VI, and VII)
investments rise more sharply, coming close to 7 percent around the year
2020. Globally, the investment maximum is about 4.5 percent. Is this large
or small? The more we tried to answer this question, the more complex it
became. If we compare this 4.5 percent with, say, military expenditures
worldwide, we see that they are both of the same order. Then too, changes
in the savings rate over the last decades have also been of that order. In
Japan, for example, during the 1960s the savings rate has been between 30
and 35 percent, although presently it is closer to 30 percent. Roughly a 5
percent difference decrease has occurred there, with no fundamental changes.
In our scenarios we assumed constantly declining economic growth rates
globally. When integrated energy investments are then compared with
integrated GOP, the ratio turns out to be rather low because of the pocket
of relatively large GOP that existed before 2030. This ratio would definitely
be higher if we were to have assumed constant growth rates (which we did
earlier in 1977 in our presentation to the World Energy Conference).
A serious comparison would have to be made sector by sector, followed
fFor a description of the IMPACT model see Appendix 13A.
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Figure 25-14. Share of total energy investment in GDP, High scenario, 1975-2030.
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by the above-mentioned input-output analysis covering the whole of the
economy. For the world trade situation, the problem of analysis becomes
particularly complex, and we were not in a position to undertake such an
extensive analysis. We observe, however, that the macroeconomical impacts
(globally) will not be too large, while the sectoral impacts will probably be
very pronounced. Such a statement is consistent with our earlier observations
about the pragmatic and realistic nature of our two scenarios, since they
defer the second transition to beyond 2030 and only prepare smoothly for
this transition at best.
• Global impact of waste heat is probably a nonproblem.
We were concerned about constraints on energy supply that only became
explicit when the energy problem was viewed globally. We therefore con-
sidered the interaction between energy and the climate system.
We became increasingly aware of the complexity of the climate system.
Climate is a very "noisy" phenomenon. In addition to changes of averages of
quantitites, such as temperature, pressure, and humidity, there are fluctu-
ations and, indeed, changes in these fluctuations that make up the temporal
and spatial patterns of climate. It is the changes in these patterns that
interested us.
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Using numerical models of global atmospheric circulations (at present
the best means available), we simulated the climatic effects of energy release
ranging from 30 to 300 TWyr/yr, from certain geographical locations and
areas. We observed that the thermal pollution effects from such waste heat
releases were not greater than the inherent noise level of the model. In fact,
it appears that only when very large amounts of energy (several hundreds
of terawatts) are released under certain circumstances (e.g., from small
concentrated areas) are there significant changes in the global average climate
state. Thus, when considering the global energy consumption levels of the
High and Low scenarios (36 and 22 TWyr/yr, respectively), waste heat
releases do not appear likely to perturb the global average climate state in
the foreseeable future. Of course, this is not to say that impacts on the local
and regional levels from waste heat releases could not be serious in the
vicinity of such operations.
A second line of investigation of the climate-energy interface led us to a
more serious conclusion.
• The carbon dioxide buildup caused by fossil fuel consumption is probably
the most severe climate issue.
While it is too early to make alarming statements about the specific climatic
impacts of large-scale deployment of any of the major energy strategies, our
study revealed that the climate impact caused by carbon dioxide buildup
over the next fifty to seventy years could lead to a global average temperature
increase from 1 to 4 K. This would have different effects on different parts
of the globe: some areas would benefit from these changes, whereas others
would experience negative impacts. For example, increased precipitation
(rainfall) in certain areas could result in changes in regional agricultural
practices, with hitherto arid areas flourishing agriculturally while others
struggle to adapt their cropping patterns to more arid conditions. The
hydrosphere, too, could undergo changes. Certain rivers could be enlarged,
whereas others would become smaller. The implications of these climatic
changes are potentially large.
Ideally, the impacts of carbon dioxide should be monitored early enough
to allow for actions that would ward off any negative effects. But reality is
sometimes far from the ideal. Present knowledge about the climatic impli-
cations of raising the carbon dioxide level is limited, and according to our
estimate a period of five to ten years is probably needed to narrow down
these uncertainties.
It does not appear realistic to assume that there will be political agreement
among nations on the avoidance of carbon dioxide impacts, as climatic
changes would in fact be welcomed in some areas. We are faced with the
dichotomy of having a highly disaggregated political power on the globe and
a truly global problem of carbon dioxide buildup. Are we doomed to en-
counter this dilemma? Probably, yes. Nevertheless, maintaining flexibility
in designing energy supply policies to delay the buildup of carbon dioxide
beyond certain levels is prudent and advisable.
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• Low density energy collection devices spread over large areas could
have climatic impacts as well.
As noted above, it is the changes in spatial and temporal climate patterns
that matter. It is in this light that we examined other possible climatic
impacts from energy conversion and use-namely, changes in the earth's
surface characteristics. We delved into this issue by examining the possible
effects on surface conditions of vast areas as a result of low density civili-
zation activities. These include large-scale deforestation in tropical or sub-
tropical areas, large-scale harnessing of energy from thermal gradient of
tropical oceans, large-scale deployment of wind mills, and even the tens of
terawatt scale of production of unconventional fossil fuels.
There are indications that such changes are to be expected with disposi-
tions of energy flows on the order of 100 TWyr/yr. Agriculture is a case in
point. Albedo changes of 0.1 seem to take place with the establishment of
farm land. Envisaging 10 billion km2 , one arrives at resulting dispositions
of energy flows on the order of 100 TWyr/yr. Given the influx of 178,000
TWyr/yr of solar power, one might consider that 100 TWyr/yr is only a
minute fraction and therefore too small an amount to warrant concern.
But because climate is a noisy phenomenon, it does not take much to change
the climate pattern, and that is what matters. For example, precipitation
and cloud formation patterns change upon such dispositions of energy
flows.
Unfortunately, the state of the art did not permit us to set upper limits on
the uses of these energy collection devices or to translate our concern into
operational constraints. Nevertheless, the concern remains.
• Nuclear waste and proliferation issues could limit the buildup of nuclear
energy over the next fifty years.
The handling of nuclear waste and the proliferation of nuclear weapons are
the principle concerns that go along with the use of nuclear fuels. The
worldwide, oeften heated debate about these issues reflects the size of the
related concerns and, as such, has become a constraint.
The IIASA Energy Systems Program did not deal with these issues ex-
plicitly for two reasons. The first reason is a pragmatic one. A large number
of capable and sizeable groups are already studying these problems, and we
did not judge it practical for the relatively small groups of IIASA scientists,
from many nations, to compete with these efforts. This is not to say that
individual members of the IIASA Energy Systems Program are not per-
sonally involved with or at least well informed on these matters. But as a
group we decided to abstain. It is in this light that we wish to mention here
the work of the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), which was
carried out, mostly in Vienna, at the same time as our global energy study.
The second and more commanding reason for abstaining is that we regard
the problems of nuclear waste handling and proliferation as primarily po-
litical ones. Indeed, the process of establishing the related standards and
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regulations is largely a sociopolitical one. We did, however, look into the
related risk problem, but obviously the issue is far more complex. The
political nature of the proliferation problem is more obvious. We hope that
indirectly we have contributed to the debate on this subject by clarifying
the factual lines of the energy problem as a whole. Is civilian nuclear power
needed or not? This question was upmost in our minds throughout our
investigations as we sought to provide decision- and policymakers with the
information they need to make strategic choices.
• Society has not yet developed adequate mechanisms for treating the
risks associated with energy supply technologies.
Risk analysis is a relatively young field, and the lack of data and the inade-
quacy of both evaluation techniques and the decision-making formal-
isms for standard setting complicate the problem of understanding the risks
of energy strategies. By conceiving a risk assessment framework (Figure
25-15), we have established categories so as to provide a meaningful debate
on this subject and to allow for more formal research in this field.
While the risks of nuclear energy have received the most attention, there
are other risks from society's activities and particularly from its energy
activities that should be examined. We have done this and reported on our
findings in Chapter 11.
Our research on public attitudes toward energy-related risks revealed that
the public is more concerned with the risks of low probability, large conse-
quence events than with those of high probability, low consequence events.
Indeed, there is a large discrepancy between the public's perception of
the risk and the risk as expressed in linear expectation values. Psycho-
Figure 25-15. Risk assessment framework.
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logical and sociopolitical factors have been shown to greatly influence
the beliefs of individuals and societies toward certain risks. This is an impor-
tant finding that has bearing on the essentially political process of establishing
the standards and regulations for energy technologies.
The importance of having established standards and regulations for
modern technologies cannot be overestimated: they are, in fact, the real
driving forces for these technologies. This is in contrast with the past when
optimization was the driving force. Optimization, usually for minimal costs
(while observing certain constraints), has been the traditional engineering ap-
proach. We maintain, however, that this often no longer prevails. Costs have
become at best a constraint (if at all). Today, the principal criterion is the
ability to "carry through" a particular engineering design and not to prove in
theory that this design is optimal in some sense. "Carrying through" a
design largely means obtaining the necessary licenses and permits. Consider,
for instance, a particular nuclear reactor designed in country x. In most
cases, this reactor will not be licensed in country x + 1, even though it is
successfully operating in country x. The reasons for this seemingly illogical
situation point to the complexities of the sociopolitical domain, as the
factors affecting decisions about licensing a technology are, in fact, in-
fluenced by the many different perceptions of reality held by the societies
of the different countries.
There is a further dimension to the problem of obtaining a license. Lead
times for constructing, say, a nuclear power station are increasing. Currently,
the time between the decision to build and the putting into operation is
close to ten years, five of which go for construction and the other five
for completing the necessary paperwork for licensing and permits.
This problematic situation is indeed not helped by the fact that the
regulatory bodies often do not know how to arrive at such regulations and
standards. Engineers become confused as to what standards and regulations
they should aim to meet. Several examples come to mind here-nuclear
waste disposal, pressure vessel safety codes, and codes for the design of
fatigue ruptures. All too often, codes, regulations, and standards are contested
in the courts, which are being used inappropriately for de facto legislative
and standard-setting purposes. This not only intensifies the uncertainty
about what standards and regulations apply, but also inhibits the responsible
bodies from functioning properly. Here again, we see the prominent role
played by psychological and sociopolitical factors in fostering fear and
uncertainty about the possible risks of certain technologies.
A "language" is needed to overcome such fears-that is, there must be
some means established for consciously addressing these fears and, in so
doing, managing risks. For in the absence of such means, the problem of
managing risk is often reduced to dealing with numerical information.
(Numbers appear easier to deal with than deep-seated beliefs, although in the
long run dealing with such numbers is not helpful.) One has only to look at
the Gofman-Tamplin debate of the late 1960s and early 1970s about permis-
sible dose rates, held at the fence of a light water reaction nuclear power
station, to see the problem of such a numerical approach.
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Although adequate mechanisms for treating energy-related risks have not
yet been developed, we felt we could not stand by idly without trying to
give some insights into how to deal with this dilemma.
THE TECHNICAL VISION
• It is possible to have a sustainable global energy system.
When we began our study of the global energy system in 1973, we were
looking for ways of moving from the present system, based on the consump-
tion of resources by the burning of fossil or nuclear fuels, to a world that
could sustain the energy needs of a global population even larger than the
eight billion people we project for the year 2030. In this sustainable system,
resources would be used for investments that permit both nuclear breeding
and the use of solar power directly and through renewable means.
Initially, we had hoped this sustainable system would be reached by the
year 2030. However, both our pragmatic quantitative analysis and our more
exploratory look at energy constraints and options showed us the reality of
the situation: over the next fifty years the world will continue to rely on
fossil fuels, albeit unconventional ones, owing to the limitation on the
buildup rate of energy technologies. Indeed, our two reference scenarios are
primarily fossil in nature, reflecting this reality.
We also observed that resource limitations would be felt only after the
year 2030, occurring sometime during the second half of the next century.
How does all that fit together? Here, it is useful to elaborate on the nature of
this ultimate, sustainable energy system, which would rely on both nuclear
and solar energy for primary energy supply and would be complemented by
electricity and hydrogen as secondary energy carriers.
What will an electrical-hydrogen world be like? It would necessarily
include the generation of vast quantities of electricity. Part of this electricity
would provide direct energy services, part would run the processes of produc-
tion, part might run local transportation (electric cars and trains), and part
would be used for water splitting to produce great quantities of hydrogen
(and oxygen). When we speak of vast quantities of electricity, we are making
an important distinction in relation to the energy world of today. We are
speaking of such an abundance of electricity that it comes to be seen virtually
as the primary energy source. Today, we think largely of using coal, oil, and
natural gas, as well as hydroelectric power, as primary forms of energy for
generating electricity as a convenient form of secondary energy. In the
future, electricity would become primary in the sense that it would become
the source of gas and liquid fuels. It could become the "standard" or ref-
erence against which all substitutions would be measured; in both a literal
and a figurative sense, it would be the "currency" of the future world.
Indeed, electricity could become the basis of new infrastructures and the
common ground for industrial processes and residential needs.
With large amounts of electricity being generated in all world regions,
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a totally different complexion to world politics would undoubtedly develop.
Instead of the world being focused mainly on one major oil-producing region,
the Middle East and Northern Africa (region VO, as is the case today, one
can imagine that a mUltiplicity of energy sources might encourage a more
dynamic stability among the world's trading partners. Whether such things
could come to pass are, of course, pure conjecture; technically, they are
more than conjecture, they are real possibilities.
The other "half" of the future energy structure would be hydrogen. With
a large worldwide electrical basis, the production of hydrogen could be
practical and probably economic. Thus, if the use of natural gas grows over
the next fifty years, as projected in our reference scenarios, the piping
systems for its long-distance transmission and local distribution networks
could come into place. Along with the physical gas networks would come
the institutional infrastructure and the skills of building, running, and
maintaining such systems. And as natural gas is phased out-through scarcity
and rising cost-hydrogen could be phased in, flowing through essentially the
same distribution systems, managed and maintained by the same cadres of
specialists. Unlike natural gas, which produces carbon dioxide when burned,
hydrogen gas produces pure water when burned (the recombination of
hydrogen and oxygen). Pure water, it hardly needs to be remarked, is cer-
tainly not an environmental pollutant.
The other essential arm of this hydrogen structure would be its use for
the creation of hydrocarbons for vital needs. The necessary carbon for
these substances could presumably come from biomass plantations of various
kinds and ultimately even from technical recycling of carbon dioxide.
Ideally, the ultimate transition to the hydrogen-electricity economy
should progress smoothly. To do this would require a strategy for the
interim period that would allow decisionmakers to plan for the kinds of
technologies and investments needed to achieve such a sustainable energy
system over the next one hundred years or so. It is within this broader
context that we make our observations.
• "Sustainability" of the ultimate global energy system means living
from the interest generated from endowments: resources are then used
for investments and not (as currently) for consumption.
In Chapter 21, on energy, endowments, and negentropy, we outlined in
thermodynamical terms how services provided by inputs of resources, energy,
labor, and skill are partly substitutable. We saw that these inputs have the
common denominator of negative entropy (which we defined as negentropy)
or, in a more general sense, of "order states." It was along such lines that we
introduced the notion of "endowments"-that is, an investment of resources,
energy, labor, and skill. And because capital is a stored form of negentropy,
it too is an input to an endowment system. It is the interest generated from
these endowments that would be used for consumption.
Since no law of conservation exists for entropy and thus for negentropy,
we feel fully justified in speaking here of "energy consumption." Indeed,
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the negentropy carried by energy is then consumed. These relations, in turn,
then also allow for the generation of negentropy. Based on this heuristic
reasoning, we suggested using only the interest from endowments to meet
the demand for services.
While this reasoning is abstract and perhaps enlightening only to physicists,
it nevertheless led us to make the operationally important distinction be-
tween the consumptive and the investive mode of resource use. For breeder
reactors, the investive use of resources would mean the use of fissionable
isotopes only as catalysts for the breeding of practically unlimited amounts
of fertile material. For solar power, the investive mode would call for the use
of 10 to 100 kg/m 2 of materials (e.g., steel, concrete) needed for the installa-
tion of solar facilities as explained in Chapter 5. Th us, the sustainability of
our ultimate global energy system, based on nuclear breeders and solar
power as primary energy sources, rests solely with the investive use of
resources, which in turn rests with the abstract nature of the services civiliza-
tion requires.
• The buildup and operation of a sustainable global energy system must
make prudent use of the carbon atom.
We observed that the transition to the sustainable energy system-to the
hydrogen-electricity world-will have to proceed through various stages,
which we refer to as the first and second energy transitions. While these
transitions would, in fact, overlap, the first transition (lasting until around
the year 2030) would be one from the present carbon-based economy to a
carbon-based economy with different features. It is useful here to describe
briefly some of the features of both the present and the future carbon-based
economIes.
Today's carbon-based economy uses mostly oil and to an extent gas. It
employs not only the energy content of oil and gas but also the many
additional services that go along with the use of versatile and clean oil and
gas resources. Until recently, the use of oil and gas had been driven mostly
by prices and market forces, implying essentially that strategic considerations
about long-term supply limitations have not, and still do not, determine
the situation.
One major characteristic of the future carbon-based economy is the short
supply of fossil fuels, including coal. (Indeed, our reference scenarios have
shown that the amounts of coal and unconventional oil that would have to
be harnessed are almost inconceivable by current standards.) At this time,
fossil waste disposal (i.e., carbon dioxide) is likely to be a global problem.
Because of these two factors, the carbon atom would have to be used strate-
gically, and allothermal coal gasification and liquefaction would be employed
for producing liquid fuels. Along with this prudent use of the carbon atom,
there would be the saturation buildup of both nuclear and solar power to
meet demand left unfulfilled by the dwindling fossil fuel resources.
This transition to the modified carbon-based economy of the world of
2030 can be viewed in yet another light: it would require a change in the
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mix of the inputs of resources, capital, labor, and skill needed to substitute
for energy services that go along with the use of oil and gas today. As we go
from today's cheap, relatively clean, and easy to move fossil fuels to the
world of more expensive, dirty, and harder to get at and to transport un-
conventional fossil fuels, there will have to be greater inputs of both capital
and skill to maintain services at acceptable levels. The most readily visible
aspect of that is the incoming abatement measures for the protection of the
environment. They are, among other things, capital intensive.
Earlier in this chapter we elaborated on the strategic view with which
coal liquefaction must be installed. Both the relative scarcity of coal and the
carbon dioxide problem led us to strongly invoke allothermal rather than
autothermal coal liquefaction (or gasification) schemes. But we now realize
that there is even more to such a strategic view. For allothermal schemes
the generation of large amounts of exogenous hydrogen from nonfossil
energy sources is required. In fact, about 50 percent of the energy content of
the hydrocarbon molecules in question is because of their hydrogen content.
Thus, having established more explicitly our vision of the ultimate sus-
tainable energy system and having realized that hydrogen should serve as the
principal secondary energy carrier, besides electricity, we can envisage the
use of such exogenous hydrogen in an even wider context-namely, to
facilitate the early and smooth introduction of the ultimate secondary
energy carrier, hydrogen. The existing difficulties in today's use of hydrogen
relate to its volatile form and to its other thermodynamical and chemical
properties. Our present infrastructure on the end use side relies greatly on
the liquid nature of the hydrocarbons in use, and to change that requires
time. Therefore, the carbon atom can be seen as a carrier of hydrogen
during the transition periods, thus permitting for the continued use of that
infrastructure. In Chapter 5 we observed that large-scale energy storage of
solar power leads most probably to the use of hydrogen, and we welcome
this view of the role that hydrogen plays in our vision. Further, in Chapter
22 we pointed to the molten iron bath technique for generating clean
synthesis gas, a fairly specific technology. While the actual development
could well evolve along somewhat different lines, it nevertheless is heuris-
tically helpful to realize system opportunities that foster the second tran-
sition and reconcile the first and the second transitions.
For the molten iron bath technique, the cleaning of the low grade fossil
fuels takes place automatically, almost as a by-product. Slag is formed on the
surface of the bath and must be removed (see description in Chapter 22).
Systems opportunities come up when this slag is, for instance, used to
produce concrete, which in tum would be used to install large-scale solar
facilities (see Figure 25-16). It is indeed surprising that the orders of mag-
nitude fit. The amount of ashes of the low grade fossil fuels to be expected in
our reference scenarios allows for a very desirable buildup of solar facilities.
Two observations must be repeated here-the integrating and fostering
role of the hydrogen atom and the mediating and smoothening role of the
carbon atom that should be understood when energy strategies for the
next decades are to be conceived.
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Figure 25-16. Hypothetical production chain: coal Iiquefaction/gasification-cemen t-
solar conversion systems.
Coal
Liquefaction
Gasification
Ash
Other inputs
Cement
production
Resulting Yearly
Coal Liquefaction/ Resulting Buildup of Solar
Gasificationa Cement Output Conversion Systemsb
Year (10· tce) (10· tons) (G W(e) installed)
1980 0 0 0
1985 0 0 0
1990 0 0 0
1995 10.3 2.1 5.5
2000 114.3 22.9 61.0
2005 452.3 90.4 241.2
2010 1,385.6 277.1 739.0
2015 2,606.9 521.4 1,390.4
2020 3,893.8 778.8 2,076.7
2025 5,481.0 1,096.2 2,923.2
2030 7,222.7 1,444.5 3,852.1
Total 11,288.9
aHigh scenario.
bAssuming total material requirements of 750 kg/kW(e), 50 percent of which would be cement.
All these considerations point to the buildup of the sustainable ultimate
energy system. But even for the operation of the completed system, the
carbon atom could play an important role-namely, along the lines of its
investive uses. In Chapter 3 on the coal option, we noted the value of consid-
ering the use of hydrocarbons in a closed cycle where the carbon dioxide
is technically recycled. For this scheme, the carbon atom would no longer
be consumed; rather, it becomes part of the endowment vision explained
above.
• Realistically, the buildup of nuclear and solar power in our two reference
scenarios can be seen only as a beginning of our second transition.
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We ask ourselves, How close did our two reference scenarios come to our
vision of a sustainable energy system? To answer this question, we refer to
the insights gained in our quantitative analysis, specifically to those for the
future role of nuclear and solar power.
In our two reference scenarios, the breeder reactor starts coming into the
energy picture around the year 2000; by the year 2030, it has taken over
some 70 percent of the nuclear share of energy production (see Figure
25-12). What near- and medium-term implications does this have for our
endowment vision?
For the breeder reactor to be considered a serious energy contender in the
terawatt demand range, it should be contributing in the hundreds of gigawatt
level by the early years of the next century. For this to be possible requires
vigorous action today.
Different assumptions about the rates of the potential development of
breeder reactors were used in our two reference scenarios. For region I,
the breeder enters the picture sometime around 2010, whereas its entrance
in region III occurs around 1995. Viewed against today's actual situation,
this would mean that region III would now have to deploy breeder tech-
nology more aggressively.
In developing our quantitative analysis we were surprised to see the limited
share that nuclear power made to energy production by the year 2030, for
both reference scenarios. Again, it is the limitation on the buildup rates of
these technologies over the next fifty years that is responsible for these
disappointing figures. Nevertheless, during the period 2030 to 2080, when
the world is making its second energy transition, the energy burden should
shift progressively onto the sustainable system, and nuclear power would
then be able to play its major role in energy supply.
For building our endowment system, we include all feasible types of
breeders. (See Chapter 4 for detailed information on breeder strategies.)
Technically, the liquid metal cooled fast breeder reactor (LMFBR) is cur-
rently the most advanced technology and has accumulated the most oper-
ational experience. Fast breeder technology is in advanced stages both in
France and in the Soviet Union.
The traditional, middle of the road approach (which our two reference
scenarios adopted) is to consider the recycling of bred plutonium to the
fast breeders. But over the long run it may be more advantageous to use the
radial blanket of FBRs for breeding 233 U. For instance, the use of 233 U in
the original light water reactors that fed the FBRs their first core plutonium
inventory could enhance the LWR conversion ratio, thereby reducing their
demand for new natural uranium and ultimately allowing the breeding gain
of the FBR to support the LWRs entirely. In fact, such a LWR-FBR complex
could become part of our endowment system. Similarly, one should consider
the crossing of fuel cycles of LMFBRs and high temperature reactors (HTRs)
that use 233 U.
The fusion reactor also fits into the picture. Be it the present D-T version,
which breeds lithium, or the much more futuristic D-D version, for both
cases the reactor is de facto decoupled from the problem of fuel supply.
",'
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Although both the fission breeder and the fusion reactor handle large
amounts of radioactive inventories and produce radioactive wastes, the fusion
reactor holds the promise of being better than the FBR in environmental
terms, although it remains to be seen at what cost. It would be a mistake,
considering the differences between these developing technologies, to get
lost in marginal technological issues and to lose sight of their important
potential contribution to meeting the large energy needs of the world
after the year 2000.
While solar and nuclear power will have different patterns of evolution,
they share the same ultimate goal-the establishment of endowments on
whose interest rates future societies would live indefinitely. Figure 25-17
illustrates some of the material requirements for solar conversion systems of
various net densities. We cannot understand all the implications of such large
inputs of human and physical resources. But it is these investive uses of large
amounts of resources that are the essential issue, as well as the time element.
Then too, there will be institutional barriers that we are not sure can be
overcome. Nevertheless, let us assume here that they can be mastered.
We are faced with yet another problem-energy storage. In the very near
term, storage will probably not be a serious problem provided that solar
power contributes no more than 10 percent to the total primary energy
sytem-an amount that can be absorbed by existing supply systems. But
beyond the 10 percent level, solar energy storage problems must be put in
focus.
The average insolation in the middle latitudes and the equatorial regions
does not differ greatly; it differs no more than by a factor of two. Seasonal
Figure 25-17. Material requirements: solar conversion system of various net densities.
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vanatIOns, however, differ by a factor of four. Thus the maximum-to-
minimum ratio between the middle latitudes and equatorial insolation is
eight. It would appear that storing energy for the winter during the summer
is much beyond the possibilities of hydrostorage.
To make the long-term storage problem of solar power manageable,
electrical-chemical processes are needed to transform solar power into either
a gas or a liquid. In Chapter 22 we examined some of the various methods
and schemes that are being considered as possible solutions to this problem.
In practical terms, the technology of hydrogen production seems suitable for
solving the problem of solar power energy storage. (This is indeed consistent
with our vision of the ultimate electricity-hydrogen economy.
However, there are other major obstacles that will have to be overcome
before there can be large-scale application of solar power. In fact, the phys-
ical embedding of solar power into the existing energy supply infrastructure
appears to be more difficult than the embedding of nuclear power. Time in
both cases, but especially for solar power, is a very precious element. There-
fore, the development of significant amounts of solar power by the year 2030
appears unlikely. Still, this should not preclude aggressive actions now that
might even hasten the final event.
• Establishing the endowment system requires a degree ofcapital formation
that can be obtained only through high productivity.
Does the world possess the productive and institutional capabilities, the
capital and material resources, and the discipline to achieve such goals?
What does it mean to mobilize building programs on such a scale around the
world or to build the productive plant to turn out the dozens of billions of
tons of concrete and steel to build these grandeurous new plants? These are
challenging questions that we hope the old and new generations will be able
to tackle. Again, it will take time and material inputs, especially of capital i
there will also be institutional barriers of all kinds at all levels to overcome.
Above all, it would demand generally much greater productivity worldwide,
and this would mean increased levels of interregional trading of all kinds-of
labor, of skills, of technologies, of knowledge, of energy, of products, of
food, and so forth. A world infrastructure of a new order would probably
be required.
In capital terms, taking into account the construction of facilities for
energy transmission and distribution, breeder technologies, and solar technol-
ogies, the investment may be on the order of $2 to $3 per watt of achieved
capacity. Thus, even a 20 TWyr/yr energy demand world (which is lower than
our Low scenario) would require an investment on the order of $40 to $60
trillion (10 12 ).
However, once this scale of investment has been made and the energy
supply mode is de facto decoupled from the problem of resource supplies,
the world would have crossed a distinct threshold. This threshold might be
regarded as great as that passed by our distant ancestors when they launched
the era of domestic agriculture, began the intensification of farming produc-
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tlVlty, and started the process of aggregation of peoples into what would
become cities. Below this distinct threshold, there would remain the problem
of supply shortages, which may be experienced by "pockets" of mankind;
above this distinct threshold, this problem would virtually disappear on a
universal scale.
In economic terms, we must ask what this investment means as compared
with world investments in energy today. If we take the average per capita
demand of 3 kWyr/yr of our Low scenario in the year 2030, we arrive at a
capital stock requirement of $6000 to $9000 for each citizen of the globe,
should he or she wish to live on the basis of endowments for the energy
supply. The present-day share of world capital stock in the existing energy
system is 25 percent. If this share were to be increased to 33 percent, thus
making the importance of energy relatively larger, the capital stock per
person would still be somewhere between $18,000 and $27,000. This is
indeed a high investment when compared with today's capital stocks, as
Table 25-10 indicates, particularly for developing countries. Their average
capital stock today is only $380, as contrasted with $8500 in the developed
market economies and even with the $2700 of the centrally planned eco-
nomies (Strobele 1975).
If one looks at the world average of $2000 in capital stock and envisages
the need to raise that to $18,000 to $27,000, then one sees that building
the energy endowments system is not a straightforward possibility within the
next one hundred years or so. This is why it is so important that the eight
billion or more people living in the year 2030 be rich, not poor, and much
richer than today. Only then will it be possible to break out of the consump-
tive mode of resource use and to cross the thresholds where, at least, the
energy resources problem can for all practical purposes be forgotten.
To become so rich will require continued economic growth as well as ever-
increasing productivity and technological sophistication. A science of "energy
and society" should become a tool of that future society in many more
respects than we can point to here. Such a science exists today only in a
rudimentary form; it is still more an art and a craft than a science, and
inasmuch as it incorporates broad social, cultural, and political issues, it
cannot be called upon readily to acquire the general sophistication needed.
Nonetheless, even lacking such tools and without attempting to work out
Table 25-10. Energy consumption and capital stock.
Developed market economies
Developing coun tries
Centrally planned economies (excluding China)
World
Source: Striibele (1975).
Energy Capital
Input Ratio
(W/7973$)
0.71
0.77
1.43
0.87
Capital Stock
Per Capita
(7973$)
8500
380
2700
2000
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a detailed plan as to how the world might rise to the high per capita in-
vestments in energy supply systems, we must conclude that endowments will
require a degree of capital formation that can be obtained only through high
productivity .
Once we were asked to identify three vital questions that we felt had to
be answered regarding the global energy situation in the year 2030. We
identified the following: How many people will live in urban areas? What is
their demand for liquid fuels? What is their industrial productivity?
Where is the crystal ball?
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AC-alternating current, electric current that reverses direction periodically,
usually many times per second.
AECL-Atomic Energy of Canada, Ltd.
AGR-advanced gas-cooled reactor.
AMP-ampere, the unit of electric current in the rationalized meter-kilogram-
second system of units j defined in terms of the force of attraction between
two parallel current-carrying conductors.
API-the American Petroleum Institute hydrometer scale for the measure-
ment of the specific gravity of liquids.
atm-a unit of pressure equal to 1.013250 X 106 dynes/cm 2 (which is the air
pressure at mean sea level).
bbl-barrel.
boe-barrel of oil equivalent.
BPA-Bonneville Power Authority.
Btu-British thermal unit [THERMO]. 1. A unit of heat energy equal to the
heat needed to raise the temperature of 1 pound of air-free water from
60° to 61°F at a constant pressure of 1 standard atmosphere; it is found
experimentally to be equal to 1054.5 joules. Also known as sixty degrees
Fahrenheit British thermal unit (Btu6o/61)' 2. A unit of heat energy equal
to 11180 of the heat needed to raise 1 pound of air-free water from 32° F
(DOC) to 212°F (lOO°C) at a constant pressure of 1 of 1 standard atmo-
sphere; it is found experimentally to be equal to 1055.79 joules. Also
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known as mean British thermal unit (BtumearJ 3. A unit of heat energy
whose magnitude is such that 1 British thermal unit per pound equals
2326 joules per kilogram; it is equal to exactly 1055.05585262 joules.
Also known as international table British thermal unit (Btu IT ).
BWR-boiling water reactor.
CANDU-A nuclear reactor of Canadian design, which uses natural uranium
as a fuel and heavy water as a moderator and coolant.
CF-confinement factor.
em-centimeter.
CPC-compound parabolic concentration.
CR-central receiver facility.
DC-direct current, electric current which flows 10 one direction only, as
opposed to alternating curren t.
$/kW-dollars per kilowatt.
$/tee-dollars per ton of coal equivalent.
DR-distributed receiver facility.
EJ-Exajoule = 1018 ].
ERDA-Energy Research and Development Administration (U.S.).
ESS-energy supply system.
eV-electron volt; a unit of energy equal to the energy acquired by an elec-
tron when it passes through a potential difference of one volt in a vacuum;
it is equal to 0.602192 ± 0.000007) X 10-19 volt.
FBR-fast breeder reactor.
FCR-fixed charge rate.
GCM-general circulation model.
GCOS-Great Canadian Oil Sand.
GDP-gross domestic product.
GeV-giga electron volt, a unit of energy, used primarily 10 high energy
physics, equal to 109 electron volts.
GM-gaming model.
GNP-gross national product.
GW-gigawatt, one billion watts, or 109 watt.
GW(e)-gigawatt electric.
GW(e)yr-gigawatt (electric) year.
GWP-gross world product.
GW(th)yr-gigawatt (thermal) year.
GWyr-gigawatt year.
GWyr(e)-gigawatt-year (electric).
h-hour.
ha-hectare.
HHV-high heating value.
HTR-high temperature reactor.
HTGR-high temperature gas-cooled reactor.
HWR-heavy water reactor.
IAEA-International Atomic Energy Agency.
ICRP-International Committee on Radiation Protection.
lEA-International Energy Agency.
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IEJE-Institut des Etudes Juridiques et Economiques at the University of
Grenoble, France.
IGT-Institute of Gas Technology, U.S.A.
IMPACT-economic impact model.
INFCE-International Fuel Cycle Evaluation.
INTERLINK-input/output model.
J -joule, the unit of energy or work in the meter-kilogram-second system of
units, equal to the work done by a force of magnitude of one newton
when the point at which the force is applied is displaced one meter in the
direction of the force.
K-kelvin, a unit of absolute temperature equal to 1/273.16 of the absolute
temperature of the triple point of water.
kcal-kilo calorie, a unit of heat energy equal to 1000 calories.
kcallmole-kilocalorie per mole, mole [CHEM]. An amount of substance of
a system which contains as many elementary units as there are atoms of
carbon in 0.012 kilogram of the pure nuclide carbon-12; the elementary
unit must be specified and may be an atom, molecule, ion, electron,
photon, or even a specified group of such units. Symbolized mol.
kg-kilogram.
km2 -square kilometer.
kW-kilowatt, a unit of power equal to 1000 watts.
kW(e)-kilowatt-electric.
kWh-kilowatt-hour, a unit of energy or work equal to 1000 watt-hours.
kWh(e)-kilowatt-hour (electric).
kW( th)-kilowatt-thermal.
KWU-Kraftwerk Union, F.R.G.
kWyr/yr, cap-kilowatt-year per year and per capita.
Q-liter.
LMFBR-liquid metal fast breeder reactor.
LNG-liquified natural gas.
LWBR-light water breeder reactor.
LWR-light water reactor.
m-meter.
MACRO-macro-economic model.
mbd-million barrels per day.
mbdoe-million barrels per day oil equivalent.
MBtu-million Btu.
MEDEE-Modele d'Evolution de la Demande d'Energie.
MESSAGE-Model for Energy Supply Systems Alternatives and Their Gen-
eral Environmental Impact.
MeV-million electron volts, a unit of energy commonly used in nuclear and
particle physics, equal to the energy acquired by an electron in falling
through a potential of 106 volts.
MIP-molten iron process.
MPC-maximum permissible concentration.
mpg-miles per gallon.
mrem-milli-rem.
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MSR-molten salt reactor.
mtce-metric ton of coal equivalent.
mtoe-metric ton of oil equivalent.
pm-micro-meter = 10-6 meters.
MW-megawatt, a unit of power, equal to 1,000,000 watts.
MW d/tU-megawatt days, thermal, per ton of uranium.
MW(e)-megawatt-electric, unit of the electric power of a nuclear reactor, as
opposed to thermal power.
MWh-megawatt-hour .
NASA-National Aeronautics and Space Administration (U.S.).
NCAR-National Center for Atmospheric Research (U.S.).
NCRP-National Commission for Radiation Protection (U.S.).
NPT-Nonproliferation Treaty.
OAPEC-Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries.
OECD-Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
OPEC-Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.
OTEC-ocean thermal electric conversion.
ppm-parts per million.
ppmv-parts per million volume.
PV-photovoltaic.
PWR-pressurized water reactor.
Quad-one quadrillion (10 15 ) Btu.
R-roentgen [NUCLEO] An exposure dose of x- or )'-radiation such that the
electrons and positrons liberated by this radiation produce, in air, when
stopped completely, ions carrying positive and negative charges of 2.58 X
10-4 coulomb per kilogram of air.
rad-the standard unit of absorbed dose, equal to energy absorption of 100
ergs per gram; supersedes the roentgen as the unit of dosage.
RBE-relative biological effectiveness. [NUCLEO] A factor used to compare
the biological effectiveness of different types of ionizing radiation; it is
the inverse ratio of the amount of absorbed radiation required to pro-
duce a given effect to a standard (or reference) radiation required to
produce the same effect.
rem-a unit of ionizing radiation, equal to the amount that produces the
same damage to humans as one roentgen of high-voltage x-rays. Derived
from roentgen equivalent man.
rpm-revolutions per minute, a unit of angular velocity equal to the uniform
angular velocity of a body which rotates through an angle of 360° (2 1r
radians) so that every point in the body returns to its original position, in
one minute.
SECURE-Swedish Nunclear District Heating Plant Study.
SIMA-economic and energy demand model for developing regions.
SIMCRED-Simulation Model based on Cross Country Regressions for
Energy Demand.
SPE-solid polymer electrolyte.
SPI-Siberian Power Institute (USSR).
SSP-solar satellite power.
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SSPS-solar satellite power station.
STEC-solar thermal electric conversion.
SWU/yr-separative working units per year.
TBR-thermal breeder reactor.
tee-ton of coal equivalent.
tC/yr-tons of carbon per year.
THTR-thorium high temperature reactor.
TVA-Tennessee Valley Authority (U.S.).
TW-terawatt, a unit of power, equal to 10 12 watts, or 1,000,000 megawatts.
TW(e)-terawatt-electric.
TWh-terawatt-hour.
TW(th)-terawatt-thermal.
TWyr-terawatt-year.
TWyr/yr-terawatt-year per year.
UNCTAD-U.N. Council on Trade and Development.
UNEP-United Nations Environmental Programme.
USEPA-U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
USNRC-U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
V-volt, the unit of potential difference or electromotive force in the meter-
kilogram-second system, equal to the potential difference between two
points for which one coulomb of electricity will do one joule of work in
going from one point to the other.
VR- Voronezh reactor.
WAES-Workshop on Alternative Energy Strategies.
WEC-World Energy Conference.
WELMM-acronym of Water, Energy, Land, Materials, and Manpower.
W1m2 -watt per square meter.
Wp -watts peak.
Wt %-weight percent.
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unconventional oil resources in, 60-61,64,533,
541,663
Canadian Atomic Energy Control Board, 346
CANDU-reactor, 99, 104. See also Reactors
Canvey Island study. 349
Capital costs, 241-42, 527-29,626-27,783,
795-96
of renewable energy, 210-11
of solar energy, 21,166,180,209
Capital investments, 241, 628-40 passim, 649-
51,809-11
Capital requirements, 623, 627-40 passim, 649-
61 passim
Capital services, 694-95, 772-73
Carbon atom, 86-88,225,322,334-35,726,
792-94, 804-806
Carbon dioxide (CO,) problem, 20, 25, 72, 82,
87,120,225,231,245-46,248,307-308,
310,332,334-35,352,371,383-86,724,
726, 793-94, 805
and fossil fuels, 384-85, 586-88, 798
greenhouse effect, 308, 318-22, 384, 587
and scenarios, 426, 586-88
standard setting model for 366-68
Carter, Jimmy, 61
Centralized heat supply, 574-76
Charcoal, 202, 225, 233, 507-12, 583-85,681
China.
See also Region VII (C/CPA)
coal resources in 48-51,78,532
Chronic oil discharge standards, 361, 364-65
Classical reactor strategy, 124-128
Climate
and CO" 20, 25, 72, 82, 84, 87, 225, 231,
307-10,318-25,332-35,352,383-86,724,
726, 793-94, 797-98, 805
and energy flows, 799
implications for energy policy, 331-32
interaction with energy systems, 307-309,309-
11, 334
and oceans, 197-98
impact of particulates on, 308, 318-22
and solar energy, 179-80, 308-309, 325-31,
334
impact on supply/demand, 307-308, 332-34,
379-81, 383-85
impact of waste heat on, 307-308, 310, 311-18
Climate models, 311-13, 316, 320, 323-27,331
Climate system, 309-11, 322
Coal
vs. biomass, 232-33
high consumption case, 80-82
costs of, 47-48,50,78-79,351
and economics, 78-79, 242-43, 532-33,626-27
and market penetration, 111-12, 256-59,266,
269
vs. nuclear energy, 133-34
public attitudes toward, 356, 371-72
and risks, 342. 343-47, 371, 386-87
in supply/demand balance, 511-12,521-23,
524-26, 532-33, 569-7~ 588-9~ 654,663,
669,672,675-78,684,792,794
and synthetic fuels, 71,232-33,654,661,663
and WELMM, 283-86, 382-83, 579, 581
Coal gasification, 42, 47, 736-38
Coal liquefaction, 83, 88, 225, 553, 565, 569-
74,660,663,669-84
passim, 791-94,805
and WELMM, 20, 287-95, 383
Coal mines data base, 297-300
Coal mining, 120-21,281,290-93,570,784
Coal production, 51-52,67,77-78,570-73,579,
581, 654
in Enhanced Nuclear case, 599-600
in Nuclear Moratorium case, 595-98
in sensitivity analyses, 614-16
Coal resources/reserves, 19-20,44, 45-52, 60,
71-72,77-79,104,230-31,569-74
and economics, 78-79
and fossil fuel substitution, 511-12
by regions, 48-51, 531-33
Coal trade, 92, 788-91
Coal use, 72, 78-80, 86-88,110-11,231-32,
248, 332,546-48,574-76,579,581
Cobb-Douglas function, 453
Cogeneration, 140, 246, 573
Commercial feasibility, 99, 106, 109
CONAES (Committee on Nuclear and Alternative
Energy Systems), 106,468
Confinement factor (CF), 134-38,235
Conservation, energy, 13-15,28,445,449-50,
457-58,659-60,668-69,672,681,774
and demand for fuel, 505-16
and heat pumps, 199
in scenarios, 467-70,513-16
Constraints, 22-26, 306, 379-81,387,390,527-
29,579-81,795-802.
See also, Climate, Market penetration, Risk,
WELMM
climatic, 331-32, 383-85
economic, 241-44, 272-76, 379-80, 382
environmental, 24-25, 83, 86-88, 194
market, 381-82, 565
political, 30
risk, 379-81, 385-87
technical, 21
Consumption of energy, 19-20, 467-69
by automobiles, 490, 493
vs. cap ital investments, 628
and climate, 307, 311, 323-25
in developed regions, 472
in developing regions, 472-73, 473-77
and economic growth, 3,437-38,443-60,654,
657-58,664-67
global distribution, 3-4,28,471-73
in industry sector, 460-64, 498-505
and land use, 744-46
in sectors, 483-95, 495-98, 498-505, 611-13
by service sector, 495-98
and settlement patterns, 749-51
in 16TW case, 608, 611-13
and substitution, 256-59, 263, 449-50, 460-63
and technological developments, 461-62
and urbanization, 16-17,747-50
Consumption of energy resources, 41-42, 64, 89,
396-97,402,410-11,426-27,525,588-89,
596-98
Consumptive vs. investive resource use, 104, 144,
178,701-702,784-85,804
Conversion, energy, 72, 83, 89, 519-21, 526
and climate, 307, 310
description of, 5-7,469-70
and land use, 744
solar energy and, 153, 154-60
Conversion costs, 453-54, 459
Converter-breeder strategy, 103-104, 123, 128-
30, 235
Cost-benefit analyses, 341,353-55,371,386
"Costly oil", 61-62
Costs.
See also Capital costs; production costs and coal
resources, 47-48,50,77-79,351,531-34,
626-27
of coal use, 78-80
and drilling, 720
and electrolysis, 727-30
of energy systems, 350-53, 371-72,614,618-
20,655,633-66, 781-84
and fossil resources, 18-20,241-44,531-34,
781-84
and natural gas, 531-34,626-27
and oil resources, 54-55, 58,61-62, 531-34,
626-27
operating, 241-44, 527-29
of photovoltaic system, 161-63,209
and renewable resources, 209-13, 224
of solar energy, 154, 157-60, 170, 172-73, 180
of SSPS, 166
and uranium resources, 116, 531, 580
of supply systems, 527-29
and thermolysis, 734-35
Deep offshore oil.
See also unconventional fossil resources. 54-56,
58,62,536,541
Deforestation, 24, 318, 583
Delphi study, 52-58,60-61,63,533.
See also Desprairies p.; WEC
Demand for energy, 12-17,237-38,248,389-
91,402,438,467-69,483,594,601-13,
657-60, 689, 722-23.
See also
and climate, 307-308, 332-34
and drilling, 722-23
and energy density, 185-86, 202-203, 226-27,
743-44
and energy problem, 5,26-29,772-75
and income effect, 450
in MEDEE-2 model, 407-409, 468
and price effect, 450, 456-58
in sectors, 483-95
and technological development, 14-15
Demand
for electricity, 478-83
for fossil fuels, 507-12
for liquid fuels, 84-86, 305-12, 505-507,524-
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26,654,659-60,672,675,681,779-80
for uranium, 114-15, 126, 132
Denmark, 167.
See also Region III (WE/jANZ)
Developed regions, 774.
See also Region I (NA); Region II (SU/EE);
Region III (WE/jANZ)
agriculture sector in, 503-505
and capital investments, 628-40 passim, 651
conservation in, 28, 654
consumption of energy in, 445, 448-49, 463,
473
electricity use in, 482
and energy densities, 442-43
energy growth in, 484, 654, 656-57, 665-66
and energy investments, 795-97
GDP in, 445, 448-49, 484, 459-60, 795-97
industry sector in, 500- 503
in Nuclear Moratorium case, 595
and renewable resources, 192, 202,208-209
in sensitivity analyses, 620
and service sector, 496-98
and substitution of fossil fuels, 508-10
Developing regions.
See also Region IV (LA); Region V (Af/SEA);
Region VI (ME/NAf); Region VlI (C/CPA)
agriculture sector in, 503-505
and capital investments, 628-40 passim
consumption of energy in, 463, 472-77,774
electricity use in, 475, 482
and energy densi ties, 442-43
energy growth in, 654, 678
and energy investments, 795-97
energy use-GDP ratio, 445,448-49
GDP in, 445, 448-49, 459-60, 484
industry sector in, 500-503
and material investments, 643-44
and prices, 456-58, 459-60
and renewable resources, 192, 202-204, 208-
209
in sensitivity analyses, 620
service sector in, 496-98
and substitution of fossil fuels, 510-12
Distributed Energy Systems in California's Fu-
ture, 205
Drilling, 69, 117, 708, 720-23
"Drilling gap," 56
D-T (deuterium-tritium) reactor, 105-107,807.
See also Reactors
Earth's surface, Changes in, 308, 310, 326-31,
334, 383-85, 799
Eastern Europe, 474.
See also Region II (SU/EE)
Economic constraints, 241-44, 272-76, 379-80,
382
Economic development
and consumption of energy, 437-38, 443-60
passim, 477-78
in scenarios, 396.401-402,424-25,430-35
Economic growth, 12-13,430-35,664-66,774,
776
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energy use, 3,437-38,443-60 passim, 654,
657-58
by region, 439, 657, 668, 672, 681, 684
Economics
of alternative cases vs. scenarios, 623-25
of breeder reactors, 127-28
of electrolysis, 727-30
of energy alternatives, 241-44
and energy problem, 4
and energy use, 664-66,776
of renewable resources, 209-13, 224, 227
of solar energy, 153- 54, 180
of tbermolysis, 734-35
Economy, the and energy, 396,402,437-38,448
Efficiency of end use, 13-15,449, 457-58, 46~
62,468,499-505 passim, 654
for automobiles, 492-93
for bu ildings, 498
and conservation, 13-15, 513-16
of electrolysis, 727-29
and negentropy, 701-702
of tbermolysis, 730
Egypt, 64.
See also Region VI (ME/NAf)
Electricity
and capital costs, 242
and consumption of energy, 469-70, 479-84,
499, 503, 507
in developed regions, 482
in developing regions, 475, 482
as reference energy system, 244-48, 802-808
storage of, 709-11, 736, 739
and substitution of fuel, 507
transmission of, 547
in supply/demand balance, 480-83, 521, 524-
26, 575-81,654,659,675,780-81
Electricity equivalent, 412
Electricity generation, 480-83, 575-81,654,
802-803
from coal, 83, 89
cost-benefit 01',350-53,371,580,619-20,783
and hydrogen, 141-44,654
from natural gas, 266
from nuclear energy, 96, 99,113-15,138-40,
233,266, 576, 580, 596
from oil, 266, 580
from renewable resources, 210-11, 236-39,
245,248
from solar energy, 159-63, 163-64, 170-72,
283-85
and WELMM, 281, 283-87
from wind power, 197, 199,206-207
Electrolysis, 163, 234, 237, 726-30, 736
Endowments, 167, 599,601,702-705, 784,803-
804, 807-11
"Energy Conservation: Ways and Means," 468
Energy densities, 16-17,430,438,442-43,743-
44
and renewable resources, 202-203, 221-22,
226-27
and settlement patterns, 744-746
and urban/rural populations, 747-51
Energy intensiveness, 499-505, 513-15,608,
611-13,654,658,665,774
Energy investments, 397,460,513-16,624-25,
635,666,795-97
Energy models, 389, 393, 400-404
Gaming model (GM), 420-21
IMPACT model, 403-404, 415-20,593,625-
27
Iterative process, case of Region III, 404-407
INTERLINK, 404
Logistic substitution model, 260
MACRO, 403-404
Macrodynamic substitution model, 273
MEDEE-2, 402, 404, 407-12, 468, 483-84,
498, 508, 516,602,604-608
MESSAGE, 402,508,519-20,549-50,575,
579, 593, 792
SIMCRED, 404
Energy payments, 458-60, 475, 666
Energy problem, 4-7,30-31,653,757-58,766-
67,771-72
realities of, 776-80
Energy services, 693-95, 772-73
definition of, 470
and order states, 695-98
Energy system, 6, 653-55, 693-94
and climate, 307-309, 309-11, 334, 383-85
constraints on, 379-81, 387,795-802
cost-benefit analysis 01',350-53,371-72
and the environment, 339, 342, 360-61
hard vs. soft, 756-62
and health risks, 339, 342-50, 371-72
and market penetration, 381-82
public preferences for, 356-59, 372
risks, 339-41, 371-72, 385-86
standards, 385-87
WELMM in, 382-83
Energy trade,S, 397, 402, 546-53, 788-91
Energy-GOP ratio, 438, 443-60, 603-08, 654,
656-57,665,681,684
Energy units, definition of, 34-36
ENERTREE, 297
Enhanced Nuclear case, 594, 598-601,648,650,
664, 794, 796
and capital requirements, 623, 635-40,650
and land requirements, 648-49
and manpower requirements, 623, 641-43
and material requirements, 623
and water requirements, 648-49
Enhanced oil recovery, 42,58,69,229,290,
534-51,587,708,723-25
Enrichment process, 115,126,129,131,283
Entropy, 693, 697, 701, 703,705,803-804
Environment, 72, 82, 87, 97,136-37,283
Environment constraints, 24-25,83,86-88,194
Electric Power Research Institute (EPRO, 533,
548
Europe, 151, 154, 159-60, 170.
See also Region II (SU/EE); Region III
(WE/JANZ)
Exploration, 42-43,46-47,55,58-59,91-92
Extraction process, 68-69
Fast breeder reactor (FBR), 105, 125. 128. 131-
32.283.295,640.807-808. See also Breeder
reactors.
Final energy
and conservation, 515-16
definition of, 6-7. 470
in supply/demand balance, 407, 438-39, 442.
448-49.451.458-60.463,471.478,484-89.
506-507,513-15,659
Finland. 167.
See also Region III (WE/j ANZ)
Fischer-Tropsch process. 293
Fisher-Pry model. 23, 255-56. 258-59
Fission. See Nuclear fission.
Ford Mitre study. 347
Forest product biomass, 204-205, 208-209.214-
15.226
Fossil fuels. 229-32
and climate, 307-309. 310, 318-25. 334. 384-
85. 586-88. 798
consumption of. 352-53. 588-89.594,600
in developed regions, 508-510
in developing regions. 510-12
vs. renewable resources, 218. 220
substitution among, 507-12
supply/demand balance. 507-12. 521,585-88.
781-85
and economics, 241-44
and industry sector. 495-505
Fossil resources. 18-20, 31,41-45,67-69,230-
31.529-34,587-88,666-68. See also Un-
conventional fossil resources
coal as, 19-20,45-48,71-72,77-79.104.532-
33, 568-73
natural gas as, 19. 164-67.279-82.534.573,
672,678,681-84
oil as. 19,44, 52-64, 505-506. 533-36,672,
675-78,681.684
France, 24. 47,50,102-103.194,452,477.613.
See also Region III (WE/JANZ)
Fuelwood. See wood
Gas. See Natural gas
Gasoline. 87-88. 144
Gedankenexperiment. 695-99.701,703
General circulation models (GCMs), 312-13. 326,
328. 383-84
Geothermal energy, 187. 189-92.226.237-40.
245,658
in California, 206-207
economic potential of. 216
realizable potential of. 216
technical potential of. 200, 216-17
Geothermal Resource Group, 200
German Democratic Republic (GDR), 24.
See also Region II (SU/EE)
Germany, Federal Republic (FRG), 24.47,50,
73-75,84-85.89-92,109,213.452,613,
626,750,784.
See also Region III (WE/jANZ)
Global politics. 96-97
Gofman-Tamplin debate, 97, 801
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Greece, 472.
See also Region 1II (WE/jANZ)
Greenhouse effect. 308, 318-22, 384, 587
Gross domestic product (GDP). 15. 396, 77 3-74
and conservation, 513-16
energy ratio. 438, 443-60. 603-08, 654. 656-
57,665.681,684
and price increases. 458-60
and sectors. 410. 483-84
in scenarios, 401, 404. 424-35, 445. 448-49.
484-86,503.651.672.675,678.681,684,
795-97
Gross national product (GNP), 3
Hard-soft controversy, 30.141,149,755-62.
766-67,776-78
Hard solar. 149-50, 151, 167-68. 172. 180. 308-
309.325-31,595. See also Solar energy
Health
and energy systems. 339. 342-50 passim, 371
risks. 347, 385-87
Heat pumps. 194. 199, 213, 217. 226, 502. 660
Heavy crude oil resources, 59-61, 68-69,77.229,
533-34,539,553.573,587,661-63,666.
See also Unconventional fossil resources
Heavy water reactor (HWR). 99. 104. 122. See
also Reactors
Heliostats, 157. 158-59, 175, 180,255.295
High temperature gas-cooled reactor. 130-32.
730. See also Reactors
High temperature reactor (HTR). 99, 113, 598.
See also Reactors
Household sector. 411-12, 482-83, 495-98. 510.
658
Human resources. See Manpower requirements
Hydroelectric power. 22. 24,194,222-23.226,
237.239-40,681
in California, 206-207
economic potential, 211-13, 216, 242-44
for electricity generation, 575, 578.580
as energy source. 581. 735-36
public preference for. 356. 372, 387
realizable potential of. 216
in supply/demand balance, 521-22, 655, 674
technical potential of. 216
Hydrogen, 141-42.225.231.233,598.793,795
and electricity storage, 710-11, 739.804
as final product, 726
as fuel, 714-15
and soJar energy. 163-64, 172, 180
Hydrogen economy. 234, 237-39. 802-803,805
IMPACT, 403-404, 415-20,593.601.625-27.
641.648-49.796
Income elasticities, 448-58
India, 475. 626,750.
See also Region V (AflSEA)
Industry sector, 410-11. 438. 460-64, 484. 498-
505,508.510.512-13.608,610-13
Information
and negentropy, 698-99
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Innovation rates, 5, 7, 274-75
In-situ recovery, 60-61, 69,544,548
Insolation, 159, 163, 170-71, 187,202,208-209,
237,808
Insulation, 496,515,658,774
INTERLINK,404
International Atomic Energy Agency (lAEA), 98,
114, 339, 356
International Commission on Radiation Protec-
tion (lCRP), 97, 362-63, 365
International Energy Agency (lEA), 468
International Fuel Cycle Evaluation (lNFCE), 97,
114,799
IIASA Conferences, 59,65,398,531
IIASA Energy Systems Program, 7-17, 24-28,
30-31, 100, 114, 138, 360, 389, 393, 395,
398,432,655-56,760-61
IIASA Workshop on Carbon Dioxide, Climate
and Society, 312, 531-32
Investive vs. consumptive resource use, 104, 144,
178,701-702,784-85,804
Japan, 51, 103, 109, 154, 167, 172, 364-65,575,
613.
See also Region 1II (WE/] ANZ)
Kerosene, 87-88
Labor inputs, 241,438,459-63,635,650,772-
73
La Hague plant, 102
Land requirements
of alternative cases vs. scenarios, 624,640,648-
51
for biomass, 232-33, 248
for renewable resources, 210
for solar energy, 154,160-61,168-71,180
and WELMM, 281-82, 285-86, 291-93,304,
382-83
Land use, 236-37,248,291,744-76 passim
Latin America.
See also Region IV (LA)
Leontief UN study, 432, 776
Lewis committee, 97, 350
Libya, 57.
See also Region VI (ME/NAf)
Lifestyles, 12-13, 14-15,483,658,773-74
Light water reactor (LWR), 99-104,109-10, 115,
118,234,242,283-86. See also Reactors
in classical reactor strategy, 124-27
and economics, 242
introduction of, 109-10
in multipurpose strategy, 130-32
and thermolysis, 730-35
and uranium consumption, 118, 120-22
and WELMM, 120, 382
Limited Test Ban Treaty, 97
Liquid fuels, 172, 506-D7, 510-11, 524-25, 779-
80
from biomass, 215, 225-27, 232-33
from coal, 86-88,225, 323-33
and economics, 623-24
in Enhanced Nuclear case, 599-601
in sensitivity analyses, 616
in supply/demand balance, 505-507,524-26,
553-73 passim, 654,659-64,672-84 passim
uses of, 506-507
and WELMM, 287-94
Liquid metal fast breeder reactor (LMFBR), 99,
105, 113,123-130,285-86,382-83;Seealso
Breeder reactors
LNG (Liquefied natural gas), 64-65, 596, 712,
718, 720, 795
Manpower requirements, 281-82, 293-94, 624,
641-43,650-51. See also WELMM
Manufacturing sector, 499-504, 608, 610-13.
See also industry sector
Market penetration, 110-13, 253-54, 276, 379-
82,521,529,565,588-89,617,707
of breeder reactors, 127-28
for coal, 110-13
energy system and, 256-63
and logistic substitution model, 254-56, 259,
268, 270-76
and long-term energy substitution, 270-72,
276, 588-89
for natural gas, 11-12, 266-69,271-72
for nuclear energy, 110-13, 266, 270-72
of renewable resources, 222-23
and scenarios, 390
of solar energy, 172-75, 266, 271-72
vs. substitution process, 263-68, 588-89
takeover times and buildup rates, 268-70, 276
Mass transit, 492, 493-95. See also Transporta-
tion sector
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), 92
Material requirements
of alternative cases vs. scenarios, 624, 640-41,
643,44
for solar energy, 158, 175-80
for synthetic fuels, 285-86, 291-93
and WELMM, 281-82, 291-93
Maximum permissible concentrations (MPCs),
134, 135, 137
McKelvey diagram, 18,42
MEDEE-2, 402, 407-12, 468, 483-84, 498,508,
516,602,604-608
Megalopolis Scenario, 313, 316
MESSAGE, 402,508,519-20,549-50,575,579,
593, 792
Methanol, 87-88,144,225,596,599-601,720,
726,736-37,739,793,795. See also liquid
fuels
Mexico, 58, 64, 544,678.
See also Region IV (LA)
Middle East, 3,5,56,59,545-46.
See also Region VI (ME/NAf)
Molten iron process (MIP), 736-38, 805
Molten salt reactor (MSR), 105. See also Reactors
Multiattribute utility measurement, 341, 359-60,
386
Multipurpose strategy, 130-32
Multistage decision model, 366-68, 372-73
National Center for the Analysis of Energy Sys-
tems, 398
Natural energy flows, 187-91,217,226-27,239-
40
Narural gas, 5, 230, 242-44, 248
and economics, 532, 534, 626-27
for electricity generation, 580
and Enhanced Nuclear case, 794
health risks from, 343-47, 352
market penetration rate, 11-12,266-69,271-
72
and Nuclear Moratorium case, 595-98, 794
as reference system, 209
storage 712-13
in supply/demand balance, 521-23, 524-26,
566-69,655,661,672,681,684,722-23
transportation, 64-65, 596,708,712,715-20,
795
Natural gas production, 64-65, 66-67, 68
Natural gas resources, 19,44,64-67,534,573,
587-88
in regions, 65, 532-34, 668,672,678,681,684
unconventional resources, 66-67
Natural gas use, 75-77, 546-47, 553
Negentropy, 693-94, 698-99, 700-703, 784,
803-804
New International Economic Order, 432
New Zealand, 542.
See also Region III (WE/JANZ)
Noise standards, 361, 364-65
Noncommercial energy, 474-77,498
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), 97
North America, 61, 474.
See also Region 1 (NA)
North Sea, 47, 62, 64, 81,366,368-71,383,
542,564,663,783
Nuclear energy, 20-21, 95-99,107-115,233-36,
807-809
accidents, 137-38, 348-53, 385
and climate, 308, 323, 334
and confinement, 134-37
and electricity generation, 139-40, 245, 283-
86,577-81,654,664
health risks from, 343-47, 371, 385-87
investments in, 628, 650
and market penetration, 110-13, 266, 270-72
public attitudes towards, 360-64, 371-72
reference trajectory, 114-15, 120-21, 123,
129-31
'Is. renewable resources, 218, 220
'IS. solar energy, 144, 178
in supply/demand balance, 521-23, 581, 669,
672,675,681,684
during transition, 725-26, 771
uses of, 138-44
and WELMM, 283-86
Nuclear facilities, 134, 136, 138,235
Nuclear fission, 95, 99-103, 233-36
Nuclear fuel cycle, 99-103, 115, 118, 121-22,
132-33
once through, 115, 118, 121, 234
Nuclear fusion, 95, 105-107,235-36,245,617,
807
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Nuclear fusion-fission hybrid reactor, 107
Nuclear Moratorium case, 594, 595-98,650,664,
794, 796
and capital requirements, 623, 635-40,650
and land and water requirements, 648-49
and manpower requirements, 623, 641-43, 650
and material and equipment requirements, 623,
644-46,650
Nuclear reactor strategies
classical reactor strategy, 124-128
converter-breeder strategy, 103-104, 123, 128-
30, 235
mUltipurpose strategy, 130-32
Nuclear safety, 97,137-38,235,354-55,362-
64, 371-72
Nuclear waste disposal, 98, 102-103.799-800
Nuclear waste storage, 134, 138
Nuclear weapons, 97-98
Oak Ridge Laboratories, 728
Oceans, 121, 123
and climate, 309-10, 313, 316
as energy source, 190-91, 197-99,217
Ocean thermal electric conversion (OTEC), 22,
25,194,223,226,237,239-40,245
economic potential of, 211, 217-18
realizable potential of, 217
technical potential of, 197-99
Oil,5
and economics, 242-44, 533-34
for electricity generation, 266, 580
health risks from, 343-47, 352
interregional balancing, 420-21,521,548-53
public attitude towards, 356, 372
as reference system, 209, 213
storage of, 3,6,712
and substitution process, 266-69, 510-11,
546-48
in supply/demand balance, 521-23, 553-66,
654,661-63,669,672,675,678,681,
684, 790-92
Oil crisis, 41, 45
Oil market, 546-58, 548-51,788-91
Oil imports, 11,44,56-57,507,533-34,661-
63,668,675-78,681,684
Oil payments, 475
Oil prices, 475,551-53
Oil production, 54, 58,63-64,67,534-46
passim, 546-48,614-16,654,663-64,
778
Oil resources, 19,44,52-64,533-36,587-88
in regions, 56-57,531-32,536,541-46,545
unconventional, 59-61,534-36
Oil trade, 420-21,551-55,788
Oil shales, 59-61,68-69,77,86,229,245,
304,533-34,537-44,553,573,654-55,
661, 666. See also Unconventional fossil
resources.
and WELMM, 287-95,383
Oil use, 510-11,546-48
Operating costs, 243-44, 527-29
Order states, 695-702, 803
Organization for Economic Cooperation and
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Development (DECO), 10, 109-10,269,
605,657-58,774
OECD-NEA/IAEA study, 116-18, 123
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC), 65, 545-46, 788-91
Outer Space Treaty, 97
Pakistan, 57. See also Region V (Af/SEA)
Particulates, 308, 310, 318-22, 334, 383-85
Persian Gulf. See Middle East. See also Region
VI (ME/NAf)
Photovoltaic system (PV), 160-64, 175, 178,
208-209,326-31
Plutonium (Pu), 124,129,131,134,137
Poland, 47, 89. See also Region II (SU/EE)
Polar oil, 553,663,783
Politics, 4-7,30,96-97,109,234,361,776-79,
791,799
Pollution, 46,72,312,384,430,701,712,714,
765-66
Population density, 16-17, 185-86,205,221,
240,304,747-50
Population growth, 12,396,401-402,424-30,
437-43,472-78,486,520,656-57,672,
681,684,772
Pressurized water reactor (PWR), 99. See also
Reactors.
Price
of coal, 77, 78-79
energy, 28,402-407,437-38,448-60 passim,
551-53,663,665-66
of oil, 3-4,507,525,548-53
of solar electricity, 170
Price elasticities, 448-58, 468-69
Price increases, 42, 47-48, 454-60,515,666
Primary energy, 72-73, 75, 82-83, 88,187-89,
248,735. See also Scenarios
in alternative cases, 596, 599-608
consumption, 3-4,471,604-606,611-13
definition of, 5-7, 469
from forest products, 215
-GOP ratio, 443-48
in MESSAGE, 412
and nuclear energy, 95, 113, 596-601, 730-35
from renewable resources, 218, 220
and solar power, 144,172-73,180,512,
735-36
substitution patterns, 263-68
in supply/demand balance, 427,438,440,
448,471-72,447-79,512,520-24,590,
660-64,669-73,675-78,684,689
Production costs, 402-403, 453-54, 459,532-
35,618-20,665-66
Production factors, 460-63, 498-99
Production fossil fuel, 67-69
of coal, 51-52,67,77-78,570-73,579,581,
595-98,599-600,614-16,654
of natural gas, 64-65, 66-67, 68
of oil, 54, 58,63-64, 534-46 passim, 546-48,
614-16,654,663-64,778
of synthetic fuel, 71,287-94
of unconven tional oil, 59-61
Public attitudes, 98,138,341,351-60,371-72,
385-87
Public health risks, 347,385-87
Quantitative analysis, See Scenarios
Radioactivity, 97-98,134-37,235
Radiation standards, 361, 362-65
Rasmussen report, 97, 138, 350
Reactors
in classical reactor strategy, 124-26
in converter-breeder strategy, 103-104, 123,
128-30,235
and electrolysis, 730-35
in multipurpose strategy, 130-32, 139, 142-44
in nuclear fuel cycle, 115, 118, 121, 132-38,
234
and thermolysis, 730-35
Recovery cost, 78-79
Recycling, 122, 128-29
Region I (NA) North America. See also Regions;
Scenarios
definition of, 10-11,31
in supply/demand balance, 445, 490-93,525,
541-42,554,556,558,568,572,577,
608-13,668-72,778-80,789-91
Region II (SU/EE) Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe. See also Regions; Scenarios.
definition of, 10-11,31
in supply/demand balance, 525, 556, 559,
568,572,575,577,672-75,780
Region III (WE/jANZ) Western Europe, japan,
Australia, New Zealand, South Africa,
Israel. See also Regions; Scenarios
definition of, 10-11, 31-32
in supply/demand balance, 404,525,542-44,
554,560,565,568,572,675-78,778-80,
608-13,789-91,794
Region IV (LA) Latin America. See also Regions;
Scenarios
definition of, 10-11,32
in supply/demand balance, 525, 543-44, 554,
561,565,585,678-81,789-91
Region V (Af/SEA) Africa (except Northern
Africa and South Africa), South and South-
east Asia. See also Regions; Scenarios
definition of, 10-11,32-33
in supply/demand balance, 526,543-44,554,
562,565,568,572,577,585,681-83,
778-79,789-91
Region VI (ME/NAf) Middle East and Northern
Africa. See also Regions; Scenarios
definition of, 10-11,33-34
in supply/demand balance, 526,545-47,
563,565,585,614-16,684,778,788-91,
803
Region VII (C/CPA) China and Centrally Planned
Asian Economies. See also Regions; Scenarios
definition of, 10-11, 34
in supply/demand balance, 526, 564, 566,
684-89
Regions, I1ASA
agriculture in, 504-505
and alternative cases vs. scenarios, 650-51
automobiles in, 490-94
C02 problem in, 585-87
capital investments in, 628-40 passim
centralized heat, in 574-76
and commercial/residential sector, 482, 495-98
conservation in, 467--{;9, 513-16,665
economic growth in, 432-35, 657, 668, 672,
681,684
electricity generation in, 576-82
electricity use in, 480-83
energy-GDP ratio, 445,448,665-66
energy use in, 440-42, 463, 472-78, 488-505
GOP in, 425-35, 445, 448, 459, 484-85,
665--{;6,773-74
and industry sector, 46O--{;4 , 498-505
interregional oil balancing, 525, 548-53
land requirements in, 648-49
manpower requirements in, 641-42
and mass transit, 493-95
material requirements in, 643-43
oil production in, 539-41
population in, 428-30, 442-43
in sensitivity analyses, 614-20
service-household sector in, 495-98
settlement patterns in, 743-46
substitution of fuels in, 508-12
transportation sector in, 484-95
Renewable resources, 21-22, 149, 185-87,
220-27,655,658,681
application potential of, 192, 201-209
and demand, 202-204, 207-209, 787
economic potential of, 192,209-13
for electricity generation, 210-11,236-39,
245,248
and environment, 187-91,210,224-27,248
vs. fossil fuels, 218, 220
and market penetration, 222-23
natural energy flow, 187-91, 217, 226-27,
239-40
vs. nuclear energy, 218, 220
realizable potential of, 213-20
supply systems for, 202-204, 207, 209
in supply/demand balance, 510-13, 522-23,
524-26,582-86,655,681,787-88
technical potential of, 191,200-201
and technology, 191-201, 220
user-oriented, 202, 204-209, 217, 226-27,
239-41
Reproces~n~ 102, 122, 129, 136-37, 138
Research
on climate changes, 343
on demand and consumption, 468
on drilling, 722-23
on energy, 398-404
on energy storage, 714-15
on enhanced oil recovery, 724-25
models, 389, 393, 398-404,404-407
on renewable resources, 209-10, 224
on standard setting, 361,365-71
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on solar energy, 159, 161
for unconven tional oil, 61
Reserves. See Resources
Reserve data base, 296, 301-304
Reserve-to-production ratio, 3, 66--{; 7, 546
Resource processing system, 279-80
Resource-to-reserve ratio, 707
Resources/reserves. See also Coal; Fossil fuels,
Natural gas; Oil; Uranium
cost categories, 50, 529-32, 783
definitions of, 18,42
and energy problem, 5, 700-703, 763-66, 810
vs. reserves, 42-45
Resources, ultimately recoverable
by cost categories, 50,529-32,783
ofco~, 77-78, 531-33, 783
of natural gas, 64--{;7, 77, 531, 532, 783
of oil, 52-59, 77, 531-32, 533-37, 783
of uranium, 531,783
R~k,25-26, 138,800-802
assessment, 339-40,371-72,385-87,800
benefit analysis, 341, 350-53, 355, 359-60,
371,385-87
estimation, 339-41, 386
evaluation, 339-41, 342--{;0
frequency vs. magnitude, 342, 347-50, 351-52,
386
management, 339-41,360-70,386-87
reduction, 353-55, 386
Risk Assessment Project, 339, 356
Rural areas, 203-204, 214-15, 226, 239-40,
475,583-84,749-51
Safety, 354-55
nuclear energy, 97,137-38,235,354-55,
362-64,371-72
Saudi Arabia, 545. See also Region VI (ME/NAf)
Scenarios, IIASA High and Low, 26-29, 389-91,
395-97,423-25,437-38,589-90,656-57,
784-85,806-807
and alternative cases, 593-94,601-13,649-51
analytic approach, 389, 393, 398-404
assumptions, 519-520, 656--{;61
C02 problem in, 586-88
characteristics of, 425-28
and coal liquefaction, 660, 672,792-94
and conservation, 467--{;9, 513-16
and energy densities, 430, 438, 442-43, 743-44
and energy investments, 627-35, 644-48, 666-
67,795-97,809-11
and energy models, 389, 393, 394-404
and energy use, 437-42,443-464,490,495
and GOP, 425-35, 443-48, 459-60, 485, 486
and elasticities, 448-58,468-69
and industry sector, 460--{;4, 498-505
and nuclear power, 59 5--{;01, 807-808
oil prices in, 551-53
oil production in, 544-48, 553, 654
and politics, 778-79
and population growth, 401-402, 424-30,
437-43,472-78,486,520,656-57,672,
684,772
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and service-household sector, 495-98
and substitution of fossil fuels, 508-12, 585-
86,781-84,802
and transportation sector, 480, 484-95, 608,
610-13,658
and transitions, 784-86
Scenarios, IIASA High and Low, supply/demand
b~ance,477-78,520-27,654-66,678-81,
772-75,776,780,788-91
coal, 511-12, 521-23, 524-26, 532-33, 569-
74,588-90,654,663,669,672,675-78,
684, 792, 794
electricity, 480-83,524-26, 575-81,654,
659,675,780-81
final energy in, 438-39,442,448-49,458-60,
463,478,487-89,506-507,513-15,659
fossil fuels, 507-12
hydroelectric power, 521-22,655,674
liquid fuels, 505-507, 524-26, 553-73,654,
659-61,675
natural gas, 521-23, 524-26, 566-69,655,
661,672,681,684,794
nuclear energy, 521-23,581,595-601,669,
672,675,681,684,794
oil, 521-23, 553-66,654,661-63,669,672,
675,678,681,684
primary energy in, 427,438,440,448,471-72,
474-79,512,520-24,590,660-64,669-73,
675-78,684,689
renewable resources, 522-23, 524-26, 582-86,
655,681,787-88
secondary energy in, 480-83,524-26,575-81,
654,659,675,780-81
solar energy, 512-13, 522-23, 524-26, 581,
658,674
Secondary energy, 404-05, 438,575-81,693-
94, 716. See also Scenarios
and coal, 72,76,83-86,89-93
definition of, 5-7,469
and market penetration, 253-54
from renewable resources, 200-201, 205, 214,
218,225-27
from solar energy, 178
in supply /demand balance, 480-83, 524-26,
575-81,654,659,675,780-81
SECURE, 140
Sensitivity analyses, 594,613 -20
Service sector, 484, 495-98,508,510-13,608,
610-13
Siberian Power Institute (SPI), 398,402,415,
420
Sicily, 64. See also Region III (WE/JANZ)
Singapore, 472. See also Region V (AflSEA)
Siting policy for power stations, 332-33
Sixteen terawatt (16 TW) demand case, 601-13,
780
Social Constraints, 30
Social cost-benefits, 210, 227, 350-53, 361, 371
Society,S, 7, 205-207, 380-81, 762-66
Softe energy, 202, 744, 751-52
vs. hard energy, 30, 141, 149, 755-62, 766-67,
776-78
Solar energy, 21-22,149-51,180,187,189,
192-94,208-209,237-40,807-809
in California, 206-207
effect on climate, 179-80, 307-309, 325-31,
334
and economics, 242-44, 308-309, 325-31,
595
electricity generation, 159-64, 170-72,211-
13,283-85
and the environment, 179-80
global system, 167-72
hard, 149-50, 151, 167-68, 172, 175-80,
308-309,325-31,595
and market penetration, 172-75, 266, 271-72
material requirements of, 175-78
vs. nuclear energy, 144
as primary energy source, 735-36
public attitudes towards, 356, 372
soft, 149, 180, 507, 512-13, 581-82, 655, 658
storage, 163-64, 167, 170-72, 180, 80S, 809
in supply/demand balance, 512-13, 522-23,
524-26,581,658,674
Solar heat, 213,218,226-27,239-40
Solar satellite power station (SSPS), 164-67, 326
Solar technologies, 151-67,617-18
Solar thermal electric conversion (STEC), 154-
60,164,175,179,285-86,295,326-31,
382, 384
South Africa, 532. See also Region III (WE/
JANZ)
South America, 56. See also REGION IV (LA)
Soviet Union. See Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (USSR)
Space heating, 512-13,658
Spain, 160, 170, 384,472. See also Region III
WE/JANZ)
Standard setting, 339-41
decision models for, 365-72, 373-73
for nuclear energy, 360-64,371-72,385-87
and risk management, 341,360-72,387
Stationary solar, 708-13
Storage, energy, 708-15, 736,739,808
and oil, 6,31,712
for solar energy, 163-64, 167, 170-73, 180,
805,809
Storage, heat, 711-12
Stripping, 47, 292
Substitution process, 22-23,84-85,253-54,
263-68,381-82,404-407,654
of capital and labor, 438, 460-63,772-73
andco~,45,72-75,80-83,89-92
and energy-GOP ratio, 256-63,449-50,
460-63
of fossil fuels, 507-12, 585-88,660-66,781-
84,802
and logistic substitution model, 254-56, 259,
268, 270
long term, 270-72
and natural gas, 75-77
and oil, 75-77
takeover time and buildup rates, 268-70
Supply of energy,S, 17, 22, 29, 389, 394,402,
426-27,435-38,519-21,523-24,588-89,
660-66. See also Scenarios
capital intensive, 459-60
capital investments in, 623,627-40
and C02 problem, 521,586-88
and climate, 307-309, 332-34
centralized heat and, 574-76
constraints on, 379-81, 387, 527-29, 779-
80, 795-802
economics, 241-44, 379,453,527-29,623-25
and electricity generation, 576-82
and energy densities, 746
and energy problem, 781-95
and fossil fuel use, 588-89
inputs to, 529-34
interregional oil balancing, 521, 548-53
land requirements for, 423,640,648-49
and logistic substitution model, 256-63
manpower requirements for, 623, 641-42
material requirements, 643-44
and market penetration, 253-54
oil production and, 534-46 passim, 546-48,
614-16,654,663-64
coal demand and, 511-12, 521-23, 524-26,
532-33,569-74,588-90,654,663,669,
672,675-78,684,785,791-92,794
electricity demand and, 480-83,524-26,
575-81,654,659,675,780-81
fossil fuels demand and, 507-12,781-84,786
gas demand and, 521-23, 524-26, 566-69,
655,661,672,681,684,785,794
hydroelectric power demand and, 521-22,
655,674
liquid fuels demand and, 505-507,524-26,
553-73,654,659-61,672,675
nuclear energy demand and, 521-23, 581,
669,672,675,681,684,794
oil demand and, 521-23,553-<56,654,661-63,
669,672,675,678,681,684,790-92,785
renewable resource demand and, 522-23, 524-
26,582-86,655,681,787-88
solar energy and, 512-13, 522-23, 524-26,
581,658,674
Surface mining, 60-61
Sweden, 167. See also Region III (WE/jANZ)
Syncrude, 61,64,290,293
Synfuel Program, 61
Synthesis approach, 26-29, 519,656
Synthetic fuels, 547-48, 555, 564, 572-73. See
also Liquid fuels
and coal, 42, 47, 71, 83, 225, 231-33, 553,
565,569-74,660-61,663,669-84 passim,
791-94,805
and cost, 618-20
in Enhanced Nuclear case, 600
in the future, 654, 661,663,675,684
investment in, 628
from solar energy, 154
and WELMM constraints, 281,287-94, 383
TARGET,710
Tar sands, 59,68-69, 229, 287-95, 383, 533,
539, 553, 573,654-55,661,666.Seea~o
Unconventional fossil resources.
in Canada, 60-<51,64,533, 541,663
Technical constraints, 21, 527-29
Technical vision, 31, 389-90, 785, 802-11
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Technological process, 12, 13-16,449-50,
460-<52,617-18,794
Technology, 12-15,529-30
as capital intensive, 623
coal, 47,72,77,79,83,89,232
for coal gasification, 736-38
constraints, 529-30
drilling, 708, 720-23
electrolysis, 726-30, 736
in energy problem-society problem, 765-77
for energy storage, 708-15, 735
for enhanced oil recovery, 708, 723-25
for fossil fuels, 68
for gas transportation, 708, 715-20,794-95
for methanol production, 720
Molten [ron Process (M[P), 736-38
and nuclear energy, 99,102-108,235-36
of OTEC, 194
for offshore oil, 62
for solar energy, 151-67,172,512-13,617-18
for substitution of fuels, 256-<53,269-70
thermolysis, 730-35
for unconventional oil resources, 60-<51, 69
and WELMM, 287-88
Thermal breeder reactor (TBR). 105. See also
Breeder reactors
Thermal pollution, 312, 384
Thermolysis, 163,730-35
Thorium, 122-23, 132-34
Thorium high temperature reactor (THTR), 132.
See also Reactors
Three-Mile Island, 580
Tidal energy, 194-95,200,217,226
Tran~tion,9-10,72-77,83,231,271-72,661,
771-72, 784-85, 794
and coal, 72-77,83
and economic growth, 776
for fossil fuels, 41-44, 48
and nuclear energy, 96
Transportation
of coal, 48, 73, 79-80, 547
load factors, 515
in MEDEE-2 model, 409-10
of methanol, 88
of natural gas, 547, 708,715-20
of nuclear energy, 96, 144
of oil, 3,6, 76
of solar energy, 159-<54, 167, 170-72
in WELMM, 285
Transportation sector, 480, 484-95, 608, 610-
13,658,713-15
Tunesia, 64. See also Region V[ (ME/NAf)
Turkey, 160, 170, 542. See also Region III
(WE/jANZ)
Unconventional fossil resources, 19-20, 54-56,
58-<51,64,66-67,68-69,77,86,229,245,
304,533-44,553,573,587,616,654-55,
611-63,666-68
and WELMM, 287-95, 383
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).
See also Region" (SU/EE), 48-51, 60, 78,
89,99,194,398,474,532,569,573-74.
UNCTAD,776
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United Arab Emirates, 545, See also Region VI
(ME/NAf)
United Kingdom. See also Region III (WE/JANZ)
Climate studies in, 312
and coal resources/reserves, 46, 50, 532
coal use in, 89-92
consumption of energy in, 477
and energy price increases, 452
manufacturing sector in, 613
reprocessing plants in, 102
solar energy in, 151, 159
standard setting in, 364-65
UN Population Conference, 16, 747
United States. See also Region I (NA)
in alternative cases and scenarios, 452, 488,
492,532,537-39,570-71,626,663,669
climate studies in, 312
and coal resources, 45, 47-51, 78-79, 299,
532,569-70,669
and consumption of energy in, 443-44
and energy price increases in, 452
enhanced recovery of oil in, 537-39
LWRs in, 109-11
and market penetration, 264, 266-68
natural gas in, 66
oil resources in, 56-59, 61, 64, 663
and solar energy, 154, 168-70, 173
and WELMM, 287-88, 303-304
uranium in, 116-18,235
U.S. Bureau of the Census, 204-205
U.S. Department of Labor, 343
U.S. Environment Protection Agency (USEPA),
97
U.S. Geological Survey, 44
U.S. Institute of Gas Technology (IGT), 65
U.S. National Center for Atmospheric Research
(NCAR), 312, 316
U.S. National Commission for Radiation Protec-
tion (NCRP), 362
U.S. National Insolation Resource Assessment
Program, 333
U,S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNCR),
97, 342
U.S. Office of Technology Assessment, 548
Uranium resources, 5,21,99,104-105,115-19,
118-24,124-26,234-35,531-32,577-80,
783
and demand for nuclear energy, 114-15
and reactor strategies, 118-32 passim
Urban areas, 202, 215-16,442-43,473,475,
490,494,584,749-52
Urbanization, 16-17, 30, 84-85,150,310,
430,483-84,654,747-50
Urban waste, 215-16
Venezuela, 60-{i I, 533,678. See also Region
IV (LA)
Voronezh reactor (VR), 99. See also Reactors.
Waste, as energy source, 508, 583-85. See also
Biomass
Waste heat, 25, 307-308, 310-18, 334, 383-85,
693,697,797-98. See also Entropy
Water, 280-82, 288-89,624,640,648-49. See
also WELMM
Water heating, 512-13,658
Water splitting. See Electrolysis; Thermolysis.
Waves, as energy source, 194, 197,217-18
WELMM (Water, Energy, Land, Manpower and
Materials), 20, 24, 120, 123,279-83,295-
304, 382-83
in alternative cases vs. scenarios, 624-25,640-
49, 701
and coal, 20,283-86,382-83, 579, 581
and coal liquefaction, 287-95, 383
and electrical generation, 281, 283-87
and IMPACT model, 403, 415-20, 640-49
and LWRs, 120,383
and solar energy, 21, 178
and synthetic fuel production, 287-94
Western Europe, 168, 170, 575. See also Region
III (WE/JANZ)
Wind, as energy source, 191, 196-97, 206-207,
211,216,237,239-44
Windscale, 102
Wood, 185-87,202,204-205, 208-209,211,
214-215,226,233,240
Workshop on Alternative Energy Strategies
(WAES), 9, 431-32, 468, 535, 539-40, 774
World Bank, 57
World Energy Conference (WEC), 43-52 passim,
59,65,66,67,78,114,431,530,533-35,
548,776
World Oil, 65
"Yellow coal," 21,119-21,123,144,235. See
also uranium resources
Yugoslavia, 60. See also Region III (WE/JANZ)
PROFILE OF THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE
FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
The International Institute for applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) came into
being officially on October 4, 1972. On that day, representatives of dis-
tinguished scientific bodies from 12 nations gathered at The Royal So-
ciety in London to sign its Charter. But the signing was only the last of sev-
eral major steps in an international cooperative effort that had begun much
earlier.
Another critical meeting had taken place in 1967, when two men met in
Moscow and agreed that their nations would work to establish an interna-
tional scientific institution. They were McGeorge Bundy, former national
security adviser to President Lyndon Johnson of the US, and Professor Jer-
men Gvishiani, Deputy Chairman of the State Committee for Science and
Technology of the USSR Council of Ministers. The idea that brought them
together had been proposed by President Johnson, who had hoped that such
an institution could serve as a way to bring peoples of the world together.
Progress came slowly. For more than five years, spurts of negotiation were
followed by long periods of seeming inactivity. Yet progress was being made.
During those years, ten more nations joined the discussions, and the Charter
gradually emerged. It was a document designed to accommodate many
points of view, and its provisions have shaped lIAS A's evolution.
Principal Features of IIASA
A key provision of the Charter makes lIASA international without being
governmental. Its members are not nations, but scientific institutions from
each participating nation. This structure helps keep lIAS A free of interna-
tional political pressures.
lIASA's founders reached another important agreement on the name of
the institute. With "systems analysis," they wanted to convey the impression
that research at lIASA would apply modern analytic tools to address major
problems of international concern. The word "applied" was meant to stress
lIASA's concern with practical, real-life issues. "Applied Systems Analysis"
is deliberately general-allowing the Institute to deal with a wide range of
topics.
The agreement reached on financing the Institute was also important to
its future. The scientific organizations from the US and the USSR had taken
leading roles in establishing the Institute. They agreed to pay the largest
amounts, which would be equal. Each of the scientific bodies from other
nations would contribute smaller but equal amounts, 15 percent of the larger
contributions. In 1980, the contributions of the two large category A mem-
bers were some 32 million Austrian schillings. Category B members, cur-
rently 15 in number, each contributed some 4.8 million Austrian schillings
in 1980.
Two other important decisions by the founders helped establish lIASA.
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One was the decision to make English the Institute's sole official language,
thereby facilitating working relations among its international staff. The other
was to accept an offer by the Austrian government to locate the Institute at
Schloss Laxenburg, a former summer residence of the Habsburgs, 16 kilo-
meters south of Vienna. The palace has been generously restored and
adapted to IlASA's needs by the Austrian authorities, who have made it
available to the Institute for a symbolic rent of one schilling per year.
The Institute's governing body is its Council, comprising one representa-
tive from each National Member Organization (NMO). The Council approves
the principal research directions and budget, sets financial and management
policies, deals with questions of membership, and appoints the Director
and Deputy Directors. The Chairman of the Council is Professor Jermen
Gvishiani.
The Director of IlASA, its chief executive officer, is responsible for for-
mulating, managing, and administering all the Institute's activities, including
preparing the budget and research plan and implementing the plan after
Council approval. Under the guidance of the Council, he represents the Insti-
tute in dealings with research agencies, governments, and multinational
bodies, and he is also an ex-officio member of the Council. The Director of
IlASA is Dr. Roger E. Levien, formerly of the Rand Corporation in the US.
Structure of Research Activities
In 1973, IIASA's first Director, Professor Howard Raiffa from Harvard
University in the US, welcomed the first scientists who came to Laxenburg
to work on six applied projects (energy systems, water resources, manage-
ment of urban systems, biological and medical systems, ecological systems,
and integrated industrial systems) and three supporting projects (methodol-
ogy, computer science, and design and management of large organizations).
By the end of IIASA's second year-just 16 months after the arrival of the
first full-time scientists-the Institute had established a full complement of
research activities and a scientific staff of 80.
In 1975 IlASA's second Director, Dr. Levien, proposed a two-dimensional
"matrix" organization for the Institute's research activities. The horizontal
rows of this matrix represent the two major cross-cutting research Programs,
which address major international issues. The Energy Systems Program ex-
amines strategies, at global, regional, and national levels, for achieving the
transition from oil- and gas-based energy systems to those based on more sus-
tainable sources. The Food and Agriculture Program is concerned with the
development of effective national food policies and the international interac-
tions among them. Each of these Programs has a four to five year lifetime.
Programs on regional development, industrial change, and risk and hazards
are under consideration.
The programs draw upon the broad range of talents that reside in the four
continuing research Areas, represented by the vertical columns in the matrix.
The Resources and Environment Area studies problems concerning the ex-
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Figure 1. IIASA's research matrix.
AREAS
(I)
~
«
a::
"o
a::
a..
Resources & Human Management & System &
Environment Settlements Technology Decision
& Services Sciences
Energy
Systems
Food and
Agriculture
General Research
ploitation of the earth's resources and the protection of its environment. The
Human Settlements and Services Area investigates the earth's population, its
distribution, and its needs for resources and services. The Management and
Technology Area pays attention to the design and operation of organizations
and the prospective development and consequences of technology. The Sys-
tem and Decisio n Sciences Area applies and develops the mathematical and
computational tools that assist in the investigation of complex systems or
decision problems. For activities that do not fit into the matrix, there is a
General Research category.
IIASA's Mandate
IIASA has three principal objectives, which derive from the aspirations of
its founders and the wishes of its members:
(1) To promote international collaboration, understanding and coopera-
tion by bringing together scientists of different disciplines and nationalities
for work on problems of concern to all mankind and by creating networks of
scientific institutions for collaborative research.
(2) To advance both systems analysis and the sciences contributing to it.
0) To apply IIASA's findings to problems of international importance by
providing decision makers with relevant information and appropriate tools
for dealing with these problems.

